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9PREFACE
The Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, with the sup-
port of the National Public Employment Foundation, commenced in 2000 the 
annual publication entitled The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Anal-
ysis, which contains a review of the current developments in the labour market 
and employment policy, as well as an in-depth analysis of a subject area within 
the topic. The editorial board endeavoured from the outset to provide experts 
working in government, colleagues working in organizations of the employment 
service, local governments, non-governmental organizations, educational institu-
tions, and research institutes, and employees of the written and electronic media 
with relevant and useful information regarding Hungarian labour market pro-
cesses, the legal and institutional environment of employment policy, and the 
latest results of Hungarian and international labour market research. This year, 
we once again compiled a publication that details the characteristics of Hungar-
ian labour market processes and their interrelations in an easily understandable, 
transparent structure based on the available statistics and on both theoretical 
and empirical research. In each chapter, we have understandably placed an em-
phasis on the presentation and analysis of the labour market consequences of the 
economic crisis. The publication consists of four main parts.
1. The Hungarian labour market in 2009/2010
The global crisis that erupted in the fall of 2008 was followed by a recession that 
lasted until the middle of 2009, bringing about a sharp decline in production and 
consumption, and a contraction of external and internal markets. During this 
same time period, the national income of the countries in the European Union 
decreased by 5–8 percent as compared with earlier years. The Hungarian econo-
my reached its lowest point in the second quarter of 2009, when GDP decreased 
by 7.5 per cent compared to the same time period of the previous year. The sec-
ond half of the year was characterized by a moderate decrease, then, in the first 
quarter of 2010 GDP commenced a slow increase. The expansion is influenced 
by two opposite factors: on the one hand, the main engine of growth was direct 
and indirect – through our main export partner, Germany – export sales to the 
far Eastern markets. On the other hand, the growth of the economy was hindered 
by the contraction of internal demand experienced in the previous time period.
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The employment rate of the 15–64 year old population grew continuously, 
though moderately, up to 2003, then, following a slight dip, stabilized around 
57 percent. As a result of the crisis, the 56.7 percent rate seen in the fourth quar-
ter of 2008 decreased to 55.5 percent by the last quarter of 2009, and continued 
to fall to 54.5 percent by the first quarter of 2010. In 2009 and 2010, the evo-
lution of employment in the public sector was also influenced by new entrants 
employed within the Pathway to work program. Overall, however – not taking 
the effects of public work unrelated to the crisis into account – similarly to the 
competitive sector, though to a lesser degree, unsupported employment in the 
public sector decreased as well.
At the onset of the crisis, we observed that between 2008 and the first half 
of 2009, most job losses were experienced by skilled workers, especially in the 
western and north-western regions of the country. During all of 2009 and the 
first half of 2010, the regional differences decreased, but as the full effect of the 
crisis evolved, with a 1.5 percentage point fall in overall employment, the disad-
vantage of skilled workers remained. Since firms adapted to decreasing demand 
by cutting back hiring to a large extent, a significant part of the damage of the 
contraction was seen in the employment of the young, and especially the young 
who were new entrants to the labour market. As the crisis developed, the ratio of 
part-time workers within the employed increased noticeably, but by the begin-
ning of 2010, due to the beneficial processes in the real economy, this situation 
changed. For women, the labour market was much more beneficent during the 
crisis; their employment rate not decreasing during the winter of 2009–2010 to 
the same extent as that of men. With the onset of the crisis, firms functioning in 
the more developed, industrialized regions (Central-, Western-Transdanubia) 
announced mass layoffs. Later, as the recession spread from the manufacturing 
sectors to other areas of the economy (services sector), the proportion of mass lay-
offs increased in the southern and eastern regions of the country. The difference 
in the employment opportunities of men and women is also due to the regional 
concentration of the different sectors and the occupations associated with them.
In addition to the quantitative adjustments in employment, wages also changed 
significantly in 2009 and the beginning of 2010. The initial contraction was 
dampened by the fact that wages in the competitive and public sectors both de-
creased in the months following the onset of the crisis. At the start of 2010, how-
ever, wages in the public sector were increasing once again. By 2009, the higher 
than 10 percent (both gross and net) average nominal wage advantage of the 
public sector, observed even at the commencement of 2009, had disappeared. 
In 2009, average earnings in the public sector decreased well beyond the level 
due to seasonal fluctuations, as the 13th month’s pay was abolished or replaced 
by smaller premiums distributed throughout the year, there were no annual pay 
rises, and the share of low-pay employment increased as a result of the expansion 
of public employment programmes.
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The government also intervened in the size of wage costs directly, an impor-
tant tool in this being the decrease in employer contribution requirements in-
troduced in a limited fashion in 2009, and then comprehensively from the be-
ginning of 2010. The tax wedge decreased further in 2010, especially at the level 
of the minimum wage, due to the abolition of the fixed rate health contribution. 
This – because of the higher wage elasticity of unskilled labour – may lead to an 
expansion in employment similar in extent to that seen as an effect of the 2009 
employer contribution decrease.
Government policy measures had a direct effect on the demand for labour. 
The Pathway to Work program was not originally aimed at tackling the crisis, 
but workers losing their jobs because of the crisis also became eligible by the end 
of 2009. A number of new support programs implemented with the specific ob-
jective of relieving the crisis and saving jobs also had an effect on labour demand. 
The demand for skilled labour may have been increased by the new two-bracket, 
tax base maximising tax scheme introduced in January 2010, which reduced the 
tax burden of taxpayers near the centre of the wage distribution.
As well as the decline in the employment rate which began in the fourth quar-
ter of 2008, the recession was also reflected in a significant worsening of unem-
ployment figures. The unemployment rate – as defined by the ILO and meas-
ured by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office – rose steeply from its typical 
pre-crisis value of about 7.5 percent to over 10 percent in 2009, then following 
its peak of 11.9 percent in the first quarter of 2010 settling at 11.2 percent in the 
second quarter. Even though the number of unemployed has still not decreased 
significantly, it is quite a positive phenomenon that the restructuring of the labour 
market is taking place among the economically active populations while the size 
of the inactive population remains essentially constant – disregarding seasonal 
fluctuation – or only slightly increasing. After 2009, however, the proportion of 
long-term unemployed began to increase, which suggests that the chances of find-
ing employment again for members of this ever-increasing group have worsened 
during the crisis. In addition to the interventions mentioned above, the evolu-
tion of unemployment was also influenced by the absence of government actions. 
Although the crisis clearly significantly increased the burden on the Hungarian 
Employment Service, the government failed to boost the resources needed for 
the operation of its job centres, an action which, other than Hungary, was only 
experienced in Luxemburg.
2. In Focus
In this year’s issue we analyze the effect of the crisis on the labour market and 
on households. As we were coordinating the contents, we thought it important 
to study not only the direct, short-term labour market effects, but also the indi-
rect, long-term processes that are realized through the households and reproduc-
tion of labour. The labour market phenomena of the crisis cannot be understood 
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fully without taking into account the reactions of households and firms. In the 
first chapter of In Focus, János Köllő analyses the evolution of employment, un-
employment, and wages in the first year of the crisis. The model-based analysis 
of the changes in the number of employed, the average paid workhours, and the 
gross hourly wage – and the relationship between them – is at the centre of the 
study. The study by Péter Elek and Ágota Scharle takes account of the European 
and Hungarian policy measures introduced with the goal of dampening the im-
pact of the economic downturn. András Semjén and István János Tóth give a brief 
overview of firms’ responses to the crisis based on firm data.
As a deviation from studies that use comprehensive data representative of the 
entire business sector, Dorottya Boda and László Neumann use a different meth-
odology. They summarize the results of two empirical studies which analyze the 
effect of the crisis on firm management mainly based on firm interviews.
The data-rich study of Irén Busch and György Lázár demonstrates the main 
characteristics of an important subset of firm human resource measures – ma-
jor layoffs. After an introduction of the legal background the authors compare 
the evolution of announced layoffs and registered unemployment over the last 
10 years, then examine the developments between October of 2008 and June of 
2010 in greater detail.
The study by Hajnalka Lőcsei analyzes the effect of the crisis on regional ine-
qualities in unemployment using the database of registered jobseekers. Based on 
the speed and type of the changes, she divides the time period between the fall 
of 2008 and the summer of 2010 into four sections, and describes the evolution 
of the spatial expansion of unemployment for each of these.
The regional analysis is completed by two short studies. The study by Albert 
Faluvégi examines how the crisis affected the most disadvantaged microregions 
more closely. The issue of commuting is an important component of the evolu-
tion of employment differences. Tamás Bartus analyses the relationship between 
commuting time and the rural-urban wage difference. The most important find-
ing of the study is that in disadvantaged regions, the estimated costs due to time 
lost commuting reach and surpass the wage increases that can be achieved. Due 
to the lack of recent data, the longer study of András Semjén and János István Tóth 
also attempts to draw conclusions based on earlier analyses regarding the effects 
of the crisis on unreported employment. Their conclusion is that the economic 
crisis probably led to unreported or concealed work becoming more widespread 
and higher in volume during the last two years.
The effect of the crisis on households stands at the centre of the last section. 
The micro-simulation analysis of Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kiss examines how 
the income position of households in different situations changed as a result of 
layoffs in the first year of the crisis. Using the labour force survey of the CSO, 
they estimate the likelihood of job loss of employees based on their individual 
characteristics, and then analyze the income effects of job loss based on house-
foreword
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hold budget surveys. The study of István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi is 
composed of two main parts. First, they demonstrate the long term evolution 
of main indicators of the income distribution based on the Tárki household 
monitor survey, with a special focus on the changes between 2007 and 2009. 
The second part of the study details subjective living difficulties, the indebted-
ness of households and their difficulties paying off their loans. The brief study 
by Zsuzsa Kapitány is related to the latter topic, which demonstrates the chang-
ing consumer behaviour of households in the real estate and mortgage market. 
The study discusses the effect of the crisis on households acquiring loans and 
specifically mortgage loans, the evolution of late payments, as well as on the real 
estate market and real estate construction based on data from the Hungarian 
National Bank, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Cen-
tral Statistical Office.
Due to the unique nature of this year’s In Focus, we felt it necessary to break 
with our tradition and include a summary at the end of the section, which was 
prepared by the editor, György Molnár. In this, we aim to provide an overview of 
the most important results of the studies in the In Focus section.
3. The legal and institutional environment of the labour market
This year, we provide an overview of the legal and institutional environment of 
the labour market in a new form. We diverge from the practice of previous years, 
when we emphasized the changes, including their causes, motivation, and effects. 
Instead, we state the currently applicable laws, focusing on the most important 
aspects, and – to provide easier understanding of the conditions – we summa-
rize the main characteristics of benefits in standardized tables. This is attached as 
an appendix to the detailed analysis.
We review the legal and institutional environment of the labour market in five 
sections. The first chapter introduces the income replacement benefits of jobseek-
ers, while the second chapter takes account of the active labour market policy 
tools, services, and programs the rules of which are included in the Employment 
Act. These can be applied for through the Public Employment Service (PES). The 
third chapter discusses the labour market tools that are regulated outside of the 
Employment Act, but managed by the PES. The fourth chapter deals with the 
forms of support that are outside the scope of both the Employment Act and the 
PES. Finally, the fifth chapter describes the governance and financing of Hun-
garian employment policy.
The main characteristics of both active and passive support can be found in 
standardized form in the appendix of the section, the most influential part of 
which is Table F7. This contains the eligibility and usage criteria of the employ-
ment and training subsidies regulated in the Employment Act and in other regu-
lations. The many types of subsidies are categorized according to their function, 
and grouped in the following way:
The hungarian Labour MarkeT
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– wage and contribution subsidies,
– forms of public employment,
– training support,
– assistance for the creation of new employment opportunities,
– assistance for job safeguarding and management of layoffs,
– mobility support,
– other (support of services and programs),
– most important SROP-programs.
4. Statistical data
In line with the structure developed in previous years, this chapter gives detailed 
information regarding the characteristics of basic economic processes, popula-
tion, labour market activity, employment, unemployment, inactivity, wages, edu-
cation, labour demand, regional differences, migration, industrial relations, and 
welfare provisions. It also provides an international comparison of a few labour 
market indicators. Breaking from the tradition of previous years, we do not show 
data pertaining to the topic of the In Focus section, in this case, the labour mar-
ket effects of the economic crisis, in a separate chapter, since these effects can be 
ascertained in the tables mentioned above.
* * *
The members of the editorial board would like to thank colleagues of the Institute 
of Economics, HAS, the Central Statistical Office, the Budapest Corvinus Univer-
sity Human Resource Department, the Public Employment Service, the Central 
Administration of National Pension Insurance, the Ministry for National Econ-
omy, and the Ministry of National Resources for their efforts in the compilation 
and review of the necessary information, in the editing of the publication, and 
in the preparation of parts of the material. We thank the experts of the National 
Public Employment Foundation for their comments and suggestions regarding 
the proposals of the current and previous issues, and last but not least, for the fi-
nancial support given for publication.
THE HUNGARIAN 
 LABOUR MARKET 
 IN 2009–2010
Mónika Bálint 
 Zsombor Cseres-Gergely 
Ágota Scharle

The hungarian labour markeT in 2009–2010
17
This chapter looks at the labour market processes taking place during the sec-
ond half of 2009 and the first half of 2010. With the first shock of the econom-
ic crisis appearing in the autumn of 2008 behind us, the economy picked up 
during the period under discussion, primarily owing to the increasing demand 
for export. Internal demand, however, continued to remain limited, with the 
result that the different industries failed to have an equal share of the boom. 
This duality in growth structure was reflected in the labour market, which was 
slow to respond to the favourable processes taking place in the real economy.
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
The global crisis hitting the economy in autumn 2008 was followed by a period 
of recession lasting until the summer of 2009. The recession was marked by a 
pronounced drop in production and consumption and the contraction of both 
external and internal markets. During this period, EU countries typically expe-
rienced a 5 to 8 per cent decrease in their – annual – GDP. Some improvement 
could be observed in the third quarter of 2009, primarily due to the economic 
stimulus measures implemented by the governments. The positive effects of 
these programmes proved to be transient when at the end of their term market 
demand fell once again. The growth of the European – and the world – econ-
omy observed at the end of 2009 was assisted by the dynamic expansion of the 
demand in developing – mainly Asian – countries (MNB, 2010).
While the boom in the Czech Republic and Slovakia more or less follows the 
EU-15 average trend, Poland exhibits an achievement unique in the European 
Union: an increase in its GDP during the crisis. The growth of the Hungarian 
economy remained well below the EU-15 average in 2009, but it starts closing 
the gap at the beginning of 2010 (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in the Visegrád countries by quarter (per cent)
Note: Change relative to the same period in the previous year.
Source: Eurostat on-line database (teina011).
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The Hungarian economy was at its lowest during the second quarter of 2009, 
when the GDP was down 7.5 per cent compared to its value for the same period 
in the previous year. The second half of the year was characterised by a moder-
ate decrease, and the first quarter of 2010 saw a slow rise in GDP.
Compared to the rest of the region, the recovery of the Hungarian economy 
commenced with some delay and showed slow progression, presumably because 
of the economic slowdown experienced by the country long before the global de-
pression and as a result of the government measures implemented in response to 
that slowdown. The country’s substantial debts presented an obstacle to boost-
ing the budget,1 and the contraction of demand was intensified by the decrease 
in credit activity on both the demand and the supply side (MNB, 2009).
The boom displays a dual structure. On the one hand the foremost motor of 
growth are the export sales targeting – via Germany, our main export partner – 
the Asian region, and on the other hand economic growth is held back by the 
fall in internal demand over the past few quarters (MNB, 2010).
The labour market was relatively quick to respond to the dwindling demand 
effected by the economic slowdown and further exacerbated by the global cri-
sis. By international comparison, the decrease in employment experienced by 
Hungary relative to the 2008 baseline is not particularly large – every country 
suffered a drop in employment with Slovakia fairing the worst. It is worth re-
membering, however, that the rest of the Visegrád countries had accrued an em-
ployment advantage during the boom of the mid-2000s, which is what was now 
lost. Hungary, in contrast, started at the lowest level and lost the meagre employ-
ment advantage gained over a decade essentially due to demographic processes.
The employment rate among the 15–64 year-old population rose steadily 
but at a slow pace up until 2003, and then, following a minor dip, stabilised 
at about 57 per cent. As a result of the crisis, it dropped from 56.7 per cent in 
the fourth quarter of 2008 to 55.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009 and 
further to 54.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2010. This figure is 9 percent-
age points below the average of the 27 EU countries and corresponds to the 
Hungarian employment rate measured in 1998. The initial plunge may have 
been tempered by the fall in both public sector and private sector wages, but at 
the beginning of 2010 public sector wages started increasing again (Figure 2).
Although the first signs of recovery can now be observed (the decrease in 
GDP has come to a halt with the revival of export), its labour market effects 
can be barely perceived: while the fall in employment has slowed down, the 
unemployment rate continues to rise steeply. It is an encouraging observation, 
however, that the incidence of economic inactivity shows a slight but notice-
able decreasing trend, which is likely to be explained mainly by the increase 
in the statutory retirement age and the improved spread of education (Cseres-
Gergely & Scharle, 2009). Maintaining the level of activity may accelerate the 
process of recovering from the crisis.
1 In order to maintain debt 
sustainability the government 
was forced to introduce fiscal 
consolidation measures, which 
curbed internal demand. As 
indirect taxes (VAT and excise 
duty) were raised in the middle 
of 2009 and the mortgage sup-
port scheme became less acces-
sible, households brought their 
investment decisions forward 
and companies postponed their 
planned investments or reduced 
their stocks (MNB, 2009).
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Figure 2: Major economic indicators in Hungary by quarter from 2006 (per cent)
Note: GDP volume: Q1 2006 = 100, GDP production at average prices in 2000.
Earnings: average gross earnings in private sector in Q1 2006 = 100, real earnings de-
flated by the Consumer Price Index.
Source: GDP, earnings: authors’ calculations based on KSH Stadat; level of em-
ployment: authors’ calculations based on the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
(HCSO) Labour Force Survey.
Figure 3: Employment rates in the Visegrád countries by quarter,  
15–64 year-old population (per cent)
Source: Eurostat on-line database.
The decline in employment was moderated by the increase in the size of the 
public sector workforce starting in the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 4) which 
was a result of the substantial expansion of public work schemes. In the private 
sector, in contrast, there was a decrease in workforce size. The details of the 
adjustments in the private sector, including changes in employment, working 
time and wages, are discussed by János Köllő in Chapter 1 of In Focus in this 
volume. One of the most important conclusions of the study is that a fine-grain 
analysis seems to confirm the impression that the two sectors responded in dia-
metrically opposed ways: the business sector through employment adjustment 
and the public sector through wage adjustments.
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Figure 4: Major labour market indicators by quarter, 2006–2010
Note: Unemployment rate shown on the y axis on the right.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey data, 15–64 year-
old population.
As will be discussed in connection with job creation, the population entering 
employment under the Pathway to Work programme had a noticeable effect on 
the size of the public sector. We can therefore paint a more precise picture of 
employment by differentiating between subsidised and non-subsidised employ-
ment. Similarly to the private sector, although to a lesser extent, non-subsidised 
employment also declined in the public sector if we disregard the expanded 
participation in public employment schemes, which is unrelated to the crisis.
The decrease in employment was first of all accompanied by an increase in 
unemployment rather than in inactivity, but the usual dynamics of transition 
from one status to another also underwent some change. Based on Cseres-
Gergely (2010), Figure 5 displays stock-flow consistent calculations of labour 
market status transitions. Compared to previous periods, early in 2009 we 
find a significantly increased flow to unemployment and a decreased flow to 
employment both from among the inactive and the unemployed populations. 
The first quarter of 2010 is characterised by a further increase in unemploy-
ment inflows but there is an improvement in the proportion of workers re-en-
tering employment. The flows between employment and inactivity also dis-
play an improving trend in the last quarter: compared to the previous period, 
a smaller proportion of workers become inactive and a larger proportion enter 
employment. This is, however, to a large extent due to the expansion of subsi-
dised employment mentioned above.2
At the onset of the crisis, the population most heavily affected by job losses 
between 2008 and the first half of 2009 were skilled workers, especially those 
living in West or Northwest Hungary (Cseres-Gergely & Scharle, 2009). In 
2009 as a whole and in the first half of 2010, there was some degree of conver-
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gence between regions but as the effects of the crisis propagated and overall 
employment fell by about 1.5 percentage points, the disadvantage of skilled 
workers persisted: the rate of employment among them dropped more sharp-
ly, by about 2 percentage points between the corresponding quarters of 2008 
and 2009. Higher education graduates appear to be the most resistant to the 
effects of the crisis: their employment figures show a decline of only 0.5 per-
centage points (see Table 1).
Figure 5: Quarter to quarter changes in employment, and its components: flows  between 
employment and unemployment, inactivity, 15–64 year-old population, 2007-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-flow 
consistent model.
The male and female employment curves diverge from the end of 2009 on-
wards: for women the employment rate rises in the third quarter of 2009 and 
only barely declines in the first quarter of 2010, while for men it decreases in 
both quarters. One reason is the slight but steady flow from inactivity to em-
ployment (see Figure 6), and the other explanation for the data lies in that not 
even the crisis could curb the flow from unemployment to employment and 
the likelihood of separations only slightly increased in the first quarter of 2010. 
The labour market, therefore, appears to have been considerably more hospi-
table to women than to men during the crisis period.
Since businesses tend to adapt to the decline in demand by curbing labour ex-
pansion, the employment of young cohorts is likely to suffer at a time of depres-
sion. This is exactly what we observe in the case of the current crisis in Hungary, 
but a number of other factors also play a role. Figure 7 displays the employment 
curves for new labour market entrants and non-new labour market participants 
among younger men and women in the first quarter of 2008, 2009 and 2010. It 
can be clearly seen that the originally low rate of employment among the 15–19 
year-old cohort further decreases substantially as a result of the crisis. Women’s 
employment is invariably lower than men’s, and the crisis does less damage to the 
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former than to the latter for each cohort. The effect is strongest at the onset of 
the crisis and the occasional increase is a product of the exceptionally low base-
line values. The figure reveals that although the crisis meant heavier job losses for 
the young in general than for older people, the group that suffered most among 
younger cohorts are the new labour market entrants. This effect weakens with 
the progress of age and in some cases disappears in the second year of the crisis.
Table 1: Employment rates among 15–64 year-olds broken down by education  
from Q1 2006 to Q1 2010 by quarter
Quarter Primary or less Vocational Upper Secondary Higher Education
2006 Q1 27.0 68.0 61.4 82.3
2006 Q2 27.9 69.5 61.5 81.4
2006 Q3 28.1 69.5 61.7 80.8
2006 Q4 27.5 69.7 62.0 80.3
2007 Q1 26.4 68.7 61.6 80.3
2007 Q2 27.5 69.0 62.0 80.4
2007 Q3 28.3 68.8 61.7 79.6
2007 Q4 27.2 67.7 60.9 79.7
2008 Q1 26.6 66.3 60.1 79.4
2008 Q2 26.9 66.4 60.6 79.8
2008 Q3 28.3 66.9 61.2 79.5
2008 Q4 27.0 66.1 61.0 79.4
2009 Q1 24.6 63.8 59.6 78.7
2009 Q2 25.7 64.6 59.8 78.5
2009 Q3 26.3 64.3 59.0 77.7
2009 Q4 26.1 64.5 59.1 77.6
2010 Q1 24.6 62.4 58.6 78.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey data.
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Figure 6: Quarter to quarter changes in employment, and its components: flows between employment 
and unemployment, inactivity, 15–64 year-old female population, 2007-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-flow 
consistent model.
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Figure 7: Employment rates among younger cohorts by gender  
and new entrant status in the first quarter of 2008, 2009 and 2010
Note: A new employment entrant is defined as a worker in employment and not in full-time 
education who was a student a year before data collection. A new labour market entrant 
is defined as a person not in full-time education who was a student preceding data collec-
tion. The non-new employed are those in employment and not in full-time education who 
were not students one year before data collection. Non-new labour market participants 
are those not in full-time education who were not students preceding data collection. The 
figures for 30–34 year-old new labour market entrants are omitted because of the large 
error margin associated with low cell counts.
LABOUR DEMAND
The effects of the crisis on the output of the various sectors of the economy var-
ied in degree but were mostly negative. During the recession, industrial pro-
duction slumped to a substantial extent, but – mainly thanks to the expansion 
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of the heavily export oriented manufacturing industry – some improvement 
has been observed recently (Figure 8). Looking at the GDP contribution of 
the construction industry – relative to that of agriculture – we find a slow but 
steady decline starting even before the onset of the crisis. For services, how-
ever, the figures reveal a relatively stable overall performance: while the eco-
nomic contribution of enterprises with sales in the internal market (retail and 
travel accommodation industries) substantially decreased, the performance of 
financial, real estate and other business services has steadily risen over the past 
year (MNB, 2010). Finally, agriculture showed an outstanding performance 
in 2008 and 2009, and, relative to its size, made a substantial contribution to 
the economy’s gross domestic product.
Figure 8: Quarterly real output by industry, 2006–2010
Note: At constant prices (base year: 2000), agriculture GDP in Q1, 2006 = 100. The GDP 
contributions shown in the figure are relative to the contribution of agriculture, e.g., in 
the first quarter of 2006 services contributed more than ten times, and manufacturing 
contributed more than four times the contribution of agriculture.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Stadat.
In terms of their demand for labour, and thus employment, the different sectors 
reacted to the changes in production with varying sensitivity (having different 
production elasticities, cf. Kőrösi, 2005). The largest degree of employment re-
duction was observed in the industrial sector, especially in construction, where 
there was a 7.4 per cent decrease in workforce size between Q1 2008 and Q1 
2009 and a further 7.5 per cent decrease between Q1 2009 and Q1 2010. Dur-
ing the same periods, construction GDP fell by 3.1 and 8.7 per cent respective-
ly (Figure 9). The production elasticity of industry is considerably lower than 
that of other sectors, and the drastic decrease in employment is the result of 
an unusually strong negative demand shock. In manufacturing, production 
first fell by 21 per cent and then grew by 4.2 per cent during the same period. 
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The gentle decline in employment (–5.3 and –4.8 per cent) is explained by the 
low (0.4 per cent) production elasticity of labour demand in manufacturing, 
which is about the usual level for Hungary. In absolute numbers, the large sec-
tor of manufacturing suffered the highest number of job losses. The output of 
the service sector – which is the sector with the highest GDP contribution – 
first dipped slightly compared to its pre-crisis level and then stabilised. This is 
also reflected in the negligible fluctuation in workforce size. Looking at agri-
culture, thanks to the above average output in 2008, labour demand grew by 
3.7 per cent between Q1 2008 and Q1 2009, and in the subsequent quarter 
fell by 6.7 per cent.
Figure 9: Employment by sector (Q1, 2006 = 100)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey.
The number of employees at any firm continually changes because of natural 
movement to and from the firm, and both types of movement may be affected 
in response to a recession: through the creation and destruction of jobs. An 
important – though certainly not the only – component of job destruction 
are mass layoffs, which are recorded by the Public Employment Service. The 
number of jobs lost in declared layoffs peaked in the first quarter of 2009 (close 
to 16 thousand employees were separated from their jobs) and subsequently 
decreased. During the first half of 2010 only 5,400 employees were displaced 
through announced layoffs, which is less than a quarter of the corresponding 
figure for the same period of the previous year and approaches the pre-crisis 
level. Although layoffs may be interpreted as an adaptive strategy implement-
ed by surviving firms, this is not necessarily the case. In Chapter 1 of In Focus 
János Köllő provides evidence that layoffs were far more likely to be employed 
by companies that had to close down later, i.e., layoffs often turned out to be a 
forewarning of failure rather than a form of adaptation.
The pattern of mass layoffs provides a good map of both the geographical 
and the sectoral spread of the crisis. Following the appearance of the crisis, 
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mass layoffs were announced by firms operating in relatively developed in-
dustrialised regions (West Hungary), while later on – as the recession spread 
from production industries to other sectors of the economy (services) – this 
step was more likely to be taken in the Southern and Eastern regions of the 
country (ÁFSZ, 2010).
The economic activity of people separated from their jobs through mass lay-
offs is indicated by the percentage of the displaced population registering as 
job seekers. Between October 2008 and December 2009, more than 50 per 
cent of this population registered with Job Centres (Public Employment Ser-
vice communication). Looking at regional data, the lowest figures appear for 
Central Hungary (30 per cent) and Western Transdanubia (34 per cent) and 
the highest figure for Southern Transdanubia (95 per cent) (ÁFSZ, 2010).
As shown in a previous publication, at the onset of the crisis, the population 
most vulnerable to the decline in employment were male skilled workers living 
in the western parts of Hungary (Cseres-Gergely & Scharle, 2009). The effects 
of education and geographical location were then explained by the attributes 
of the economic sectors most severely damaged by the crisis. The figures for 
the period between Q1 2009 and Q1 2010, however, do not reveal statistical-
ly significant differences of the sort measured in the previous period. That is, 
the differences observed at present should be put down to the losses suffered 
in 2008–2009.
Besides layoffs, the restraint shown in job creation also played a role in the 
decline in employment. One indicator of job creation activity is the number of 
new job announcements recorded by the Public Employment Service (Figure 
10). At the beginning of 2009, the majority of registered new jobs were subsi-
dised, presumably several of them were created within the Pathway to Work pro-
gramme. There was only a slight increase in the number of non-subsidised jobs, 
as we have seen in Figure 6 above. The number of non-subsidised announced 
jobs stabilised at a low level in 2009. A real turnaround did not come until the 
late spring or early summer of 2010, when the number of non-subsidised new 
jobs finally escaped from the low level where it had hovered in 2009.
A more subtle form of labour demand adjustment is a reduction of work-
ing time. Although a mild rising trend had been observed before, the share of 
part-time workers within the total working population perceptibly increased 
at the time of the crisis, even though the nature of statistical analysis prevents 
us from observing some parts of this increase through simple calculations – see 
Chapter 1 of In Focus for details. Among men, the share of part-time employ-
ment first decreased and then increased during the first phase of the crisis, and 
later decreased once again as a result of the positive processes taking place in 
the real economy. This suggests that the increase observed early on during the 
crisis was purely an adjustment strategy. Looking at women, the long-term in-
creasing trend appears to persist but this difference between the genders may 
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be partially explained by the policy implemented on 1st January 2010 stating 
that mothers returning to the public sector from maternity leave must be of-
fered part-time employment until the child’s third birthday. This explanation 
is supported by a separate analysis of full-time and part-time employment in 
the private and the public sectors: among men, the decline in the share of part-
time work is clearly steeper in the public sector, while the opposite pattern is 
observed for women, i.e., a mild decrease is followed by stabilisation in the pri-
vate sector, while there is a pronounced increase in the public sector.
Figure 10: Announced subsidised and non-subsidised jobs
Source: Number of jobs: Public Employment Service; number of employees in public work 
schemes: KSH, 2010b.
Figure 11: Share of part-timers in total employment, 2005–2010
Source: CSHO Labour Force Survey.
Besides the quantitative adjustments in labour, there were significant changes 
in wages, i.e., the price of labour, in 2009 and at the beginning of 2010. By the 
middle of 2009, the wage advantage of the public sector over the private sector 
disappeared, although at the beginning of 2009 there had still been a gap of 
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more than 10 per cent in nominal average wage, both before and after tax (Fig-
ure 12). In 2009 the average wage in the public sector decreased far beyond the 
level of seasonal fluctuation as a result of a number of events: the 13th month’s 
pay was abolished or replaced by smaller premiums distributed over the year, 
there was no annual pay rise and the share of low-pay employment increased 
as a result of the expanded public employment programme.
Figure 12: Gross real wages in the public and the private sectors by quarter,  
2006–2010 (Q1, 2006 prices)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Stadat.
The more positive processes observed in the private sector are primarily ex-
plained by changes in the composition of its workforce. As a consequence of 
the mass layoffs among blue-collar workers, there was an increase in the share 
of white-collar employees. Private sector wages were at the same time reduced 
when companies withheld premiums and bonuses as a wage adjustment strat-
egy (KSH, 2009b). As discussed in Chapter 1 of In Focus, the strategy of with-
holding wages favoured by employees in German speaking countries was al-
most entirely absent in Hungary.
Policies affecting labour demand
The demand for labour was also shaped by government measures introduced 
at the beginning of 2009. The Pathway to Work programme mentioned above 
was not originally aimed at tackling the crisis, but workers losing their jobs 
because of the crisis became eligible at the end of 2009, when they had been 
unemployed for the specified period of time – more will be said about this lat-
er. There were also a number of new support programmes implemented with 
the specific objective of relieving the crisis, and these also had their effects on 
labour demand.3
According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH, 2010b) and 
Office for Employment and Social Affairs reports, small and mid-sized com-
panies showed substantial interest in the relief funds financed by the Social Re-
newal Operational Programme (TÁMOP), while micro-businesses and large 
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3 The Hungarian crisis-relief 
package deviated from the tools 
used in other countries of the 
European Union in several re-
spects (see Péter Elek and Ágota 
Scharle’s report following Chap-
ter 1 of In Focus), and the distri-
bution of resources was less than 
ideal, especially with regard to 
the welfare effects of the package 
(see Chapter 1 by János Köllő 
and Chapter 6 by Katalin Gáspár 
and Áron Kiss in In Focus).
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firms showed considerably less interest (Table 2). We can only conjecture that 
the difference in popularity may be related to the period of the funds’ availa-
bility as well as to the varied administrative requirements of the programmes. 
There are several gaps in the information available on these support schemes: 
virtually nothing is known about their targeting, associated dead weight losses 
or their effectiveness (i.e., whether the employment situation improved more 
with them than it would have done without them).
Table 2: Major financial indicators of government programmes aimed  
at job preservation and potentially increasing labour demand (billion HUF)
Programme Size of fund Amount used in 2009
Hungarian Employment Fund preservation programme 9.5  
(2009–2010)
7.3
Central programme of job preservation support 0.7 
 (2009)
0.6
Job preservation programmes managed by regional employ-
ment centres
10.0 10.2
TÁMOP 2.3.3/A. Job preservation through working time reduc-
tion and training (for small and mid-sized companies)
20.0 4.8
TÁMOP 2.3.3/B Training support for large companies 10.0 0.4
TÁMOP 2.3.3/C Job preservation support with training for 
businesses with fewer than 5 employees in Central Hungary
2.5 1.1
Source: Office for Employment and Social Affairs.
The demand for labour was affected by a number of other measures: the obli-
gation of employers to offer part-time work to women returning from mater-
nity leave, the support – equivalent to the amount of Work Availability Allow-
ance – paid to employers for hiring an unemployed person, and the more than 
five-fold increase of the rehabilitation benefit. No analyses are as yet available 
on the effects of any of these interventions, but as was mentioned above, the 
first of these may have played a role in the increase in part-time employment 
among women.
In addition to direct interventions, the demand for labour can be encouraged 
at government level by amending wage costs – considering results published in 
Kőrösi (2005) – this can indeed have a non-negligible effect. The wage elastic-
ity of labour demand was between –0.4 (manufacturing) and –0.2 (other sec-
tors) in the early 2000s. This means that a one per cent decrease in labour wage 
costs leads to an increase of 0.2–0.4 per cent in employment, everything else 
held constant.4 That is, relying solely on this strategy in their efforts to coun-
teract the decrease of approximately 3 per cent in employment in two years, the 
government would have to reduce wage costs by 7.5–15 per cent. Official esti-
mates put the employer contribution reduction of 2009 not far off this target: 
in the short run, the tax cut may have increased employment by 0.3–2.8 per 
cent (for details, see the brief report by Péter Elek and Ágota Scharle following 
Chapter 1). The tax wedge was further lowered in 2010, especially at the level 
4 We must of course be cautious 
with our conclusions, since the 
results of surveys conducted in 
“peacetime” cannot be projected 
onto a different set of circum-
stances, if there has been no oc-
casion to observe similar events 
in the past. It remains the case, 
however, that at least we have 
an empirically motivated, plau-
sible estimate of the operation 
of this tool.
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of the minimum wage (thanks to the abolition of the fixed health contribu-
tion), which – because of the higher wage elasticity of unskilled labour – may 
lead to an increase in employment similar in extent to that in 2009 (Figure 13).
Figure 13: Tax wedgeat the minimum wage and for an average wage  
in manufacturing, 2008–2010, bi-annual series (per cent)
Note: The tax wedge is shown as a percentage of the total wage cost (Figure 12 in the introduc-
tion to the 2009 volume of the Hungarian Labour Market shows the tax wedge as a percent-
age of the gross wage, for the English version see Cseres-Gergely & Scharle, 2010, p. 29).
Source: Taxes and contributions from Hungarian Tax Authority data; gross wages 
HCSO institutional statistics.
Figure 14: The minimum wage and skilled workers’ wage  
minimum in real value, 1997–2010
Notes: HUF at 1997 level, in 2010 using the Hungarian National Bank’s 4.9 per cent 
inflation projection (MNB, 2010). The values for 2009 were weighted with reference to 
changes in employer contributions during the year. The skilled workers’ wage minimum 
is the lowest wage payable to employees in jobs requiring general or vocational secondary 
education (before July 2009 the pay could be slightly lower if the employee had less than 2 
years’ experience).
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Wage cost reductions are accompanied by a smaller loss of revenue if the level 
of the minimum wage and the skilled workers’ wage minimum are set with 
restraint. As shown in Figure 14, the total wage cost of the wage minimum de-
clined in real value in 2010 – the combined effect of the slightly below-infla-
tion rise in its level (2.8 per cent) and the reduction in the tax burden – which 
may have contributed to the prevention of further decline in labour demand.
LABOUR SUPPLY
All responsibility for the crisis emerging at the end of 2008 is borne by the de-
mand shock; no crisis-induced changes were observed in labour supply. What 
changes there were on the supply side were caused by government policies and 
economic interventions. The analysis that follows therefore focuses on these 
events, and the overall analysis of labour supply published in last year’s volume 
of the Hungarian Labour Market will not be repeated here (Cseres-Gergely & 
Scharle, 2010). In 2009 and the first half of 2010, there was a slight increase in 
the economic activity of the population, which gives no support to the conjec-
ture that people separated from their jobs because of the crisis may have chosen 
inactivity either without any social security benefit or relying on some type of 
pension allowance. Given almost 100 thousand job separations and a sudden 
surge in unemployment, this is a significant achievement in itself, which could 
contribute to the growth of employment once the crisis is over. However, if a 
policy committed to preserving the level of activity is also to achieve results in 
welfare, the job seekers’ and low-income employees’ social support programmes 
should be redesigned (see Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis’s discussion of this in 
Chapter 6 of In Focus).
Similarly to employment, economic activity is also shaped by two opposing 
forces. The stable level of activity is a product first, of the strong ties between 
the labour market and those who have just been displaced – more will be said 
about this in connection with unemployment – and second, of the absence 
of programmes that may aid long-term exits from the labour market, such as 
some kind of early, fast-track retirement, which the government refrained from 
introducing. As can be seen in Figure 15, the flow from unemployment to in-
activity is not any higher than it was before. The figure also reveals, however, 
that the usual summer dip in the flow from employment to inactivity – made 
possible by the opening of seasonal jobs – does not appear in 2009. Similarly 
to the data on new labour market entrants, this also testifies to the vulnerabil-
ity of people with weak labour market ties.
From the second half of 2009 onwards, the level of economic activity was 
raised as a result of a number of interventions, most of which were introduced 
by the government. The first of these is the Pathway to Work programme, which 
is intended to offer community jobs of various duration to those in long-term 
unemployment. Although no information is available on the ILO labour mar-
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ket status of participants, previous research has revealed that only 60 per cent 
of registered participants seek work actively (Bajnai et al, 2008). Inactivity is 
likely to be even more frequent among the long-term unemployed, as suggest-
ed by the fact that the inactivity to employment flow shifted back a quarter 
in 2009: the Pathway to Work programme admitted participants starting in 
April, but the labour absorbing effect of seasonal summer jobs could not be 
felt. While the Pathway to Work programme may direct people from inactiv-
ity to employment, it may also have the effect of increasing the flow from inac-
tivity to unemployment because of the increased risk of being called upon to 
perform community work and the stricter sanctions that may in some cases be 
imposed in the event of refusal. This problem – similarly to other aspects of the 
Pathway to Work programme – however, requires a more thorough analysis.
Figure 15: Quarter to quarter changes in inactivity, and its components: flows between 
inactivity and employment, unemployment, 15–64 year-old population, 2007-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-flow 
consistent model.
The demand for skilled labour may have been increased by the new two-bracket, 
tax base maximising tax scheme introduced in January 2010, which reduced 
the tax burden of taxpayers in the centre of the income distribution. At the 
same time, tax credits were now phased out in the upper income bracket, which 
raised the marginal tax rate on excess income, which in turn may have the ef-
fect of encouraging the top quintile of taxpayers to reduce their working hours 
or to undervalue their declared income (Scharle et al, 2010).
In the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010, no other measures were 
brought in that may already have an observable effect in 2010, but decisions were 
made on actions with significant mid-term effects. A new maternity allowance 
system was introduced on 1st May, which limited the duration of entitlement to 
two years and tied the higher rate of maternity allowance (GYED) to a longer 
period of prior employment than had been required by previous regulations. 
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In 2010 it became possible to admit children under the age of three together 
with older children to public nursery schools in settlements where there are 
no other suitable day care facilities for under-threes. Both steps are expected 
to increase female labour supply provided that certain criteria are met (acces-
sibility of workplace, day care services of adequate quality), since they reduce 
the costs of employment for the worker.
UNEMPLOYMENT
Besides the decline in employment rate starting with the fourth quarter of 
2008, the recession was also reflected in unemployment figures. The unemploy-
ment rate – as defined by the ILO and measured by the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office – rose steeply from its typical pre-crisis value of about 7.5 per 
cent to over 10 per cent in 2009, then after peaking at 11.9 per cent in the first 
quarter of 2010, it settled at 11.2 per cent in the second quarter.
In the first quarter of 2010, job seekers registered with the Public Employ-
ment Service represented a considerably higher percentage (15 per cent) of the 
15–64 year-old economically active population than indicated by the ILO un-
employment figure (Figure 16). The rising curves of the two indicators tend 
to run in parallel suggesting that a substantial share of those separated from 
their jobs become active job seekers. While the rising trend in the number of 
unemployed has still not turned round, it remains a favourable phenomenon 
that the restructuring of the labour market takes place among the economi-
cally active populations, leaving the size of the inactive population essentially 
constant (disregarding seasonal fluctuation) or only slightly increasing.
Figure 16: Non-employed subpopulations (partially overlapping)  
among the 15–64 year old population after 2006 by quarter
Source: ILO-unemployed, long-term unemployed, inactive: authors’ calculations based on 
HCSO Labour Force Survey; registered job seekers: authors’ calculations based on Office 
for Employment and Social Affairs data.
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The dominant factor shaping changes in unemployment is the flow arriving 
from employment, but we can also observe an increase in the number of tran-
sitions from unemployment to employment. As a result of the bloated unem-
ployed stock, however, the probability of exiting in any direction was constant 
for the period under discussion with the exception of the second quarter of 
2009 (Figure 17). It seems likely that the increased unemployment to employ-
ment flow is explained by the Pathway to Work programme, but this hypoth-
esis cannot be directly confirmed.
In the short term, the balance of transitions between the unemployed and 
the inactive populations is positive in the sense that movement from inactiv-
ity to unemployment, i.e., towards economic activity, has a higher incidence 
than transitions in the opposite direction. Figure 16 reveals, however, that the 
size of the long-term unemployed population began to grow after 2009 sug-
gesting that the odds of this constantly expanding group being re-employed 
substantially diminished during the crisis.
Figure 17: Quarter to quarter changes in unemployment, and its components:  
flows between unemployment and employment, inactivity,  
15–64 year-old population, 2007-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HCSO Labour Force Survey micro-data, stock-flow 
consistent model.
As in the case of job separations, the risk of unemployment varies between the 
genders and age cohorts. The crisis brought about a change in the distribution 
by educational attainment of the registered unemployed: it is now more simi-
lar to the corresponding distribution of the employed population than to pre-
vious unemployed patterns. The changes did not, however, have a significant 
effect on the usual seasonal regularity in the distribution: among the entrants 
to unemployment there is a higher share of those with secondary education at 
the end of the school year and during the summer, while as winter approaches 
and seasonal jobs close, elementary and secondary qualifications become more 
frequent. The percentage of new labour market entrants registering as unem-
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ployed steadily increases starting with 2007 over and above the strong seasonal 
effect of school leavers.
Industries typically employing more male than female labour, such as manu-
facturing and construction, were hit harder by the crisis with the result that the 
risk of unemployment increased more sharply among men. By the end of 2008, 
men’s unemployment rate exceeded women’s and this pattern has not turned 
round since: in the second quarter of 2010 the gap is 1.3 percentage points. 
The incidence of unemployment is higher among the young, especially among 
young men, but the rising trend seems to slow down in the first quarter of 2010.
The characteristic geographical distribution of industries and occupations 
is also reflected in the geography of unemployment. This will not be discussed 
here, however, as it is the topic of Hajnalka Lőcsei’s study in Chapter 4 of In 
Focus.
Policy Interventions
In addition to the interventions discussed above, the unemployment situation 
was also affected by the absence of certain government actions. Although the 
crisis clearly placed an extra burden on the Public Employment Service, the 
government failed to boost the resources required for the operation of its job 
centres. As demonstrated by Péter Elek and Ágota Scharle in their brief report 
following Chapter 1 of In Focus, this could have been an almost automatic step 
in crisis-relief efforts, one that was taken in all EU countries (with the excep-
tion of Luxemburg and Hungary). The allocation of extra resources would 
have been justified simply by the task of dealing with claims and applications. 
Added to this, a crisis substantially raises the risk of long-term unemployment, 
which could be forestalled by putting more tools and attention in the service 
of maintaining job seeking activity.
The Pathway to Work programme has not been revised since its launch. The 
only publication, KSH-FSZH (2010), relies on data supplied by the Hungarian 
Treasury and shows the number of Regular Social Assistance and Job Seekers’ 
Allowance claimants as well as the number of workers employed in communi-
ty jobs through Pathway to Work.5 Table 16 of the publication reveals that by 
November 2009 almost 90 thousand workers participated in the programme, 
which is a large number in all respects. The one notable event in the history 
of the programme has been its expansion and extension by the Pathway to the 
World of Work SROP 1.1.3 programme worth HUF 7.5 billion. The aim of the 
extension is to allow job centres to offer employment other than public work 
to long-term unemployed Job Seekers’ Allowance claimants. If a labour mar-
ket position is available at the job centre, this should be offered in preference 
to public work, and it is this process that the extension programme supports.
An important change to the Job Seekers’ Allowance scheme has been that as 
of 1st January 2010 – only one person per family is entitled to the allowance. 
5 There are no official publi-
cations on the number of par-
ticipants that could be used to 
calculate the average annual size 
of the programme.
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If a family has more than one eligible unemployed member of active age, one 
may continue to claim Job Seekers’ Allowance while the others are only entitled 
to public work scheme participation (as a priority group) or training, and are 
given priority to participate in the Pathway to the World of Work programme. 
This change is difficult to justify on economic grounds and its welfare effects 
are questionable (see Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kiss’s study in Chapter 6 of In 
Focus for details). The change of government in spring 2010 has been accom-
panied by major changes in several areas of government administration and it 
would be little surprise if there was a turn in employment policy. As the Min-
istry for Social and Labour Policy has been dissolved, employment policy has 
been moved under the jurisdiction of the pertinent department of the Minis-
try for National Economy. The new government has replaced the head of the 
Office for Employment and Social Affairs and a substantial share of the Pub-
lic Employment Service regional job centres, and projected a radical overhaul 
of the entire system.
REFERENCES
ÁFSZ (2010): Munkaerő-piaci helyzetkép [A look at the 
labour market], 2009. Authored by Ágnes Nagy and 
Vilmosné Prima. Office for Employment and Social 
Affairs, Budapest, available at http://www.afsz.hu/
engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_eves_reszletes.
Bajnai Blanka, Hámori Szilvia & Köllő János 
(2008): The Hungarian Labour Market – A Europe-
an Perspective. In Fazekas Károly & Köllő János 
(eds.): The Hungarian Labour Market, 2008. MTA 
Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet-Országos Foglalkoz-
tatási Közalapítvány, Budapest
Cseres-Gergely Zsombor (2010) Munkapiaci áram-
lások, gereblyézés és a 2008 végén kibontakozó gaz-
dasági válság foglalkoztatási hatásai [Labour mar-
ket flows, raking and the employment effects of the 
economic crisis emerging at the end of 2008], BWP 4, 
MTA KTI, Budapest
Cseres-Gergely Zsombor & Scharle Ágota (2009): 
The Hungarian Labour Market in 2008–2009. In 
Fazekas Károly, Lovász Anna & Telegdy Álmos 
(eds.) The Hungarian Labour Market MTA KTI-OFA, 
Budapest, pp. 15–40.
Kőrösi Gábor (2005): A versenyszféra munkapiacának 
működése [The labour market of the private sector], 
KTI Könyvek, MTA KTI, Budapest.
KSH (2010a): Statisztikai Tükör [Statistical Report] No. 
42 Vol. IV, Népmozgalom January-December 2009 
http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idosza-
ki/nepmozg/nepmoz09.pdf
KSH (2010b): A válság hatása a munkaerőpiacra [The la-
bour market effects of the crisis]. Online publication, 
available at http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/
xftp/idoszaki/pdf/valsagmunkaeropiacra.pdf
KSH (2010c): Munkaerő-piaci jellemzők 2010. I. negyed-
évében. Statisztikai Tükör [Labour market statistics 
in the first quarter of 2010. Statistical Report], No. 
60, Vol. IV. available at http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/
docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/munkero/munkero101.pdf.
KSH-FSZH (2010): A válság hatása a munkaerőpiacra [The 
labour market effects of the crisis], KSH http://portal.
ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/pdf/valsag-
munkaeropiacra.pdf
MNB (2009): Jelentés az infláció alakulásáról [Report on 
inflation]. Hungarian National Bank, Bp., November.
MNB (2010): Jelentés az infláció alakulásáról [Report on 
inflation]. Hungarian National Bank, Budapest, June.
Scharle Ágota, Benczúr Péter, Kátay Gábor 
& Váradi Balázs (2010): Hogyan növelhető az 
adórendszer hatékonysága [How to improve the ef-
ficiency of the tax system] Közpénzügyi füzetek, 26.
IN FOCUS
LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS 
OF THE CRISIS
Edited by
György Molnár

fpreface
39
PREFACE
The In Focus section of The Hungarian Labour Market usually examines one 
specific area of the labour market based on available Hungarian empirical re-
search results. This time, we have expanded our perspective to a greater extent 
than usual, and have attempted to assess the effect of the crisis on the entire 
labour market, in fact including a survey of the effects on households as well.
Until now, the In Focus section has mostly presented well-developed research 
results that have been previously evaluated during academic debates. On the 
topic of the crisis, we cannot expect such a synthesis, since the processes un-
der study have not yet reached completion and the longitudinal datasets nec-
essary for the analysis are short, in actual fact, in the case of some topics (for 
example, household consumption), data covering the time period of the crisis 
are not yet available.
Despite these difficulties, more than two years after the beginning of the cri-
sis, we must reflect on it in depth. An extraordinary situation demands unusual 
reactions in research and in publication as well. This is also why we feel that it is 
necessary to consider not only direct, short-term labour market effects, but also 
indirect, long-term processes that manifest themselves via the households and 
the reproduction of the workforce. The labour market phenomena of the crisis 
cannot be understood if we disregard the responses of firms and households.
In the first chapter of In Focus, János Köllő examines the evolution of em-
ployment, unemployment, and wages in the first year of the crisis. The study 
focuses on the changes in the number of employees, average monthly paid work 
hours, and gross hourly incomes – and the relationship between these – based 
on calculations using a panel sample comprised of more than five thousand 
firms that were observed in May of both 2008 and 2009 in the wage survey of 
the National Employment and Social Office. The most important result of this 
analysis is that in the first year of the crisis, Hungarian firms mainly respond-
ed to the fall in demand, the narrowing of loan opportunities, and the falter-
ing of business confidence by downsizing employment. Based on data from 
the labour force survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), 
it can also be stated that the decrease in employment was primarily due to the 
deferred hiring of employees. The study concludes with a brief overview of the 
employment policy response to the crisis.
The In Focus section, in line with the practice that has evolved over previ-
ous years, briefly touches on a few topics related to the more detailed analyses. 
The study by Péter Elek and Ágota Scharle takes account of the European, and 
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within these, the Hungarian policy measures that were aimed at dampening 
the employment effects of the economic downturn. They find that the most 
important elements of Hungary’s crisis management were the encouragement 
and protection of labour demand.
András Semjén and János István Tóth provide a brief overview, based on firm 
survey data, of the steps taken by firms in response to the crisis. The results of the 
survey suggest that firms typically combine several different reactive measures 
that are effective in the short-term, and proactive crisis management measures 
that lead to long-term adaptation – no single preferred corporate strategy for 
crisis management can be pinpointed.
Compared to comprehensive analyses based on data reflecting the entire firm 
sector, Dorottya Boda and László Neumann use a different methodology. The 
authors summarize the results of two empirical studies, which mainly exam-
ined the effect of the crisis on firm management based on firm interviews. The 
study shows, through telling examples, under which conditions, and as a result 
of which employment decisions, do the specific events that can be measured 
in the labour market evolve. During this analysis, they also make note of the 
symptoms of the crisis that are felt by firms, the crisis management measures 
that have employment effects, and the role of government supports and the 
representatives of employee interests.
The data-rich study of Irén Busch and György Lázár demonstrates the main 
characteristics of an important subset of firm human resource measures, ma-
jor layoffs. Comprehensive data regarding this area are available via mandatory 
reporting-based datasets of the Public Employment Service. After an introduc-
tion of the legal background the authors compare the evolution of announced 
layoffs and registered unemployment over the last 10 years, then examine the 
developments between October of 2008 and June of 2010 in greater detail. The 
authors had the opportunity to link the data of workers affected by layoffs to 
the database of registered job seekers, so they were also able to track the evolu-
tion of the labour market status of affected workers.
The study by Hajnalka Lőcsei analyzes the effect of the crisis on regional in-
equalities in unemployment using the database of registered jobseekers. Based 
on the speed and type of the changes, she divides the time period between 
the fall of 2008 and the summer of 2010 into four sections, and describes the 
evolution of the spatial expansion of unemployment for each of these. She de-
termines that during the first stage of the crisis, the number of job seekers in-
creased significantly mostly in the districts with export-oriented firms, the most 
developed regions, and, within these, in the source locations of commuters. 
Later on, however, increasing unemployment became a regionally generalized 
phenomenon. Up until the lowest point of the crisis, the spatial duality of the 
labour market lessened somewhat and regional differences decreased, but this 
effect will probably only be temporary.
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The regional analysis is completed by two short studies. The study by Albert 
Faluvégi examines in more detail how the crisis affected the most disadvan-
taged micro-regions. He demonstrates the procedure for selecting these areas 
as well as their main characteristics, of which the very high, more than double 
the national average, unemployment stands out. He shows that the unemploy-
ment rate of these areas continued to increase during the crisis, but the devia-
tion from the average decreased somewhat – mostly due to the expansion of 
public employment.
The issue of commuting is an important component of the evolution of em-
ployment differences. Tamás Bartus analyses the relationship between com-
muting time and the rural-urban wage difference. The data needed for the 
calculations of the model are only available for the time period prior to the 
transition, but these also provide some important implications. The most im-
portant finding of the study is that in disadvantaged regions, the estimated 
costs due to time lost commuting reach and surpass the wage increases that 
can be achieved.
Due to the lack of recent data, the longer study of András Semjén and János 
István Tóth also attempts to draw conclusions based on earlier analyses regard-
ing the effects of the crisis on unreported employment. Within unreported 
employment, they focus on two types: “under the table” payments and “billed 
payments”. Differentiating between 13 types, they review what kind of effects 
the crisis may have had on the ratios of reported and unreported employment, 
or employment concealed as entrepreneurial activity. Their conclusion is that 
the economic crisis probably led to unreported or concealed work spreading 
more widely, and increasing in volume over the last two years.
The effect of the crisis on households stands at the center of the following 
studies. The micro-simulation analysis of Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kiss exam-
ines how the income position of households in different situations changed as 
a result of layoffs in the first year of the crisis. Using different characteristics 
from the labour force survey of the HCSO, they estimate the likelihood of 
job loss of employees and then analyze the income effects of job loss based on 
household budget surveys. Among other conclusions, they find that the prob-
ability of job loss is two to three times higher in the case of employees in lower 
income groups compared to that observed in higher income groups. The ab-
solute value of the average income loss due to job loss increases with income 
level, but the relative income loss is of similar magnitude for all income groups.
The study of István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi is composed of two 
main parts. First, they demonstrate the long term evolution of the main indica-
tors of the income distribution based on the Tárki household monitor survey, 
with a special focus on the changes between 2007 and 2009. These processes 
reflect not only the effects of the crisis, but also those of the consolidation meas-
ures of the earlier years. They find that in the last period, the situation of both 
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the rich and the poor has deteriorated, but that of the poor worsened signifi-
cantly. Compared to the “depolarization” observed earlier, the most important 
change is the polarization that occurred at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion. When examining polarization in employment, they reach the conclusion 
that employment decreased most in the case of those groups that previously 
had two employed workers in their household. The second part of the study 
details subjective living difficulties, the indebtedness of households and their 
difficulties paying off their loans. The ratio of households that were in need 
and reporting financial difficulties increased between 2007 and 2009. Diffi-
culties repaying debt increased, primarily in the case of lower income groups.
The brief study by Zsuzsa Kapitány is related to the latter topic and demon-
strates the changing consumer behaviour of households in the real estate and 
mortgage market. The study discusses the effect of the crisis on households ac-
quiring loans and specifically mortgage loans, the evolution of late payments, 
as well as the effects on the real estate market and real estate construction. She 
finds that households were forced to decrease their consumption sharply and 
to constrain acquiring loans, primarily mortgage loans, significantly as a result 
of the crisis, so the household sector as a whole became a net loan re-payer. At 
the same time, the ratio of those who made late payments or missed payments 
increased significantly.
Due to the unique nature of this year’s In Focus, we felt it necessary to include 
a non-traditional summary at the end of the section, which was prepared by 
the editor, György Molnár. In this, we aim to provide an overall picture of the 
most important results of the studies in the In Focus section, highlighting the 
relationships between the different studies as well as the differences that arise 
from the different approaches used by their authors.
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1. EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE FIRST YEAR  
OF THE CRISIS*
János Köllő
Introduction
In 2009, the average annual stock of employed persons fell by about one hun-
dred thousand compared to 2008. In relative terms, the number of employees 
was cut by 3.6 or 3.7 per cent, depending on how employee status is defined, 
while ILO-OECD employment decreased by 2.5 per cent, as shown in Table 1.1.1
Table 1.1: The number of employed persons and employees  
in 2006–2009 (thousands)
Year
Employed
Employees
Average annual number 
of persons participating 
in the activity of eco-
nomic organizations
Population aged 
15–64
Population aged 
15–74
2006 3,906 3,930 2,790 2,829
2007 3,897 3,926 2,761 2,806
2008 3,849 3,879 2,762 2,812
2009 3,751 3,781 2,661 2,710
Change 2009/2008
Thousand –98 –98 –101 –102
Per cent –2.5 –2.5 –3.7 –3.6
Source: Website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (http://ksh.hu). The 
first two columns are based on the Labour Force Survey while columns 3 and 4 are 
establishment-based.
Employment measured in hours fell by a slightly higher rate because the aver-
age monthly working hours of employees diminished by a little more than one 
per cent, as will be discussed later in more detail.
The ILO-OECD unemployment rate of prime age males (15–61 year olds) 
jumped from 7.8 per cent in July-December 2008 to 10.0 per cent in January-
June 2009 while the respective figures were 8.1 and 9.4 per cent for women.2 
Alternative indicators of unemployment followed similar time paths as shown 
in Table 1.2, and continued to grow until the first quarter of 2010. At the peak, 
in January-March 2010, the ILO-OECD rate reached 11.9 per cent, a level un-
precedented since 1995.3
The growth of unemployment was accompanied by a decline of the real wage. 
In 2009 the gross real wage fell by 3.4 per cent and the net real wage de creased 
by 2.3 per cent.4
* This chapter draws heavily 
from a study commissioned and 
published by the ILO and forth-
coming at Edward Elgar (Köllő 
2011). It also includes translated 
excerpts from Köllő (2010).
1 According to the ILO-OECD 
definition, a person is employed 
if she/he did at least one hour of 
gainful work in the week pre-
ceding the interview, or, was 
only temporarily absent from 
an existing job.
2 The data come from the Labour 
Force Survey, where individuals 
(i) out of work, (ii) ready to take 
up employment and (iii) actively 
searching for jobs are classified 
as unemployed, following the 
guidelines of the ILO and the 
OECD.
3 http://portal .ksh.hu/pls/
ksh/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/fog/
fog21003.pdf.
4 According to the HCSO’s on-
line Stadat data base (August 
26, 2010) gross and net earnings 
increased by 0,6 and 1.8 per cent 
while consumer prices went up 
by 4.2 per cent.
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Table 1.2: Unemployment ratesa using alternative definitions of joblessness
Definitions  
of unemployment
2006 2007 2008 2009
I. II. I. II. I. II. I. II.
Male
– Actively searching 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.6 7.8 10.0 10.8
– Registered 7.6 7.2 7.4 7.3 8.3 8.3 10.1 10.5
– Would like to workb 12.5 11.8 12.0 11.8 12.6 12.6 15.1 15.7
Female
– Actively searching 7.7 8.1 7.4 8.0 8.2 8.1 9.4 10.2
– Registered 8.8 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.9 8.9 10.2 10.9
– Would like to workb 15.1 15.1 14.5 14.5 15.2 15.0 16.6 17.2
a The unemployment rate is calculated as U/(E + U), where E is employment according 
to the ILO–OECD definition and U is the number of unemployed according to the 
definition given in the respective row
b Is not actively searching but wants paid employment
Note: The data relate to persons aged 15–61.
Source: Labour Force Surveys, author’s calculations.
The most comprehensive international comparative survey of reactions to the 
crisis so far (Verick–Islam, 2010) ranks Hungary among countries including 
Finland, Croatia and Slovenia, where a substantial fall of GDP was associated 
with a moderate fall of employment. The paper also examined the role of work-
ing time adjustment within total employment adjustment in the manufactur-
ing industry. In this respect, Hungary, Croatia and The Netherlands form a 
triad characterized by a substantial fall in the number of employees and mi-
nor cuts of working hours. Counter-examples are Germany, Austria, Island 
and Malta, where shortening the workweek made a decisive contribution. In 
Ireland, Estonia and Slovakia working time reductions played a less prevalent 
but still important role.
For the time being, there are several obstacles hindering a reliable cross-coun-
try comparison. Data on real wage evolutions during the crisis are still missing 
in several countries and time series distinguishing the public and private sec-
tors are hardly available. The existing figures on wages and working time typi-
cally relate to the manufacturing industry while the data on employment and 
GDP cover the whole economy. For the moment, only the latter indicators can 
be used for meaningful international comparison.
Panels a and b of Figure 1.1 show the position of OECD member states (and 
some other European countries) in terms of changes of GDP and employment 
in 2009. The best-fitting regression lines are added. The output elasticity of 
employment (slope of the regression line) is 0.62 for all countries and 0.42 for 
countries excluding the Baltic states, which experienced an extreme, two-digit 
fall in their GDP. The respective indicator (log change of employment divided 
by log change of GDP) amounted to 0.35 in Hungary. Even though employ-
ment fell mildly relative to the fall of GDP, Hungary ranks among the big los-
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ers of the crisis in terms of absolute change of employment: the vast majority of 
OECD countries (23 out of 35 shown in Figure 1.1) performed better in terms 
of employment change than did Hungary.
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Figure 1.1: Changes of GDP and employment in 36 countries, 2008–2009
 a) All countries b) Without Baltic states
Abbreviations: A – Austria, AUS – Australia, B – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CDN – 
Canada, CH – Switzerland, CHI – Chile, CZ – Czech Republic, D – Germany, DK 
– Denmark, E – Spain, EST – Estonia, F – France, GB – United Kingdom, GR – Greece, 
HU – Hungary, I – Italy, IRL – Ireland, IS – Island, KOR – Korea, LT – Lithuania, LUX 
– Luxemburg, LV – Latvia, MEX – Mexico, N – Norway, NL – Netherlands, NZ – New 
Zealand, P – Portugal, PL – Poland, RO – Romania, S – Sweden, SF – Finland, SI, – Slo-
venia, SK – Slovakia, TR – Turkey, USA – United States. Source: OECD and Eurostat 
on-line data bases, August 12, 2010
Figures similar to the ones presented in Figure 1.1 are to be interpreted with 
caution since they merge the public and private sectors, which followed rather 
different paths in many countries, including Hungary. The means relating to 
the whole economy are hotchpotch indicators that actually do not reflect the 
underlying processes taking place in either parts of the economy. As shown 
in Table 1.3, employment grew in the public sector while the real wage fell by 
two-digit percentages. By contrast, in the private sector, the real wage remained 
virtually unchanged and employment was cut substantially by 6.7 per cent.
Table 1.3: Changes of employment, wages and working hours, 2009
Public sectora Private sectorb Total
Number of employees 3.6 –6.7 –3.7
Real gross monthly earningsc –11.6 0.1 –4.5
Average monthly working hours per employeed –1.3 –1.1 –1.1
a Nonprofits included. Employees include those doing public works.
b Firms employing at least 5 workers.
c Consumer price index: 1.042.
d Annual mean of quarterly figures.
Source: HCSO Stadat, August 25, 2010 except for working time: June 8, 2010.
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In the remainder of this chapter we study the dynamics and relation to each 
other of changes in employment, wages and working hours in the private sec-
tor. It seems that there is no point in repeating the analysis for the public sec-
tor, where the number of permanent employees did not change (fell by 0.4 per 
cent excluding people doing public works) and wages fell as a result of across-
the-board measures such as the abolishment of the 13th month’s salary and an 
(unofficial but effective) ban on pay rises. Therefore, in the public sector, we do 
not expect remarkable structural changes to be explained.
The study of the private sector is primarily concerned with the issue of “hard” 
versus “soft” adjustment. The countries of Europe reacted to the crisis in sharply 
different ways: in Germany, unemployment grew by 0.2 percentage points de-
spite a 5 per cent fall of GDP while in Spain a recession implying a 3.6 per cent 
fall of GDP brought about a 6.7 percentage points increase in unemployment 
(Verick–Islam, 2010, 25). In Hungary, there was much talk about soft adjust-
ment via shortening the workweek and pay cuts, but the actual contribution of 
these measures should be judged on the basis of data rather than media coverage.
Soft versus hard adjustment
In a competitive labour market with finitely elastic supply and demand, both 
employment and wages are expected to respond to a negative aggregate shock. 
Why the textbook predictions so often fail is an old and much debated ques-
tion in labour economics. Several theories have been developed to understand 
why we observed large fluctuations in employment, and small ones in the real 
wage, over the business cycles of the US and some other developed market 
economies. In a monopoly union setting or in the case of efficient bargaining, 
for instance, we expect that the burden of adjustment predominantly falls on 
employment (McDonald and Solow 1982, Brueckner 2001). Similar conclu-
sions follow from the theories of implicit contracts (Azariadis 1975, Feldstein 
1976, 1978, Rosen 1985) and intertemporal substitution over the life cycle 
(Lucas and Rapping 1969).
Despite the theoretical predictions of strong cyclicality in employment and 
less in wages the recent empirical evidence is mixed. In a study of the cyclical-
ity of manufacturing employment and wages between 1960 and 2004 Messi-
na, Strozzi and Turunen (2009) find substantial cross-country variations even 
after controlling for the type of data and methods used in measuring cyclical-
ity. They identify positive correlation between the cyclicality of real wages and 
the cyclicality of employment, but identify groups of countries having rather 
different positions along these dimensions. The available data on the current 
crisis also suggest high diversity across countries.
In a transitory downturn, reductions in hours and pay cuts may be attractive 
options if firing and hiring costs are high and firm-specific skills are impor-
tant. When plant utilization is temporarily low, firms may also prefer training 
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their workers since the costs of accumulating firm-specific skills are lower. Re-
acting to a negative shock in ways other than dismissals is easier if institutions 
supporting the adjustment of hours and wages are at hand, as emphasized in 
Bellmann and Gerner (2009). One institution of this kind is working time ac-
counts allowing that employees work longer or shorter hours than usual and 
thereby collect working time credits or debits in an individual account, which 
are later compensated for by additional leisure or work. Similarly, softer meas-
ures can be encouraged by pacts for employment and competitiveness in which 
employees accept lower wages and reduced working time and employers guar-
antee jobs, training, and offer financial participation (Bellmann, Gerlach and 
Meyer 2008). Profit sharing can also make wage adjustment easier since it es-
tablishes an automatic link between workers’ pay and the fluctuations of busi-
ness fortune.
The institutional features of the Hungarian labour market make the adjust-
ment of both employment and wages relatively easy but there are few formal 
agreements and legal institutions explicitly encouraging a heterodox reaction 
to a negative shock.
Union coverage is low and has been declining since the start of the transition. 
According to the Labour Force Survey, the share of union members amounted 
to 20 per cent in 2001, 17 per cent in 2004 and 12 per cent in 2009. The pro-
portion of workers employed in unionized firms fell from 38 per cent in 2001 
to 33 percent in 2004 and 28 per cent in 2008. The share of workers covered 
by collective agreements declined from 25 per cent in 2004 to 21 per cent in 
2009. The agreements are typically concluded with a single-employer and are 
not extended. Furthermore, the unions seem to be relatively weak as suggest-
ed by estimates of a small (0–2 per cent) regression-adjusted union wage gap 
(Neumann 2002, Rigó 2009).
There are few legal constraints on employment and wage setting, with the most 
important one being the minimum wage. The minimum wage-average wage 
ratio (34.7 per cent just before the crisis) can not be considered high by inter-
national comparison but the real minimum wage has been constantly grow-
ing over the last ten years. The adjustment of the minimum wage is negotiated 
annually at the national level, by employer organizations and unions, allowing 
careful policies in hard times, but unions generally start the negotiations with 
ambitious goals and usually achieve at least modest increases in real terms.5 It 
was the case at the beginning of the recent crisis too, as will be discussed later.
Only a single estimate of adjustment costs is available (Kőrösi and Surányi 
2003) suggesting that hiring and firing are relatively inexpensive by interna-
tional comparison. Training costs probably do not play an important role in 
firms’ decisions since the fraction of Hungarians participating in adult train-
ing is one of the lowest in Europe and on-the-job training is particularly in-
frequent (Bajnai et al. 2009). Hungary’s employment protection (EPL) index 
5 The real net minimum wage 
increased in all years between 
1998 and 2008.
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is the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe and one of the lowest in the EU 
(Cazes and Nesporova 2007).
Institutions encouraging the combination of employment, hours and wage 
adjustment are undeveloped in Hungary. Formal agreements similar to the 
pacts for employment and competitiveness do not exist to the best of the au-
thor’s knowledge. Working time accounts have not been established as a le-
gal institution, in contrast to the Czech Republic and Germany, for instance, 
where about half of the medium-sized and large companies are covered (Bell-
mann and Gerner 2009). The fraction of workers involved in profit sharing 
agreements is one of the lowest in Europe with Hungary preceding only Por-
tugal and Cyprus (European Foundation 2007). Still, it would be mistaken to 
rush to the conclusion that these practices simply do not exist. We have ample 
anecdotal evidence that working time accounts are applied informally. Profit 
sharing also exists informally as suggested by a relatively high elasticity of wag-
es with respect to the firm’s productivity (Mickiewicz and Köllő 2004, Com-
mander and Faggio 2004). Employer and employees may also conclude infor-
mal agreements on saving jobs by means of soft measures, and we hope to find 
the traces of such agreements when we look at how firms actually combined 
staff reductions, wage cuts and reductions in hours during the current crisis.
Firms’ reactions to the crisis
In this section, we look at variations in the changes of employment, hours and 
wages using longitudinal firm-level data covering May 2008 and 2009. The 
estimation of a full causal model – explaining how the crisis affected firms’ 
decisions on the level and composition of employment and wages – is beyond 
the capacity of the data at hand. We do not have, as yet, firm-level data on the 
changes of output and other variables capturing the size of the shock to which 
the firm had to respond. This will be approximated with two-digit industry-
level data on the changes of output, which is an admittedly second-best solu-
tion. Equally important, the identification of causal effects in a system with 
several endogenous variables would require exogenous instruments having 
impact on particular outcomes without affecting others. Such instruments 
are not available in the data set. The available variables like firm size, industry, 
ownership, union coverage, exposure to the minimum wage and skill compo-
sition are likely to affect employment, hours and wages simultaneously. There-
fore we use a descriptive three-equations model explaining the log change of 
employment (L), monthly working hours (H) and average hourly wages ( w ) .
 ΔlnLi = Xiβ + ui (1a)
 ΔlnHi = Xiγ + vi (1b)
 Δln w i = Xiδ + ωi (1c)
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The equations have the same set of explanatory variables (X) so the coeffi-
cients and the standard errors are the same as if the equations were estimated 
one by one with OLS. By estimating (1a-1c) jointly as a system of seemingly 
unrelated regressions we can study the correlations between the residuals u, v 
and ω and test if the three equations are independent.
In a second step, we show that the changes of average wages were strongly 
affected by changes in the firms’ skill composition. By regressing Δlnw– on 
changes in the demographic and skill composition of the workforce and tak-
ing the residuals  (ζ)  as in equation (2) we can get a measure that is controlled 
for compositional effects. (In the equation AGE stands for average age, EDU 
denotes average years in school and MALE relates to the share of men within 
the firm.) Then, after replacing Δlnw– with ζ in an equation similar to (1c), we 
can check how residual wages were affected by the X-s.
 ζi = Δlnw
–
i   – β1ΔAGEi – β2ΔEDUi  – β3ΔMALEi  – c. (2)
The analysis relates to 5,173 firms observed in 2008 and 2009 in the Wage 
Survey (WS). A description of the survey, analysis of selection to the panel 
and a comparison of descriptive statistics to published figures are presented 
in Appendix 1. Here we turn to the estimation results presented in Table 1.4.
As shown in the first row, industry output has a significant positive effect on 
both employment and hours and has no effect on wages. The estimated elas-
ticity is rather weak (0.055) and most probably downward-biased since the in-
dustry’s change of output measures the firm-specific shocks with a wide mar-
gin of error. Unfortunately, firm-level data and three or four-digit sector level 
data were not available at the writing of this text. The change in output had a 
weak effect on working hours (0.027) and no effect on wages.
Male-dominated firms lost more jobs and had worse-than-average wage re-
cords. Firms, in which the male’s share was higher by one standard deviation 
(31 per cent) lost more by about 1 per cent in terms of employment and 0.7 per 
cent in terms of average wages. Skills also seem to matter: a one standard de-
viation (1.5 year) difference in workers’ average years in school implied about 
1 per cent higher employment and 1.1 per cent lower wage in 2009 relative to 
2008. Average age had no effect on employment and hours but affected wages 
marginally: a workforce older by 6.3 years (one standard deviation) implied 
that wages grew slower by 0.6 per cent.
Firm size has a marked effect on employment and some impact on hours while 
its effect on wages is insignificant. Small and medium-sized firms lost less jobs 
than large ones (300+ employees) by 8, 4, 2 and 2 per cent, respectively, as we 
move from the bottom to the top of the size ladder. This pattern is probably 
explained by differences in exposure to exports: we find the advantage of the 
smallest firms to be much larger (12 per cent) in manufacturing, where larger 
firms tend to be either exporters or suppliers of exporters, than in the rest of 
the economy (5 per cent).
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Table 1.4: Changes of employment, working hours and hourly wages –  
multivariate regressions (firm panel)
Dependent: log change of
Employment Working hours Hourly wage
β T β T β T
Log change of industry’s  
output 0.0551 2.06 0.0265 4.00 –0.0198 –1.17
Share of men –0.0289 –2.23 0.0029 0.91 –0.0256 –3.11
Average years in school 0.0047 1.69 0.0008 1.23 –0.0069 –3.90
Average age –0.0002 –0.45 –0.0001 –0.83 –0.0009 –2.58
Fraction paid the base  
minimum wage 0.0039 0.22 –0.0054 –1.22 0.0418 3.65
Fraction paid the skilled 
minimum wage –0.0400 –2.67 –0.0112 –3.03 0.0003 0.04
Covered by collective  
agreement 0.0196 2.24 –0.0003 –0.18 0.0081 1.46
Majority state-owned 0.0361 2.24 0.0057 1.44 0.0001 0.04
Majority foreign-owned –0.0027 –0.24 –0.0049 –1.77 0.0030 0.42
0–10 employees 0.0845 5.27 0.0069 1.76 –0.0007 –0.07
11–20 employees 0.0431 2.59 0.0027 0.67 0.0161 1.53
21–50 employees 0.0235 1.47 0.0068 1.73 0.0036 0.35
51–300 employees 0.0188 1.33 0.0071 2.05 –0.003 –0.42
Personal services 0.1004 3.07 0.0028 0.35 –0.0165 –0.80
Water 0.0836 3.69 0.0072 1.30 0.0025 0.18
Health (private) 0.0758 3.38 0.0202 3.65 –0.0275 –1.93
Agriculture 0.0692 4.40 0.0122 3.15 –0.0058 –0.59
Energy 0.0594 2.08 0.0127 1.79 0.0155 0.86
Mining 0.0568 1.28 0.0069 0.63 0.0380 1.35
Finance, insurance 0.0535 2.35 0.0175 3.12 0.0050 0.35
Professional services 0.0529 2.57 0.0093 1.84 0.0240 1.85
Communication 0.0513 2.13 0.0075 1.26 0.0213 1.40
Transport 0.0428 2.50 0.0026 0.63 –0.006 –0.64
Culture (private) 0.0346 1.06 –0.0243 –3.00 0.0202 0.98
Hotels & Restaurants 0.0299 1.49 0.0088 1.78 –0.0066 –0.52
Real estate 0.0227 0.89 0.0034 0.54 –0.0032 –0.20
Trade 0.0225 2.01 0.0057 2.10 –0.0108 –1.53
Construction 0.0129 0.91 0.0060 1.71 –0.0075 –0.84
Administrative services –0.0016 –0.09 –0.0011 –0.25 –0.0042 –0.36
Education (private) –0.0807 –2.26 0.0098 1.12 0.0313 1.38
Constant –0.1336 –2.99 –0.0248 –2.25 0.1606 5.68
R2 0.0376 –0.0072 0.0173
Correlation of the residuals:
Employment-hours: 0.0117. Employment-wage: –0.0072. Hours-wage: –0.3107
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2=500.185 (0.0000)
Number of observations: 5,173
Reference industry: manufacturing. Industries are ordered by the size of the coeffi-
cients in the employment equation.
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As far as industry effects are concerned, the employment records of manufac-
turing, construction and real estate appear to be statistically identical, while 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants seem to have lost fewer jobs. Three groups of 
sectors stand out (i) water, energy and transport (ii) personal services, finance 
and insurance and (iii) agriculture. In these sectors, employment fell less by 
5–9 per cent relative to manufacturing (where it was cut by 12.2 per cent) even 
after controlling for the change in sales revenues. Inelastic domestic demand 
for some of the aforementioned services, market power and a high share of 
self-governing firms (family businesses, partnerships of friends and relatives) 
are factors potentially explaining why employment suffered less in these in-
dustries. We do not observe trade-offs between employment and hours and/
or wages on the sector level: in sectors losing less jobs average working hours 
changed favorably, too, while the industry wage effects were insignificant with 
only two exceptions (agriculture and professional services, both weakly signifi-
cant at the 5 per cent level).
State-owned firms lost fewer jobs than did domestic private ones by 3.6 per-
cent, and held average hours higher by 0.6 percent. In terms of wages they did 
not differ from their private counterparts. The estimates relating to foreign 
firms are insignificant and hint at negligible difference between them and do-
mestic private enterprises.
Exposure to changes in the minimum wage is measured with the fraction 
earning near the base minimum wage (MW±1,000 HUF) and the skilled 
minimum wage (SMW±1,000 HUF). More workers paid the MW in the base 
period predict faster average wage growth but having more SMW earners has 
no wage effect. A firm with only MW earners increased the average wage faster 
by about 4 per cent compared to a company with no MW earners, consistent 
with the fact that the base MW grew by 3.6 per cent. At the same time, we do 
not observe larger-than-average employment and hours cuts in firms with more 
MW earners. Firms with many SMW workers did lose more jobs and also cut 
working hours more than did their observationally similar counterparts. These 
cuts are hardly explained by the tiny (0.8 per cent) rise in the nominal SMW 
but the existence of a floor may have prevented enterprises from reducing the 
wages of skilled employees.6
Finally, the estimates suggest that firms covered by collective agreements valid 
for 2009 kept the level of employment higher by about 2 per cent compared to 
their observationally similar counterparts. The estimates relating to working 
hours are insignificant. It seems that wages grew slightly faster than elsewhere 
but the coefficients are not significant at conventional levels.
To summarize the regression results, the employment effects of the variables 
in equation (1) are mostly significant and often rather strong. The variations 
in average working hours seem much smaller while wage evolutions were large-
ly unrelated to the variables in the model. Apart from the variables depicting 
6 In 2008 the regulations dis-
tinguished three mandatory 
minima: the base minimum 
wage (MW), the skilled mini-
mum wage (SMW=1.25MW) 
and a reduced minimum for 
younger skilled workers with 
less than 3 years experience 
(YSMW=1.2MW). In Septem-
ber 2008, the unions started the 
negotiations with the claim of a 
15.9 per cent rise in the MW, 14.7 
per cent rise in the YSMW and 
10.1 per cent rise in the SMW 
starting from January 2009. 
Given a consensus inf lation 
forecast of 4.2 per cent at the 
start of the negotiations these 
hikes would have implied 11.2, 
10.0 and 6.3 per cent increase 
of the minima in real terms, 
respectively. Even at the end of 
November, two months into the 
crisis, the unions demanded a 
10.9 per cent rise in the base MW 
in nominal terms, and insisted 
on their original claims regard-
ing the SMWs. Finally, under 
the pressure of the crisis the 
parties agreed to a 3.6 per cent 
increase of the MW, 5.1 per cent 
rise in the YSMW and a mere 
0.8 per cent rise in the SMW in 
nominal terms. More precisely, 
the negotiations resulted in the 
elimination of YSMW and the 
setting of a uniform SMW equal 
to 87,000 HUF, which implied 
the percentage changes quoted 
above.
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the base-period composition of the workforce and the share of MW earners 
almost all the other variables in equation (1c) are statistically insignificant.
The only significant variable in the wage equation re-estimated with ζ rather 
than Δlnw– on the left hand is the base-period share of MW earners. (The coef-
ficient is 0.053, significant at the 1 per cent level.) Since ζ captures the change in 
the cost of labour more precisely than Δlnw– we conclude that wage evolutions 
were unrelated to industry, firm size, ownership, union coverage and region.7 
On closer inspection the same seems to apply to the effect of skill composition. 
The employment and wage equations (1a, 1c) give the impression that firms with 
a skilled labour force adapted to the crisis by cutting wages but keeping employ-
ment relatively high – an outcome consistent with expectations grounded in 
the theories of quasi-fixed costs and firm-specific skills. The re-estimated equa-
tion suggests that the cost of labour actually did not fall in these enterprises – 
this is a statistical illusion generated by the changing composition of the staff. 
Firms employing many skilled workers dismissed more skilled workers, even 
in relative terms, which led to lower average wages.
The close-to-zero correlations between the residuals u, v and ω of equations 
(1a-1c) suggest that the firm-specific changes of employment and hours, and 
employment and hourly wages, were independent of each other. By contrast, 
the residual changes of hours and hourly wages are relatively strongly correlat-
ed (–0.31). This result arises for two reasons. On the one hand, monthly earn-
ings do not fall proportionately when working hours are cut therefore falling 
hours are associated with rising hourly earnings. On the other hand, errors in 
the reporting of hours can establish a spurious correlation between Δw and 
ΔH.8 In view of this risk, a system similar to (1a-1c) was estimated by dropping 
the hours equation and working with monthly rather than hourly wages. The 
residual correlation between the changes of employment and monthly wages 
amounted to –0.02 in this case, too, and the Breusch-Pagan test did not reject 
the independence of the two equations.
A note on union effects
The finding that employment fell less in unionized firms as in the rest of the 
private sector, all else equal, is an interesting one but needs further inspection. 
The OLS results can be biased for at least two reasons.
First, controlling the employment equation for firm size, industry and other 
variables is insufficient to ensure that we compare comparable firms. Therefore 
the employment effect of collective agreements is further analyzed with pro-
pensity score matching following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). We use Stata’s 
pscore module developed by Becker and Ichino (2002) at this aim. As shown in 
Table 1.5 nearest neighbor matching suggests a statistically insignificant effect 
of 1.7 per cent while the stratification method and the kernel matching model 
results in significant effects of 1.9 and 2.0 per cent, respectively.9
7 The regional variables (NUTS-
3 dummies, NUTS-4 unemploy-
ment rates) were insignificant in 
all specifications and dropped 
from the models.
8 Assume that all firms cut work-
ing hours but only some of them 
report it. Assume further that all 
firms hold genuine hourly wages 
constant. In the non-reporting 
group, the estimated hourly 
wages (monthly pay/observed 
hours) fall and observed hours 
remain constant. In the report-
ing group the calculated hourly 
wage rises and observed hours 
fall. At the end of the day we 
observe a negative correlation 
between the observed changes of 
hours and hourly wages.
9 Note that the estimated effects 
are “average treatment effects 
on the treated” (ATT), larger 
than the average treatment ef-
fects (ATE) capturing the re-
turns to coverage for a randomly 
selected firm.
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Table 1.5: Estimates of the effect of collective agreements  
on the changes of employment 2008–2009
Model Effect t
OLS 2.0*** 2.24
ATT nearest neighbor matchingb 1.7 1.44
ATT stratification method 2.0*** 2.77
ATT kernel matching method 1.9*** 2.26c
a The propensity score equation included firm size, size squared and size cubed, share 
of men, average age and average years in school.
b The propensity score models were estimated for unweighted sample and excluding 
heavy outliers. ATT stands for average treatment effect on the treated.
c Based on bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications.
Second, selection to treatment (having a collective agreement in 2009) might 
be affected by unobserved characteristics simultaneously affecting the prob-
ability of concluding a collective agreement and the change of employment 
in 2009. It may be the case, for instance, that firms with a better outlook for 
2009 were more likely to conclude an agreement with their unions or workers’ 
councils – in this case their favorable employment records should be interpret-
ed as a cause rather than an effect. For addressing endogeneity we would need 
instruments correlated with coverage but uncorrelated with unobserved fac-
tors implying better employment outcomes in 2009. Such instruments are not 
available in the WS data set. Therefore, we address endogeneity in an indirect 
way, by showing that firms foreseeing a larger decline in their industry’s sales 
revenues were more likely to conclude an agreement in 2009. Likewise, firms 
operating in high-unemployment regions were more likely to extend their col-
lective agreements to 2009.
Table 1.6: The effects of industry-level change of output and local unemployment  
on the probability of being covered by collective agreement in 2009 (firm panel)
Sample
Number  
of firms
Covered  
in 2009
Logita marginal effect of
industrial output May 
2009/May 2008 (log)
micro-region unemploy-
ment rate 2007 (log)
All firms 5,432 1,480 –0.5745*** 
(8.72)
00316*** 
(3.25)
Firms covered in 2008 1,407 1,067 –0.4694*** 
(4.01)
0.0685*** 
(3.70)
Firms uncovered in 2008 4,025 413 –0.5849 
(1.02)
0.0295 
(0.35)
a Logit with a coverage dummy on the left hand and the two listed variables on the 
right-hand.
Results from our substitute for the study of endogeneity are presented in Table 
1.6. The first column shows that a one per cent difference in the industry’s out-
put had a half per cent effect on the probability of concluding an agreement. 
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This result holds for all firms as well as firms having an agreement in 2008. The 
second column suggests that companies operating in high-unemployment re-
gions were more likely to conclude a collective agreement in 2009. The coeffi-
cients are similarly signed and have similar magnitudes in the case of firms un-
covered in 2008 but covered in 2009, but the effects are statistically insignificant. 
The data suggest that collective agreements were stimulated by hardships rather 
than expected improvements in the firm’s environment and call into question 
if the gains estimated with OLS and propensity score matching are illusory.
While the presence of unions was conducive to smaller than average rate of 
job loss, it did not imply that wages and working hours fell more than elsewhere. 
The question of how profits and prices were affected remains a question to be 
addressed when financial data become available.
Rigidity of wages and working hours – further inspection using 
individual data
In evaluating the results presented in the previous section one has to consider 
that firm-level average wages and working hours had been calculated by aggre-
gating individual data. The firm-level means are precise in the case of small firms 
(since the WS covers all of their employees) and sufficiently precise in the case 
of large firms (where the within-firm samples are large enough). However, in 
the case of medium-sized firms we generate the firm-level means using a small 
number of observations. The resulting measurement error leads to attenuation 
bias and leads to potentially mistaken conclusions concerning the impacts of 
firm-level attributes on wages and hours. In this section we study individual 
panel data, which confirm the conclusions drawn from the regression model in 
that they show the distribution of wages and working hours remarkably stable 
in 2008–2009. (See Appendix 1 on how the individual panel was constructed.)
Wages
The four panels of Figure 1.2 show average wages in 2008 and 2009 in 100 per-
centile groups of the 2008 wage distribution. Members of the panel were sorted 
by their earnings in 2008 and were divided into 100 groups. The base-period 
average earnings of these groups are measured on the horizontal axis while 
their earnings in 2009 are shown on the vertical axis. Base period earnings are 
also indicated on the vertical axis by a 45o line. The closer a point to the 45o line 
the smaller the change in the wages of the respective group. Panels a and b re-
late to gross earnings while panel c and d show net figures. Wages in 2009 are 
expressed in real terms by discounting their values using the consumer price 
index (1.036 between May 2008 and 2009). In order to improve visibility the 
charts covering percentiles 1–75 and 76–100 are shown separately and loga-
rithmic scales are applied. In chart a) the base minimum wage and the skilled 
minimum wage are indicated by vertical lines.
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The charts suggest that real wages did not change in the middle and top of 
the distribution: in percentiles 12–100 the monthly gross real wage fell by 0.4 
per cent while the net real wage grew by 1 per cent. By contrast, in percentiles 
1–11 the gross and net real wage increased by 6.9 and 6.6 per cent, respectively.
Developments in this part of the distribution can not be explained by changes 
in the minimum wages since the base minimum wage did not change in real 
terms in 2009 and the skilled minimum wage actually decreased. Composi-
tional effects can be ruled out as we compare groups of fixed membership. The 
observation is probably explained by random events: workers, who earned much 
less than their permanent wage in 2008 – for reasons of unpaid leave, sickness, 
or entry to the firm during May 2008 – returned to (or reached) their “normal” 
wage level in 2009. The conjecture that large increases at the bottom of the dis-
tribution are explained by such exceptional events is supported by the fact that 
median earnings did not rise in real terms in percentiles 1–11.
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Figure 1.2: Individual earnings in 2008 and 2009
a) Gross earnings in percentiles 1–75  
of the 2008 wage distribution
b) Net earnings in percentiles 1–75  
of the 2008 wage distribution
c) Gross earnings in percentiles 76–100  
of the 2008 wage distribution
d) Net earnings in percentiles 1–75  
of the 2008 wage distribution
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The individual data thus suggest that the insignificant, close-to-zero coeffi-
cients estimated in the wage regressions are explained by the stability of the 
wage distribution rather than measurement error. In the first year of the crisis 
Hungarian firms left wages virtually unchanged. Changes in enterprise aver-
age wages did occur but were unrelated to industrial and regional affiliation, 
firm size, ownership, union coverage and composition of the workforce.
Working time
Similar to the case of wages, our attempts at explaining the changes in work-
ing hours might have failed because of measurement error. Therefore, in this 
section we check how paid working hours changed on the individual level be-
tween May 2008 and 2009.
In the individual panel, the number of monthly paid working hours per em-
ployee decreased by 1.6 per cent. The distribution of the 52,409 observed work-
ers by change of working hours is shown in Figure 1.3. Panel a covers the cases 
falling to the range of ±60 hours per month. (Only 1.5 per cent of all workers 
fell outside this range). In order to improve visibility we add panel b that is re-
stricted to changes in the ±40 hours range, and ignores zero change account-
ing for more than 50 per cent of all observations.
Figure 1.3: The size distribution of members of the worker panel  
by change in their monthly paid working hours between May 2008 and 2009
a) Distribution in the range of ±60 hours b) Distribution in the range of ±40 hours. Zero change excluded
In both the positive and negative domains changes amounting to 8, 16, 24, 32 
and 40 hours a month (1, 2, …, 5 days) occurred frequently and the columns 
indicating decreases are taller than those standing for increases. The difference 
is sizeable at 8 hours: people observing 8 hours fall in their monthly working 
time clearly outnumbered those having 8 hours increase. We conclude from 
these data that about 5 per cent of the total sample was affected by a typically 
minor shortening of working time.
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Given that everybody working less than 40 hours a week is regarded as a part-
timer in Hungary, the small change in working hours brought about a rela-
tively large (5.5 percentage points) hike in the share of part-timers, as shown 
in the first row of Table 1.7. Further rows of the table help clarify how to eval-
uate this figure.
First, there is a striking difference between the data reported by firms and 
workers: the number of LFS respondents reporting less than 40 hours of gain-
ful work in the reference week (second row) grew only by 1.3 per cent. This gap 
is probably explained by the working of a “4 days work + 1 day training” pro-
gram that was subsidized using EU funds. The program required that firms 
classify the involved workers as part-timers for the duration of the program 
while workers probably interpreted their obligation to attend training as work.
Table 1.7: Changes in different measures of part-time employment, 
 2008–2009 (percentage points)
Concept Data source Respondents Change
Actual paid hours in May fell short of 168 hours/month Wage Survey Firms 5.5
Actual hours in the reference week fell short of 40 hours LFSb Workers 1.3
Had part-time contract in May HCSO ELSa Firms 1.7
Had part-time contract in April-June LFSb Workers 1.2
a Hungarian Central Statistical Office Establishment-based Labour Statistics 2008, 
2009
b Labour Force Survey, April-June, 2008, 2009
Secondly, it seems that the workweek was often shortened without re-writing 
the worker’s employment contract: the share of such contracts grew only by 1.7 
and 1.2 per cent according to firms and workers, respectively.
Altogether we perceive that relatively few people were shifted from full-time 
to part-time jobs in the first year of the crisis, even less on a permanent basis, 
and even the seemingly large changes (as the 5.5 per cent figure in the first row 
of Table 1.5) hide small shifts in actual working hours. Predictably, a large part 
of these changes were accounted for by government-sponsored programs. Ac-
cording to establishment-based statistics10 the number of part-time employees 
in firms employing five or more workers increased by 36,800 in 2008–2009 
while job retention subsidies affected 52,000 workers. These data lead us to 
think that working time reductions outside the subsidized firms occurred 
rather infrequently, if at all.
“Hard adjustment” – How hard it was?
Evidence based on the firm panel suggested that Hungarian businesses primar-
ily reacted to the crisis by cutting employment. A net decrease in employment 
does not necessarily imply that firms fired their incumbent employees on a mas-
sive scale. The available data suggest that about 15 per cent of the workforce of 
Hungarian enterprises is accounted for by new recruitment at any point in time 
10 http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/
ksh/docs/hun/xstadat/xsta-
dat_eves/tabl2_01_20_02ib.
html
in focus
58
(workers entering the firm in the preceding 12 months). Therefore, in a purely 
technical sense, the average firm is able to cut its staff by two digit percentages 
within a short time without dismissing any incumbent workers. It seems that 
Hungarian businesses indeed responded to the crisis by bringing hiring to a 
halt rather than dismissing an exceptionally large fraction of their workforce.
We study the contributions of firing and hiring to the net loss of jobs indi-
rectly, using data on flows in and out of employment before and during the cri-
sis. The discussion is based on panels built from the quarterly waves of the LFS. 
The Hungarian LFS follows workers for 1.5 years – households are interviewed 
six times and then replaced with a randomly selected new cohort. Utilizing 
the rotating panel structure of the LFS we can measure up the magnitude of 
job loss and job finding with some precision. Although we do not observe all 
flows in and out of employment we can observe if an individual was employed 
in quarter t and non-employed in quarter t+1, and vice versa. Many of the short 
spells of employment and non-employment remain unobserved with such data 
at hand – a deficiency we can not avert.
Following Jenkins (1995) we estimate discrete time duration models, in 
which members of two risk groups (employed and non-employed) are followed 
over time. The conditional job loss and job finding probabilities are estimated 
using constant and time-varying characteristics (X and Z) and time spent in 
the risk group (t) as explanatory variables. In equation (3) the term f(t) stands 
for a set of dummy variables denoting that the person was employed (non-em-
ployed) for 1,2,…,T periods. In the case of employment t is measured in years 
of tenure in the current job as a continuous variable while in the case of non-
employed individuals t is measured with dummies standing for the months 
of joblessness. The function g(τ) collects the parameters of a set of dummies 
measuring calendar time (quarters).
 Pr (exit between t and t + 1 = βX + γZt + g(τ) + f(t) (3)
Model (3) is estimated for a pool of 1.12 million observations from 2006.
Q1–2009.Q3. The 2010.Q1 wave of the LFS was not available at the writing 
of this text so we do not know the direction of exit from the populations ob-
served in 2009.Q4. The observed period was split into two overlapping parts: 
one from 2006.Q1 to 2008.Q2 and another from 2008.Q2 to 2009.Q3. Split-
ting the period in this way has the advantage of observing if the parameters are 
the same before and during the crisis and ensuring that the calendar time ef-
fects can be connected using 2008.Q2. as the reference wave in both periods.
The estimation results are presented in Appendix 2. Here we start with the 
calendar time effects shown in Figure 1.4. Surprisingly, we do not see a large in-
crease in the rate of job loss during the crisis – flows out of employment jumped 
high in 2008 October – December but a similar hike could be observed one 
year earlier. The job loss rate followed an increasing trend throughout 2006–
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2009, and the period of the crisis seems to fit the trend. By contrast, the job 
finding rate followed a decreasing trend in 2006–2008, and deteriorated mark-
edly during the crisis.
Figure 1.4: The impact of calendar time on the probabilities  
of job loss and job finding (Logit odds ratios. Reference period: 2008.Q2.)
 (a) Quarterly rates (b) Three-quarters moving average
Looking back in time, we observe a dramatic slump in the job finding rate in 
July-December 2006 that was most probably associated with the announc-
ing of a strict austerity program in June and the outbreak of political unrest in 
September-October (panel a). It seems that in 2008, too, enterprises reacted to 
the arising uncertainties by drastically cutting hiring: in October-December 
the probability of escape from unemployment dropped to an exceptionally low 
level. Parts of the vacancies left open at the end of 2008 were most probably 
filled in January-March 2009, when the job finding rate jumped high tempo-
rarily. If we smooth the zigzag by applying 3-quarters moving averages (panel 
b) the widening gap between the rates of job loss and job finding becomes eas-
ily observable.
The slump in hiring strongly affected the baseline hazard of exit from non-
employment (Figure 1.5). The baseline hazard captures how the risk of exit is 
affected by the duration of joblessness holding other observed characteristics 
constant.11 The anti-clockwise shift of the baseline hazard curve at t=4 indi-
cates that workers in the first four months of unemployment were less likely 
to get back to employment, and more likely to become long-term unemployed, 
in the period of the crisis.
The observed slump in hiring provides part of the explanation of why wage 
cuts and working time reductions did not play an important role in the adjust-
ment to the crisis. Negotiations leading to soft measures are likely to develop 
if the jobs of many incumbents are at risk. The motivation for such negotia-
tions is obviously weaker if firms react to the crisis by not replacing those, who 
retire or quit.
11 The hazard is also affected by 
unobserved attributes result-
ing in a gradually growing share 
within an unemployed cohort of 
people with poor chance of exit. 
Therefore the exit rate falls with 
the duration of joblessness even 
in the absence of “true” duration 
dependence.
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Figure 1.5: The baseline hazard of exit to employment before and during the crisis 
(Logit odds ratios. Reference: non-employed for 12 or more months.)
Policy responses
The Hungarian government’s policies were primarily aimed at keeping employ-
ment as high as possible. Actions included a two-digit, all-embracing real wage 
cut in the public sector, the preserving of the pre-crisis levels of employment 
in state-owned enterprises, the provision of job retention subsidies and the 
creation of public works opportunities. Apart from financing the benefits of a 
growing number of entitled job losers, the government cut all other programs 
aimed at assisting those, who actually became unemployed.12 In this section 
we look at the nature and effects of these policies in more detail.
Job losers’ access to passive support
The “improving” composition of flows out of employment (in terms of skills 
and labour force attachment) implied that a relatively large part of the new 
unemployed were entitled to benefits. The fraction of the short-term non-em-
ployed receiving insurance-based benefits (UI) or unemployment assistance 
benefits (UA) increased by 10 percentage points while at the same time the 
share of those receiving pension or childcare fell by a similar magnitude.13 The 
proportion of job losers registered at labour offices also grew by about 10 per-
centage points (Table 1.8).
Despite relative improvements in the receipt of unemployment compensa-
tion the share of job losers receiving no assistance at all (in the form of UI, UA, 
pension or childcare benefit) remained high: about 40 per cent of the job losers 
got no financial support in 2008–2009. The absolute number of the unassisted 
non-employed grew substantially, especially in July-December 2009 when many 
UI recipients exhausted their benefits (Table 1.9). Furthermore, the propor-
tion of people, who either wanted a paid job, or were actively searching to find 
one, increased substantially among the unassisted unemployed.
12 Cutting the expenditures on 
training was all the more pain-
ful as enterprises cut their own 
outlays anyway. There was much 
talk about the need for training 
and retraining during the crisis 
but the number of people actu-
ally participating in training fell 
substantially. According to the 
LFS the annual average stock of 
participants in adult training fell 
from 92 to 73 thousand while 
the number of those receiving 
on-the-job training fell from 53 
to 37 thousand.
13 The growth in benefit receipt 
came entirely from growing 
flows to UI. The absolute num-
ber of flows from employment 
to retirement and childcare did 
not fall in 2009.
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Table 1.8: Registration and transfers received by workers non-employed for 0–3 
months at the time of the LFS interview (LFS, per cent)
2006 2007 2008 2009
I II I II I II I II
Registered 49.7 49.6 49.5 48.0 47.2 51.2 54.5 58.7
Transfer status:
UI, UA 38.3 38.8 39.6 38.7 37.6 40.5 44.1 47.3
Pension, child-care 19.5 20.5 26.2 21.9 22.3 17.2 14.5 12.0
None of the above 42.2 40.7 34.2 39.4 40.1 42.4 41.4 40.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 1.9: Selected indicators of the unassisted non-employed
2008 2009
I II I II
Average stock of the unassisted non-employed (thousand) 452.8 460.0 495.5 544.7
Wants a job/unassisted, by duration categories (per cent)
Duration: 0–3 months 76.7 76.0 86.1 86.7
Duration: 0–6 months 77.8 77.3 84.9 86.7
All duration categories 61.7 60.2 63.4 64.9
Looks for a job/unassisted, by duration categories (per cent)
Duration: 0–3 months 53.0 52.8 61.9 61.9
Duration: 0–6 months 53.9 55.4 62.4 64.5
All duration categories 36.8 36.8 39.4 42.1
Unassisted: received no UI, UA, pension or child-care benefit. The data relate to the 
population aged 15–61 excluding full-time students. Source: LFS
Access to active support
The direction of change in active labour market policies (ALMP) is easy to 
check in Table 1.10: resources were directed from the existing schemes to the 
provision of job retention subsidies and extension of the public works schemes. 
These programs involved an additional 110 thousand workers while all other 
programs were cut and the staff of the public employment service (PES) was 
curtailed by 5 per cent. The government’s efforts were clearly directed at keep-
ing employment as high as possible, even at the cost of reducing active support 
for the unemployed.
The costs of the job retention and public works programs are difficult to as-
sess. According to the data summarized in Table 1.8 about 19 billion HUF (70 
million €) was spent on job retention subsidies. The stock of workers in public 
works grew by 32,000 in 2008–2009 (KSH 2010) while the monthly cost of a 
job – assuming that the take-home pay was equal to the minimum wage – was 
estimated to be 89,000 HUF. This adds up to a total cost of at least 32 billion 
HUF. The additional costs of the two programs together thus amounts to a 
minimum of 51 billion HUF – a substantial amount equal to almost 2.5 times 
the total annual operative and development budget of the PES.
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Table 1.10: Flows to ALMPa and staffing of the PES 2006–2009
2006 2007 2008 2009 Change in 2009
Job retention subsidies 7,390 3,843 3,040 52,027 48,987
Public works 66,403 63,098 63,100 123,754 60,654
Wage subsidiesb 58,931 43,501 52,349 41,677 –10,672
Training, retraining 56,883 47,735 79,080 74,308 –4,772
Start your own business 5,667 4,861 7,127 5,607 –1,520
Other 7,235 4,336 13,764 3,354 –10,410
PES staff 4,306 3,931 4,017 3,825 –192
PES local office staff 3,946 3,624 3,688 3,518 –170
a The figures relate to cumulative annual inflows to the given program. Data on stocks 
and/or the duration of support are not available except for public works.
b These subsidies are targeted at the long-term unemployed, mothers returning from 
childcare leave and school leavers.
Sources: KSH (2010), p.27, data provided by the PES and the Treasury. Data on the 
PES staff were provided by the Budapest Institute of Public Policy Research, and are 
based on the annual budgets of Hungary
How many jobs were saved – Some back of the envelope calculations
As shown in Table 1.11, the National Development Agency and labour offices 
spent a total of 19 billion HUF for job retention – an amount sufficient to fi-
nance 23 thousand man-years if workers are paid the minimum wage. This is a 
lower-bound estimate since many jobs could have been maintained at the cost 
of partial contribution to wage costs. We may come to a naive upper-bound es-
timate by relying on the plans of enterprises applying for job retention subsi-
dies, assuming away deadweight loss and crowding out effects, ignoring that 
the firm-reported data are obviously upward-biased, and presuming that each 
and every subsidized job survived until the end of 2009. Assuming further that 
the total number of saved jobs amounted to 1.76 times the number of subsi-
dized jobs (as suggested by the first row of Table 1.11) we arrive at an estimate 
of 119 thousand jobs.
Table 1.11: Job retention programs in 2009
Program
Outlays  
(billion forint) Affected firms Affected workers
Jobs saved according  
to the subsidized firms
Preserving jobs  
(government) 10.2 921 30,365 53,461
Operative program  
TÁMOP 2.3.3 6.3 .. 12,719 ..
Preserving jobs (OFA) 7.3 .. .. ..
Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs 0.6 23 2,201 ..
Labour offices .. 418 3,473 ..
Source: KSH (2010) pp. 25–27. and data provided by the National Employment and 
Social Office.
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Finally, if we consider that the annual average stock of workers involved in pub-
lic works programs increased by 32 thousand in 2009 we come to an estimate 
of 60 to 150 thousand jobs “saved” directly or indirectly by means of job reten-
tion subsidies and direct job creation. The upper-bound estimate is strongly 
upward biased and predictably has little to do with reality.
Closing remarks
The approach chosen by the Hungarian government seems rather unique by 
international comparison. A survey by the ILO (2009b) suggested that about 
¼ of the countries created public employment opportunities and/or assisted 
working time reductions, but at the same time 54 per cent provided additional 
cash transfers, 1/3 extended unemployment benefit, 1/3 introduced additional 
social assistance and protection measures and 55 per cent increased their sup-
port to low-income households. Brazil extended the benefit payment duration 
of unemployment insurance by two months for formal-sector workers in the 
most crisis-ridden sectors. Chile expanded unemployment insurance to cover 
workers with fixed-term employment or service contracts. The Czech Republic 
increased the duration of unemployment benefits by one month and raised its 
amount. France extended unemployment benefits to those who have worked 
four months within the last 28 months, with a duration equivalent to the du-
ration of work, up to 24 months. Romania extended unemployment benefits 
from six to nine months. The United States extended unemployment benefits 
for up to 33 weeks and increased the amount by $25 per week.
Furthermore, in contrast to Hungary, where the capacity of the PES was fur-
ther cut during the crisis, many countries involved in the ILO (2009b) survey 
increased their PES staff and/or extended opening hours, including Canada, 
Germany, Mexico, Cambodia and Spain. An extension similar to that carried 
out in Germany or Spain would have created 600–900 new jobs in the Hun-
garian PES (taking into account the size difference between Hungary and the 
two comparators) while the PES staff was actually cut by nearly 200.
The strong emphasis on public works as a remedy to the unemployment prob-
lem is also distinctive, at least within the EU-26, where only Ireland created 
public employment posts on a large scale according to ILO (2009b). (Among 
non-members in the survey Serbia, Ukraine and Turkey are mentioned).
While the government’s efforts at minimizing the loss of employment saved 
a minimum of 60 thousand jobs, registered unemployment grew relentlessly 
from 424 thousand in September 2008 to 659 thousand at its peak in February 
2010 – a growth of 235 thousand. In the same period employment (as meas-
ured by the LFS) fell from 3,924 million to 3,719 million – a decline of 205 
thousand. It seems that the majority of those at risk of job loss did lose their 
jobs, had poor prospects of finding new ones because of a slump in hiring, and 
many of them were left without social assistance.
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Appendix 1
The Wage Survey and the firm panel of 2008–2009
The WS is carried out by the Public Employment Service annually, each May. 
All Hungarian firms employing more than 20 workers are obliged to fill in 
the WS questionnaire while in the case of smaller firms a 20 per cent random 
sample is selected and obliged to report. The firms provide enterprise-level data 
(size, industry, ownership, employment) and individual data on their workers. 
Firms employing less than 50 workers report on all employees while the larger 
ones report on a (roughly 10 per cent) random sample of their workers. The 
firms can be linked across waves directly while workers can be identified indi-
rectly, with a margin of error, using data on their firm ID, date of birth, gender, 
education and job classification.
Out of the 9,054 enterprises reporting data in 2008, 5,428 were observed 
in 2009. Selection to the panel was mostly affected by the sampling design of 
the survey but firm exit and non-response could also play a role. A medium-
sized or large firm can vanish from the WS if it goes bankrupt or drops below 
the 20 workers limit and is not selected to next year’s randomly chosen small-
firm sample. The probability that a small firm observed one year will also be 
observed next year is 0.2 if it continues to employ less than 20 workers, and 1.0 
if it grows large enough to be included in the “medium-sized and large” cat-
egory. Actually, out of the base period sample 39.5 per cent of the small firms 
and 71.7 per cent of the larger ones were observed in May 2009. Selection to 
the panel was analyzed with probit and the inverse of the estimated survival 
probabilities were used as weights in the forthcoming calculations. (See Köllő 
2010 for the estimation results).
The most important indicators of firms in the panel are compared to the 
closest available figures of the HCSO in Table A1.1. We do not expect exactly 
the same indices since the published figures relate to April-June while the WS 
data compare May 2008 and 2009 and the wage concepts are slightly differ-
ent, too. In the firm panel, compared to the published figures, employment 
fell more and hours fell slightly less. The rates of change in real earnings vary 
with the wage concept and also influenced by a small difference in the CPI re-
lating to the reference periods (Q2/Q2 versus May/May). The data of the firm 
panel nevertheless follow the same pattern as the HCSO data, in suggesting a 
considerable loss of jobs, minor downward adjustment of working hours and 
slightly changing real wages.
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Table A1.1: Changes in the firm panel versus the whole private sector
Firms employing at least 5 workers
Private sector Firm panel
2009 Q2/2008 Q2 2009 May/2008 May
Employment –7.6 –8.9
Average monthly working hours per worker –2.6 –2.3
Real gross monthly earnings 1.4
Real gross monthly base wage .. 1.5
– Regular supplements and bonuses included .. 0.0
– Monthly value of previous year’s  
non-regular bonuses included .. –0.9
Data on the entire private sector are drawn from the Statinfo data base available in the 
Central Statistical Office’s homepage www.ksh.hu.
Before turning to the estimations, we identified heavy outliers using a proce-
dure proposed in Hadi (1992). The procedure looks for one or more sub-popu-
lations where the linkages between some key variables follow a pattern sharply 
different from the one characteristic of the whole population. Search for such 
a sub-population in the space of DlnL, DlnH and Dlnw resulted in 255 outli-
ers. As shown in Table A1.2, these firms lost almost half of their staff in a year, 
their average working hours fell ten times faster than those of the non-outliers, 
and their hourly nominal wages went up by 16.5 per cent as opposed to 3.8 per 
cent with the non-outliers.
Table A1.2: Changes of employment, hours and wages with outliers and non-outliers
Mean log change of
Employment Hours Hourly wage
Not outlier (5,173) –0.058 –0.013 0.038
Outlier (255) –0.467 –0.136 0.165
Note: Outliers were identified with Stata’s hadimvo procedure in the space of the log 
changes of employment, hours and hourly wages
The outliers were more likely to be in construction and administrative ser-
vices, and less likely to be state-owned and agricultural than the non-outliers 
were while other variables (size, ownership, and union coverage, exposure to 
the minimum wage, industry, and region) had no statistically significant ef-
fect. The outliers seem to be collapsing firms and/or ones where the company’s 
structure changed considerably. In any case, their inclusion to a model look-
ing at adjustment on the margin would hinder rather than help the analysis.14
In our estimations, the hourly wage figure relates to total monthly remunera-
tion (last row in Table A1.2) divided by paid hours during the month. The data 
on industrial output (sales revenues deflated with the producer price index in 
the tradable sectors and the consumer price index elsewhere) relate to 82 two-
digit sectors and have 33 distinct values.
14 The probit used to predict the 
probability of being an outlier 
and the regression results on all 
firms are available on request.
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The descriptive statistics of the estimation sample are presented in Table A1.3.
Table A1.3: Firm panel – Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Log change of employment –0.0590 0.3784
Log change of total labour input –0.0782 0.3899
Log change of average gross monthly earnings 0.0284 0.2095
Share of men 0.6020 0.3165
Average experience 23.3124 6.7881
Average education (years) 11.6925 1.5085
1–10 employees 0.2386
11–20 employees 0.1454
21–50 employees 0.1634
Fraction paid the minimum wage (base or skilled) 0.2119 0.3055
Collective agreement only in 2008 0.0517
Collective agreement only in 2009 0.0638
Collective agreement in 2008 and 2009 0.1454
Foreign-owned 0.1592
State-owned 0.0641
Local unemployment rate (log) –3.0280 0.6585
Agriculture 0.0567
Mining 0.0061
Water & Sewage 0.0310
Construction 0.0892
Trade 0.2214
Transport 0.0493
Hotels 0.0344
Communication 0.0259
Finance & Insurance 0.0278
Real estate 0.0200
Professional services 0.0370
Administrative services 0.0432
Education (private) 0.0095
Health (private) 0.0370
Culture (private) 0.0124
Personal services 0.0121
Finally, the estimate for Equation (2) is shown in Table A1.4.
Table A1.4: Removing compositional effects: wage regression  
(firm panel, unweighted sample, OLS)
Dependent: log change of the average hourly wage
b T
Log change in average years in school 0.0422 15.92
Log change in average age 0.0034 6.07
Log change in the share of men 0.0931 5.82
Constant 0.0294
aR-sq 0.0574
köllő: employment, unemployment...
67
Appendix 2
The estimates of discrete time duration models (logit form) for exit from and 
to employment are presented in Tables A2.1 and A2.2.
Table A2.1: Estimation of exit to non-employment (LFS panel) Discrete time duration 
model – Logit odds ratios
2006. Q1. – 2008. Q2. 2008. Q2. – 2009. Q3.
Male 0.98 –1.33 0.99 –0.64
Potential experience 1.00 0.01 0.99 –2.29
Vocational 0.93 –4.45 0.89 –5.40
Secondary 0.92 –4.61 0.87 –6.06
Higher 0.89 –4.13 0.85 –5.01
Tenure (months) 0.99 –2.92 0.99 –5.90
Size 0–4 1.10 4.24 1.06 2.29
Size 5–10 1.16 6.77 1.05 2.14
Size 11–50 1.19 7.84 1.03 1.16
Cleaners 1.09 2.15 1.05 1.10
Material handlers 1.31 6.24 1.40 6.89
Machine operators 1.02 0.47 1.06 1.42
Janitors, guards 1.08 1.58 0.94 –0.98
Drivers 0.96 –0.88 0.99 –0.31
Farmers & agric workers 1.08 2.00 1.03 0.63
Construction workers 1.05 1.34 1.03 0.71
Industrial workers 0.99 –0.07 1.00 0.14
Trade workers 1.07 2.11 1.03 0.78
Service workers 0.99 –0.19 0.99 –0.05
Office workers 1.03 0.85 0.98 –0.32
Technicians, assts 0.99 –0.05 1.02 0.52
Administrators 1.02 0.67 1.00 0.05
Managers 0.99 –0.33 0.94 –1.48
Professionals 1.00 0.20 0.98 –0.51
Teachers & Doctors 1.16 1.02 1.02 0.13
Number of jobs 248,841 152,250
LR chi2 700.15 0.0000 486.75 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.0027 0.0030
The calendar time effects are shown in Figure 1.4.
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Table A2.2: Estimation of exit to employment (LFS panel) Discrete time duration 
model – Logit odds ratios
2006. Q1. – 2008. Q2. 2008. Q2. – 2009. Q3.
Male 1.29 7.32 1.19 3.92
Experience: 0–2 years 0.92 –0.50 1.32 1.53
Experience: 3–10 years 0.97 –0.58 1.00 0.08
Experience: 21–30 years 0.84 –3.61 0.93 –1.28
Experience: 31–40 years 0.73 –6.49 0.77 –4.28
Experience: 41–years 0.43 –9.03 0.39 –8.08
Vocational 1.26 5.80 1.10 1.99
Secondary 1.23 4.48 1.24 3.78
Higher 1.30 3.59 1.25 2.63
Searching for a job 2.64 17.11 2.77 13.77
Wants a job but is not searching 1.90 11.51 1.98 9.36
Child care 4.14 16.70 4.47 14.04
UI 4.82 17.61 4.08 12.17
UA 3.86 14.83 4.25 12.58
Unassisted 4.85 21.60 4.19 14.82
Registered 1.32 5.55 1.35 4.72
Number of observations 235,973 136,165
LR chi2 13873.36 0.0000 7703.5 0.0000
Pseudo-R2 0.2858 0.2752
Reference: 11–20 years of experience, primary education, does not want a job, pen-
sioner
Sample: aged 15–61, full-time students excluded
The calendar time effects are shown in Figure 1.4.
The coefficients of the duration dummies are shown in Figure 1.5.
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1.A) CRISIS MEASURES ON THE LABOUR MARKET
Péter Elek & Ágota Scharle
All developed countries have adopted temporary 
or permanent policy measures in order to miti-
gate the employment effects of the recession that 
started in 2008.15 Such interventions may be jus-
tified by three basic goals: to strengthen the social 
safety net, to prevent long-term unemployment by 
sustaining active job-search, and more generally, 
to curb or prevent the increase of unemployment. 
The latter effort is justified especially at the be-
ginning of the crisis as preventive measures may 
block the necessary adjustment in the structure of 
production during the upturn and thus may de-
lay recovery.
Although unemployment benefits had been quite 
generous in the majority of EU-member states even 
before the crisis, a few countries still found it nec-
essary to prevent mass impoverishment by tempo-
rary welfare measures. Such measures included the 
temporary extension of the duration of unemploy-
ment benefit or the temporary easing of eligibility 
criteria. Though the three-month maximum dura-
tion of the wage-related phase of the unemployment 
benefit is extremely short by European comparison, 
the Hungarian government did not extend it. Some 
welfare measures were introduced however: a crisis 
management fund was established to help families 
caught in a mortgage trap or other difficulty, and a 
moratorium was declared on evictions.
Central European countries and the post-socialist 
EU member states focused primarily on curbing 
unemployment and concentrated their efforts on 
increasing or sustaining labour demand. The An-
glo-Saxon countries were concerned mainly with 
preventing long-term unemployment by encourag-
ing job search and the training of the unemployed. 
The same strategy was followed in the Scandinavian 
countries as well albeit less actively. Less action was 
needed in those countries that use strong feedback 
mechanisms in their unemployment provision sys-
tems, such as in Denmark, where the majority of 
labour market measures are decided upon locally, 
and central government funding is pegged in pro-
portion to the unemployment rate.
Economic growth in Hungary had slowed down well 
before the beginning of the global crisis, hence crisis 
management had to tackle two challenges: 1. Find 
a rapid response to the external recession and at the 
same time take long overdue measures to correct 
structural distortions; 2. Stay within budget very 
tightly constrained by the high debt ratio and the 
high initial government deficit, practically ruling 
out anticyclical fiscal policy.
As in other countries in the region, crisis manage-
ment in Hungary focused on the increase and pres-
ervation of labour demand.16 In 2009, more than one 
third of all expenditures, 60 billion HUF was spent 
on the reduction of labour costs: the employers’ so-
cial security contribution rate decreased by 5 per-
centage points up to twice the minimum wage. The 
reduction was extended to all wage levels in 2010, 
which, together with the abolishment of the lump-
sum health contribution, resulted in a revenue loss 
of around 225 billion HUF. Such an across the board 
cut in the social security rate is badly targeted, since 
by design it affects all jobs, not only those that need 
to be saved. Thus it implies a substantial deadweight 
loss and is extremely costly as well. However, it may 
be justified as a temporary crisis management tool 
or if it fixes a structural distortion (OECD, 2010b) 
– as in the case of Hungary.17 The 2009 and 2010 re-
15 This summary of measures is based on OECD (2009b).
16 The classification used here follows the questionnaire of 
OECD (2009a). Although they may indirectly contribute to 
the alleviation of employment decrease, we deal neither with 
measures to ease firms’ liquidity constraints (amounting to tens 
of billions HUF) nor with the targeted subsidies for certain 
branches of industry (e.g. the introduction of the reduced VAT 
rate for tourism).
17 The evaluations of international organisations in the last four 
years have all concluded that the level of labour taxes is high, 
and this is the most important obstacle to economic growth 
(World Bank, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, IMF, 2007, Ecfin, 2007). The 
latest country report of the OECD and also the latest evaluation 
published by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs of the European Commission welcomed the 2009 reform 
but at the same time proposed further cuts in labour taxes and 
social contributions (OECD, 2010c, p. 11, Ecfin, 2010, p. 28).
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ductions in labour costs together may increase em-
ployment by 0.3–2.8 per cent in the short run and 
by 0.5–1 per cent in the long run.18
Short time work schemes (such as the Preservation 
programme of OFA [National Public Employment 
Foundation] or SROP [Social Renewal Operation 
Programme] 2.3.3.) form another group of the meas-
ures which aim at increasing or preserving labour 
demand. According to the OECD (2010b), these 
forms of subsidy substantially moderated the lay-
offs in a number of countries. The magnitude of such 
schemes was around average in Hungary: slightly 
less than one per cent of workers took part in such 
a programme in 2009. However, their effective-
ness was below average: the OECD estimated that 
around 0.1 per cent of all permanent jobs could 
be saved in this way, while in the best performing 
country, Belgium, the programme contributed to 
the preservation of 1.3 per cent of jobs with an al-
most 6 per cent participation rate (OECD, 2010c).19
Table 1.A)1: Labour policy crisis measures in the EU member states in 2009
More than one measure One measure No measure
Central government expenditure/
revenue loss in Hungary in 2009 
(billion HUF)
Income support 11 members  
(including Hungary)
Austria, Czech  
Republic, Italy, Slovakia
Denmark, Ireland,  
Luxemburg, Netherlands
2.7
Labour demand 12 members  
(including Hungary)
Austria, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy,  
Netherlands, UK
– Reduction of labour costs: 60 
Job subsidies:* 45 
Public works:** 51
Measures to support job 
search and re-employment
14 members Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia
Hungary,  
Luxemburg
0***
Training of employees and 
apprentices
Austria, Finland, France, 
Netherlands, UK
8 members Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Italy,  
Luxemburg, Portugal
0
Source: Based on Table 1 (page 3) of OECD (2009a), 
data from January-May 2009. Data on Hungary were 
obtained from the Public Employment Service. The 
table only contains the crisis-related measures taken, 
over and above regular provisions for the unemployed 
(thus in the case of public works, we present the addi-
tional funds made available on top of the regular budg-
et). For all countries, training measures combined 
with reduced working hours are classified as measures 
for preserving labour demand, hence the Preservation 
programme of OFA and the SROP programmes are 
categorised this way in the case of Hungary. In the last 
column, the revenue loss caused by the social contribu-
tion reduction is calculated after consolidation with 
contributions paid by the government.
* OFA Preservation programme (7.3 billion HUF in 
2009), OFA Back to Work programme (0.7 billion 
HUF), central programmes (10.8 billion HUF), SROP 
2.3.3. programmes (6.3 billion HUF), extension of 
SROP 1.1.2. (20.2 billion HUF).
** Extension of funds made available for public works 
organised by local governments.
*** The New Prospects programme of OFA launched at 
the end of 2009 would belong to this category but it 
was not yet included in the OECD survey and no pay-
ment was made from it until the end of 2009.
18 According to OECD (2010b) a one per cent reduction of labour 
costs boosts employment by 0.6 per cent in the short run, while 
– due to the adjustment of nominal wages – by only 0.2 per cent 
in the long run. This yields a 2.8 per cent short term and a 0.9 
per cent long term employment effect of the social contribution 
reduction in 2010. Calculations using Table 16 of MKKT (2010) 
imply a 0.3 per cent short run and a 0.5 per cent long run employ-
ment effect of the contribution cut, and the GDP effect may be 
0.2 per cent in the short run and 0.4 in the long run. Simulations 
with the quarterly projection model of the national bank show a 
larger multiplier effect: GDP may increase by 0.4 per cent in the 
short run, while the long term increase may well be 1.9 per cent 
(Horváth et al., 2006).
19 See also Chapter 1 about the effectiveness of employment 
preserving subsidies.
The OFA Back to Work programme or the exten-
sion of SROP 1.1.2., which belong to job subsidies 
(job preservation and creation) also aim at increas-
ing labour demand. These programmes subsidise 
firms for hiring employees who were laid off from 
elsewhere. The analysis of OECD (2010c) regards 
this form of subsidy to be most efficient at the end of 
the recession, at the beginning of the recovery, thus 
in 2010 and in the subsequent period.
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Finally, direct public sector job creation is also catego-
rised as a measure for increasing labour demand. In 
Hungary this was mainly implemented via the Path-
way to Work programme which involved a redesign 
of the regular social assistance and increased fund-
ing and incentives for local governments to organise 
public works for the long term unemployed. In 2009, 
average participation in the scheme increased from 
around 20–30 thousand people to 90–100 thousands.
Most countries sought to encourage the re-employ-
ment of the unemployed by increasing the admin-
istrative capacity of the public employment service 
and the funds for active labour market programmes, 
especially for training. These measures are particu-
larly important in the case of the unskilled young, 
immigrants and low skilled workers, whose chanc-
es of re-employment are much smaller and who are 
more likely to leave the labour market for good. As 
the only country in the EU or OECD (apart from 
Luxemburg), Hungary did not extend these meas-
ures until the beginning of 2009, in fact funding 
had been cut to finance the increase in job preser-
vation subsidies. The only new activation measure, 
the New Prospects programme of OFA was intro-
duced at a later stage and even then its significance 
was smaller by one order compared to the funds al-
located to sustaining labour demand.
The capacities of the public employment service had 
been insufficient even before the crisis: their budg-
et for operating costs was half of that in countries 
with a similar unemployment rate (e.g. in Finland 
and Sweden). Staff levels in the branch offices serv-
ing the unemployed barely changed between 2004 
and 2007, and even decreased in 2009 – while the 
number of registered unemployed increased, and 
the scope of duties of the branch offices widened. 
The large majority of EU countries and all Eastern 
European member states chose the opposite strat-
egy and increased government funding for the op-
eration of the public employment service (Czech 
Republic, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia), or 
decreased funding at a lower rate than the decline 
in unemployment (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia) 
(Cseres-Gergely–Scharle, 2010).
1.B) CORPORATE REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS
András Semjén & István János Tóth
In the second half of 2008 the unfavourable effects 
of the economic crisis appeared powerfully in the 
Hungarian economy, and they also became visible in 
the statistics. Findings of corporate climate surveys 
suggest that the crisis first reached the companies 
producing for export markets, and hit them more 
powerfully than the other firms, however, the com-
panies producing mainly for domestic markets were 
affected by the crisis relatively quickly as well. Com-
panies could react to the crisis in different ways: 
with reactive steps having a short-term positive ef-
fect (improving their liquidity position, cost-cut-
ting, restructuring of credits etc.), or with proactive 
steps, more efficient in the long term (seeking new 
markets, organizational adjustments, transforma-
tion of the production structure etc). Reactions re-
lated to employment and wages, such as freezing 
wages, transforming employment and layoffs belong 
to corporate responses exerting a short-term effect.
Below we review the more important adaptive 
steps taken by the companies, and their changes in 
2009–10, based on the experience of three corporate 
surveys.20 The first data survey was carried out in 
March 2009, which also means that, unfortunate-
ly, we have no direct information about the initial 
stage of the crisis, in which the lay-off and jobless-
ness figures already showed significant corporate 
adaptation.
Employment figures were between 10–19 individ-
uals in 23 % of the firms surveyed, between 20–49 
in 27 pc, between 50–99 in 21%, while 16 % of the 
20 The surveys were conducted by MKIK GVI in March 2009, June 
2009 and March 2010, on a sample of 300 companies respectively, 
with the companies surveyed revisited a second time. This aim 
has not been achieved successfully in every case, so, in the end, 
the panel database contains the responses of 184 companies. 
For the summary of the survey findings see: Bartha-Tóth, 2009, 
Bartha et al., 2009, Czibik et al., 2009, 2010. Our paper outlines 
the more important statements of the above studies.
in focus
72
surveyed firms employed more than 249 people. The 
distribution of the sample by sector showed that 34 
% of the enterprises were operating in manufactur-
ing, 15 % in construction, 32 % in trade and 18 % in 
other service sectors.
In the survey the companies were asked which of 
several possible crisis management solutions they 
had applied during the last six months. The find-
ings show that the companies typically combined 
different crisis management steps and applied them 
simultaneously, ie. we cannot find a single corpo-
rate strategy for handling the crisis [see Table 1B)1.]
Table 1.B)1: Adaptive measures employed by enterpri-
ses in response to the economic crisis (%, N=916)
% of firms applying different steps
March 2009 June 2009 March 2010
1. Reducing short-term debts 39.6 41.9 45.1
2. Reducing receivables 45.5 58.3 60.7
3.Postponing/slowing down 
planned investments 36.2 41.5 44.8
4. Layoffs (also of agency 
workers) 21.4 42.5 32.5
5. Switching to part-time 
employment or shorter work-
ing hours
10.3 16.9 22.5
6. Freezing/reducing wages/
benefits 30.0 80.1 80.6
7. Cutting down on temporarily 
dispensable services 31.6 67.8 63.2
8. Seeking new sales markets 64.4 78.1 79.1
9. Offering new products and 
services 30.9 36.9 50.5
10. New suppliers/reduce 
dependence on suppliers 45.6 33.1 33.9
11. Use of government subsi-
dies and EU funds 16.8 12.0 25.7
12. Preparing new long-term 
plan, modification of corpo-
rate strategy
32.7 35.8 39.5
13. Improving the safety of 
short-term finance, eg. extend 
bank loans
21.2 – –
14. Cutting prices, applying 
new pricing 20.8 – –
15. Selling some assets 8.3 – –
16. Credit conversion (Foreign 
currency to HUF) 4.2 – –
17. Other 17.0
Explanation: Response options 13–17 did not feature in 
the June 2009 and March 2010 surveys.
In the six-month period preceding March 2009 most 
respondents chose seeking new sales markets (64%) 
and the taking of some steps to handle liquidity prob-
lems. Within this latter category the most frequently 
applied measures of crisis management were reduc-
ing receivables and reducing dependence on suppli-
ers (46–46 %), alongside the reduction of short-term 
debts (40%). The repeated surveys suggest that freez-
ing or reducing wages and cutting down on tempo-
rarily dispensable services became dominant (80–
81, 68 and 63 %) only in the later stages of the crisis 
(in the six-month periods preceding June 2009 and 
March 2010). The same period saw layoffs also be-
coming widespread (43 and 32% compared with the 
initial 21%). Reducing working hours and introduc-
ing part-time employment became twice as impor-
tant within a year’s time, though it was not yet typical 
even in the last survey (22%). Nevertheless, the ap-
plication of proactive means strengthened, seeking 
new sales markets improved from 78 to 79%, while 
offering new products and services showed a change 
from 37 to 51 %.
From the reactive steps, companies mostly used 
cost-cutting measures first: 36 % postponed their 
investments, 30 % froze or reduced wages. In addi-
tion about 30% of the firms also cut down on buying 
several temporarily dispensable services.
Unfortunately, but quite understandably, the busi-
ness climate surveys used here did not explicitly in-
quire about whether or not, simultaneously with 
the cost-cutting measures, some forms of black and 
grey employment (like paying partly or fully non 
disclosed income “cash in hand”, or masking em-
ployment as a contract with a subcontractor and 
paying contractual fees instead of wages) were also 
revived and applied more widely. On the basis of for-
mer surveys, however, it is justified to assume that 
some of the companies (primarily those that used 
layoffs and the reduction of working hours as a reac-
tive step to a large extent) also applied this method 
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of cost-cutting in parallel with the strengthening of 
the effects of the crisis.
When analyzing the period following the transition 
to a market economy, Laki (1994) already pointed 
out that postponing or delaying tax payments or 
pecuniary obligations toward suppliers in order to 
gain time can be an important element of corpo-
rate survival strategy. Tóth-Semjén (1999) showed 
based on enterprise surveys that the legal and illegal 
reduction of the tax burden, i. e. tax avoidance and 
tax evasion become part of the companies’ struggle 
for survival, especially among the more vulnerable 
small and medium-sized companies. At the same 
time their results also indicated that parallel with 
the improvements of economic environment and 
corporate prospects, tax discipline and the disci-
pline of payments in general also improve and tax 
arrears and the default of payment to suppliers are 
driven back.
Based on a comparison of several empirical surveys 
Semjén-Tóth (2004) have confirmed, further elab-
orating the ideas presented already in Tóth-Sem-
jén (1999), that economic environment and tax be-
haviour are closely interrelated: parallel with the 
improvement of economic environment and cor-
porate prospects, companies will rely on strategies 
employing legally disputable, risky measures to a 
lesser extent, i.e. in other words, as economic stabi-
lization proceeds, tax discipline will also improve 
ceteris paribus. It is presumable that these formerly 
well-documented relationships are also valid in the 
case of reverse changes.
Applying the conclusions of our former research to 
the period of economic crisis involving a significant 
and relatively lasting worsening of the economic cli-
mate and corporate prospects, we have good reason 
to presume that during the period of the crisis, with 
all conditions held unchanged, tax discipline and 
the discipline of payments will, by necessity, worsen, 
(statistical data unambiguously show the worsening 
of payment to suppliers). At the same time in compa-
nies producing not primarily for export markets and 
in which the rate of foreign ownership is not domi-
nant the application of tax-saving and contribution-
saving forms of employment (e.g. partly or fully pay-
ing on an invoice with pretended subcontracting) is 
likely to become more wide-spread again.
Of the proactive steps, seeking new sales markets 
was already detectable as early as March 2009, and 
later its rate continued to increase (from 64% to 78–
79%), while the occurrence of steps taken to launch 
new products or services on the market grew sig-
nificantly (to 51 %) only in the period covered by 
the last survey. Seeking new suppliers and reducing 
the dependence on suppliers also belong to proac-
tive measures, and so does the application of gov-
ernment funds or EU subsidies, but these were only 
applied by a smaller part of the firms during the 
survey period.
Companies were usually compelled to apply several 
steps simultaneously during the crisis. Already the 
findings of the March 2009 survey suggested that 
Hungarian enterprises were dramatically hit by the 
crisis. This was reflected by the fact that 44% of the 
companies surveyed applied five or more measures 
out of the 12 types of reaction that were offered in 
all of the surveys. The fact that the companies were 
forced to apply newer and newer measures to han-
dle the crisis as time passed by indirectly underlines 
the long-term nature of the crisis and the short-term 
ineffectiveness of the steps taken. While in March 
2009 the companies named on average four types 
of reaction, in 2010 they already used on average 5.5 
types of reaction to ward off the crisis.
Our findings suggest that for exporting companies 
the first state of the crisis was a good deal more strik-
ing than for those producing exclusively for the do-
mestic market. On the one hand, the business cli-
mate index measuring their position showed much 
lower values in March 2009 than for those producing 
only for domestic buyers [see Figure 1.B)1]. On the 
other hand, exporters, to respond to the crisis, were 
forced to apply more measures at the same time than 
those producing only for domestic markets. This re-
lationship holds for all three surveys, but it appears 
especially powerfully in June 2009 [see Figure 1.B)2].
The rate of companies applying layoffs showed a 
fluctuation in the different sectors during the three 
surveys [see Figure 1.B)3]. While in March and June 
2009 the rate of those forced to lay off staff was the 
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highest in enterprises operating in trade and com-
merce (28 and 48%), by March 2010 we found the 
lowest rate exactly in this sector (30%). The deep and 
lasting crisis of the construction sector is reflected 
by the fact that while in March 2009 the rate of com-
panies applying layoffs in the sector was relatively 
low (10%), later, in spite of the fact that the spring 
and the summer are usually stronger in this sector 
due to seasonality, the number of firms applying 
layoffs grew to 40%, and probably stabilized later 
at this high level.
There are no data available regarding the effective-
ness of the crisis management measures mentioned 
above. Company CEOs were asked in the March 
2010 survey to name the most successful measures 
based on their company’s experience. Their answers 
suggest that new sales markets may have had a deci-
sive role in the adaptation to the crisis: 64 % of CEOs 
mentioned that seeking new sales markets proved 
useful in overcoming the effects of the crisis. In ad-
dition 41 % of CEOs mentioned freezing or reduc-
ing wages and other benefits among the more ef-
fective or successful measures, while 37 % of CEOs 
mentioned the reduction of receivables as success-
ful in protecting the firm from the negative effects 
of the crisis. Cutting down on dispensable servic-
es or the postponement/slow-down of investments 
were mentioned as successful measures by 25–21 % 
of the respondents. Layoffs (the reduction of em-
ployment) proved even less effective as indicated by 
the relatively low 11 % share of CEOs mentioning 
it, while switching to part-time employment was 
mentioned only by 5 % of respondents as useful. 
[Cf. Figure 1.B)4].
Figure 1.B)1: The change of the Business Climate  
Index (BCI) for firms and companies producing 
exclusively for the domestic market and  
producing for export markets as well, %  
(March 2009 – March 2010, N = 916)*
Note: The definition of the Business Climate Index is 
the following:
BCI = (business climate at present + business prospects 
(expectations) + predicted investments + predicted 
employment + predicted wages) / 5. The value of BCI 
can be between –100 and + 100, where a –100 value of 
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Figure 1.B)2: The average number of measures taken 
as a response to the crisis for firms and companies 
producing exclusively for the domestic market and 
producing for export markets as well, %  
(March 2009 – March 2010, N = 916)
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the index indicates that all the firms surveyed gave 
negative answers (“bad” or “deteriorating”) for every 
indicator, while an index value of +100 indicates 
that all the firms surveyed gave only positive answers 
(“good”, “improving” or “expanding”) for all the 
indicators covered by the index.
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Figure 1.B)3: The share of firms applying layoffs as a response to the crisis  
by sector, %, (March 2009 – March 2010, N = 916)
0
10
20
30
40
50 Other services
Trade and commerce
Construction
Manufacturing
March 2010June 2009March 2009
Source: Czibik – Makó – Tóth, 2010.
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Figure 1.B)4: Percentage of firms mentioning particular crisis management 
measures as successful in protecting the firm from the unfavourable effects  
of the crisis, % (March 2010, N = 299)
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2. THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON COMPANY POLICIES
László Neumann & Dorottya Boda
Introduction
Being economists, we tend to take it for granted that a large share of companies 
will exhibit the behaviours predicted by models of labour economics. Relying 
on two empirical company studies, this paper endeavours to analyse the con-
ditions and labour decisions lying behind one or another event with observ-
able labour market consequences. At a micro-level, the responses to the crisis 
fit into a characteristic and unique corporate history: previous circumstances, 
long-term plans, ongoing development programmes and rapid market move-
ments all make their contribution to the pattern of crisis symptoms.
Let us consider two extreme examples: One company is at the winning end 
of globalisation and gradually relocates its raw-material production to its joint 
venture set up in the Far East. The other company is at the losing end of the 
price competition sparked by globalisation and has been vegetating since 2005; 
it would have terminated long ago if the state owning it had not thrown a life 
belt to it under various pretences. What is common between the two is that in 
2009, at the time of the crisis, both were among the very few companies that 
raised wages. To be fair, the wage increase was substantial at the consistently 
successful company, while the struggling firm only complied with the com-
pulsory rise in the minimum wage.
Even the smallest company, one with a hundred-odd employees, reduced its 
workforce, but only the “peak time” unskilled temporary agency workers’ con-
tracts were cancelled. Among the companies we analysed, permanent staff were 
only laid off at those employing unskilled labour and regularly exploiting the 
numerical flexibility. We also have to look closely to detect the advantages of the 
changes in workforce size: first, the oversupply of labour in the market allowed 
replacing low-performance workers by better ones, and second, under the pres-
sure of staff rationalisation, employees of relatively insecure status were laid off 
(those on fixed term contracts, working pensioners and those past the statutory 
retirement age). What is more, workers newly employed once the economy was 
on the way to recovery were given fixed term contracts, since the future is still 
uncertain. The status of skilled workers who have had several years of experience 
and are qualified to perform a variety of tasks has been found to be secure: the 
restructuring of work organisation usually involved making the most of these 
employees’ skills and working hours. An empirical study of companies allows 
us to find out which strata of workers suffered the worst of the crisis.
The crisis presented a new type of challenge for trade unions and works 
councils. They clearly had to abandon the bargaining strategy they had been 
accustomed to since the mid-1990s focussing almost exclusively on pay rises 
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and employee compensation packages. The “protection of jobs” now came to 
the forefront. But just how pressing the need was, how much the unions were 
able to achieve, and what kind of deals they could make with the management 
varied from company to company depending on local conditions and on the 
bargaining power of the individual unions. This chapter undertakes to com-
pare the behaviours exhibited by Hungarian trade unions during the crisis with 
typical union strategies in developed market economies.
The studies
This paper summarises the results of two empirical studies conducted in 2009.
1. The first project was funded by the National Public Employment Founda-
tion (OFA) and involved case studies based on 5 or 6 interviews conducted at 
each participating company focusing on corporate wage systems, with special 
emphasis on the mechanisms of wage determination, and also extending to the 
crisis and its effects.21 The case studies cover 10 companies in nine branches of 
the manufacturing industry. The industries included are auto part and medi-
cal supply manufacturing, baking, meat, vegetable oil, and pharmaceutical 
industries and electronic goods, building material and porcelain manufactur-
ing. Five of the ten companies are multinational, one of which is listed on the 
Hungarian Stock Exchange and the Hungarian state has a substantial share 
of ownership. The state has majority ownership in one of the companies, and 
the employees have majority ownership in two.
The multinational companies in the sample use the most modern technolo-
gies and are rich in capital. The Hungarian factories of the foreign multination-
al companies – with one exception – sell exclusively to their mother company. 
The one exception manufactures an end product and has a monopoly of sales. 
With one exception again, the companies with vested interests in Hungary are 
in a stable financial position, and most of them possess a fairly modern plant 
as a result of continual development. Two of these companies have substantial 
export revenue, while the others primarily deliver to Hungarian customers. 
Government (or local government) orders form a substantial share of the sales 
of the building material manufacturing firm.
Three of the companies are classified as large businesses by Hungarian stand-
ards. One of them, the contract manufacturer producing electronic goods and 
its management of human resources differs considerably from the other mod-
els: temporary agency workers are hired and fired as required by its continu-
ally changing orders. Three other companies are mid-sized enterprises with 
between 300 and 600 employees. The small businesses in the sample employ 
about 100 workers and are typically Hungarian owned companies with sales 
in the domestic market.
A criterion for inclusion in the sample was that the selected companies should 
not resort to illegal employment or wage practices. The case studies rely on 
21 OFA Project No. 8341 entitled 
“Company wage and employ-
ment policies with special em-
phasis on the role of trade un-
ions”. Researchers other than the 
present authors participating in 
the cases studies: Balázs Hörich, 
Viktória Horváth, Noémi Imre, 
Zsófia Jenei, Lajos Kósa, Dániel 
Mester, Annamária Meszlényi, 
Péter Mód, Mercedes Obritron, 
Anna Tobler and Enikő Tóth.
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interviews conducted with the managing director of the firm, the human re-
sources manager, the shop-floor supervisor, the leader of the trade union or 
works council and one or more employees.
The project was met with even less enthusiasm than we had expected. The case 
studies were carried out during the most critical period of the crisis, between 
March and December 2009, and the managements were reluctant to discuss 
the position of the firm while temporary measures were in place. What was 
working in our favour was that the job preservation support programme was 
a tool of economic policy with special significance in crisis relief. Some of the 
companies had hopes that the presence of the research team would accelerate 
the support payment. As the large majority of the companies we approached 
refused cooperation, the final sample was largely a product of personal rela-
tionships. As a result, companies in employee ownership are overrepresented 
in the sample relative to their share of the private sector. Also, trade unions 
have a considerably stronger than typical presence: there are trade unions in 
all but one of the sample companies, and all of the trade unions have signed 
collective agreements.
2. In addition to the case studies for OFA, this paper also benefits from the 
industry-specific and corporate experiences of a survey of the automotive indus-
try. The study commissioned by the Dublin based European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofund) involved stand-
ardised interviews in eight countries with industry specialists, representatives 
of government organisations and trade unions.22 Unlike in the OFA project, 
corporate information came from the media and from a single internal source: 
interviews with the trade unions. We were turned away by the management of 
the sixth company we approached (Suzuki Hungary, a large company with no 
trade union). The inclusion of the automotive industry case studies in this paper 
allows us to illustrate the two extremes of soft versus hard adaptation within 
a single – and widely known – industry. Also, this is the industry in which we 
find Hungarian examples of the type of soft adaptation where “employment 
pacts” agreed between the management and the trade union played a signifi-
cant role. Needless to say, the case studies can only serve illustrative purposes; 
they are unsuitable for drawing quantitative conclusions.
As the companies agreeing to the case studies were promised anonymity, 
only their industries are given in our report. Some of the companies partici-
pating in the automotive industry project are named, however, since they were 
widely discussed in the media – which was one of our sources of information.
The onset of the crisis and its spread
Most of our companies had to face the consequences of the crisis in autumn 
2008 but the timing and extent of production slowdown and the symptoms 
of the crisis varied, mainly as a function of the specialised industrial activities 
22 International research pro-
ject entitled “Industrial rela-
tions in the automotive sector: 
How can social dialogue assist 
a sector in crisis” (Pedersini, 
2010).
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of the individual companies.23 Most of the within-industry variation is ex-
plained by the destination of sales, i.e., whether the company’s revenue comes 
from export or domestic sales. A further factor is whether the manufactured 
product is sold to end-users or to the mother company for further processing. 
These factors also play a crucial role in the local depth and channels of the crisis.
The companies faced with the greatest problems are those in the porcelain 
industry, which has been on the decline since the 1990s. In this sector the pro-
longed crisis is rooted in globalisation. Companies producing quality products 
with skilled labour can hardly compete with the combination of cheap and 
unskilled labour and modern and expensive computerised machines used by 
foreign mass producers. The decline of the industry was further accelerated 
first by the slump in Hungarian consumer purchasing power commencing 
in 2006, and then by the financial crisis of 2008. In the case of a company 
producing for the internal market, it is difficult, if not impossible, to sepa-
rate these effects from the general management difficulties experienced by 
the struggling industry. Although the company’s handling of the crisis was 
in many ways successful, what has allowed it to survive are the repeated cash 
injections from the state. In this industry, the direct effects of the global crisis 
are easier to measure with reference to the larger company, which produces 
for export: the demand for luxury goods plunged immediately and heavily 
in overseas markets.
The balance-sheet figures of the contract manufacturing company produc-
ing communication technology end products showed a loss in 2007, but – as 
the managing director claims – this was not the result of the general crisis but 
the consequence of the end of the mobile phone boom and that the company’s 
largest customer had lost some of its market share. In the heavily export-ori-
ented automotive industry, the decline of sales in Western Europe had an al-
most immediate effect on the production orders of the Hungarian companies. 
Adding to their problems, of the 75 thousand employees working in the indus-
try (in 2008) at most 15 thousand work in end-product manufacturing, while 
the rest produce car components. Also, few of the companies have diversified 
their production; most of them are the suppliers of just one manufacturer and 
are therefore dependent on its orders.
Although the construction industry – which is regarded as a crisis barom-
eter and where the slowdown started as early as 2006 because of the decline in 
government investment and the restrictions on subsidised mortgages – is not 
represented in our sample, but we have looked at a building material manu-
facturer in a similar position. This company was the first to face a decrease in 
orders, as early as 2007. It is only thanks to its diversified production structure 
and its wide customer base that it could pull through. The fall in the demand 
among direct consumers and companies was compensated for by government 
orders related to motorway construction. It is clear from our case study that 
23 Our experiences are in line 
with HCSO data: The labour 
market effects of the crisis first 
appeared in manufacturing in 
autumn 2008. During the second 
half of 2009, the rate of job sepa-
rations decreased. The decline in 
employment in manufacturing 
virtually came to a halt and the 
employment effects started ap-
pearing in previously less vulner-
able sectors (KSH, 2010). In their 
analysis of Individual Wage Sur-
vey data, Köllő and Nacsa (2009) 
report that manufacturing suf-
fered heavier job losses than any 
other industry, while the retail 
and the hospitality industries 
experienced the steepest wage 
reductions.
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the construction industry or, specifically, the related building material indus-
try, felt the combined and thus intensified effects of the crisis.
The position of companies producing for direct consumption depended on 
their sales destinations and on their position in the sales market. The pharma-
ceutical company, which produces necessity goods and realises most of its sales 
revenue outside of Hungary, experienced hardly any decrease in its orders. The 
problems it had to face came from the currency crisis that hit the country of its 
sales destination. The crisis had similarly mild consequences for the large food 
manufacturer, which has a monopoly on its product.
This contrasts with the vulnerable position of the smaller food manufactur-
ers, which cater for the domestic market and are more threatened by the price 
competition. With the repressed wages, the already low demand for their qual-
ity products was further cut as real wages were falling.
Our sample also provides examples for companies “cashing in” on the crisis. 
One such opportunity is taking over the orders of a competitor. The building 
materials manufacturer, for instance, claims to have received unexpected or-
ders when one of its competitors went bankrupt. The long struggling porcelain 
manufacturer is given a new chance, as a large foreign company manufacturing 
cheaper substitutes offers to hire it as a subcontractor because it does not have 
the capacity to meet the increased demand for its product while maintaining 
its efficiency. In another case the increase in labour supply provides an oppor-
tunity for a company to upgrade the quality of its staff. The managing director 
reports that as a result of the layoffs, they can not only pick and choose from 
unskilled workers but also easily find suitable staff to fill positions requiring 
higher qualifications.
Crisis channels, crisis symptoms
Due to their varying activities and markets, the companies were hit by the cri-
sis through different channels and to different degrees. Before surveying the 
possible effects, let us discuss the cases in which the crisis was felt indirectly, 
through the difficulties or the decisions of the multinational mother company.
None of the subsidiary companies included in the sample were in danger of 
being closed down by the management of the parent company. This is because 
the productivity of all these factories surpasses the productivity of the mother 
companies’ other European subsidiaries. This is the consideration that applies 
to the auto parts unit and the plant of the multinational food manufacturer. In 
tackling the crisis, the most common strategy used by the headquarters was the 
centralisation of decisions with the result that the autonomy of the subsidiaries 
– which had already been limited to cost and human resource management – 
was further restricted. The food manufacturer is a case in point, where the hir-
ing of new labour has been subject to central approval since the emergence of the 
crisis. A second example of shifting in company-internal position is the case of 
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the electronic contract manufacturer, whose mother company closed down its 
Budapest-based European headquarters. The move was a part of a cost reduc-
tion strategy, whereby the former geographically organised (continent-based) 
management was replaced by product group based management.
Turning to the direct effects of the crisis, the most prevalent and most im-
portant of these was the decline in the volume of orders.24 For most of the com-
panies in our sample, the 2009 sales revenues were about 50 per cent down 
from the revenues realised in the previous year, even though the downturn in 
orders had already started in the second half of 2008. In the Hungarian mar-
ket the decline in consumer purchasing power began in 2006, well before the 
global economic crisis. The volume of goods manufactured on order usually 
decreased by 30 per cent (the most frequent average value for individual com-
panies). There is variation between and within the firms, however. While be-
tween 2008 and 2009 the building materials factory lost 70 per cent of its orders 
of concrete slabs used in hall construction, one of the automobile factories in 
effect increased its production of engine parts needed for the launch of a new 
subsidiary of the company in the Far East. Notwithstanding this occurrence, 
the automotive industry suffered an especially spectacular fall in the number 
of goods produced: Suzuki’s output fell from 280 thousand before the crisis to 
184 thousand in 2009, and Audi produced 48 thousand sports cars compared 
to the previous year’s 60 thousand, while its engine output dropped from 1.9 
million to 1.35 million.
A second factor contributing to loss of revenues are the depressed prices. 
Smaller companies selling to the domestic market are more threatened by the 
price competition and their position therefore became more sensitive than that 
of their export-oriented peers. The danger of the companies in the industry 
going bankrupt because of the depressed prices was raised by the managers of 
the meat factory and the building materials plant. The product composition 
of sales was also altered: the demand was lower for relatively high priced prod-
ucts with higher profit margins.
A further symptom of the crisis is the absence of the usual cyclic nature of 
production driven by sale waves. Especially the luxury good manufacturers 
report that the surge in production previously associated with gift shopping 
periods did not take place in 2008. The production cycles of the porcelain fac-
tory, which exports most of its products, were previously adjusted to holiday 
periods. The task of production scheduling was assisted by the fact that the or-
ders arriving in the first quarter of the year took up the total annual capacity of 
the facility. Now, however, as a result of the decline in orders, production can 
only be planned for 30 to 45 days in advance.
The two smallest (with 100–200 employees), Hungarian-owned companies 
in our sample struggled with financial difficulties: one because of its connec-
tion with the construction industry, and the other because of the increased 
24 According to the results 
of the DSG Global Research 
questionnaire survey – involv-
ing the managing directors and 
HR managers of 180 Hungarian 
companies employing altogether 
more than 100 thousand work-
ers – 70 per cent of companies 
experienced a decline in turnover 
and half of them were forced to 
introduce some sort of crisis-
relief measure (DSG Global Re-
search, 2009).
As a part of the project led by 
József Poór of the University of 
Pécs, questionnaires were sent 
out to companies at the end of 
November 2008, 86 of which 
returned valid responses. Almost 
all of the respondent compa-
nies were affected by the crisis: 
3 out of 4 firms experienced a 
substantially slower increase in 
their turnover during the most 
recent period, and 40 per cent 
predicted a decline in their sales 
revenue by 2009 (Poór, 2009).
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prices of its agricultural suppliers. These companies mention that banks in-
troduced increasingly restricting conditions on their current asset loans. The 
financial position of the baking factory was also shaken by the crisis: while in 
2008 it operated efficiently enough to be able to reduce its debts, its cash-flow 
indicators declined in 2009. The porcelain manufacturer had had enormous 
debts before and now the bank terminated its contract with the company. This 
opened a new chapter in the debt history of the firm: it only owed its suppliers 
before, now it cannot even pay its utility bills or taxes. What is worse, in Feb-
ruary 2009 it could only pay its employees’ wages in two instalments.
As most of the multinational companies are rich in capital, they have no 
difficulty repaying any loans they might have. One exception is the electronic 
contract manufacturing company, which needs more than usual current assets 
because of the high prices of materials and the relatively long payment dead-
lines. (In this case it was mainly the mother company that struggled with fi-
nancial problems). The food factory, which had previously financed agricul-
tural producers and stored the unprocessed food until needed, switched to a 
new financing system just before the crisis. Now that the food to be processed 
is bought at the actual day’s stock market price, the company needs consider-
ably fewer current assets.
Some of the company case studies also allow us to observe the spreading 
mechanisms of the crisis. While the Hungarian meat industry company has 
lost some of its previous orders because several of its non-end user customers 
have been wound up, the production at the building material manufacturer 
is held up because its suppliers cannot deliver on time. A typical adjustment 
strategy used by the companies in the automotive industry is insourcing, i.e., 
cutting down on their reliance of suppliers and third-party contractors (see 
later). These companies effectively choose to pass the burden of the crisis on to 
their subcontractors in order to be able to preserve their own labour.
Crisis-relief measures with indirect labour effects
The crisis-relief strategies of businesses have been studied in a number of sur-
veys (DSG Global Research, 2009, Poór, 2009, Bartha et al., 2009). Our projects 
focus on corporate decisions with relevance to employment. Besides measures 
specifically targeting staff size or wage rates, we have also encountered a num-
ber of – typically cost reducing – decisions that have an impact on employment 
or company wage structure in a different way.
One strategy used by some of the companies is to reduce the non-wage costs 
of labour. The auto parts manufacturer even introduced measures of a sym-
bolic value: they revised the regulations on the use of protective clothing, for 
instance, in order to save on cleaning costs. A number of companies decided to 
reduce the costs of company transport for employees. The most widely know 
case is Suzuki’s, which cancelled the bus service transporting employees living 
neumann & boda: the effects of the crisis...
83
at a longer than 30 kilometre from work. According to business newspapers, the 
cancellation of 13 buses in Hungary and 20 in Slovakia, and the offer of a cash 
bonus – worth three months’ pay – to those voluntarily quitting the company 
helped to dispose of 800 employees, mostly from Slovakia (Renitenseket kül-
dik el..., 2008, Kiutálják..., 2009). (This is of course an example of a not-so-fair 
form of downsizing, and we are not convinced that it was a simple cost-cutting 
measure.) In addition to cutting overhead costs, the electronic contract manu-
facturer also reorganised the work environment by merging three production 
halls into two and transforming the third into a warehouse.
Although the meat industry company chose to outsource the operation of 
the boiler room at the time of the crisis, the companies more commonly ter-
minated sub-servicing contracts and re-integrated previously outsourced ac-
tivities into their structure. The same meat industry factory gave jobs to more 
than twenty people when the previously outsourced cleaning and janitor duties 
were moved back in-house. The reorganisation at Audi Hungária involved an 
even larger change in staff size when logistics was retrieved from third-parties 
creating 400 jobs. The balance of the employment effects of reorganisations 
is difficult to establish, however, since even the re-integration of old in-house 
activities may end in layoffs. At the porcelain factory, for instance, a function 
previously performed by four full-time staff in-house was later outsourced 
and then moved back to the company engaging only two part-time employees.
Changes in employment structure
The cut in production necessitated a revision of work organisation, especially of 
the allocation of working time. At the companies in the sample the method of 
adjusting the employment schedule to incoming orders is essentially technol-
ogy dependent. During the initial phase of the crisis in autumn 2008, some of 
the companies suspended production in response to the decline in orders. The 
well-known automobile manufacturers (Suzuki and Audi) repeatedly halted 
production or extended the usual end-of-year production shutdown. At the 
end of the year the contact lens factory inserted a few days’ compulsory holiday 
into its normally non-stop work schedule: the holiday schedule was rearranged 
to allow for the shutdown between Christmas and New Year.
For most of our companies the winter and summer shutdowns have been 
normal practice for years and the current capacity reduction was achieved by 
the temporary closure of individual divisions or on occasion by dropping an 
entire work shift. Of the companies using technologies requiring a non-stop 
production schedule, the communication technology factory changed from a 
three-shift schedule to a two 12 hour shifts one at the beginning of 2008, and 
solved the problem of fluctuating production needs by a flexible number of 
weekly days off. The pre-production technology of the building material plant 
leaves more room for the scheduling of production. Under “normal” market 
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conditions, production is non-stop in the summer and the winter work sched-
ule is shorter. In response to the crisis, the summer-time schedule was short-
ened. The company in the best position is the baking factory, where thanks to 
recent technological developments – allowing the use of frozen dough – the 
costs incurred are directly proportional to production volume. The crisis, how-
ever, demands “tight labour management”, meaning that they have fewer than 
optimal permanent staff and follow the fluctuation in production by shift man-
agement, overtime and holiday planning.
Most of the companies under analysis introduced a working time account 
(i.e. predetermined a reference period in which the average hours of work must 
correspond to the legal working week) even before the crisis, which allowed a 
drastic cut in the amount of paid overtime. The working time account system 
provides a formal framework for the flexible use of labour hours.25 However, 
to what extent the possibilities it provides are and have been exploited by the 
companies cannot be clearly established from the official statistics.26 During 
the crisis, overtime hours – trivially along with the drop in orders – decreased 
greatly, and there was an increasing number of cases when overtime was rec-
ompensed by time off in lieu of payment. In our case studies we have seen not 
only examples of informal agreements on changing the formal work schedule 
(e.g. taking a day off, to be compensated by an extra working day later on), on 
occasion but also signals suggesting downright illegal employment practices. 
A second strategy of adjusting labour utilisation is “functional flexibility,” i.e., 
the optimisation of the organisation of activities within a given working hour 
arrangement. Possible solutions are the merging of positions, formal on-the-
job training covering more than one work activity, the reassignment of duties 
through job rotation and the transfer of employees between different depart-
ments. The smaller the company, the more likely it is to resort to these tac-
tics. At larger companies, if workforce reduction takes place, relatively highly 
qualified, more valuable staff qualified to perform a variety of different tasks 
are more likely to be retained. Beyond the rational organisation of labour, this 
solution follows from experienced veteran workers’ strong ties with the com-
pany as much as it does from the management’s commitment to their staff.
At one of the porcelain manufacturers, job rotation was typically used on 
a temporary basis, i.e., rather than being transferred, employees were tempo-
rarily assigned to activities other than their regular duties. The regulations 
specified in the collective agreement limit this arrangement to 110 days a year 
and the employees are entitled to their original average wages. If an employee 
is kept in the new position beyond the 110 days, his or her work contract must 
be modified and the wages adjusted.
Making use of every single tool of organisational flexibility, the building 
materials factory endeavoured to increase the ratio of workers having multiple 
skills. The employment of these “all-purpose” workers across a range of activi-
25 Working time account system 
as one of the prerequisites of “soft 
adaptation” were also pro-posed 
by János Köllő in Chapter 1 in In 
Focus. However, previous case 
studies show that the Hungarian 
working time account system 
differs from its West European 
counterparts in that in almost 
all cases, its purpose is to uni-
laterally benefit the employer by 
allowing cost-effective working 
time flexibility, while the em-
ployees’ needs for f lexibility 
(for reasons to do with family 
or private life, for instance) are 
almost completely disregarded 
(Neumann and Nacsa 2004). 
Another difference between the 
Hungarian and the West Euro-
pean or, especially, the American 
solutions is that credit hours are 
only redeemable for a relatively 
limited period and do not allow 
early retirement, for instance, 
at the end of an active career, 
or transfer to a new employer.
26 Both the HCSO Labour Force 
Survey and the Individual Wage 
Survey of the Public Employ-
ment Service include ques-
tions on regular working time 
and overtime but the number 
of hours worked and changes 
thereof cannot be determined 
unless the type of the employ-
ment contract (whether full or 
part-time) is known.
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ties at this company to some extent stretches the boundaries of a traditional 
employment relationship. The activities performed by the employee tend to 
be entirely unrelated to the duties specified in the employment contract. The 
grounds and justification (or excuse) for this practice is provided by the em-
ployees’ status as owners.
A strategy far more popular than functional flexibility was a reliance on nu-
merical flexibility. The most common form of this strategy of capacity reduc-
tion was the compressing of the working week, which was applied at seven of 
the 15 companies studied in the two projects.27 The specific solutions varied: 
the measure was in effect for periods of varying lengths, in some cases it only 
applied to white-collar workers and in other cases only to the rural packaging 
sites of the company or else to everyone except maintenance workers.
The most flexible scheme was observed at the auto parts manufacturer, where 
the minimum weekly working hours were specified by the agreement between 
the trade union and the management. The management of the firm has the right 
– on condition of giving advance notice – to declare days off for minor units 
or even certain jobs, and is given plenty of freedom to make decisions on the 
duration of shutdowns. It is also worth mentioning the case of the auto parts 
company, which introduced new models in preparation for the post-crisis mar-
ket, and whose management scheduled training sessions for every fifth day of 
the working week. This period of working time is used to equip selected em-
ployees (almost half of the staff) with the skills and knowledge (in informat-
ics and foreign languages) they would need in the future. While the general 
experience is that companies are unwilling to combine subsidised working 
time reduction with training, two of the automobile factories in our sample 
organised training sessions for the fifth day of the week. Of the seven compa-
nies that compressed the working week, only two received OFA job preserva-
tion support.28 (The larger of the two, twice.) We will return to the details of 
the support scheme and its wage effects.
We will also discuss in more detail the agreements between the company 
managements and trade unions. It is clear from these agreements that the pres-
ervation of staff was a priority at the companies in the sample. This concern 
was especially evident at the companies in employee ownership. The building 
materials firm, for instance, introduced retired workers’ continuing employ-
ment payments – contingent on sales revenues – among its owner-employees.
Workforce size
Based on the above, it is not surprising that in our sample layoffs only occurred 
at the companies employing unskilled labour, while the firms having a skilled 
workforce preferred the strategy of working time reduction.29
Both our interviews and the published statistics show that the heaviest job 
losses were experienced in the automotive industry.30 “Hard” adaptation was 
27 Due mostly to the appearance 
of – partially subsidised – re-
duced-time employment, intro-
duced as a cost saving measure, 
in 2009 the number of workers in 
part time employment increased 
by 17.3 per cent (31 thousand 
people) according to HCSO La-
bour Force Survey data.
28 Our results do not corrobo-
rate János Köllő’s conclusion that 
working time was only reduced 
by companies receiving subsidies 
(see Chapter 1 by János Köllő in 
In Focus).
29 Our experiences are in line 
with the conclusions drawn from 
the Individual Wage Survey: al-
though there was no downsizing 
at companies typically employ-
ing skilled-workers, there were 
moderate wage cuts while their 
preferred adjustment strategy 
was working time reduction 
(Köllő and Nacsa, 2009).
30 Based on the Index.hu Layoff 
Counter and the regular HCSO 
statistics on workforce size by 
industry covering companies 
with at least f ive employees, 
the crisis-period decrease in 
the workforce of automobile 
manufacturers is estimated at 
about 25,000 people. According 
to HCSO figures, the sectors of 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers and 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment (NACE C29–30) ex-
perienced the heaviest job losses 
of all included sectors during 
the period between January and 
August 2009.
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also the policy adopted by the contract manufacturing electronics factory, 
where the tools of numerical flexibility are also used under “normal” circum-
stances. The Human Resource Manager of the firm states that it is difficult to 
find a person in the county who has not worked for the company. During the 
crisis, a major downsizing was carried out in two steps in 2009. 450 employees 
and 900 temporary agency workers were laid off in January, and 400 employ-
ees and 350 temporary agency workers in September.
Table 2.1: Major layoffs in the automotive industry  
between October 2008 and August 2009
Company in Hungary Place Mother company
Total number 
of employees
Number of  
employees laid off
Suzuki Esztergom Suzuki 5900 1200
Ibiden Hungary Dunavarsány Ibiden Co. Ltd 1200 430
Videoton Car Electronics Székesfehérvár Videoton Holding 1300 400
Syncreon* Győr Syncreon 1400 400
Bosch Hungary Hatvan Bosch Group 3118 318
BPW Szombathely BPW Bergische Achsen 
Kommanditgellschaft 986 270
Delphi Hungary Szombathely Delphi Corporation 1150 250
Bakony Préstechnika Veszprém Bakony Művek Autóal-
katrész Gyártó Rt. 250 250
Rába Járműipari Holding Győr n. a. 250
Borg Warner Turbo System Oroszlány Borg Warner Inc 745 172
ZF Hungary-ZF Lenksystem Eger ZF Friedrichshafen 1700 160
Saia Burgess Ózd Ózd Saia Burgess Electronics 700 150
Knaus Tabbert Nagyoroszi Knaus Tabbert Gmbh 270 150
* Syncreon, Audi’s logistics supplier
Source: Az Index.hu Layoff Counter (http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/elbocs/), 
and European Restructuring Monitor (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/
index.htm).
One of the companies manufacturing simple auto parts is also characterised 
by high labour turnover, which – in contrast with the general trend – did not 
stabilise in response to the crisis. The firm laid off 29 employees in both Janu-
ary and February 2009, which is just below the collective redundancy thresh-
old of 30 people. Finally, in March 2009 the firm announced plans of 293 job 
separations but half of these jobs were saved in the end thanks to an expansion 
in production. The upturn even allowed the company to hire new employees 
in April. The new staff were given fixed term contracts, which foreshadows 
the risk avoidance strategy of the post-crisis period: It will be easier to adjust 
workforce size to production in the future if permanent contracts are replaced 
by fixed term contracts matching the demands of secure orders.
The first and foremost form of labour capacity reduction in our case stud-
ies is the termination of the temporary employment contracts and/or that of 
agency workers.31 In terms of labour organisation the rationale behind this is 
31 According to an on-l ine 
HCSO publication, the number 
of employees in this category 
decreased by about a quarter in 
Q4 2008, i.e., the first phase of 
the labour market crisis (KSH, 
2010). According to the figures 
of the National Employment and 
Social Office, in 2009 temporary 
agency work (in terms of num-
ber of days) fell by 31.8 per cent 
compared to the previous year 
(FSZH, 2010).
neumann & boda: the effects of the crisis...
87
that workers hired from agencies typically perform production or service ac-
tivities – requiring low skills and a short training period – in units having the 
most variable labour demand. As it had a pile-up of stocks, the pharmaceuti-
cal company cut its packaging activity during the first two months of the year, 
and downsized its workforce by discharging temporary agency workers. Al-
though the crisis did not demand layoffs at the small baking industry company, 
the 4 or 5 people who were hired from agencies had to be dismissed. The auto 
parts manufacturer also realised a radical reduction in the number of its tem-
porary agency workers: between August and October 2008, 130 people were 
discharged. The company with the highest incidence of similar terminations 
was the electronics production plant.
Besides dismissing temporary agency workers, downsizing affected other 
types of temporary labour. Before the crisis, the meat industry factory had a 
subcontractor performing boning activities, while the building material and 
the baking industry firms regularly employed students as semiskilled labour. 
Such temporary workers have not been needed since the onset of the crisis.
The managements treated people employed on pensioner work contracts 
and those having fixed term contracts as the internal reserves of capacity re-
duction.32 The companies having an aging workforce were thus in a position to 
downsize (or at least constrain) labour capacity by sending employees into early 
retirement or terminating pensioner work contracts. The significance of this 
phenomenon is accurately illustrated by the pharmaceutical company, where 
compared to the 250 pensioners employed a few years ago, now there are only 
120. The option not to renew fixed-term contracts (or not to replace them by 
permanent ones) was especially popular among the automobile manufacturers.
The intent to minimize the costs of downsizing is not the only motivation 
for terminating temporary employment. Every company’s top priority is to re-
tain skilled employees having substantial vocational experience. Also, thanks 
to the rationalisation measures of previous years, a number of the companies 
have already almost reached the limits of efficient workforce size minimally re-
quired for their technologies. In fact, as a result of the composition and owner-
ship structure of our sample, at more than one of the companies the continued 
employment of their staff was an operational objective of special significance.
While only a few of the companies we interviewed put a freeze on employ-
ment, most of them move within strictly controlled limits. Some of these com-
panies have experienced a decrease in labour turnover.33 We encountered a 
number of cases where the increased supply in the labour market encouraged 
the company to upgrade the quality of its workforce. The managing director 
of the building materials factory reports that the company received job appli-
cations from the employees of competitors that were being wound up. Before 
the crisis, the contact lens factory had had great difficulty filling skilled posi-
tions and the work discipline of unskilled workers had also left something to 
32 Köllő and Nacsa (2009) also 
arrive at the conclusion that mar-
ginal groups suffered especially 
heavy job and wage losses.
33 Our experiences corroborate 
Köllő’s results: The decrease in 
employment is primarily ex-
plained by the postponement 
of hiring rather than by job sepa-
rations, and those who become 
jobless remain jobless longer 
than previously (see Chapter 1 
by János Köllő in In Focus).
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be desired. The crisis not only created an opportunity to say goodbye to the 
most unsuitable of the unskilled workforce but also allowed the company to 
hire valuable skilled workers.
Wage policy
Our companies only resorted to measures directly aimed at restructuring the 
wages system in exceptional cases. Pay decreases were far more likely to follow 
from changes in the work organisation and work scheduling. The basic wage 
rates, i.e., the general pay arrangement, did not change at any of the compa-
nies. The compression of working time, however, lowered the wages paid to 
the employees to varying degrees: there was variation in the number of hours 
worked as well as in the extent of compensation. At the companies included in 
our sample working time reduction typically took place without government 
support and the partial compensation was provided by the company in ac-
cordance with the collective agreement or at least with the trade union’s silent 
approval. Only three of the companies received wage compensation support.
Added to the decrease in wages proportional to working hours, there were 
pay losses due to the cancellation of shift work compensation and the with-
holding of bonuses normally payable in addition to the basic wage.34 Bonuses 
were withheld by two of the companies in the sample: one of the large auto 
part manufacturers and the meat industry factory. Non-monetary compensa-
tion may also decrease. Two of the companies, for instance, reduced their em-
ployees’ meal voucher entitlement; one of them, in fact, completely stopped 
distributing the vouchers. (This decision was made before the new tax regula-
tions declared the vouchers taxable from 2010. This cost reduction measure is 
now seen in a different light.)
As a result, the rate of pay reduction varied not only between companies 
but also between different groups (blue-collar vs. white-collar) and jobs. The 
companies implementing shorter working hours report a pay decrease of 10–
20 per cent.
At most of the companies real wages declined in 2009 even if there was no 
reduction in working time because wage rates did not keep up with inflation. 
In an agreement with the trade union, the management of the large auto part 
manufacturer put a freeze on wages and in return granted their employees paid 
time off. The three companies that were able to maintain a sound profit margin 
raised wages by 3–4 per cent in 2009. Complying with a previous agreement, 
the auto part manufacturer and the meat industry company also raised wages, 
but at the same time negotiated a concession that there would be no increase 
in 2010. Wages were also raised at the other end of the corporate achievement 
scale: Owing to regulations compulsorily increasing the level of the minimum 
wage, skilled workers at the porcelain factory received a 0.6 per cent, and un-
skilled workers a 3.5 per cent pay rise. However, once the series of layoffs had 
34 According to KSH (2010), the 
ratio of non-regular earnings 
to gross earnings was 0.6 per 
cent below the previous year’s 
figure. We also know, however, 
that in private sector companies 
the share of basic pay in labour 
income was about 82 per cent in 
2008. Previous studies further 
show that – in contrast with in-
ternational trends – the propor-
tion of variable wages somewhat 
decreased rather than increased 
during the past five years (Neu-
mann and Boda, 2010). That is, 
the withholding of variable wag-
es could constitute substantial 
savings for a company, while it 
may be barely perceptible for the 
Hungarian economy as a whole.
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taken place, mostly skilled workers remained in the workforce, and a substan-
tial proportion of unskilled positions were filled by them. Since – with the ex-
ception of the manufacturing of a single product with bright prospects – each 
blue-collar worker is paid either the minimum wage or the skilled workers’ wage 
minimum according to the skill demands of the job he or she is employed in, 
this organisational policy directly saved wage costs or, more precisely, lessened 
the extra burden of the compulsory wage increases. In other words, following 
a transition period, the employees involved in the restructuring were paid the 
lower minimum wage matching their unskilled job specifications regardless 
of their qualifications as skilled workers.
The role of government support programmes
The crisis-relief measures of the government are customarily divided into two 
groups: economic stimulus packages (for product and service markets) and 
employment packages (for the labour market). The former type are usually 
industry-specific actions. The automotive industry is a good example, since 
several Western countries have introduced so-called scrappage programmes 
to stimulate demand.
Notwithstanding intensive lobbying by the Hungarian automobile retailers’ 
association, the Hungarian government rejected the introduction of a scrap-
page programme, i.e., a demand stimulating programme modelled on the ones 
introduced in the United States and several Western European countries. The 
reason given for the decision was the low market share of Hungarian-made 
cars, since not even Suzuki Hungary, the largest end-product manufacturer 
can claim more than 17 per cent of car sales. Consequently – contends the gov-
ernment department – a scrappage programme would have assisted car retail-
ers rather than the Hungarian automotive industry, and retailers have over-
developed their capacities counting on the future stability of the cheap credit 
opportunities of previous years. In the summer of 2009, in parallel with the 
negative decision on the scrappage programme, the Hungarian Ministry for 
National Development and Economy issued its automotive industry action 
plan. This programme, however, focused on boosting the share of production 
with higher added value in accordance with the strategy of the industry, rath-
er than on job preservation. The action plan therefore promised specifically R 
& D-type support and took steps to support the Mercedes-Benz investment 
in the town of Kecskemét. New resources were not allocated; the aims were 
meant to be realised through the subdivision of the existing sub-programmes 
and priorities of the National Development Plan and through the reallocation 
of the resources of the Labour Market Fund.
The following major “structure enhancing” actions were specified by the 
action plan:
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1. Job preservation measures, including the programme with the title of “Sup-
port for the Employment of Highly Skilled Labour”, which was intended 
to allow the re-employment of former R & D professionals. The National 
Office for Research and Technology allocated HUF 1.6 billion for the call 
in 2009, or HUF 10 million for each research position, from the Research 
and Technology Innovation Fund.
2. Vocational training development programme of HUF 10 million from 
the Labour Market Fund, entitled “The Development of Goal Oriented 
Vocational Training and Higher Education with the Involvement of Large 
Employers Representing High Quality Technology”.
3. Investment incentive programmes, including the programme entitled “In-
vestment Incentive through the Development of Supplier Skills”.
4. Programmes promoting R & D activities.35
Since the Hungarian automotive industry is quite tightly integrated into Eu-
ropean car manufacturing, the effects of the stimulus programmes implement-
ed abroad were to a greater or lesser extent also felt by the factories in Hungary. 
The main beneficiaries of the foreign government support given – through the 
scrappage programme – to the mother company of our auto part factory were 
foreign plants with similar profiles manufacturing relatively small engines. 
Nevertheless, our interview reveals that during the summer months – partly 
thanks to the scrappage programmes abroad – the Hungarian factory could 
continue to operate at full capacity. As mentioned before, the other factory 
manufacturing simple parts (cable whips) observed an upturn in demand to-
wards the middle of 2009, which is also explained by the spread of the effects 
of the artificial boost of the demand for the end product.
Although the labour market programmes of the crisis-relief package36 were 
not industry-specific, the government made it clear that preference would be 
given to small and mid-sized companies. Some larger firms nevertheless re-
ceived a share of the various job preservation funds. One of these was one of 
the porcelain factories included in our sample. Within the automotive indus-
try support was given to Rába for 1,326 jobs, Knorr-Bremse for 587 jobs and 
General Motors Powertrain-Hungary for 530 jobs. It is evident that compa-
nies targeting the Hungarian market were not the only ones to benefit from 
job preservation programmes.
We should note that besides the current crisis-relief support programmes, 
the case studies also reveal a high pre-crisis incidence of making use of the gov-
ernment’s economic and active labour market policy tools. We have seen wage 
subsidies supporting the retraining and employment of unemployed work-
ers provided by job centres, and, in a rather extreme move, government loans 
covering the costs of downsizing at the state-owned company. We have even 
encountered a case where some of the capital stock of a relatively small com-
pany in foreign ownership was provided by a substantial job creation aid. The 
35 http://nfgm.gov.hu/data/
cms2013364/jarmuipari.pdf
36 See Mária Frey’s study in the 
present volume for details.
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company in 100 per cent government ownership struggling with a long-term 
recession specific to its industry was saved by the owner’s financial reorganisa-
tion (debts written off and a successor company founded using the assets). The 
step was motivated by employment policy considerations, as there are virtually 
no other significant employers within a 50 kilometre radius of the company.
Our case studies also reveal, however, that some of the companies were ex-
cluded from the support programmes because of the programmes’ eligibility 
conditions: either because they did not meet the requirement of “irreproach-
able employment conduct” (i.e., they had been fined by the Hungarian Labour 
Inspectorate at some point) or because they had received subsidies of a different 
type (e.g., for investment) or else because they found the conditions of the sup-
port (no downsizing for twice the duration of the subsidies) too constraining. 
The companies participating in the programme also voiced several criticisms of 
the schemes. A human resources manager observed that the government decree 
concerning subsidised working time cuts came with some delay. One reason 
for the delay, the manager believes, may have been that the actual conditions 
of the central support of working time reductions were not yet in place. The 
schemes that were finally introduced turned out to be rather inflexible. One 
company, for instance, would have needed flexibility in working hours so that 
they could match the orders received, but the OFA support contract required 
the applicant to specify the precise extent of the reduction for the full period 
of support. The firm winning job preservation assistance from the regional 
job centre thought the condition requiring the preservation of the job of each 
individual for six months was too inflexible. A further drawback mentioned 
by our case studies was that for the duration of the support, employment con-
tracts could not be terminated even by mutual agreement at the employee’s 
initiative. (This includes cases when an employee wanted to leave the company 
in the hope of better employment abroad, and the rule also applied to workers 
reaching the retirement age.)
Finally, the – partly temporary – amendment of labour laws also constitutes 
a special form of government support. Some of the amendments were intended 
to relax the eligibility criteria of the regulations tying government support and 
public procurement tenders to so-called irreproachable employment conduct, 
while others introduced flexibility into working time regulations.
The 2009 amendments to the Hungarian Labour Code allow the regular 
40 hour working week to be extended to 44 hours during the period between 
1st June 2009 and 31st December 2011 provided that the working week was 
compressed prior to this period. The Code does not specify the compensation 
payable in return for the extra hours. The introduction of a longer reference pe-
riod of working time account is contingent on a written agreement between the 
employer and the employee, and the employment cannot be terminated either 
by regular discharge or as a part of collective redundancy for the duration of 
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the agreement. The reference period of working time account implementable 
in the absence of a collective agreement’s stipulation was increased from three 
months to four months. The legal cap of annual overtime had been increased 
at an earlier date from 200 hours to 300 hours, but this was subject to compli-
cated regulations: it was tied to an individual agreement with the employee 
while the labour requirements had to be reported to the authorities. These con-
ditions were now relaxed by the 2009 amendments. We can see that the main 
consideration behind the temporary working time flexibility regulations is that 
businesses should be able to transfer the hours “saved” during the crisis to the 
boom period prognosticated for 2011 without any additional costs (updated 
Articles 117 and 127/A, Act XXII of 1992 and Fodor & Neumann, 2009).
The new regulations were put into practice at two of the automotive indus-
try companies. At one of them, an agreement signed with the trade union ex-
tended the working hour account until 2011, that is, full wages are paid during 
shutdowns, and the lost hours will have to be worked when there is a demand 
for a greater capacity. (Incidentally, this company played a role in initiating the 
amendment to the Labour Code.)
The role of trade unions and works councils in tackling the crisis
When evaluating the bargaining power of trade unions, it is worth noting 
that the most typical corporate adjustment strategy, working time reduction, 
requires individual work contract amendments – as specified by the Labour 
Act – regardless of the outcome of any collective bargaining. This means that, 
unlike as in several Western European countries, managements intending to 
compress the working week do not necessarily need to hold negotiations with 
trade unions.
Among the case studies under discussion, regular consultations between the 
management and the trade union or works council were typical mainly at the 
foreign owned multinational companies. The success of these consultations is 
called into question, for instance, by the experiences of the electronic goods 
factory, where workforce size was continually matched to the volume of orders, 
the management deciding on downsizing as the most straightforward solution 
to the crisis. The works council claims to have suggested several improvements 
and believes that the efficiency of the company could have been increased even 
under “normal” market conditions, as far back as 2005, by employing 25–30 per 
cent fewer but better qualified staff. The company could have responded to the 
challenge of the crisis, the leader argues, by cutting working time and/or wages.
The weak bargaining power of the works council and the trade union at the 
Hungarian plant is not entirely the result of the relatively low level of workforce 
qualifications and the employment policy relying on the flexibility of workforce 
size guaranteed by the practice of hiring long-term labour from agencies. As has 
also been observed at several other multinational companies, the central man-
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agement relies on “coercive competition” between the company’s factories with 
similar technologies and roughly equivalent expenditure.37 Prior to the crisis, 
the factories had to compete for developments and major orders, and on these 
grounds the company has closed down a number of production sites in recent 
years. The crisis clearly raised the stakes: economical, flexible and quality pro-
duction became the key to survival. This strategy has successfully constrained 
the freedom of trade unions, which have now accepted that a more assertive 
policy would endanger jobs. In theory, the solution to this strategy of “coer-
cive competition” could come from international solidarity, i.e., an alliance 
between trade unions operating in the various countries. There is a reason why 
in the past decade the cross-country co-ordination of trade union actions and 
the setting up and support of European Works Councils have received special 
emphasis in the policy of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC 
and the industry based federations). Although a European Representative Fo-
rum was set up at the multinational electronics company in 2007, for reasons 
that cannot be detailed here, its activities were limited to providing – usually 
retrospective – information to trade unions, and it could not play a worthwhile 
role in the restructuring of the company.
The role of local trade unions in corporate crisis-relief measures varied be-
tween the companies. Although we did not hear of conflicts ending in legal 
action or being accompanied by strikes or demonstrations, it remains a fact 
that most of the trade unions envisaged goals and solutions differing from the 
ones advocated by the company management. Yet, companies where the trade 
unions could take an active part in developing recovery strategies were the ex-
ception rather than the rule, and in these exceptional cases the influence of the 
trade union was largely due to its connections with international labour or-
ganisations. The most typical attitude displayed by the trade unions was a clear 
focus on the preservation of employment (or, rather, the employment of core 
staff), in return for which they were prepared to make concessions on wages, 
working time and flexibility.38 This attitude is not equivalent, however, to the 
concession bargaining39 policy pursued by American and West European la-
bour unions, since the unions in our case studies do not have the bargaining 
power to prevent the management from carrying through their intentions. 
What happened here was that the unions accepted their management’s crisis-
relief measures – as a necessary evil – in order to preserve jobs. Even less simi-
lar is this way of operation to the “employment and competitiveness pacts” in 
Western Europe and especially in Germany, where the agreements not only 
include “wage restraint for jobs” deals but also extend to strategies of recover-
ing from the crisis (e.g., financial consolidation, investment plans, site reloca-
tions, changes to work organisation and, most of all, to training programmes 
(Wever, 1995, Sission, 2005).
37 The phenomenon of “coer-
cive competition” is usual ly 
presented as an alternative to 
hierarchical company manage-
ment that acts as an incentive 
for local management and at the 
same time constrains trade un-
ion demands (Ferner–Edwards, 
1995, Mueller–Purcell, 1992).
38 As we rely on a small number 
of case studies, we cannot make 
quantitative generalisations and 
we do not have any estimates 
of the probability of trade un-
ion agreements concerning job 
preservation. Even so, we should 
mention Köllő’s finding pub-
lished in the current volume that 
“Finally, the estimates suggest 
that firms covered by collective 
agreements valid for 2009 kept 
the level of employment higher 
by about 2 per cent compared 
to their observationally similar 
counterparts”.
39 The term concession bargain-
ing has been used since the crises 
of the seventies and eighties in 
the United States to describe a 
collective bargaining behaviour 
whereby trade unions make con-
cessions, typically agreeing to 
wage cuts in return for job se-
curity. An early and well-known 
example is the agreement in 1979 
between United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and Chrysler, which 
was facing bankruptcy, when 
employees agreed to 200 million 
dollars of givebacks in order to 
save the company (McKersie–
Capelli, 1982).
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The agreement reached at one of the porcelain factories appears to be a clas-
sic case of concession bargaining: The employees agreed to two unpaid days of 
work every month. The concession was made despite the fact that there had only 
been a minimal increase in wages between 2005 and 2008 because of various 
measures during that period. Knowing the balance of power, the events at the 
building materials company seem to be more typical: the management used 
the crisis as an excuse for scrapping the collective agreement.
In the automotive industry, the objective of the dominant Metalworkers’ 
Trade Union (Vasasszakszervezet) declared at the onset of the crisis was to pre-
serve jobs, and thus they were prepared to make wage concessions. Although 
this policy was met with greater or lesser resistance among the rank and file, 
it was finally accepted by the local unions, and their local negotiations were 
held in this spirit. While at the time of the crisis this was a reasonable political 
decision, it should be emphasised that it meant a drastic break with Hungar-
ian trade union policies of the past decade and a half, which had always seen 
wage demands as an absolute priority. The crisis incidentally did not give rise 
to major conflicts in the industry, which was of course not so much an active 
achievement of the trade unions as it was a consequence of the rather weak bar-
gaining power of the employees and their unions. (We should add that there 
had been no major strikes in the industry before the crisis, either.) There is a 
Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee in the automotive industry, but it did not 
play any role in the tackling of the crisis, and there is no industry-wide collec-
tive agreement either.
Several automobile companies signed agreements concerning the introduc-
tion of crisis relief measures. Audi Hungaria made all decisions in co-opera-
tion with its employees’ representative organisations. At the end of 2008, a se-
ries of negotiations about wages and employment were launched between the 
trade union and the management and they successfully led to an agreement. 
The first step was to extend the Christmas shutdown, which was the result of 
two deals. Both deals concerned compulsory holidays in lieu of wages. In one, 
employees were given 10 days off in return for a wage freeze in 2009. The man-
agement preserved the right to specify the date of the holidays but they had to 
comply with certain provisions, e.g., 30 days’ notice had to be given. In the sec-
ond deal the end-of-year bonus was limited to one month’s pay in return for 12 
days off. The dates of these holidays were entirely the management’s decision 
with no obligation of advance notice. As the union leader put it, this effective-
ly meant that the shutdowns were financed by the employees. An agreement 
signed with a different trade union extended working time account’s reference 
period until 2011, i.e., the full wages were paid during shutdowns, and the ac-
cumulated hours will have to be worked in the future when increased capac-
ity is required. (This agreement was made possible by the amendment to the 
Labour Code discussed above.)
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An agreement between one of the large auto part manufacturers and the trade 
union specified 50 per cent compensation for lost working time: that is, 90 per 
cent of the wages was paid for 80 per cent of the working week. The trade un-
ion of another automobile company signed a similar agreement. In both cases, 
however, the loss of some of the shifts meant a substantially greater decrease 
in earnings for blue-collar workers because they also lost the high rate of shift 
work compensation laid down in the collective agreement. The latter company 
also signed a wage agreement in 2009: on 1st January, employees were given a 
3 per cent pay rise. This should be seen, however, as a concession on the part of 
the trade union, since the wage rises of previous years had always exceeded the 
inflation rate. It is worth noting that the above automotive industry agreements 
were almost without exception signed by multinational companies in German 
ownership, and the deals clearly correspond to the German pattern of pacts 
for employment and competitiveness. The labour organisations of these fac-
tories have established especially strong ties with the trade unions and works 
councils of the mother companies, and it is evident that the managements sat 
down at the negotiating table fully aware of the crisis-relief policies in Germany.
In these cases, therefore, the crisis had a positive impact on labour relations. 
This can be seen in the case of the automobile company where the crisis led to 
a substantial improvement in consultations between the management and the 
trade union: three managers and three employee representatives meet every 
Monday to evaluate the company’s position and discuss the necessary actions.
The automotive industry not only offers examples of close co-operation be-
tween managements and trade unions but also illustrates tense relationships. 
The trade union at the cable whips manufacturer is generally critical of the 
company’s employment standards (namely, a high incidence of infringements 
of rights, Labour Inspectorate fines, low wages, long working hours, etc.). A 
review of the collective agreement had been due for eight months at the time 
of the crisis, but the management failed to get trade union approval for their 
plans to introduce a flexible labour schedule that would have put an end to paid 
lunch time and non-monetary compensation too. The management tried to 
circumvent the trade union negotiators and turned directly to employee dele-
gates, who, however, also rejected the plan. The company at the same time initi-
ated internal job rotation to fill low qualification precarious positions, but the 
attempt failed because of a clause in the collective agreement specifying that 
the original wages had to be paid in such cases. It was this company that laid 
off 29 + 29 workers, the number just below the 30-person threshold of collec-
tive redundancies. Also, the management unilaterally terminated bonus pay-
ments, which meant a 20 per cent decrease in blue-collar workers’ earnings, 
and refused to come to an agreement on the annual pay rise, which effectively 
constituted a freeze on wages.
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Concession bargaining of some type was therefore typical of companies re-
lying on skilled labour and yielding high added value. Their trade unions re-
port several “positive compromises,” and the regularity of consultations in-
creased at some of the companies. In some cases, the trade unions even became 
better organised during the crisis. One factor contributing to positive union 
outcomes was of course the circumstance that the layoffs were more likely to 
affect unskilled workers with insecure employment contracts, who were not 
trade union members, than older blue-collar workers, who typically were. Un-
skilled and relatively new staff were also more likely to be affected by alterna-
tive crisis-relief measures (in-sourcing, termination of temporary agency work 
and fixed-term contracts). Although these solutions do not appear to require 
active trade union interference, they were not introduced without (legally re-
quired or voluntary) consultations with the unions and/or works councils, i.e., 
they were approved by the labour organisations with the aim of protecting core 
staff. It seems reasonable to claim, then, that trade unions whose activities are 
successful follow a policy of “insider” privilege.
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3. MAJOR LAYOFFS DURING THE CRISIS
Irén Busch & György Lázár
Introduction
As a consequence of the financial market crisis, Hungarian employers were 
forced to resort to layoffs of an exceptional scale. A substantial proportion of 
employees were separated from their jobs through major layoffs. Planned group 
layoffs and downsizing decisions must be announced to the local public em-
ployment office in compliance with employment laws.
As the economic crisis intensified, at the beginning of 2009 the Hungarian 
Public Employment Service (PES) developed an on-line registration system 
allowing employers to comply with their notification obligations in a simple 
manner and in accordance with the formal regulations. This system at the same 
time benefits the Employment Service by giving easy access to the information 
needed to provide efficient assistance for displaced workers in finding re-em-
ployment, and to be able to register workers for job seeking services.
The database also constitutes a good resource for statistical analyses allow-
ing analysts to reveal in more detail than was previously possible who were laid 
off by whom and with what attributes during a given period.
An important part of this study describes the status of displaced workers fol-
lowing the loss of their jobs: the layoff database was linked to the database of reg-
istered job seekers, which allowed us to establish which of the displaced work-
ers registered as job seekers, and what kind of services or support they received.
Using the Hungarian Tax Agency’s insurance declarations database in ad-
dition to the job seekers’ database, the study investigates to what extent the 
victims of the series of layoffs triggered by the economic crisis could return to 
the active side of the labour market.
Finally, relying on the figures of the past ten years, it is shown whether the 
scale of announced major layoffs had an impact on employment indicators, 
and if so, how strong the effect was.
A brief overview of group layoff procedures
Employers are required by law to announce planned group layoffs and down-
sizing decisions to the appropriate local office of the PES to which the given 
business site belongs geographically.40
Most employees are employed under the Hungarian Labour Code and the 
major layoffs of the economic crisis typically affected this group. A group layoff 
is defined with reference to the average workforce size during the six months 
preceding the decision. Downsizing is classified as a group layoff if the job sepa-
rations are due to causes related to the operation of the company and:
40 Paragraphs 94/A-G of Act 
XXII of 1992 on the Labour 
Code; Paragraph 17/B of Act 
X XIII of 1992 on the rights 
of civil servants; Paragraph 38 
of Act XXXIII of 1992 on the 
rights of public sector employees; 
Paragraph 59 of Act XCV of 2001 
on the rights of regular and con-
tract soldiers of the Hungarian 
Defence Forces and Act LVIII 
of 2010 on the rights of govern-
ment officials.
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a) workforce size is more than 20 and fewer than 100 persons, and at least 
10 jobs are terminated,
b) workforce size is 100 or more but fewer than 300 persons, and at least 10 
per cent of workers are displaced or,
c) workforce size is 300 or more persons, and at least 30 workers are displaced 
– within a 30 day period.
If an employer is planning a group layoff, discussions must be initiated with 
the company council or in the absence thereof with a committee set up of rep-
resentatives of the employees and delegates from trade unions with represen-
tation at the company (henceforth: employee representatives) at least 15 days 
in advance of making a decision, and the discussions must be continued until 
the decision is made or an agreement is signed. If the discussions end in a deci-
sion to implement the group layoff, the employer must specify
a) the number of workers affected by the decision broken down to occupa-
tional groups,
b) the start and end dates of the implementation and the schedule of the 
group layoff.
The employer must notify in writing the public employment agency of the 
intent to implement a group layoff and of the details of the planned downsiz-
ing as specified by the regulations. In parallel with the announcement, a copy 
of the notification must be given to the employee representatives, and an in-
formation session held.
The decision of a group layoff must be communicated in writing to the public 
employment agency at least 30 days in advance of terminating the contracts or 
making the legal statement. The communication must include the displaced 
workers’ natural identifiers (name, date of birth, etc.) and – in order to secure 
job seeking services and the payment of related benefits – their social security 
number, last occupation, qualifications and average wages.
Major layoffs affecting civil servants, public sector workers or regular or con-
tract soldiers of the Hungarian Defence Forces are regulated by separate laws. 
The size categories applying to them differ from those in the Labour Code.
Workers separated from their jobs through group layoffs are entitled to a no-
tice period and a redundancy payment. These are fully specified by the regula-
tions listed in Footnote 40. As we can see, a substantial proportion of employ-
ees are protected by legal regulations in the event of a major layoff.
For these cases, workforce reduction is classified as a group layoff if, within 
a period of 30 days the number of civil servants or other public sector workers 
separated from their jobs is at least
– 5 at an institution with fewer than 20 employees,
– 10 at an institution with more than 20 and fewer than 100 employees,
– 10 per cent of employees at an institution with 100 or more but fewer than 
300 employees,
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– 30 at an institution with 300 or more employees.41
The regulations on group layoffs do not apply to workers who
– work for an employer employing fewer than 20 employees (that is, it is 
considerably simpler for micro- and small businesses to discharge their 
workers);42
– are self-employed;43
– are smallholders;
– are employed on-call in semi-illegal or illegal arrangements on the fringes 
of the labour market. These typically unskilled workers are highly vulner-
able as they are not protected by any legal regulations.
The major layoffs that are required to be announced and are regulated by 
laws account for far fewer than the total number of employment terminations. 
During a crisis, the level of employment is further reduced as employers fail to 
fill positions left vacant by workers leaving voluntarily, choosing retirement or 
losing their work capability.
Obtaining statistical data is not the primary purpose of the notification re-
quirement. The strict order of the major layoff process is meant to protect work-
ers and to ensure that they can be given assistance. The notification requirement 
also offers valuable information as regards the state of the economy and assists 
the statistical analysis of workforce reductions in terms of the sectoral and 
geographical distribution of downsizing companies and the socio-economic 
composition of the group of workers separated from their jobs.
Announced major layoffs and registered unemployment  
in the past ten years
The statistical details of announced major layoffs have been collected by the 
Hungarian Employment Service (and its predecessors) since the early 1990s. 
The current study explores the past ten and a half years, starting with the be-
ginning of 2000 through to the summer of 2010. In the interest of compara-
bility and clarity the layoff and unemployment data are aggregated into quar-
terly periods.
A set of time series have been constructed using the number of job separa-
tions in announced layoffs for 42 quarterly periods: 1) the inflow to registered 
unemployment (job seekers) for non-school-leaver participants broken down to 
a) first-time job seekers and b) all job seekers; and 2) quarterly average size of the 
registered unemployed (job seeker) population including school-leaver entrants 
(see the two graphs a) and b) in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.A1 in the Appendix).
Looking at the time series of layoffs, there is considerable variation in the 
quarterly number of announced job separations during the period before the 
crisis (ranging from 4,500 to 11,300), and quarterly figures of 10–11 thousand 
are not exceptional. Aggregated over a whole year, we even see values as high 
as 37–38 thousand.
41 As the act on the rights of 
government officials came into 
effect on 6 July, 2010 and our 
database of mass layoffs had been 
closed on 31 December, 2009, 
our sample does not include 
job separations covered by the 
new act.
42 The Employment Service does 
not have information on possible 
job separations at the suppliers of 
large companies that “collapsed” 
and laid off a substantial propor-
tion of their employees. These 
job separations are likely to have 
made a significant contribution 
to the slump in employment dur-
ing the crisis.
43 The crisis also had an adverse 
effect on the position of the 
self-employed. Although self-
employment is characterised by 
constant entries and withdraw-
als under non-crisis conditions, 
the number of withdrawals sub-
stantially exceeded the number 
of entries during the crisis.
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Figure 3.1: Major layoffs and the registered unemployed by quarters (2000–2010)
a) Job separations and first-time unemployment registrations among non-school-leaver participants
b) All unemployment registrations among non-school-leaver participants  
and the average level of registered unemployment
As there is only one unusually high quarterly figure in 2009, the only complete 
year of the crisis (almost 16 thousand job separations were announced in the 
first quarter), the total number of announced job separations is “only” around 
38 thousand in that year, which is not significantly higher than the figures of 
about 38 thousand observed in 2003 and 2004. It is also worth noting the fi-
nal data points of the quarterly time series of layoffs: During the first two quar-
ters of 2010 only a total of 5,414 job separations were announced by employers, 
which is considerably lower than the figures for the same period during the 
previous 10 years. This suggests that the decline in employment and the rise in 
unemployment are likely to have come to an end.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30  First-time unemployment 
registrations
Announced 
job separations
2010/12009/12008/12007/12006/12005/12004/12003/12002/12001/12000/1
Quarter
Thousand
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Quarterly average of 
registered unemployed
Total inflow to regis-
tered unemployment
2010/12009/12008/12007/12006/12005/12004/12003/12002/12001/12000/1
Quarter
Thousand
busch & lázár: major layoffs...
101
It is worth comparing the quarterly layoff time series with the time series fig-
ures of the flows to the unemployment registry (see Figure 3.1 a).
Despite the fact that not every displaced worker registers, the number of 
first-time registrations among non-new labour market participants is higher 
for each quarter than the total number of job separations for that quarter. In 
the early 2000s the former figure can be as much as five times as high as the 
latter. An obvious explanation for this phenomenon is that a substantial share 
of job separations are exempt from the notification requirement. The only pe-
riod when the number of job separations approaches the number of registra-
tions is the first quarter of 2009.
Looking at first-time registrations among non-new labour market partici-
pants in isolation, the following observations can be made. 1. In the early 2000s 
several of the quarterly figures are well above 20 thousand but none of them are 
for the quarters from 2006 onwards, not even for the worst period of the crisis. 
2. The figures for 2009 show a clear increase relative to the data of the previ-
ous two years, and the level of the flow falls back to its previous lower value by 
the second quarter of 2010.
The decreasing trend displayed by the long time series of first-time registra-
tions among non-new labour market participants – which is only interrupted 
for one year at the time of the crisis – is evidently related to the increase over 
the past twenty years in the number of people who have registered before. If 
this is the case, there should be an increase in the ratio of re-registrations among 
non-new labour market participants, since these include workers with previ-
ous registrations.
To explore this question, the distribution of registrations in 2008 and 2009 
has been examined. Re-registrations are categorised according to the date of 
the last previous job seeker registration.
The results show that both in 2008 and in 2009, re-registrations after a pe-
riod of at least four years since the previous registration are about two and half 
times as frequent as first-time registrations. This is a special group, since the 
great majority of people who had not had registered job seeker status for at least 
four years had with all probability been employed, and were separated from 
their jobs now – i.e., during and presumably because of the crisis – similarly to 
first-time registered job seekers (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Job seeker registrations by period of time since last  
previous registration (thousand people)
Year First-time registrations
Re-registrations after  
less than four years
Re-registrations after  
four or more years
2008 54.9 372.3 144.8
2009 70.5 482.1 185.6
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That is, in 2008 almost 200 thousand and in 2009 about 256 thousand peo-
ple entered the job seekers’ programme for the first time or after an at least four-
year period of non-registration.
The time series of all registrations among non-school-leaver participants 
contains considerably larger figures than the number of first-time registrations 
[see Figure 3.1 b)]. There are at least 100 thousand people per year here. For 
seasonal reasons, the first and last quarters of each year are characterised by 
a higher number of registrations than the third or fourth quarters. This data 
series also shows a surge during the crisis period, when in some quarters the 
number of people registering for the first time or re-registering after a period 
of some duration may almost reach 200 thousand. By the second quarter of 
2010, however, this value also drops to a lower level.
The quarterly average of size of the total registered unemployed population 
displays a decreasing trend until the end of 2002, which is followed by an up-
ward trend from the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2008 with a minor dip 
in 2006. Starting with the first quarter of 2009, there is a huge leap in the fig-
ures. Some improvement can be seen, however, in the second quarter of 2010, 
when the number of job seekers drops considerably more steeply than the usual 
seasonal drop of 30 thousand.
Layoffs and inflow figures can only account for some of this enormous in-
crease in the number of registered job seekers. A decline in outflows contrib-
utes at least as much to the growing average size of the job seeker population as 
does the increase in inflows. The substantial drop in outflows is also a product 
of the crisis: the demand for labour greatly declined in the whole of the econ-
omy (cf. Chapter 1 by János Köllő).
A detailed analysis of major layoffs (October 2008 – June 2010)
Major layoffs can be analysed along a number of different dimensions, both in 
terms of company attributes (area, industry, extent and causes of layoffs, etc.) 
and in terms of redundant worker attributes (age, sex, education, occupation, 
category of activity, method of employment termination, nationality, etc.).
When the crisis emerged in the autumn of 2008, the Hungarian Employ-
ment Service made it a priority to develop a new computerised system record-
ing all the legally required details of announced layoffs and organising them 
into a database that could be searched for all attributes and their combinations.
Let us first look at the geographical distribution of layoff announcements. Ta-
ble 3.2 shows the number of companies announcing group layoffs and the total 
number of job separations broken down to quarter and geographical region.
As can be seen in Table 3.2 by far the largest number of announcements were 
made in Central-Hungary and these account for the highest share of all job 
separations. The second highest figures occur in Central-Transdanubia. That 
is, companies in relatively highly developed and industrialised regions made 
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more announcements and these tended to affect a higher number of workers. 
As regards the timing of the announcements, these regions were also the first 
to announce layoffs: The incidence of major layoff announcements was ini-
tially minimal in less developed regions, but at a later stage downsizing spread 
to these areas, especially to the North-Great Plains and North-Hungary. (For 
details on the geographical distribution of unemployment, see Chapter 4 by 
Hajnalka Lőcsei.)
Table 3.2: Number of companies announcing layoffs and number of affected workers  
(between 1st October 2008 and 30th June 2010)
Region/county
Number of 
companies
Distribution of companies 
(per cent) Number of job 
separations
Distribution of job separa-
tions (per cent)
Average number of job sepa-
rations per announcement
Region County Region County Region County
Central-Hungary 246 27.7 14,400 27.3 59
Budapest 189 21.3 10,670 20.2 57
Pest 57 6.4 3,730 7.1 65
Central-Transdanubia 169 19.0 11,748 22.3 70
Fejér 54 6.1 3,770 7.2 70
Komárom-Esztergom 48 5.4 5,966 11.3 124
Veszprém 67 7.5 2,012 3.8 30
West-Transdanubia 104 11.7 7,174 13.6 69
Győr-Moson-Sopron 30 3.4 1,893 3.6 63
Vas 30 3.4 2,372 4.5 79
Zala 44 4.9 2,909 5.5 66
South-Transdanubia 65 7.3 3,949 7.5 61
Baranya 35 3.9 1,796 3.4 51
Somogy 20 2.2 1,221 2.3 61
Tolna 10 1.1 932 1.8 93
North-Hungary 93 10.5 5,112 9.7 55
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 43 4.8 2,681 5.1 62
Heves 33 3.7 1,512 2.9 46
Nógrád 17 1.9 919 1.7 54
North-Great Plains 125 14.1 5,507 10.4 44
Hajdú-Bihar 57 6.4 2,365 4.5 42
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 38 4.3 2,029 3.8 53
Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg
30 3.4 1,113 2.1 37
South-Great Plains 87 9.8 4,830 9.2 56
Bács-Kiskun 39 4.4 2,784 5.3 71
Békés 29 3.3 1,635 3.1 56
Csongrád 19 2.1 411 0.8 22
Total for all regions 889 100.0 100.0 52,720 100.0 100.0 59 59
Unfortunately, barely more than half of the companies could be unequivocally 
classified for industry, as a new industry classification system was introduced by 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office during the period under analysis, and 
some of the companies specified the old code while others used the new code.
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Since the question is important, however, the 486 companies that could be 
identified and the 22,435 job separations they announced have been grouped 
according to their industry. More than a third of the 486 companies (35.8 per 
cent) are in the manufacturing industry, and the job separations announced 
by them constitute exactly half of all job separations successfully identified 
for industry. This ratio seems to be high in itself and becomes even more strik-
ing if we take into account the fact that according to Hungarian Central Sta-
tistical Office (HCSO) data – during the third quarter of 2008 (i.e., before 
the crisis) only 22 per cent of employees in the Hungarian economy were em-
ployed in manufacturing. It is also revealing that between Q2 2008 and Q2 
2010 the number of manufacturing employees fell by 66.5 thousand people 
(7.8 per cent), while the total number of employees in the Hungarian economy 
decreased by 89.6 thousand people (2.3 per cent) over the same period. That 
is, the manufacturing industry accounts for three quarters of the total decline 
in employment in the Hungarian economy. This means that the manufactur-
ing industry suffered the most from the crisis in terms of both announced and 
non-announced layoffs with the result that its 22 per cent share in the coun-
try’s work force dropped to 20.8 per cent over the crisis period.
Within manufacturing, the industries accounting for the highest share of 
announced job separations are metal manufacturing (8.9 per cent), textile in-
dustry (6.7 per cent), automotive industry (6.5 per cent), electrical goods man-
ufacturing (6.1 per cent) and the food, beverage and tobacco industry (5.6 per 
cent). Other than manufacturing, the industry group with the next highest 
share of job separations is transport, storage, postal services and telecommu-
nications (12.3 per cent), with real estate and financial services (8.1 per cent), 
construction (5.9 per cent), retail and repairs (6.9 per cent) and financial bro-
ker services (5.8 per cent) not far behind.
When announcing the layoff, the companies had the opportunity to specify 
the reason. The most important reasons were the decline in foreign or internal 
demand (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Distribution of causes of major layoffs given  
by the employers (between 1st October, 2008 and 30th June, 2010)
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For most of the job separations (48,684) we can determine the method of 
terminating the employee’s contract. The majority (84.5 per cent) of employees 
were discharged, the employment of one in seven workers (14.8 per cent) was 
terminated by mutual agreement and only 0.75 per cent were separated from 
their jobs when their fixed-term contract terminated.
Looking at the demographic features of the people separated from their jobs 
through the mass layoffs, the first figures that stand out are the 50.5 per cent 
share of men versus 49.5 per cent share of women. For the correct interpreta-
tion of the figures it should be taken into consideration that 51.8 per cent of all 
employees are men and only 48.2 per cent are women (in Q3 2008 data of the 
HCSO Labour Force Survey). That is, contrary to first appearances, women 
were slightly more likely to be affected.
The age distribution of displaced employees is similarly important informa-
tion [Figure 3.3 a)]. We can assume that people over 55 will have the option of 
entering the pension scheme if they are still unable to find other employment 
after an extended period of time. The 45–54 year-old cohort appears to be in 
the most difficult position. Their age makes it difficult for them to find re-em-
ployment but they have 10–20 years before they reach the new, higher statutory 
retirement age. More than a quarter of job separations are among this age group.
Figures 3.3 a) and b) display the age distribution of the unemployed and the 
employed populations based on the 2009 data of the HCSO Labour Force 
Survey. The age distribution of the displaced workers is very similar to that of 
the employed population. This indicates that age discrimination does not play 
a role in employers’ redundancy decisions. Comparing the age distribution of 
displaced workers with the HCSO Labour Force Survey unemployment fig-
ures, we can see that there are far more older workers and considerably fewer 
younger workers among those laid off than among the unemployed.
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Figure 3.3: The age distribution of people separated from their jobs through major layoffs,  
of the unemployed and of the employed
a) Major layoffs (between 1st October, 2008 
and 30th June, 2010)
b) The Labour Force Survey unemployed, 
2009 (15–74 year olds)
c) The Labour Force Survey employed,  
2009 (15–74 year olds)
From the point of view of future re-employment prospects, educational at-
tainment is a further factor of special significance. An adverse result is that 40 
in focus
106
per cent of those made redundant have no more than primary education [see 
Figure 3.4 a)], and 14 per cent of these did not even complete primary school.
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Figure 3.4: The educational distribution of people separated from their jobs through major layoffs,  
of the unemployed and of the employed
a) Major layoffs (between 1st October, 
2008 and 30th June, 2010)
b) The Labour Force Survey unemployed, 
2009 (15–74 year olds)
c) The Labour Force Survey employed, 
2009 (15–74 year olds)
Looking at the distribution by educational attainment [see Figures 3.4 a), b) 
and c)], what stands out is that the incidence of people with higher education 
or vocational qualifications is substantially lower among those displaced than 
among the employed population, while we find a much higher share of work-
ers with no more than primary education. Workers having non-vocational 
secondary education are represented in about equal proportions among the 
displaced and the employed. These results suggest that employers attempt to 
retain higher education graduates and workers with vocational qualifications 
at the expense of workers with low educational attainment. Comparing the 
layoff figures with the educational distribution of the unemployed population, 
we find a far lower incidence of vocational qualifications and a higher incidence 
of general secondary education and primary education or less among the for-
mer than among the latter.
74.4 per cent of displaced employees are blue-collar workers and 25.6 per cent 
are white-collar workers. In this respect Central-Hungary significantly devi-
ates from the national average in that the share of white-collar workers is 47 per 
cent in this region. The explanation is that in the capital city there are substan-
tially more white-collar workers than blue-collar workers (57 vs. 43 per cent).
An important data point in group layoff notifications is the four-digit code 
of the redundant worker’s last occupation. While a comprehensive list is be-
yond the scope of this study, Table 10.11 of the Statistical data section of this 
volume lists the occupations in which a total of at least 50 job separations were 
announced. Table 3.3 summarises the occupations in which at least 500 job 
separations were announced or, for occupations requiring higher qualifica-
tions, in which at least 100 employees were affected, grouping them according 
to the four-digit codes used in the Hungarian classification system (FEOR).
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Table 3.3: The most frequent occupations in the layoff announcements,  
with four-digit FEOR codes
FEOR Occupation Number of employees
Occupations with at least 500 people in decreasing order
8193 Assemblers 6785
9190 Other elementary workers (e.g., casual labourers) 1335
7321 Tailors, seamstresses and model makers 1242
8199 Manufacturing machine operators 1190
7490 Other iron and metal workers 1121
7530 Storage labourers 1114
7421 Smiths 955
7439 Other machinery mechanics and repairers 955
8129 Other light industry machine operators and assembly line labourers 890
8192 Metal processing machine operator 833
5231 Package deliverers 790
9131 Material handlers, hand packers 769
3612 Postal and communications clerks 723
8122 Garment machine operators and assembly line workers 684
8356 Truck drivers 589
3192 Quality control and security officers 579
3632 Bank teller clerks 553
8343 Fork lift truck drivers 516
Occupations requiring higher education degree, with at least 100 people
2129 Other engineers 430
2910 Other highly qualified assistants 280
2529 Other finance professionals 241
2190 Other engineering professionals 151
2521 Market research, advertising and marketing professionals 126
2133 Software engineers 120
2117 Mechanical engineers 118
2139 Other IT professionals 115
2511 Economists 104
2522 Sales managers 104
2523 Human resource managers 101
The final factor considered here is the nationality of the displaced workers: what 
share are not Hungarian citizens and from where these people come. 1,687 
of the 52,720 employees specified in the announcements are not Hungarian 
citizens, which constitutes 3.2 per cent of the total. Almost all (1,501 people, 
or 89 per cent) of the foreigners are Slovak citizens. Looking at geographical 
areas, 84 per cent of the foreigners were employed at companies in Central-
Transdanubia, specifically in Komárom-Esztergom county (cf. Chapter 2 by 
László Neumann and Dorottya Boda on layoffs in the automotive industry). 
Most (91.8 per cent) of the foreign citizens were laid off by companies in man-
ufacturing, and within that in electrical machinery manufacturing (54.2 per 
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cent), automobile manufacturing (19.9 per cent) and rubber and plastic goods 
manufacturing (10.9 per cent).
A detailed analysis of displaced workers who registered  
as job seekers
Between the fourth quarter of 2008 and 2009, mass lay-off decisions affect-
ing 48,751 employees were announced by employers at the regional centres 
of the employment agency. Of these, the details given for 44,231 workers are 
sufficiently specific to allow them to be identified in other databases. By the 
end of June 2010, 25,828 of these people registered as job seekers, which con-
stitutes almost 60 (58.4) per cent of the total. The sample of our analysis was 
limited to announcements made between October 2008 and December 2009 
because for a substantial share of the workers on these redundancy lists, the 
notice period ended before June 2010, and thus they had the opportunity to 
register with their employment centres before data collection if they did not 
find new employment.
Figure 3.5: Registered job seekers among those separated from their jobs through 
major layoffs between October 2008 and December 2009 by quarter of entry
As we can see in Figure 3.5, there is a considerable time lag between the lay-
off announcement and the unemployment registration. While the number of 
major layoff announcements peaks during the first quarter of 2009, job seeker 
registrations rise to their highest level in the second and third quarters of the 
same year.
As regards regional differences shown in Figure 3.6, Central-Hungary is the 
only area where the probability of displaced workers registering as job seek-
ers is substantially lower (47.5 per cent) than average. (The regional pattern is 
difficult to interpret, however, as workers can register at the local job centre of 
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their permanent home address, at the place of their temporary residence or in 
the area of their former employment.)
Figure 3.6: Job separations by the region of job separation and by the region  
of permanent home address between October 2008 and December 2009,  
and the share of registered job seekers by place of registration
Abbreviations: CH: Central-Hungary; CT: Central-Transdanubia; WT: West-Transdan-
ubia; ST: South- Transdanubia; NH: North-Hungary; NG: North-Great Plains; SG: 
South-Great Plains.
Further questions explored in our analyses are the benefits and services received 
by those who became registered job seekers (Table 3.4).
In total, 95.6 per cent of job seekers are entitled to a job seeker’s allowance 
and South-Great Plains is the only region where this figure falls below 90 per 
cent. We may assume that in this region some of the job separations were in-
duced by the crisis while others were the result of seasonal layoffs, and in the 
second case workers were typically not employed long enough to gain entitle-
ment to job seeker’s allowance.
Somewhat more than half of job seekers received operative services at their 
job centre potentially helping them to find employment.44 Customers were 
especially likely to receive help in South-Transdanubia: two thirds were in 
this position.
The overall participation rate in Active Employment programmes is 13 per 
cent. There is, however, considerable variation across the regions: while about 
one in five job seekers participated in North-Hungary, only 6 per cent did so 
in Central-Hungary. The overall rate of participation in subsidised training 
programmes is 6 per cent, and South-Transdanubia stands out with 9 per cent 
of job seekers here starting their training by the end of the first half of 2010.
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Table 3.4: People laid off between October 2008 and December 2009  
and registering as job seekers between October 2008 and June 2010, receiving 
operative services or benefits, or participating in Active Employment programmes
CH CT WT ST NH NG SG Total
Number of job seekers 5,248 6,270 4,290 2,180 2,951 2,956 1,933 25,828
Receiving operative services (%) 44.9 52.2 50.9 66.6 52.1 42.9 59.1 51.2
Receiving successful re-employ-
ment services (%) 6.1 16.5 23.8 14.0 24.6 24.2 21.4 17.6
Participation in Active Employ-
ment programmes (%) 6.4 10.7 13.9 16.7 21.6 15.4 14.2 12.9
Receiving training support (%) 3.5 4.8 6.7 8.7 6.4 6.9 5.3 5.6
Having entitlement to job seek-
er’s allowance (%) 96.5 96.9 95.9 94.8 94.7 96.1 89.8 95.6
Abbreviations: CH: Central-Hungary; CT: Central-Transdanubia; WT: West-Trans-
danubia; ST: South-Transdanubia; NH: North-Hungary; NG: North-Great Plains; 
SG: South-Great Plains.
We have also looked at the probability of a displaced worker exiting the job 
seeker’s programme, and the causes of exits (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Re-employment among workers separated from their jobs  
between October 2008 and December 2009 and registering as job seekers  
up to June 2010 (per cent)
CH CT WT ST NH NG SG Total
Exits from the register 51.2 62.3 67.41 62.1 49.7 61.6 48.4 58.3
Exits to employment 47.2 60.2 64.1 55.9 54.3 61.7 49.6 56.5
Exits to non-subsidised employment 44.3 54.2 56.9 47.9 39.1 53.3 40.7 49.3
Exits to subsidised employment 2.9 6.0 7.2 8.0 15.2 8.5 8.9 7.3
Non-subsidised jobs among the re-employed 93.9 90.1 88.7 85.7 72.0 86.3 82.1 87.1
Subsidised jobs among the re-employed 6.1 9.9 11.3 14.3 28.0 13.8 17.9 12.9
Public work schemes among the re-employed 3.6 6.6 4.8 6.2 8.1 10.1 10.7 6.6
Starting subsidised business among  
the re-employed 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5
Abbreviations: CH: Central-Hungary; CT: Central-Transdanubia; WT: West-Trans-
danubia; ST: South-Transdanubia; NH: North-Hungary; NG: North-Great Plains; 
SG: South-Great Plains.
By the end of June 2010, 15.1 thousand of the 25.8 thousand job seekers exited 
the system, 57 per cent of those through finding employment. The probability 
of re-employment is highest in West-Transdanubia and North-Great Plains, 
and is still slightly over 60 per cent in Central-Transdanubia. In Central-Hun-
gary and the South-Great Plains, however, not even half of job seekers could 
find new employment.
As we can see, on the whole the developed regions are characterised by the 
best chances of re-employment, although Central-Hungary is left behind while 
the North-Great Plains is among the “high” re-employment group. These re-
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sults are explained by various phenomena. In the North-Great Plains, which is 
in the best position, people were generally less inclined, or under less pressure, 
to register, i.e., only those entered the job seeker’s programme who abandoned 
all hope of finding a job without help. Those who did register proved to be less 
“marketable.” Although the labour markets of West- and Central-Transdanu-
bia were hit especially hard by the crisis, these (especially West-Transdanubia) 
were also the first regions to show positive signs of recovery.
It is worth analysing the re-employment rates in more detail and looking at 
the types of employment offered to job seekers (bottom rows of Table 3.5). 13 
per cent of the almost 15 thousand re-employed found jobs through some type 
of Active Employment programme. This indicates that job seekers separated 
from their jobs through major layoffs have better labour market prospects than 
registered job seekers in general: In 2009, 60 per cent of all registered job seek-
ers found non-subsidised jobs and 40 per cent found subsidised employment, 
i.e., the likelihood of requiring assistance in finding a suitable job is consider-
ably higher here. The ratio of non-subsidised to subsidised employment was 2 
to 1 even during the “peacetime” years preceding the crisis.
Among the population of re-employed post-redundancy job seekers the share 
of re-employment in non-subsidised jobs is over 90 per cent in Central-Hungary 
and Central-Transdanubia, and it approaches 90 per cent in West-Transdan-
ubia. The lowest rates are observed in North-Hungary and the South-Great 
Plains but even these are higher than the values characterising other groups 
of job seekers.
Overall, only 6.6 per cent of the re-employed were placed within one of the 
public employment schemes; the regions with the highest figures are the South-
Great Plains and the two areas in the worst positions, North-Hungary and the 
North-Great Plains.
Based on the information in the job seekers’ administrative database we can 
also find out how many customers start their own business with the support of 
the job centre. Of the 14,604 people finding re-employment, only 72 decided 
to start a business career. This solution was somewhat more frequent in Cen-
tral-Hungary and South-Transdanubia but both remained below 1 per cent.
The labour market status of displaced workers in June 2010
Using the available administrative data sources, we attempt to map the labour 
market status of workers displaced through major layoffs between Q4 2008 
and Q4 2009. We can establish legal employment status and official unem-
ployment status from the insurance declarations filed with the tax authority 
and the database of registered unemployed workers. Any remaining workers 
are categorised as having unknown status, as the Employment Service does not 
have access to other data sources and thus no further breakdown is possible.
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This section of the paper discusses the labour market position in June 2010 
of the displaced workers recorded in the above two databases. The data are bro-
ken down by region, gender, age and educational attainment.
In June 2010, 30.7 per cent of the 44 thousand people in the sample are in 
employment, 24.6 per cent are registered job seekers and 44.7 have unknown 
status (Figure 3.7). The unknown group may comprise workers in undeclared 
employment, unregistered unemployed workers and various inactive popu-
lations: students, participants of childcare welfare schemes and pensioners.
Figure 3.7: The labour market status on 20 June 2010 of workers separated  
from their jobs through major layoffs  
between October 2008 and December 2010, by region
Abbreviations: CH: Central-Hungary; CT: Central-Transdanubia; WT: West-Transdan-
ubia; ST: South-Transdanubia; NH: North-Hungary; NG: North-Great Plains; SG: 
South-Great Plains.
The highest share of workers with known employment is observed in West-
Transdanubia and the North-Great Plains, i.e., the two regions where displaced 
job seekers display the highest probability of finding re-employment. At the 
other end of the scale, in Central-Hungary, 23 per cent of displaced workers 
work legally. The corresponding figure is around 30 per cent for the remain-
ing regions. The South-Great Plains and North-Hungary have the highest 
incidence of registered job seekers, while in the remaining regions this figure 
is not far from the overall average. Unknown status is most likely to occur in 
Central-Hungary and least likely in West-Transdanubia.
The probability of employment is slightly more likely among men than wom-
en, registered unemployment occurs with about the same frequency for the two 
sexes, and women are marginally more likely to have unknown status than men, 
presumably more of them became inactive (Figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.8: The labour market status on 20 June 2010 of workers separated  
from their jobs through major layoffs between October 2008 and December 2010,  
by demographic features (per cent)
 Employed Registered job seeker Unknown status
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The probability of job seeker status rises with the advance of age. The prob-
ability of finding re-employment is highest among under 25s, only marginally 
lower among the – 25–50 year old – population of the most productive work-
ing age, and lowest among people aged over 50 who are divided from the other 
two groups by a large margin. The latter group also has the largest proportion 
of unknown status, which is likely to indicate a high frequency of transitions 
to inactivity.
Looking at the educational attainment of displaced workers, it can be seen 
that workers with at most primary education have seemingly better chances of 
legal re-employment than do skilled workers or people with secondary educa-
tion. An unpleasant surprise of the survey is that higher education graduates 
have the worst re-employment prospects among the displaced, although we 
should note that the incidence of unknown status is rather high here.
The probability of the transition to job seeker status among workers separated 
from their jobs through major layoffs is highest among those with vocational 
training, people with at most primary education come next, and they are fol-
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lowed by workers having secondary education. Higher education graduates 
are the least likely to become job seekers (just as they are to find legal re-em-
ployment). Unknown status occurs with about 50 per cent higher frequency 
among these than among their primary or vocational school educated peers, 
and even people with secondary education are 10 percentage points less likely 
to have this status. That is, the probability of unknown status steeply rises with 
educational attainment.
Summary, main observations
1. The number of actual job separations is usually smaller than the number 
specified in major layoff announcements because the announcement must 
specify the upper limit of separations.
2. The regulations require major layoffs to be announced if more than 20 peo-
ple are employed at the company and the layoff affects a pre-specified number 
or percentage of employees. (Different rules apply to the public sector). How-
ever, several of the suppliers and subcontractors of large Hungarian owned and 
multinational companies, which are typically small businesses, also laid off a 
substantial share of their employees, or changed full-time contracts to part-
time contracts or other atypical forms of employment.
3. A non-negligible portion of displaced workers avoid the transition to unem-
ployment either because they find re-employment (or possibly start a business) 
or because they become inactive (e.g., enter the pension scheme).
4. Nevertheless, the annual increase in the number of registered job seekers is 
well above the total annual job separations announced. While part of the ex-
planation is that in the private sector layoffs affecting fewer than 20 people do 
not have to be announced, another important reason is that the crisis was ac-
companied by a marked decrease in the demand for labour. Layoffs therefore 
constitute only one aspect of the problem while the other is that the contraction 
of labour demand heavily constrained exits from registered unemployment.
5. As a result of the decline in demand, companies do not replace workers leav-
ing, retiring, etc. (and several public sector institutions introduced a freeze on 
workforce size).
6. Companies do not, however, displace every worker that temporarily becomes 
redundant. Once the recession turns round, this reserve labour provides the 
foundations of renewed growth. As a result, the first phases of recovery are not 
accompanied by an expansion in employment or a decrease in unemployment.
7. A large share (about half) of all displaced workers are laid off by companies 
in the manufacturing industry. This ratio is well above the – fairly large, 22 
per cent – share of manufacturing jobs in the Hungarian labour market. Job 
separations in the manufacturing industry account for almost three quarters 
of the overall decrease in employment in the Hungarian economy, with the 
result that the share of manufacturing dropped to 20.8 per cent.
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8. Major layoffs in themselves cannot explain the striking increase in either the 
size of the registered unemployed population or the number of unemployed 
workers recorded in the HCSO Labour Force Survey. Nor can they explain 
the substantial decline in the level of employment.
9. Within the 44.2 thousand job separations, by 30 June 2010 almost six in ten 
displaced workers registered as job seekers at employment centres.
10. 96 per cent of registered job seekers were entitled to job seeker’s allowance. 
Slightly more than half of job seekers received operative services at their job 
centre raising their chances of re-employment. 13 per cent of displaced job seek-
ers participated in Active Employment programmes and 6 per cent attended 
subsidised training. Of those receiving operative services, 57 per cent exited 
the programme by 30 June 2010 due to re-employment.
11. The labour market status of displaced workers in June 2010 can be sum-
marised as follows: 31 per cent had jobs, 25 per cent were registered job seekers 
and 44 per cent had unknown status. The latter group includes those having 
undeclared employment, unregistered unemployed people and various inactive 
groups: students, participants of childcare support schemes and pensioners.
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Appendix 3
Table A3.1: Announced job separations and registered job-seekers
Year, quarter
Announced  
job separations
Job seeker registrations by non-school-leaver partici-
pants (inflow), in thousands Average number of registered job 
seekers, in thousands
First-time entrants All entrants, in thousands
2000 Q1 4,505 26,397 155.4 432.5
2000 Q2 4,811 21,027 119.6 392.3
2000 Q3 5,477 22,977 128.0 371.7
2000 Q4 5,807 21,087 151.3 365.7
2001 Q1 8,122 25,902 166.0 401.4
2001 Q2 5,753 21,858 134.0 370.6
2001 Q3 3,933 22,197 128.2 350.8
2001 Q4 9,645 20,412 153.1 333.9
2002 Q1 5,084 22,854 157.9 372.5
2002 Q2 7,123 18,321 122.8 337.2
2002 Q3 5,498 18,735 126.5 334.6
2002 Q4 11,331 18,006 145.5 334.5
2003 Q1 10,394 21,687 156.5 383.0
2003 Q2 8,929 18,162 121.1 351.9
2003 Q3 8,187 18,405 131.7 345.5
2003 Q4 10,795 17,550 151.1 348.4
2004 Q1 10,240 22,599 163.4 395.5
2004 Q2 10,012 17,838 129.4 363.6
2004 Q3 7,037 19,425 141.4 362.2
2004 Q4 10,041 19,482 168.3 382.5
2005 Q1 10,283 21,345 170.5 435.3
2005 Q2 7,072 19,473 145.0 402.3
2005 Q3 8,001 19,779 154.7 400.1
2005 Q4 6,921 16,458 159.5 402.1
2006 Q1 5,961 17,844 140.2 434.8
2006 Q2 6,887 13,983 104.9 373.3
2006 Q3 5,877 15,342 133.0 377.6
2006 Q4 11,228 14,679 147.5 388.1
2007 Q1 9,300 16,917 150.5 450.3
2007 Q2 10,650 14,487 111.4 416.3
2007 Q3 4,297 15,864 128.4 415.1
2007 Q4 5,219 14,013 151.7 425.9
2008 Q1 5,823 15,684 144.6 469.0
2008 Q2 3,575 12,771 117.5 427.7
2008 Q3 5,224 12,687 129.3 423.3
2008 Q4 9,708 13,779 180.6 449.3
2009 Q1 15,882 18,462 183.3 538.7
2009 Q2 8,982 17,937 195.2 560.7
2009 Q3 7,927 17,409 161.5 562.8
2009 Q4 6,252 16,707 198.3 584.9
2010 Q1 3,327 16,419 189.1 652.1
2010 Q2 2,088 13,242 146.9 567.9
Source: National Employment and Social Office, Hungary
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4. THE INFLUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON SPATIAL 
INEQUALITIES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Hajnalka Lőcsei
Introduction
The global financial crisis also created turbulence in the Hungarian economy 
during the autumn of 2008. A significant and critical sign from society’s point 
of view was the sudden increase in the number and share of jobseekers. The 
deterioration in the employment situation affected the regions unequally: the 
effect varied across regions with dissimilar socio-economic character or spa-
tial location, and also appeared differently in time. The aim of the study is to 
explore these spatial and possibly temporal differences.
Today it is not necessary to explain the importance and aim of analyses which 
have regional aspects. Development and lagging behind appears specifically 
not randomly but is often concentrated spatially. In addition the regional as-
pect is not just a projection of socio-economic features, but also plays a role in 
the development and subsistence of inequalities, therefore it has substantive 
explanatory power.45
The spatial duality of the Hungarian economy that emerged and stabilized 
following the regime change primarily due, as it was, to differences in entre-
preneurial productivity, efficiency and foreign direct investments, also has a 
regional character (Barta 2000, Kukely 2008). Simply put, the country can be 
divided into two parts, one having a favourable position, competitiveness and 
ability to comply with the altered circumstances, and another having a much 
less favourable situation, hardly attracting FDI and continuously lagging be-
hind. This is because FDI, which creates job opportunities, was not aimed at 
locations randomly, but preferred regions having an advantageous geographi-
cal location and agglomeration economies and which offered a skilled labour 
force that had experience in modern production techniques (Fazekas 2000). It 
follows that FDI flowing to backward regions with unfavourable labour con-
ditions is still not to be expected.
Both the volume and structure of unemployment mirrors the spatial divi-
sion of the economy and society. In contrast to the central and north-western 
part of the country with its favourable position, in East- and South-Hungary 
not only is the rate of unemployment higher but also the composition of un-
employed people is more unfavourable (in terms of education or age structure), 
additionally the share of permanent and passive unemployment is higher. The 
examination of the recession-caused changes of the – at least decade long es-
tablished – spatial structure of unemployment can provide useful information 
not only for the tools and institutions established to handle unemployment, 
45 Regional d ifferences in 
development and the labour 
market are analysed by several 
Hungarian researchers (e.g. 
Ábrahám–Kertesi 1996, Nemes 
Nagy–Németh 2005), and in the 
background to these inequali-
ties, in addition to structural fac-
tors, geographical location was 
also found. In chapter 1 Köllő 
used regional variables for the 
explanation of the decline in 
working hours, unemployment 
and wages in 2008–2009, but 
these variables did not prove to 
be significant.
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but can also give general lessons. The main guideline of the study is therefore 
the question of what kind of effect the global economic crisis and the extreme 
recession had on the country’s spatial structure of development. Additionally, 
can the initial apparent equalisation exist over a long period, or can a further 
sharpening of the already considerable economic and social conflicts generat-
ing differences eventually be expected?
To demonstrate the processes of the present and the rapidly changing recent 
past, the register of jobseekers happened to be the most appropriate vehicle.46 
The applied database was provided by the PES (Public Employment Service 
of Hungary) on a monthly basis and with just a couple of months delay. This 
served as a basis for aggregating data on a microregional level, where spatial 
processes are most suitable to be analysed. The study therefore takes into ac-
count the number of jobseekers and an indicator close to the unemployment 
rate, namely the changes in the share of jobseekers compared to the 15–64 
years old population. In the following the rate of unemployment is identified 
by these indicators. In order to filter seasonal effects, changes are described in 
relation to the previous year (population numbers are presented in the ratio of 
the previous year, while the changes of the unemployment rate are interpreted 
in percentage point differences).
The new wave of unemployment – general trends and periods
There were approximately 424 thousand jobseekers in September 2008 in the 
registry of the PES, and the share of jobseekers in the 15–64 years old popula-
tion was 6 percent. These data – not counting a shorter transitional period with 
seasonal reasons – were continuously in decay until February 2010, when cca. 
659 thousand people had no job; this meant a 9.4 percent share. In the longer 
period commencing from the change in regime this can be named as the sec-
ond large wave of unemployment, since the situation worsened the last time 
in the same rapid way at the beginning of the ‘90s. That time the number of 
registered unemployed people increased practically from zero (there were 23 
thousand registered in January 1990) to more than 700 thousand.
It should be pointed out that the evaluation of “raw” data is difficult due 
to the in-year change of unemployment. The main reason is that the employ-
ment capacity of certain sectors, mainly agriculture, construction and tourism 
are seasonally fluctuating, and therefore it is a general phenomenon to see the 
number of unemployed persons increasing in February and March, decreasing 
in spring and summer, and then increasing again in the autumn and winter 
period. (Seasonality is in minor part explained by the appearance of entrants 
on the labour market in July and in January-February.) So the role played by 
seasonality in the increasing number of jobseekers in 2008–2009 and in the 
change for the better in spring 2010 cannot be exactly determined. From the 
pure changes in the number of jobseekers the development of trends can be 
46 Public Employment Service 
(PES) registers unemployed 
persons according to prevail-
ing Hungarian law. This regis-
try was developed for operating 
and evaluating the toolkit es-
tablished for dealing with un-
employment, so the definition 
of unemployed workers (lately 
termed jobseekers) depends on 
the current employment policy 
and the rigour of the support 
system, so it results in higher 
values than the Labour Force 
Survey published by the Hungar-
ian Statistical Office. (See Figure 
16 in the introductory study of 
this volume written by Bálint–
Cseres-Gergely–Scharle.) The 
frequency of rule changing 
causes problems in the temporal 
and spatial comparison of data, 
because increasing or decreas-
ing the number of jobseekers 
depends not only on the demand 
for a workforce. Before the crisis 
the number of jobseekers in the 
PES’ registry was increasing, 
while unemployment was stag-
nating according to the Labour 
Force Survey. This difference was 
obviously due to the change of 
regulation – e.g. the raising of 
the retirement age, increasing 
the severity of disabled superan-
nuation, social security reform. 
(See also ÁFSZ 2008, pp. 15–16.)
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concluded only through prediction and care must be taken to eliminate the 
seasonal effects. The difference between raw and seasonally adjusted data, as 
well as the increase of unemployment can be seen on Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The number of registered jobseekers in 2008–2010
Note: Seasonally adjusted data, September 2008 = 100%.
Seasonal adjustment is prepared with X-11/12 ARIMA procedure by MultiRáció Kft. 
on behalf of the PES.
Source of data: PES, http://kisterseg.afsz.hu/index.php?ts=00&am=1&kiigbtn=Rajt
a&chxs=1&mode=kiig.
On the basis of the speed and nature of changes the past (from autumn 2008 
until summer 2010) is divided into four periods.
1) From October 2008 to January 2009 seasonally adjusted data already in-
creased to an appreciable extent, the increase of raw data therefore exceeded 
the volume normally available in previous years.
2) From January 2009 the growth rate dramatically increased, more and 
more people became registered by PES. This period lasted until May 2009. In 
May, though, a slight decrease was seen in the number of jobseekers – by 5000 
people or rather 0.1 percentage point in under a month. After filtering out the 
seasonal effect it is obvious, however, that the trend of the rapid increase had 
still not been broken at this point. In May 2009 the number of jobseekers was 
already 33 percent (nearly 140 thousand people) higher than one year earlier.
3) From June 2009 until February 2010 the number of registered people 
was increasing, but the period of drastic changes had come to an end. Raw 
data hardly change during the summer, the seasonality caused a much smaller 
wave in the time series: the number of jobseekers decreased by a few thousand 
people in only two months (both in June and July). The stagnation in summer 
and the slight increase in autumn were again replaced by a large volume of in-
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flows. During this period, however, the increase in the number of those on the 
register had rather been influenced by seasonal effects, although the role of the 
economic downturn was still not negligible.
4) From February 2010 the negative trend seems to turn: first, the season-
ally adjusted, then also the raw numbers started to decline. Between March 
and June the number of registered jobseekers declined to about 100 thousand 
people. In contrast to the previous year the positive effects of seasonality were 
not extinguished in 2010 by a wave of dismissals in the other sectors. However 
the whole improvement cannot be explained by seasonality: in “no recession” 
years the outflow of only 50 thousand people is usual.
Favourable processes of the last period may warrant further explanation; 
the improvement, which was also significant apart from the seasonal effects, 
should be treated carefully. In fact, according to the labour survey of the HCSO 
there is a decrease in the number and rate of unemployed people, but this im-
provement is far from being of a great degree, as can be seen from PES data: 25 
thousand people or 0.7 percentage points between the 1st and 2nd quarter of 
2010. The decrease in the number of jobseekers registered by the PES was also 
potentially affected by the substantial intensity of the Back to work public em-
ployment programme.47 (See the introductory study of this volume written by 
Bálint–Cseres-Gergely–Scharle on this programme and its effects.)
The programme, launched in 2009, aimed at improving the employability of 
a well determined – also incidentally spatially relatively concentrated – social 
group, the permanently unemployed, who receive regular social allowances. 
It can be assumed that as a result of the programme individuals have dropped 
out of the circle of registered jobseekers, which explains the greater part of the 
differences between the HCSO-ILO and PES registries: passive unemployed 
persons, who were counted as inactive in labour surveys. To sum up, the signifi-
cant improvement of the seasonally adjusted number of registered jobseekers is 
not necessarily a sign of recovery from the crisis, but rather reflects the results 
of an attempt to solve a long-existing social and employment problem. Proof 
of this train of thought and the evaluation of the results of the programme is 
not a specific consideration in a study analysing the labour market effects of 
the global crisis, but even so cannot be ignored in the assessment of regional 
processes, since it is not possible to filter out the effect.
Regional diffusion of unemployment
After the infiltration of the global crisis into the Hungarian economy48 un-
employment – measured by the number and share of jobseekers – began to 
develop differently not only in time but also spatially. In the following section 
the regional differences of the effects of the crisis on the labour market are pre-
sented, acting upon the previously outlined periods, by comparing spatial pat-
tern and disparities experienced before and at the deepest moment of the crisis.
47 Public employment fluctuates 
seasonally due to the character 
of the works; during winters it 
is always less.
48 An increase in the number of 
jobseekers followed the decline 
in production and output with 
some delay. Industrial produc-
tion began to decrease in May 
2008, but a increase in unem-
ployment was only perceptible 
in October 2008, when jobseek-
ers’ numbers, over and above 
seasonal effects, also started to 
increase. Signs of improvement 
in the labour market also had a 
time-lag.
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Initial state – regional pattern of unemployment before the crisis
The regional pattern of unemployment has been relatively stable since the sec-
ond half of the 1990’s. The observable regional structure (Figure 4.2) clearly re-
flects the spatial structure of development. In the triangle formed by the capital 
and its agglomeration, the M1 motorway, the western border of the country, 
Lake Balaton and the M7 motorway the rate of jobseekers is the lowest, un-
der 5 percent. Unemployment constitutes the largest problem east of the so-
called BB-line (an imaginary line between Balassagyarmat and Békéscsaba), 
as well as in South-Transdanubia and in micro-regions with no major cities. 
Particularly critical was (and remained) the state of the micro-regions along 
the north-eastern border and in a small cohesive zone in Somogy and Baranya 
along the border of the country, as well as in settlements of the inner periphery 
of the Közép-Tisza area. In these areas it was not simply the high rate of job-
seekers which caused problems, but also its unfavourable structure (high rate 
of low-skilled and long-term unemployed people). In areas burdened by social 
and often ethnic tensions, and with low entrepreneurial activity the demand 
on labour due to the absence of large enterprises is very low, additionally these 
areas are far distant from cities that could offer job opportunities.
By further generalisation of the above detailed picture it can be concluded 
that at the turn of the millennium some convergence clubs had arisen among 
regions and counties: the difference between the group of the 8 counties in 
West-Transdanubia, Central-Transdanubia, Central-Hungary and the coun-
ties in the rest of Hungary became increasingly greater. The economic duality 
that can be derived from the location and agglomeration economies, and the 
significant spatial segregation of favourable and unfavourable regions is rep-
resented by the strong positive spatial autocorrelation of the rate of jobseekers 
(Moran’s I was +0.73 in September 2008), and also by the spatial clusters out-
lined upon results of Local Moran’s I 49 (Figure 4.3.).
The regional character of changes
In the following we examine how general trends influence the previously pre-
sented stable spatial structure of the labour market. Since the shaping of the 
regional differences of unemployment is closely linked to the drop in economic 
performance as well as to cutbacks of companies,50 it is no wonder that accord-
ing to both PES statistics and press information the number of jobseekers in the 
first period (namely between September 2008 and January 2009) increased 
the most in regions which were previously major centres of industrial production 
– that is the northern and north-western part of Transdanubia (Figure 4.4, 
January). On figures, which exemplify the changes, the index of the number 
of jobseekers depends also on the initial basis [part a) on Figure 4.4]. Where 
the number of jobseekers was relatively low prior to the crisis, the value of the 
index has increased rapidly, since a smaller value can be doubled much easier.
49 Moran’s I measures spatial au-
tocorrelation, thus the proximity 
in space. A zero value indicates a 
random spatial pattern, negative 
values (up to –1) refer spatial dis-
persion and positive values (up 
to +1) mean that similar (high 
or low) values concentrating in 
space. Local Moran’s I clustering 
spatial units with statistically 
significance spatial autocorrela-
tion. (See Dusek 2004, Anselin 
1995.)
50 The public sector usually pro-
vides a safety net during a crisis. 
Köllő highlights in Chapter 1 
that at the beginning of the reces-
sion initially wages were shrink-
ing in the public sector, while the 
market sphere preferred layoffs. 
See more details concerning ma-
jor layoffs in Chapter 3 written 
by Busch and Lázár.
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Figure 4.2: The share of registered jobseekers in the 15–64 years old population, 
September 2008 (percentage)
Source of data: PES, http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_stat_telepules_ada-
tok_2008.
Figure 4.3: Regional clusters defined on the basis  
of the rate of registered jobseekers,* September 2008
* Rook-contiguity, 5% significance level.
The rate of jobseekers in the high-high category is generally high both in the micro-re-
gion and in its neighbourhood; in low-high category it is low in the micro-region but 
high in its surroundings, in low-low category it is low both in the micro-region and in 
its neighbourhood, and in high-low category it is high in the micro-region, while low 
on average in the neighbourhood.
Rook-contiguity: the neighbourhood relation exists if regional units share a common 
border with non-zero length, since association of spatial units in only one point is less 
relevant in connection with socio-economic relations.
Source: Own construction by the application of Geoda programme
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Figure 4.4: The change of the number (a) and share (b) of registered jobseekers  
in relation to the same period of the previous year
a) the same period of the previous year = 100% b) in relation to the same period  
of the previous year in percentage points
Source of data: PES, http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_stat_telepules_ada-
tok_2009.
This approach well illustrates the spectacular and shocking changes. The an-
nual change of the rate of jobseekers [part b) on Figure 4.4] shows a more fac-
tual regional image. The changes have begun to spatially concentrate primar-
ily from November, most spectacularly so in the northwest. This may easily 
distract attention from other large loser micro-regions in the underdeveloped 
parts of the country.
In centres of manufacturing industry in Komárom-Esztergom, Fejér, Győr-
Moson-Sopron and Vas counties (e.g. in Komárom, Esztergom, Tatabánya, 
Mór, Székesfehérvár, Győr, Szombathely) as a result of the large companies’ 
holding back production and substantial layoffs, there were 1,5–2 times more 
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jobseekers registered in employment centres of the area prior to January 2009 
than one year before. The record holder in January was the micro-region of Mór, 
where the volume of increase was 170 percent. On the contrary, if we were to 
look at a reverse map of development, the situation has deteriorated slightly 
in the poorer regions of the country and moreover the rate of jobseekers even 
decreased in 28 micro-regions. The strong impact of the crisis can be observed 
among those Northwestern-Transdanubian regions, where a major part of the 
workers were commuting to the nearby large cities’ manufacturing companies, 
i.e. inside the triangle formed by the capital, the M1 motorway, western bor-
der, Lake Balaton and the M7 motorway.
The second period from February until May 2009 is the phase of the diffusion 
of the crisis. The number of job seekers increased from month to month, in May 
only very few regions remained in Hungary where the effects of the crisis were 
not perceptible through the significantly increasing number of registered job-
seekers (Figure 4.4, March and May). The impact of the crisis was not limited 
to the environment of the export-oriented manufacturing facilities already 
affected, but became general and affected more and more sectors and regions. 
At the same time it was still perceptible the most in inner peripheries of the 
north-western part of the country.
The maps began to darken spectacularly from March, namely the one-year 
rate was significantly increasing in a growing number of micro-regions by more 
than 3 percentage points. In this phase of diffusion an important role was played 
by contiguity, since impacts of the layoffs of certain large companies extended 
throughout the whole economy, and in all agglomerations of micro-regions 
with close connections the rate of jobseekers increased. (This was proven by 
the Moran’s I index calculated for the change of the rate of jobseekers. The in-
dex reached the annual maximum in June 2009 with a value of +0.37, and then 
began to decrease, and strengthened its role again only in the fourth period.)
The economic crisis did not cause too great a shock on the labour market in most 
parts of the regions which lagged behind (beside the eastern border of the coun-
try, in South-Transdanubia, in micro-regions of Bács-Kiskun country close to the 
Danube or to the border, or in the Central-Tisza area). In addition to the external 
and internal peripheries also less influenced were Paks and Tiszaújváros51 with 
industries of strategic importance, while in regions of Dunaújváros, Százhalom-
batta, Kazincbarcika and Diósgyőr the major factories made significant layoffs, 
or in some cases it was just delayed by the promise of state support.52
The changes were slight in the capital and the agglomeration, however the 
“unaffected” zone was getting narrower. It seems that the economy and the la-
bour market of Budapest were less shocked by the recession. Although the ab-
solute number of jobseekers increased to a 1.5 times higher value prior to May 
2008 compared to the previous year this resulted in only a minor increase in 
relative indices (the increase is from 2 to 3 percent, namely only 1 percentage 
51 Another important company 
in Tiszaújváros is the Jabil Cir-
cuit, whose intention to make 
cutbacks became publ ic in 
February 2009. It affected 900 
workers.
52 E.g. in Kazincbarcika (Bor-
sodchem – chemistry company) 
and in Dunaújváros (ISD Duna-
ferr – steel production).
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point). Similarly the values were not increased significantly in the Balaton re-
gion; some surveys say this area could have been a temporary winner of the cri-
sis, since instead of travelling abroad Hungarian tourists preferred to choose 
domestic destinations in 2009.53
In the third period, when the number and the rate of unemployment were 
primarily determined by seasonal effects, the spatial pattern of the increase in 
unemployment remained stable. There were only slight changes regarding both 
indicators, but these alterations refer clearly on further diffusion of the crisis. 
On the labour market of almost all regions the processes having a negative di-
rection became perceptible, in accordance with the preliminary expectations 
the number and the share of registered jobseekers increased from the autumn.
It should be noted among the changes that the crisis also appeared increasing-
ly in Central-Hungary. The difference between the annual and previous year’s 
rate of jobseekers compared to the employment age population was slowly but 
steadily increasing in Budapest and in the surrounding micro-regions. The main 
reason is that in the economy of Budapest the service sector is predominant 
suffering higher losses at a later time in comparison with the export-oriented 
industrial branches, additionally local companies were probably able to pass 
on unfavourable labour market effects of the crisis to the peripheries. (A good 
example is the bank sector, where offices in rural areas with fewer turnovers 
have been closed first.) The increase of the capital’s and its neighbourhood’s 
unemployment rate were also delayed by the fact that unemployed people in 
unfavourable regions attempt to find new jobs initially on their own, and only 
register themselves in labour offices when they are not successful after a cou-
ple of weeks. Here, the seasonally affected usual increase in July in the num-
ber of unemployed entrants was generally perceptible later, around September.
Starting from autumn the increase of the number of registered jobseekers was 
caused by the seasonal change in the labour needs of some economic branches, 
since the demand on the labour force decreases in the winter season in tourism, 
the construction industry and agriculture. It is a usual phenomenon that the 
number of jobseekers rises the most in late autumn particularly in the tourist 
region around Balaton and secondly in the agricultural areas of the Great Plain.
In this period there was no change except in the most underdeveloped exter-
nal and internal peripheries of the country: the already very high values have 
not become worse. Moreover, the situation has improved in a couple of micro-
regions (also perhaps as a result of public employment programmes).
The assessment of the data for 2010 is distorted by some methodological 
problems. The rate of jobseekers increased significantly from December 2009 
to January 2010 (from 8.6 percent to 9.3 percent), although this was not only 
caused by the growing number of job-searching individuals, but also by the 
decrease in the 15–64 year old population.54 Its effect was not the same in all 
regions: in areas with a migration surplus and with agglomerations with an 
53 Press announcements con-
cerning this at : http://www.c-
travel.hu/hirek/gorogbalatonc-
travel2009, http://www.valla-
lkozoinegyed.hu/20091002/
meguszta_a_valsagot_a_bala-
ton
54 As a denominator the number 
of the population registered in 
January of the previous year is 
used.
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increasing number of residents the above mentioned effect amends the unem-
ployment indicator, while in regions that were losing population (e.g. in South-
Transdanubia or North-Hungary) it fosters worsening tendencies.
After all, what kind of spatial processes can be discovered from 2010 data? 
By regional analysis of the layoffs in spring 2010 (Figure 4.6) it can be con-
firmed that the positive turn can be explained not merely by seasonal factors.
In the first quarter of 2010 the labour situation improved the most partly in 
areas of the Great-Plain having an agricultural character, as well as in micro-
regions with a tourist profile around Lake Balaton. In April and May the rate 
of jobseekers surprisingly decreased in regions which were lagging behind the 
most and were affected the most by unemployment (Cserehát, Szatmár, Ormán-
ság). This is also remarkable, since in these areas the number of registered job-
seekers had previously not increased due to the crisis. It is unlikely that in these 
regions, which were beset by social problems and permanent unemployment, 
new job opportunities would have been created. The spectacular change may 
rather reflect the results of the endless intensity of public employment pro-
grammes. Beside the effects of seasonality and the results of public employ-
ment a third factor could have played a role in improving the national average. 
Primarily in May and June a positive shift can be noticed in micro-regions as 
well as in their labour agglomeration, where companies of export-oriented 
manufacturing are concentrated. Namely unemployment is also decreasing 
in West and North-Transdanubia. It has to be said however that the effects of 
the public employment programme, the seasonal factors and the market pro-
cesses cannot unfortunately be separated.
It seems however somewhat strange that the improvement can still not be 
perceived in the agglomeration of Budapest, since in this area the number and 
share of jobseekers were still growing in spring 2010 compared to the previous 
year. This is especially interesting in respect of the fact that it is about the most 
developed part of the country, where the labour market remained relatively 
stable even at the deepest point of the crisis, and the share of jobseekers in the 
employment age population has not reached even half the national average – 
not even exceeding 4%. It seems that the labour market of the agglomeration 
of Budapest reacts to boom and bust waves with something of a delay, and that 
the target group of the Back to work programme is represented by a relatively 
small weight in the region’s population.
Temporary (?) regional equalisation and the altering of the spatial 
structure
By the summer of 2010 the recession had still not finished and the level of em-
ployment and unemployment did not even approximate the level before the 
crisis. It is, however, worth summing up the effects of the previously mentioned 
changes on the spatial differences and structures of the labour market.
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Changes have led to a specific regional equalisation, since in a substantial 
part of the regions being in a favourable position and having previously low 
data, the rate of jobseekers has increased and got closer to the national aver-
age. The inequality indicator of relative standard deviation calculated on the 
rate of jobseekers, which was previously stabilized at a high level, was almost 
continuously decreasing from September 2009 (Figure 4.5). The crisis had an 
effect solely with regard to the direction of the priority of regional develop-
ment policy by the reduction of inequalities. The only problem is that not the 
improvement of the situation in the underdeveloped regions is standing in the 
background. In spring 2010 regional equalisation continued, and in contrast 
with previous processes this was due to the improvement in the number of job-
seekers of lagging regions and not of developed areas.
Figure 4.5: Spatial inequalities and autocorrelation of the rate of jobseekers  
at microregional level, January 2008 – August 2010
Source: own construction
In accordance with Figure 4.5 the Moran’s I values that measure the stability of 
the spatial structure were also decreasing following the onset of the crisis, which 
refers to the dissolving of the strong spatial segregation of favourable and unfa-
vourable regions. The extent was however meant not to be important: it decreased 
from the initial value of +0.73 to +0.64 prior to May 2009, but changed in the 
direction of stabilisation again after. The role of contiguity remained important.
Comparing the spatial image of the rate of jobseekers in August 2010 (Figure 
4.7) with the maps of the initial states (Figure 4.2), it can be concluded that the 
spatial structure of unemployment has not changed significantly. It is still valid 
that the rate of unemployment is larger than average in the micro-regions of 
South-Transdanubia or east of the Balassagyarmat – Békéscsaba axis, the only 
exceptions being the micro-regions of large central cities. The number of re-
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gions in a relatively good position sharply decreased, the rate remained under 
4 percent only in micro-regions around Budapest, as well as near the western 
border of the country and in the micro-region of Balatonfüred. Despite the 
fact that the number of jobseekers increased significantly in more developed 
regions of Northwestern-Transdanubia, the rate was still a lot lower than in 
the already lagging regions of the country.
The maps of Local Moran’s I refers also to the stability of the spatial struc-
ture (Figure 4.8). The spatial allocation of the clusters has not changed to any 
great extent since September 2008 (Figure 4.3).
Regional polarisation which is also perceptible by unemployment eventually 
dissolved to no great extent as a result of the crisis. There were changes partic-
ularly in the north-western part of the country, additionally by the end of the 
period examined (until August 2010) a kind of reordering could be observed.
Differences along the structure of settlements
In addition to geographical location the characteristics of the settlement net-
work can also significantly affect the inequalities of the socio-economic fea-
tures, although the role of the settlement structure is smaller than that of the 
geographical location (Nemes Nagy–Jakobi–Németh 2001). Within the frame-
work of this examination 8 categories were created first of all based on the size 
and secondly on the central function of the settlements. The main character-
istics of the categories are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Differences of unemployment according to regions and categories of settlements  
before the appearance of the crisis, September 2008
Settlement categories
Share of 
population 
(%)
Share of jobseekers in the 15–64 year old population (%)
Hungary Central-Hungary
Central-
Transdanubia
West- 
Transdanubia
South- 
Transdanubia
North-
Hungary
North-Great 
Plains
South-Great 
Plains
Budapest 16.6 2.0 2.0
Cities of county rank* 20.3 4.9 2.1 3.8 3.5 5.1 7.9 5.4 5.0
Population between 
10–40 thousand 22.4 5.6 2.4 4.4 3.1 7.5 9.1 8.7 6.5
Population between 
5–10 thousand 9.5 7.2 2.7 4.9 4.4 6.1 9.9 10.7 8.2
Population between 
2–5 thousand 14.8 7.7 3.4 4.5 3.3 7.7 10.6 12.7 7.5
Population between 
1–2 thousand 9.0 9.0 2.9 4.7 3.8 9.8 12.7 14.0 8.4
Population between 
500–1000 4.7 10.3 4.0 5.4 4.7 11.7 14.2 17.4 10.7
Population under 500 2.7 11.6 3.2 6.9 5.9 15.2 16.2 18.4 9.8
Total 100.0 6.0 2.3 4.5 3.8 8.3 10.5 9.8 6.8
* Cities of county rank are all the 18 capitals of the counties and the cities that have larger than 50,000 residents (So-
pron, Nagykanizsa, Érd, Dunaújváros, Hódmezővásárhely)
Source: Own construction based on PES data
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Figure 4.6: The change in the rate of the number of registered jobseekers in relation 
to the same period of the previous year (in percentage points)
Source of data: PES, http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_stat_telepules_ada-
tok_2010
Figure 4.7: The share of registered jobseekers from 15–64 year old population, 
August 2010 (percentage)
Source of data: PES, http://www.afsz.hu/engine.aspx?page=full_afsz_stat_telepules_ada-
tok_2010.
It can be concluded that the higher the rate of jobseekers the smaller the popu-
lation of the settlement appears to be. At the same time this rule prevails less 
in more developed regions (Central-Hungary, Central-Transdanubia, West-
Transdanubia), while in lagging parts of the country the disadvantage of the 
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settlements at a lower level of the hierarchy and with less service functions 
is obvious. In addition, within the same settlement category there are much 
stronger differences among the regions than within a certain region among 
the different settlement types.
Figure 4.8: Regional clusters defined by the rate  
of registered jobseekers, August 2010
Source: Own construction by the application of Geoda programme. See also note for Fig-
ure 4.3.
Looking at Figure 4.9, which demonstrates changes of the rates for settlement 
categories in time, it can be concluded that there were larger differences among 
categories only in the period when the number of jobseekers rose suddenly or 
dropped significantly. In the period of regional diffusion – from January un-
til May 2009 – the larger urban centres have consequently devolved the nega-
tive effects of the crisis onto smaller settlements, where the rate of jobseekers 
increased by 3–4 percentage points in one year, but this still means a lower 
increase in relation to the already high (typically 10–12 %) values. Later, dur-
ing the period of slow growth, however, the differences between settlement 
categories have become blurred, and the effects of the crisis have also become 
general in this dimension; in the second half of 2009 the volume of the annu-
al change was already around 2 percentage points in all categories. (The out-
standing values in January 2010 can possibly be traced back to administrative 
and methodological factors.)
In spring 2010 a similar process can be observed as in the second phase, but 
this time the relationship is reversed: the smaller villages with an unfavourable 
position have improved their values the most. This of course is in connection 
with regional specificities of the country’s settlement structure: the majority of 
the small and tiny villages and the lagging and disadvantaged labour areas are 
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concentrated in the same geographical spaces (North-Hungary, South-Trans-
danubia, as well as in the peripheries of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county), hence 
the beneficial effects of public employment programmes can be observed in 
both categories. (Note, however, that the relation between settlement size and 
development is not obvious, a counter-example can be the favourable position 
of small villages in Vas county or around Lake Balaton.)
Figure 4.9: The change of the rate of jobseekers between September 2008  
and August 2010 (deviation from the same period of the previous year,  
percentage points)
Source: Own calculation based on PES data.
The settlement categories are tracking approximately the same path, namely 
that the increase and decrease of unemployment happens at a similar time, there 
are only differences at certain periods in the extent of the changes. A single, 
but more important exception is the special and differing character of Buda-
pest, which can be also observed in calculations based on settlement hierarchy.
Summary
The impact of the crisis on the labour market appeared with a differing strength 
geographically. Initially, the number of jobseekers increased considerably in 
areas of export-oriented (industrial) enterprises, i.e. the most developed ru-
ral regions, among them the source areas of commuting experienced the most 
spectacular recession. Later, however, as a result of the common effects (for-
int crisis, lack of credits, decrease of domestic demand), the increase of unem-
ployment also became a general phenomenon, and caused problems in regions 
characterised by poorer conditions and less favourable labour market posi-
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tions. Geographical location and settlement structure already differentiated 
the changes to a small extent
Overall, the also spatially perceived duality of unemployment eased up some-
what until the deepest point of the crisis. In regions, which could be termed 
developed ones, the above average increase of unemployment or the so-called 
downward nivellation is partly observable, meanwhile the differences between 
the capital (together with its agglomeration) and the rest of the country have 
not been dissolved.
The group of jobseekers who lost their jobs as a result of the crisis is signifi-
cantly different from the group of permanent jobseekers: newcomers are bet-
ter educated and more likely to be traced back to the world of work (Fazekas–
Ozsvald 2010). So the question is in which regions and with what speed the 
economic processes of increasing labour demand are able to be regenerated. In 
spring 2010 the signs of recovery in the industrial sector are perceptible, the 
value of orders or the level of exports and production have increased, and also 
the press were reporting continually about new investments and the creation 
of new workplaces. The habits of choosing the locations where foreign direct 
investment is made however have not changed; the previously evolved econom-
ic centres are still the prime destination areas of investments. In fact the most 
vulnerable areas are those where the effects of the crisis could be long lasting. 
There is little chance to complement large companies, which vegetated since 
the transformation of the regime and became bankrupt in 2008–2009. So not 
only a reversal to the former polarised structure, but also a strengthening of 
the differences are possible scenarios.
Previously no governmental instruments could have changed the stable spa-
tial structure considerably, therefore it can be regarded as a positive process that 
in recent months the number of jobseekers has also been reduced in the poor-
est regions with the highest unemployment rate. This is particularly notable 
in respect of the fact that the most remarkable layoffs did not affect these pe-
ripheral regions. It is also known however that the improvement of these areas 
is not the result of the economic revival. It is to be feared that the positive phe-
nomenon is temporary, and persists only until the funds of the programme are 
accessible. The easing of differences and tensions, which also appear spatially, 
cannot be attained in the short term, and not only requires the use of employ-
ment policy, but is also linked with the necessity and justification of regional 
development policy. Preserving jobs is also very important in a crisis, but the 
harder task – which was also urgent even before the crisis – is to “create” jobs 
and to stimulate the economy.
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4.A) THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AMONG THE MOST DISADVANTAGED MICRO-REGIONS
Albert Faluvégi
Given the unbalanced nature of regional (socio-eco-
nomic) growth, programmes aimed at regional de-
velopment may at best moderate the processes that 
accentuate inequalities but cannot stop them. Re-
gional divergence has grown to the point of creating 
an unacceptable degree of inequality of opportunity 
and, as such, hampering economic development.55
The development programme targeting the most 
disadvantaged micro-regions warns that the de-
velopmental gap between micro-regions gives rise 
to social inequalities passed on from generation 
to generation. Several micro-regions have to face 
a growing problem of poverty, unemployment, an 
absence of operational businesses and quality public 
services and a lack of opportunity. These processes 
leave the Roma population especially vulnerable. 
In response to this problem, at the end of 2007 the 
government identified the 33 most disadvantaged 
micro-regions based on statistical indicators of un-
derdevelopment.56
The 33 micro-regions
The 33 most disadvantaged micro-regions are per-
sistently underdeveloped areas, internal and ex-
ternal peripheries concentrated in Northeast and 
Southwest Hungary. In addition to their poor ac-
cessibility, their critical position also follows from 
the absence of regional centres capable of providing 
operative services for their area, the unfavourable 
age and educational composition of their popula-
tions, their inadequate economic structure and the 
scarcity of resources (a shortage of capital and the 
migration of trained labour).57
These regions are essentially rural areas in the sense 
that their population density is well below the na-
tional average and a higher than average share of the 
population work in agriculture. These persistently 
underdeveloped micro-regions have been subject to 
socio-economic erosion with the risk of rural slum 
formation attracting social groups excluded from 
the labour market and from urban areas. The geo-
graphical isolation of their population constitutes a 
serious obstacle to their return to the labour market.
The population living in the settlements of these 
regions are typically inactive and financially de-
pendent. The main threat is not so much ageing or 
depopulation but segregation and a high fertility 
rate coupled with a high proportion of young people 
having low educational attainment, which can lead 
to the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Selection criteria for the 33 most disadvan-
taged micro-regions in Hungary
The 33 most disadvantaged micro-regions [Figure 
4.A)1] of Hungary’s 174 micro-regions are those ac-
commodating ten per cent of the country’s inhab-
itants in total and ranked lowest in a scale defined 
by the combination of five – economic, infrastruc-
tural, social, welfare and employment – indicators 
comprehensively measuring development/underde-
velopment.58 The task of narrowing the gap between 
these regions and the rest of the country requires a 
complex intervention programme.
According to the census of 1 January 2009, the total 
population of the 33 micro-regions was 931 thou-
sand people, 31 thousand fewer than at the begin-
ning of 2007. 55 of the 719 settlements located here 
are towns and the average size of settlements is 1,294 
inhabitants.
Main attributes of the most disadvantaged  
regions
Of the 33 micro-regions that can benefit from a com-
prehensive programme 8 are situated in Southern 
Transdanubia, 12 in Northern Hungary, 8 in the 
Northeast and 5 in the Southeast. Their popula-
tions are highest in Northern Hungary followed by 
Northeast Hungary, Southern Transdanubia and 
Southeast Hungary.
55 Hungarian Regional Development Plan, 2005. Hungarian 
Parliament Resolution 97/2005(25/12).
56 Government Decree 311/2007 (17/12) based on Hungarian 
Parliament Resolution 67/2007 (28/6).
57 According to Census data of 2001, 24 of the 33 most disad-
vantaged micro-regions had a significant Roma population.
58 See KSH (2008) for details on the selection of micro-regions 
of special status.
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On 1 January 2009, 13 of the most disadvantaged 
micro-regions had populations of fewer than 20 
thousand people. 5 of these are situated in Northern 
Hungary, 4 in Southern Transdanubia, 1 in North-
east Hungary and 3 in the Southeast. In most of 
these micro-regions there are no population centres, 
or not sufficiently developed ones, that could pro-
vide adequate public services. One of the centres lo-
cated in a micro-region with fewer than 50 thousand 
inhabitants is the town of Ózd, whose previous role 
as an industrialised, regional motor of development 
has withered spectacularly. With their agricultural 
background diminished, the micro-regions of Ber-
ettyóújfalu and Mátészalka are also unable to rep-
licate their past achievements.
The lowest third of the 33 most disadvantaged mi-
cro-regions have a developmental complex indicator 
value of between 1.51 and 1.87, the micro-regions in 
the middle of the scale are characterised by values 
falling between 1.89 and 2.07, and the values for the 
top third range from 2.09 to 2.17. Among the most 
disadvantaged, the micro-region in Southern Trans-
danubia has the highest weighted indicator value, 
with the average of Northeast Hungary not far be-
hind. After a longer gap comes Northern Hungary 
and the micro-regions in Southeast Hungary are in 
the worst position.
The impact on the economic crisis among the 
most disadvantaged micro-regions
As a result of their poor economic position and the 
large share of unskilled labour, the most disadvan-
taged micro-regions almost immediately responded 
to the crisis. The rate of employment among their 
population dropped by 1.9 per cent as early as the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and the decline continued 
from quarter to quarter in 2009 [4A)Table 2]. The 
steepest decrease is observed in the first quarter, 
when employment in the 33 most disadvantaged 
micro-regions fell by 4.8 per cent compared to the 
decrease of 4.5 per cent measured in the 61 disad-
vantaged regions and “only” 2.4 per cent observed 
in the 80 relatively developed micro-regions.
In the fourth quarter of 2008, the most disadvan-
taged micro-regions had an employment rate of 44.7 
per cent among the 15–64 year-old population, and 
the average rate for 2009 remains below this figure. 
The steepest decline, 1.4 percentage points, is ob-
served in the first quarter of 2009. During this peri-
od the lowest micro-regional employment level was 
less than half that of the highest. The highest values 
are observed in the micro-regions of Vác and Szob, 
while at the other end of the scale we find the mi-
cro-regions of Baktalórántháza and Hajdúhadház. 
In the fourth quarter of 2008, the 61 disadvantaged 
micro-regions had an employment rate of 51.4 per 
cent, and the corresponding figure is 59.7 per cent 
for the 80 relatively developed micro-regions. The 
decrease in employment in the first quarter of 2009 
is, respectively, 1.6 and 1.4 per cent.
In the summer of 2009, the economic austerity 
measures put a freeze on hiring in the public sector 
but mass layoffs did not take place here. The work-
force decreased by only 0.6 per cent in total, or even 
increased slightly taking into account those partici-
pating in subsidised public works programmes. Al-
though the group of workers separated from their 
jobs in the private sector and the group of public 
works participants have markedly different charac-
teristics, the negative labour market consequences 
of the crisis were nevertheless somewhat dampened 
by the intervention programmes.
The most disadvantaged micro-regions have had the 
highest unemployment rate for 10–15 years. This situ-
ation has been further exacerbated by the crisis [4.A)
Table 3]. The negative effects of the crisis appeared 
earlier in the most disadvantaged micro-regions 
than they did in other areas and remained percepti-
ble throughout 2009. In the third quarter of 2008 the 
average unemployment rate of the 33 most disadvan-
taged regions was 17.9 per cent, compared to 11.6 per 
cent for the 61 disadvantaged micro-regions and 5.6 
per cent for the relatively developed micro-regions.
Although by the fourth quarter of 2009 the most 
disadvantaged micro-regions had moved closer 
to the national average, their unemployment rate 
peaked in this period during the crisis. The highest 
unemployment rate of 26.4 per cent experienced in 
the Encs micro-region was ten times as high as the 
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lowest value of 2.5 measured in the Sopron-Fertőd 
micro-region.
The rise in unemployment among the micro-regions 
under analysis commenced in the fourth quarter 
of 2008, and it was exceptionally steep in the 33 
most disadvantaged micro-regions: 3.8 percent-
age points. The upward leap in the unemployment 
curves for the other two groups of micro-regions 
appeared in the first quarter of 2009; the average 
rise was 1.5 percentage points for the relatively de-
veloped micro-regions and 2.2 percentage points 
for the disadvantaged micro-regions.
Table 4.A)1: The 33 most disadvantaged micro-regions by increasing order  
of complex indicator of development intervals
Region 1.51–1.87 1.89–2.07 2.09–2.17
Population weighted aver-
age of complex indicator
Southern Transdanubia Sellye Sásd, Csurgó, Szigetvár, Kadarkút, Barcs, 
Tamás, Lengyeltóti
2.07
Northern Hungary Abaúj-Hegyköz, Bodrogköz, 
Mezőcsát, Encs,
Szikszó, Ózd, Edelény, 
Heves, Szerencs,  
Bátonyterenyei
Tokaj, Sárospatak 1.92
Northeast Hungary Csenger, Fehérgyarmati Berettyóújfalu, Nyírbátor, 
Vásárosnamény
Baktalórántháza,  
Mátészalka, Tiszafüred
2.03
Southeast Hungary Mezőkovácsháza, Sarkad, 
Jánoshalma, Bácsalmás,
Kistelek 1.83
Source: KSH (2008).
Table 4.A)2: Employment rates in the three groups of micro-regions by quarter
2008 2009
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Relatively developed micro-regions 59.2 59.4 60.2 59.7 58.3 58.6 58.2 58.3
Disadvantaged micro-regions 50.9 51.5 52.4 51.4 49.8 50.5 50.8 50.7
The most disadvantaged micro-regions 44.3 44.8 45.6 44.7 43.3 44.2 46.9 44.2
Per cent of national average
Relatively developed micro-regions 105.5 105.1 105.1 105.3 105.8 105.4 104.9 105.0
Disadvantaged micro-regions 90.7 91.2 91.4 90.7 90.4 90.8 91.5 91.4
The most disadvantaged micro-regions 79.0 79.3 79.6 78.8 78.6 79.5 84.5 79.6
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMSR – Micro-regional Labour Statistics System, micro-regional data 
estimates for 15–64 year-old population. Method: MultiRáció Kft. (2008).
Table 4.A)3: Unemployment rates in the three groups of micro-regions by quarter
2008 2009
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Relatively developed micro-regions 5.9 5.5 5.6 5.8 7.3 7.4 8.3 8.5
Disadvantaged micro-regions 11.9 11.6 11.6 12.1 14.3 13.9 14.5 14.3
The most disadvantaged micro-regions 18.2 17.8 17.9 21.7 21.2 19.8 20.0 20.2
Per cent of national average
Relatively developed micro-regions 73.5 72.2 72.5 72.5 75.0 77.0 79.6 80.8
Disadvantaged micro-regions 148.6 150.9 150.4 150.7 147.3 144.6 139.4 136.1
The most disadvantaged micro-regions 227.6 232.8 230.7 270.2 218.6 206.0 193.2 192.4
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMSR – Micro-regional Labour Statistics System, micro-regional data 
estimates for 15–64 year-old population. Method: MultiRáció Kft. (2008).
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Figure 4.A)1: The 33 most disadvantaged micro-regions
Source: KSH (2008).
4.B) TRAVEL TIME AND THE URBAN-RURAL WAGE DIFFERENTIAL*
Tamás Bartus
In the previous chapter, Lőcsei argued that the im-
pact of the world economic crisis on unemployment 
was relatively large in the economically developed 
regions of Hungary, including Budapest and the ad-
jacent micro-regions, as well as the north-west part 
of the country; however, the effect was small in the 
economically backward micro-regions, which are 
situated in north-eastern and southern Hungary. 
Why does the level of unemployment in backward 
micro-regions remain stable despite the economic 
crisis? One possible explanation stresses the fact that 
high costs of daily commuting might prevent rural 
residents from finding employment in urban areas 
(Köllő 1997, Kertesi 2000). Although there is some 
evidence that commuting costs are indeed high 
(Köllő 1997, 2002, Kertesi 2000, Bartus 2003, 2007), 
it is still unknown whether they are compensated by 
possibly higher urban wages. Obviously, commut-
ing costs alone do account for rural unemployment, 
if they do not exceed the expected wage gain from 
commuting. In this chapter, we make an attempt to 
estimate the expected gains of commuting from vil-
lages to larger towns, and to compare those expected 
gains to estimated costs of commuting.
Methods
Our research describes the spatial distribution of 
settlement-level wages in six local labor markets. 
Each of the local labor markets consists of a city 
center and surrounding villages. The centers are 
large Hungarian towns, namely Pécs, Szeged, De-
brecen, Nyíregyháza, Miskolc and Győr. The vast 
majority of villages having high unemployment 
rates are situated in the micro-regions surround-
ing the selected towns, with the exception of Győr, 
which was selected only for the purpose of compari-
son. In addition, with the exception of Debrecen and 
Nyíregyháza, the selected towns are far from each 
other, thus our setting is close to the classic mono-
centric model of urban economics, in which deci-
sions about residential locations are assumed to be 
influenced by the distance to a single city center. We, 
however, do not assume that all jobs are located in 
the CBD (central business district); rather, we as-
sume that “good” jobs are all in the CBD and “bad” 
jobs can be found everywhere in the labor market.
* The research was financially supported by the National Science 
Foundation (OTKA), grant number F 68693.
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The boundaries of the local labor markets were de-
fined in terms of travel time on public transporta-
tion. More specifically, the labor markets embrace 
villages from which the city center can be reached by 
traveling one hour or less on public transport.59 The 
data on travel times come from time schedules of the 
state railway and bus companies in January 2006.60
Our analyses focus on the commuting decision of 
people who completed a vocational secondary de-
gree or less, and who seek full-time employment in 
the private sector. Therefore, during the calculation 
of settlement-level average wages, we only consid-
ered the wages of full-time employees who work in 
the private sector and have poor education. The fo-
cus on people with poor education is natural, since 
the vast majority of the unemployed completed 
only vocational secondary education or even less. 
We will ignore the public sector and the regulated 
wages therein, partly because private sector employ-
ees might be less willing to reimburse travel expens-
es of workers. Our focus on full-time employees is 
motivated by studying the possible effect of pure 
spatial mobility, without considering changes in 
working time.
The wage data were taken from the 2005 wave of the 
Hungarian Wage and Employment Survey (Bértari-
fa). Although the data on travel times were collected 
in 2006, we believe that the use of wage data from 
2006 or later might be biased.61 The settlement-level 
wages are means of the gross hourly wages report-
ed by employees with the characteristics described 
in the above paragraph.62 We used settlement-level 
rather than individual-level wages since our purpose 
is to estimate the expected returns to commuting.
The method of assessing the expected gains of com-
muting is as follows. Consider the individual who 
lives in a village at distance t from the city center. 
At their place of residence, the average wage is W(t); 
in the city center, the average wage is W(0). The ex-
pected gain of commuting to the city are reflected by 
the estimated coefficient –b of the regression model
 W(t) = a + bt. (1)
(Changing the sign of the coefficient is necessary 
because b measures the expected decrease in the av-
erage wage when one leaves the center and travels 
time t.)
Provided that travel costs are the linear function 
of time, the comparison of the expected gains and 
commuting costs is as follows (Manning, 2003). As-
sume that utility of individuals depends on the sum 
of wage income and the income from household pro-
duction. One hour unit of household production re-
sults in household income H. Let C be the monetary 
cost of traveling one hour. If residents of villages 
work in the place of residence, they get 8W(t) each 
day. If they commute, they earn 8W(0) each day. 
Commuting incurs the monetary costs Ct and time 
costs 2Ht (note that t refers to one-way trips). Living 
at distance t might have the additional gain of reduc-
ing housing costs by Lt each day. The spatial wage 
gradient –b creates incentives to commute only if
 8W(0) – 8W(t) ≥ Ct + 2Ht – Lt. (2)
The assessment of the inequality is difficult for two 
reasons. First, the monetary costs of travel on public 
transport actually depend on travel distance instead 
of travel time, but unfortunately, our data do not 
cover distances. (However, we could have estimat-
ed travel costs by using the information on prices 
and imputing distances from travel time using ad-
ditional data sources.) Second, we are not aware of 
59 Using data from a survey which was conducted among un-
employed people who happened to find a job and found a job 
in March 2001, we found that the vast majority, 80 percent of 
commuters travel one hour or less per day, and there are hardly 
any workers who spent two hours on commuting (Bartus, 2008). 
The one hour threshold therefore is very likely to guarantee the 
inclusion of villages from which travel to centers is very costly.
60 The time schedule data were kindly provided by the National 
Development Office. Although our wage data refer to May 2005, 
time schedule data collected in 2006 are very likely to be reliable 
measures of time schedules in 2005.
61 In 2005, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office carried out 
a micro-census which contains settlement-level information on 
the number of commuters. Using that data, it could be possible 
to assess the reliability of our estimates concerning the net 
gains from commuting. This is one reason that we use wage data 
which refer to 2005. Another reason is highway construction in 
the region of three of the selected towns, namely Nyíregyháza, 
Debrecen and Szeged, which might shorten the travel time from 
some villages to the center.
62 For each employee, either the hourly wage or the monthly wage 
is reported. If the latter occurs in the dataset, the hourly wage 
figure was calculated by dividing the monthly wage by 176, the 
number of working hours for full-time employees in May 2005, 
the month when the data collection took place.
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datasets which could be used to estimate the coef-
ficients H and L. The evaluation of the inequality is 
still possible if one is willing to make two assump-
tions. The first assumption is that monetary costs of 
commuting are of the same magnitude as the gains 
in housing costs. The second assumption is based on 
the idea of revealed preferences: employment reveals 
the fact that the income from household produc-
tion does not exceed wage income (otherwise, un-
employment was chosen). Assume that the income 
from household production equals the average wage 
at the settlement. Although this is a strong assump-
tion, it enables us to the rewrite (2) as
 8W(0) ≥ 8W(t)+2W(t)t. (3)
We estimate W(t) using the regression equation 
a + bt. We will measure time in minutes. Fixing one-
way travel time at 30 minutes, inequality (3) implies
 –270b – a ≥ 0. (4)
If the inequality holds, the expected wage gain from 
one hour travel exceeds commuting costs. To sum-
marize, we first estimate the regression model, as 
described in equation (1), then we proceed with in-
terpreting the size of the estimated coefficient of 
travel time using inequality (4).
Results
The estimates of the linear regressions and the linear 
combinations of the form –270b – a are presented in 
Table 4.B)1. We first estimated the regressions using 
all settlements of the local labor markets (Panel A), 
then we restricted the analyses to villages where the 
average wage is below the average characterizing the 
center (Panel B). In order to correct for heteroscedas-
ticity arising from aggregation, the regression coef-
ficients were estimated using weighted least squares, 
the weights being the number of individuals behind 
the settlement-level averages. The first row of the ta-
ble displays the observed average wages in city cent-
ers because, due to weighting, the constants slightly 
differ from those averages.
Not surprisingly, the estimated returns to commut-
ing in terms of wages are the largest in Panel B) of 
Table 4.B)1. Those results deserve special attention 
since commuting to towns is important for employ-
ees who earn less than employees in those towns. 
The coefficient of commuting time is significant and 
negative in all of the local labor markets; this means 
that average wages fall with the distance of the vil-
lage to the center.
The steepest wage gradient is found in the local la-
bor market around Győr: one minute of additional 
traveling is associated with an 3.3 forint expected re-
duction in rural hourly wages. To interpret the effect 
size, consider a rural resident who should travel half 
an hour by train or bus in order to reach the city cent-
er (in this case, Győr). Half an hour’s travel increases 
the expected wage by about 100 forints. This expect-
ed effect is substantial: since there are 176 working 
days per month, half an hour’s travel increases the 
monthly net wage by 17,600 forints, which should 
compensate for the monetary costs of travel.63
Let us continue with examining the wage gradi-
ent in labor markets where villages with extremely 
high unemployment are situated. The lowest rate 
of return to commuting is found in the local labor 
market around Pécs; here one minute of travel is as-
sociated with one forint change in expected wage. 
Half an hour’s travel to Pécs is expected to increase 
the hourly wage of a rural resident by only 30 for-
ints, which amounts to a 5,280 forint increase in 
the net monthly wage. Although this spatial differ-
ence might cover travel expenses, it is less by about 
10,000 forints than the compensating wage differ-
ential in the labor market surrounding Győr. Final-
ly, in the labor markets around Debrecen, Nyíregy-
háza and Miskolc we find an 1.3–1.55 forint increase 
in hourly wages associated with one minute of trav-
el, which implies that a half an hour’s travel to the 
center improves the expected net monthly wage by 
about 6,800–8,200 forints.
Depending on the local labor market we study, half 
an hour’s travel to the center of the labor market 
is associated with a spatial wage premium ranging 
from 5,280 to 17,600 forints. 
63 According to our earlier estimates, traveling half an hour on 
public transport is equivalent to traveling 20 kilometers (Bartus, 
2007). In 2007, a monthly bus ticket for a 20 km distance cost 
12,000 forints. Employees, however, were expected to pay only 
2,400 forints, the remaining amount being expected to be paid 
by their respective employers.
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Table 4.B)1. Average hourly wages as a function of distance to centers: Weighted Least Squares estimates)
Győr Pécs Szeged Debrecen Nyíregyháza Miskolc
Hourly wage in the center (HUF) 489 415 421 436 433 423
Panel A) All settlements
Travel time (b)
–1.8694* 0.0928 –0.741 –1.0484* –0.8992* 0.389
(0.001) (0.417) (0.104) (0.004) (0.034) (0.26)
Constant (a)
483.6474 421.3153* 414.0869* 433.7648 429.1041* 423.6991*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
–270b – a
21.093 –446.373 –214.023 –150.686 –186.325 –528.74
0.886 0.00 0.17 0.122 0.145 0.002
N 41 38 25 17 30 46
Panel B) Center plus villages where average 
hourly wage is smaller than that in the center
Travel time (b)
–3.3202* –0.9279* –2.2053* –1.5523* –1.3043* –1.4926*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Constant (a)
482.9393* 413.5731* 414.7616* 434.5032* 425.8602 421.1516*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
–270b – a
413.519 –163.045 180.67 –15.378 –73.712 –18.159
(0.000) (0.002) (0.193) (0.822) 0.523 (0.742)
N 32 23 17 15 24 29
Note: Weights are the number of individuals with valid wage data within settlements. Estimates marked with an 
asterisk are significant at 5 percent. Numbers in parentheses are p values.
labor markets, it is thus possible that urban wag-
es are large enough to compensate for costly com-
muting.
Conclusions
We examined the spatial wage gradient in six local 
labor markets and we found that rural wages are a 
decreasing function of the distance to the center of 
the labor market. The difference in wages between 
centers and villages seems to be high enough to com-
pensate for the direct costs of commuting, provid-
ed that employees receive the legally prescribed re-
imbursement for travel expenses. However, urban 
wages do not seem to compensate for the time costs 
of commuting. Our results therefore support the 
hypothesis that costs of commuting have a negative 
impact on labor-mobility, provided that we think of 
the time costs of commuting and we have made cor-
rect assumptions about other components of com-
muting costs.
Our next question is whether the spatial wage pre-
mium compensates for commuting costs. To an-
swer this question, one should examine the linear 
combination of the parameters, namely –270b – a. 
There is only one local labor market, that around 
Győr, where the linear combination is positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that the spatial 
wage gradient is large enough to compensate for the 
time costs of commuting. A positive, but not sig-
nificant result is found for the labor market around 
Szeged; this means that we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that rural residents would be worse off when 
commuting to the center. The most hopeless labor 
market is that around Pécs. The linear combina-
tion is negative and significant, which implies that 
commuting costs exceed the urban-rural wage dif-
ferences. The linear combination turns out to be 
negative, but not significant in the labor markets 
situated in the north-east part of Hungary. In these 
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5. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON UNDECLARED EMPLOYMENT
András Semjén & István János Tóth
Introduction
In our analysis we examine the possible effects of economic crisis on both the 
degree and the different forms of undeclared employment. The difficulty of 
the work lies in the fact that there have been no empirical surveys or data that 
could enable us to directly examine the changes that have taken place in un-
declared or informal employment in the labour market by regional or sectorial 
segments, or different types of labour force, since 2008. No empirical research 
referring to this subject has so far been started in Hungary either financed from 
government subsidy or from private funds. Consequently if we wish to investi-
gate the effects of the crisis on the incidence of undeclared work and the socio-
economic factors behind it, we are forced to rely on the data provided by two 
of our own empirical surveys made in the period immediately preceding the 
outbreak of the crisis (in autumn 2007 and spring 2008, see Appendix at the 
end of this chapter), and the findings of the analytic papers based on these data 
(Fazekas et al., 2010, Semjén et al., 2009a, 2009b, Czibik-Medgyesi, 2008, and 
Tóth, 2008). On the basis of the relationships explored in these works, we can 
then formulate hypotheses and draw speculative conclusions regarding the ef-
fects of the crisis. We hope that by way of the review and secondary analysis of 
pre-crisis data surveys, we have been able to arrive at seemingly trivial hypoth-
eses referring to the possible effects of the crisis on the market of undeclared 
employment that, in the future, will be confirmed by empirical studies as well.
In reality, the forms of employment not fully bearing welfare charges (taxes 
and contributions), and thus classified as belonging to the grey economy, are 
of tremendous variety, and the widely used technical terms normally used to 
describe them, like eg. undeclared employment, black labour etc., are not en-
tirely suitable to describe this highly complex reality. In the narrow sense we 
mean by undeclared work any, otherwise legal, income-earning activity that 
has not been reported to the authorities as legal employment, and thus evades 
the payment of income tax and social insurance contribution.
A special case “under the same heading” is when the employer reports the em-
ployee as someone earning a wage below the actual remuneration paid to him, 
and the difference is then paid directly to the employee as “cash in hand” (an 
“off the books” payment, known in Hungary as “payment into the pocket”). 
In such cases, employer and employee split between themselves the taxes and 
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social insurance contributions saved. The risk of getting caught at the labour 
check-up is obviously lower than in the case of classic, totally undeclared work.
Another tax- and contribution-saving form of employment that further re-
duces the risk of being caught is the so-called masked employment, when the 
employer enters into a pretended subcontractor’s agreement with the employee 
and pays him on invoice. It may also happen that the employee at the same time 
is also registered as earning a lower income at the employer’s firm, but this is not 
a necessary condition. As in such cases a part or the whole of the income earn-
ing activity is not registered as employment, in the broader sense we may also 
regard this as some form of undeclared employment. At the same time we can 
consider the use of this term to be a little misleading as the employee in such 
cases is usually reported as having some sort of income in his own enterprise 
or at the employer’s firm. For this reason in our paper, for the sake of greater 
terminological precision, we usually call this situation masked employment. In 
some places, however, such as for example. in titles, subtitles or the introduc-
tion, for brevity’s sake, we use undeclared employment or undeclared work in 
the broader sense as well.
Firstly we are going to deal with the pre-crisis size and social components of 
undeclared employment, then we discuss the possible changes that may have 
occurred on the market of undeclared work as a consequence of the crisis.
The effects of the crisis on employment, hidden employment and 
unemployment
The aggregate employment and unemployment data make it obvious that the 
economic crisis has induced deep changes on the Hungarian labour market. 
(Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Changes in employment and unemployment, 2007–2010
Period
No. of employed  
(1000 people)
No. of unemployed  
(1000 people)
Rate of unemployment  
(%)
2007 August-October 3940.2 310.8 7.3
2008 August-October 3916.2 327.9 7.7
2009 August-October 3788.9 439.5 10.4
2010 May-June 3789.4 467.2 11.0
Source: KSH, http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/fog/fog21007.pdf
Reported employment fell by 150 thousand people between 2007 and 2010, 
while the number of unemployed grew even more than this, by 160 thousand 
people, and the unemployment rate rose from 7.3% to 11.0%. (For further de-
tails regarding the changes in employment and unemployment see the intro-
ductory chapter in this volume by Bálint–Cseres-Gergely–Scharle.)
However, there are also other, much more extreme changes underneath these 
rather gloomy aggregate data in certain regions and sectors, and it is exactly 
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these changes that lend this crisis its special character. Our former research 
suggests that the incidence and the different types of undeclared employment 
show significant territorial and sectorial differences: it is reasonable to think 
that these regional and sectorial effects are further strengthened by the crisis. 
Lőcsei (2009) was the first to call attention to the peculiarities of the territorial 
effects; her analysis published as part 4 of the “In Focus” chapter of the cur-
rent volume provides us with further valuable insight regarding the effects of 
the crisis. Hajnalka Lőcsei has shown that the first period of the crisis mainly 
struck companies producing for export and concerned the labour market of the 
centre and the developed areas, mostly by reducing employment and increas-
ing the number of job-seekers. Later, however, the crisis spread over to the less 
developed regions, further worsening the labour market situation, which in 
the pre-crisis times was not so rosy anyway. Another important observation of 
Lőcsei is that while the former, more developed areas recover relatively quickly, 
in regions lagging behind only government intervention in the labour market 
(communal works) can somewhat moderate the effects of the crisis, while the 
deterioration in the competitive sector because of the crisis seems there to be 
rather more enduring.
These territorial links can efficiently contribute to the analysis of employ-
ment shunning taxes and insurance contributions, as the two basic forms of 
the latter – paying cash in hand and paying the employee as if he were a sub-
contractor, i.e. paying a part of his wage for an invoice issued by the employee’s 
own enterprise – are popular with different social layers and with different 
sectorial and territorial proportions.
Another important consequence of the crisis on the labour market is freez-
ing or reducing the wages for officially declared work. The former was rather 
characteristic of the competitive sphere, while the latter was typical mainly 
of the public sector. In 2009 consumers’ prices rose by 4.2 %; monthly net 
earnings in the competitive sector grew by slightly more than this, 4.4% over 
the year, while wages in the public sector decreased by 4.5% over the same 
period.64
Besides layoffs and wage cuts, the third fundamental effect of the crisis from 
the point of view of our subject was the dramatic decline of business confidence, 
unprecedented since the slow-down following the transition (Figure 5.1). Its 
importance is also due to the fact that it radically influences both the compa-
nies’ short-term reactions, and their longer-term recruitment plans. In the short 
run companies react to the loss of their markets and the substantial fallback 
of orders by cutting down on production costs: besides inevitable staff reduc-
tions, further means of cost containment in such situations are offering only 
tiny wage increases, freezing, or even reducing wages. An interesting corporate 
cost-cutting technique from the aspect of our narrower subject can be shifting 
the internal proportion of tax compliance and tax evasion toward the latter.
64 Source of data: KSH, Stadat-
system, http://portal,ksh.hu/
portal/page?_pageid=-
37.592 051&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL
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Figure 5.1: Business confidence among Hungarian enterprises 1998–2010 (%)
Source: The GVI business climate index 1998–2010. GVI, http://www.gvi.hu/index.php/
hu/forecast/show.html?id=13
The degree and forms of undeclared employment before  
the crisis
As the studies in Semjén-Tóth (ed.) (2009) showed from several aspects, a wide 
variety of declared and undeclared types of employment (from entirely legal 
employment to completely hidden forms involving tax evasion) are present in 
the economy simultaneously. Based on a study examining different forms and 
scenarios of tax evasion with agent-based models (Szabó et al., 2009), 23 types 
of payment packages can be distinguished (Table 5.2).
From this wide variety of forms, we will give a closer look at only two basic 
types of evading or avoiding taxes and contributions, paying cash in hand 
and “invoice-based payments” or “masking employment as subcontracting” 
(Figure 5.2). When the employees receive their pay from the employer di-
rectly as unreported cash payments in hand, both the employment and the 
payment remain totally invisible for the authorities. In the other case ex-
amined here the employees receive at least some part of their compensation 
not in the form of wages but as a subcontractor, “in return for an invoice”. 
In the short term this is a practice favourable both for the employer and the 
employee: for the employer the non-payment of taxes and contributions re-
duces the labour costs, and, provided that the two parties split the unpaid 
public dues, it may enhance the chance of employment and increase dispos-
able income for the employee.
When examining the incidence of working in the hidden economy among 
adults in the18–60 age-group one can find that the rate of those receiving cash 
in hand was about 15%, while those receiving at least part of their pay on an 
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invoice (pretended subcontractors) were around 13–14% in the years preced-
ing the crisis.
Table 5.2: The 23 different types of payment combinations
No.
Paying  
reported 
wages
Fringe 
benefits
Paying on an in-
voice (pretended 
subcontracting)
Paying cash  
in hand Paying in kind Type
1 • Legal
2 • • Legal
3 • • Mixed
4 • • Mixed
5 • • Mixed
6 • • • Mixed
7 • • • Mixed
8 • • • Mixed
9 • • • Mixed
10 • • • Mixed
11 • • • Mixed
12 • • • • Mixed
13 • • • • Mixed
14 • • • • Mixed
15 • • • • Mixed
16 • • • • • Mixed
17 • Hidden
18 • • Hidden
19 • • Hidden
20 • • • Hidden
21 • Hidden
22 • • Hidden
23 • Hidden
Note: The dots in the cells of the table indicate the incidence of the given form of pay-
ment.
Source: Szabó et al., 2009.
Among those paid cash in hand there were some who received only a smaller 
part of their pay in this way, while there were others, who received the greater 
part of the pay as black (unreported and untaxed) payment. 5% of all respond-
ents received less than half of their pay as unreported cash payment the last time 
they used this method, while 7% of the respondents received more than half of 
their remuneration in this way when they last did any undeclared work as moon-
lighters. Those who did any work as pretended subcontractors, the last time 
typically received the larger part of their pay on invoice (16% of the age-group 
mentioned), while 2% received only a smaller part of their pay in this form.
The spring 2008 survey showed that over the two years preceding the survey 
26% of the 18–60 age-group of the Hungarian population had at some point 
been paid either cash in hand, or on an invoice as pretended subcontractors. 
Projecting this ratio to the 15–64 population (4.2 million people), the number 
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of those in Hungary who had received any sort of undeclared labour income 
(more precisely, any labour income that was either totally unreported or reg-
istered not as labour income and thus completely or partly failed paying taxes 
and contributions) can be estimated at over 1 million people.
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Figure 5.2: Incidence of labour related payments on invoice and as cash in 
hand payments among employees, casual workers and people of active 
working age in Hungary, 2007–2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
Considering the distortion of opinions obviously occurring during a data sur-
vey, i.e. that some respondents may have withheld the truth about their par-
ticipation in hidden employment, this number is likely to be bigger and the 
number of those really concerned may significantly exceed 1 million people.
It can also be substantiated that the respondents with a first-hand experience 
either of undeclared employment or of employment masked as “pretended sub-
contracting” typically only used just one of these two methods to shun taxes 
and contributions, and only 2% of them used both types of tax- and contribu-
tion-saving solutions during the time surveyed.
We also asked the other members of the respondents’ households whether 
they had any labour income during the time of the survey, and if so, in what 
form they were paid: did they receive fully taxable reported income, unreported 
cash in hand, entrepreneurial income from “pretended subcontracting”, pay-
ment for temporary work registered in the casual work booklet, liable to reduced 
tax and contribution rates only. This also made it possible to examine whether 
the spouses of the respondents were also concerned by the hidden economy.
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Examining the households of all respondents between 18–60, irrespective 
of their labour market status, in 7% of the households neither spouse had any 
kind of labour income (Figure 5.3). There was only one labour income recipi-
ent per household in 26% of the households, and these recipients received their 
pay as taxed income. In 6% of the households there was also only one labour 
income recipient, but they typically received the greater part of their pay as 
cash in hand or on invoice. In almost half of the households there was more 
than one labour income recipient, and all of them received their pay as taxed 
income. In 12% of the households there were more than one labour income 
recipient and at least one of those received the greater part of their pay on in-
voice or as cash in hand. However, in the sample one can find only a tiny part 
(1%) of households in which there are more than one labour income recipient, 
and where there are also at least two household members paid cash in hand or 
receiving income from pretended subcontracting.
Figure 5.3: Undeclared work in the household, 2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
So the accumulation of undeclared employment (or employment masked as 
subcontracting) within a household is not typical. The households of employ-
ees and casual workers show a similar pattern to that of the households in the 
active working age, the only difference being that in the first group the rate of 
households with no employment income is obviously lower.
Below we examine how the probability of undeclared employment (or pre-
tended subcontracting) varies in the different socio-economic groups of the 
Hungarian population. We analyse the incidence of undeclared employment 
first by demographic variables, then by labour market characteristics, eventu-
ally by the financial position of the households.
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An important statement made by empirical studies is that in Hungary unde-
clared work is much more wide-spread among men than among women. (Elek 
et al., 2009). The surveys analysed here confirm the above statement: the oc-
currence of cash in hand payments shows a higher frequency among men, eg. 
in the 2008 survey 19% of them received cash in hand, while for women the 
same proportion was only 11%. The occurrence of payment on invoice is also 
slightly higher among men.
We can also find substantial differences in undeclared employment accord-
ing to age (Figure 5.4). Young employees are more affected, the cash in hand 
method of remuneration occurs more often among these than the average. 
Among employees and casual workers, 17% of those under 30 have received 
some remuneration as cash in hand, while in the other age-groups this rate is 
around 10%. The rate of those receiving their pay on invoice as pretended sub-
contractors does not show significant age differences, however, if both main 
forms of undeclared employment are considered, it is obvious that the young 
are more affected, as unreported labour income (paid cash in hand or on in-
voice) shows a higher than average incidence among them.
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Figure 5.4: Undeclared work by age groups (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
The two types of tax-saving employment (undeclared work or employment 
masked as subcontracting) show different patterns in relation to educational 
attainment. The frequency of receiving cash in hand payments decreases as 
school qualification increases. Among those employed regularly or working as 
casual workers 22% of those with only a primary school qualification received 
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cash in hand, compared to only 6% among those with a college or university 
degree. However, in the case of paying on invoice for pretended subcontract-
ing, the situation proved to be the reverse: those with a degree show a higher 
incidence of receiving their pay in this form than those with lower qualifica-
tions. All in all, among employees the incidence of employment not bearing, 
or not fully bearing, taxes and contributions increases with the decrease of 
school qualification: Among those who attended a maximum of eight forms 
of primary school, 36% received cash in hand or payment on invoice, whereas 
among university graduates only 27% received such payments as remuneration.
These data (Figure 5.5) do not, however, reveal how wages paid for unde-
clared work would change the income differences between university gradu-
ates and those with lower qualifications, estimated from earnings stemming 
from declared employment. Recent research (Köllő, 2010b) have pointed out 
that while university graduates conceal 23–41% of their income, households 
where the head of the family has a lower school qualification hide only 8–13% 
of their income. This suggests that hiding income is more common among 
university graduates than among those with lower qualifications, so the actu-
al income difference between the two categories can be greater than reflected 
by official statistics.
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Figure 5.5: Undeclared work according to level of educational attainment (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
Undeclared employment is slightly more frequent than the average in Budapest 
and in the villages. Among employees and casual workers, 28% of those living 
in Budapest and 32% of those living in villages were paid on invoice or cash in 
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hand. We also found similar rates when examining the incidence of black and 
grey labour in the whole of the adult population.
Looking at the regional characteristics of hidden and masked employment 
(i.e. undeclared employment and employment masked as subcontracting), we 
can also find significant differences. In the counties of Eastern Hungary this 
type of work is much more common, while in Western Hungary it is less fre-
quent than the average. Among employees and casual workers, in Eastern Hun-
gary 40% of the surveyed population received cash in hand payments or was 
paid on invoice, while in Western Hungary this rate was only 16%. In central 
Hungary one can find average rates.
If we look at undeclared employment according to labour market status, it 
is clear that within the 18–60 year-old population undeclared employment is 
most common amongst those who are economically active but without regu-
lar employment (i.e. casual workers and the unemployed). 42% of the above 
group received cash in hand and 21% of them did work for payment on invoice 
in the two years preceding the survey, and in total 55% of them did some work 
shunning the payment of taxes and contributions. Among those having regu-
lar work, the rate of those paid cash in hand is roughly average, while the rate 
of those paid on invoice is somewhat higher (17%) than what is typical of the 
whole sample (14%) (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: The share of those receiving labour compensation as cash in hand 
or on invoice according to labour market status in the 18–60 age group (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
We also examined among regular and casual workers, how the type of their 
occupation and the industry they worked in influenced the incidence of un-
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declared work and employment masked as subcontracting. As to occupation-
al categories, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and managers were 
distinguished. Among white-collar workers the rate of those having received 
cash in hand payments was only 2%, which is considerably lower than the 8% 
observed among blue-collar workers. On the other hand, the rate of those re-
ceiving pay as pretended subcontractors was higher among white-collar work-
ers: in total 22% of them received pay on invoice, while this rate was only 18% 
among blue-collar workers.
At the same time it came as a surprise that among managers the share of those 
receiving cash payments in hand was rather high (15%). However, due to the 
low number of observed cases in this category, this result does not allow us to 
form a robust conclusion.
Due to the low number of cases we had to reduce the number of sectors by 
merging some of them in order to be able to analyse the sectorial patterns of 
undeclared work. Apart from industry and agriculture, services were grouped 
in four categories. We drew together traffic, communications, telecommuni-
cations, and trade and created from them one complex category; financial ser-
vices and other services were treated as separate categories, while the fourth 
category (communal services) was made up of public administration, educa-
tion, culture and health care. The rate of those receiving payments as cash in 
hand was lower in financial services and especially in communal services, than 
in the other sectors (5% and 2% respectively). At the same time the rate of those 
paid as pretended subcontractors was the highest in communal services. In 
communal services 25% of workers received pay on invoice, compared with 
an overall average of 19% (Figure 5.7).
The research based on our previous survey results has also shown how the 
level of compensation received in the main job influenced the incidence of un-
declared work among employees and casual workers, and to what extent the 
former determined whether the respondent had any second job or enterprise.
With those having a main job pay of less than 70,000 forints, the rate of 
those paid cash in hand was somewhat higher than the average. Those with low 
earnings showed a higher than average rate (13 %) of being paid black money. 
With those having a higher main job pay, however, payment on invoice had a 
higher frequency (23%). For those with no extra earnings beside their man job 
pay the incidence of cash payments in hand or pretended subcontracting did 
not differ from the values typical of the whole of the sample. The number of 
those mentioning any income from second or part-time jobs is rather low, but 
among those having a second source of labour income the incidence of cash in 
hand payments is especially high, which makes it likely that in the field of sec-
ond and part-time jobs undeclared work or pretended employment may have 
an important role.
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Figure 5.7: The share of those receiving labour compensation as cash  
in hand or on invoice according to economic sectors among employees  
and casual workers, 2007–2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008)
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The 2008 survey made it possible for us to also analyse the incidence of casual 
work among those not working regularly at the time of the survey, i.e. among 
those who are registered as inactive or unemployed. Doing casual work char-
acterized only 11% of those without regular work according to the survey, but 
it typically went together with receiving some part of labour income as cash 
in hand or working on invoice. Low case numbers make it impossible to carry 
out a more detailed analysis, but even this is enough to show that work among 
the officially jobless or inactive is usually related to the black or grey economy.
Unemployment, however, affects working in the hidden economy not only 
as a current state of affairs. Research in labour economics has shown that the 
longer someone has been unemployed, the more difficult it is for them to find 
new employment. On the basis of this, the number of months spent out of a 
job may forecast the individual’s chances for finding a job, his or her labour 
market opportunities. Accordingly, those who have been unemployed for a 
longer time may show a higher rate of undeclared work (or pretended subcon-
tracting), as they find it more difficult to find a job on the official job market.
The findings of our surveys corroborate this hypothesis: amongst those hav-
ing been out of job for more than a year 25% admitted being paid cash in hand, 
which is ten percentage points higher than the average. For those with no pre-
vious unemployment spells, this rate was only 9%. However, the rate of those 
paid on invoice was the highest not among those who have been jobless for the 
longest time, but among those who were in this situation for shorter than half 
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a year. Since in this group the rate of those paid cash in hand is also relatively 
high, it is justified to consider this group to be the most affected by participa-
tion in the hidden economy.
The incidence of undeclared work and pretended employment varies not only 
according to regional, sectorial, qualification and labour market variables, but 
also according to the financial position of the households (Figure 5.8). On the 
one hand it is conspicuous that the incidence of undeclared work and pretend-
ed subcontracting is more typical of the less well-off households with lower in-
comes: while in 31% of the lowest quartile of households, from an income point 
of view, at least one active member of the household does undeclared work, this 
rate for the highest quartile is only 23%. At the same time, income per house-
hold and the incidence of shunning labour related taxes and contributions do 
not show a linear relationship: the lowest participation rate in work partly or 
fully shunning taxes and contributions can be observed not in the highest, but 
in the third quartile (20%). On the other hand, the incidence of the two types 
of undeclared work surveyed also shows a difference according to household 
incomes. While receiving cash in hand payments is rather characteristic of the 
poorer households (it can be observed in 20% of the households belonging to 
the lowest income quartile), the incidence of being paid on invoice does not 
seem to be correlated with household income in the same way.
Figure 5.8: The share of those compensated for work with payments on invoice  
or cash in hand according to the quartiles of per capita family income, 2008 (%)
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Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
The profile of those involved in undeclared work and pretended subcontracting 
can be summarized on the basis of Semjén et al. (2009b) as follows: the share 
of those paid cash in hand is the highest among those on the peripheries of the 
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labour market. People with lower school qualifications, casual workers, jobless 
people, and those, currently in employment, having formerly spent a longer pe-
riod out of work all show a higher than average likelihood of being paid cash in 
hand. It is more typical of the poorer households that at least one family mem-
ber takes undeclared work. On the other hand, the incidence of payments on 
invoice is undoubtedly higher than average among white collar workers. The 
occurrence of having been paid (also) on invoice during the last two years seems 
to be above average amongst people with a higher education degree, those work-
ing in public administration, health care, education and culture.
Aside from the incidence of work partly or fully avoiding or evading taxes 
and contributions, there is another aspect worth taking into consideration for 
our current subject. This is how employees justify taking job offers for unde-
clared work or pretended subcontracting. The responses highlight the employ-
ees’ motivations concerning undeclared or masked work and can be helpful in 
pointing out the possible effects of the crisis.
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Figure 5.9: Motives of accepting job offers involving cash in hand payments, 2008 (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
It can be seen from the survey results highlighted above that 15% of the re-
spondents had done work for which they had been partly or fully paid cash in 
hand.65 But also the respondents who had not received cash in hand payments 
could have come across such job offers. On the basis of the 2008 survey (Semjén 
et al., 2009b) we can see that 4% of those not receiving any pay as cash in hand 
had received job offers with such a payment arrangement, which they eventu-
ally turned down. The results also show that in total 18% of the respondents 
had come across job offers involving cash in hand payments. Looking at this 
from the other side, 29% of those having been offered work with cash in hand 
65 Besides this, Semjén et al. 
(2009b, pp. 238–239) also give 
a detailed analysis of the reasons 
for accepting or refusing offers 
for pretended subcontracting.
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compensation turned down all these offers, while 56% accepted some of these 
offers (the remaining 14% could not answer the question).
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Figure 5.10: Motives of refusing job offers involving cash in hand payments 2008 (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
We have analysed the motivations which lay in the background of accepting 
or refusing such job offers in the case of those who had already received (and at 
least once accepted or refused) such offers. In our survey we asked them about 
the reasons for their decision related to the last such offer they had received. 
Both for refusal and for acceptance, they could choose one or more motivations 
from several options (listed in the form of closed questions).
Those who accepted work offers involving cash in hand compensation men-
tioned most frequently the pressure of need (lacking means of subsistence) as 
the justification for accepting the offer (Figure 5.9): 56% answered that they 
had accepted the offer because they were compelled to work; 39% said they had 
accepted it because they were better off this way, while 34% replied that it also 
played a part in their decision that otherwise they would not have received the job.
Those who turned down job offers involving cash in hand mentioned most 
often the uncertainty of payment as the reason for their decision: this factor 
played a part in the negative decision of 40% of those refusing these offers. 
About one third was the share of those who mentioned low pay and bad work-
ing conditions, while 23% referred to the fact that black labour is illegal, that 
it involves violating the law and may entail punishment (Figure 5.10).
Possible changes occurring as a consequence of the crisis
Linking the main characteristics of undeclared work and pretended subcon-
tracting to the documented effects of the crisis on the legal economy and de-
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clared employment it seems to be safe to conclude that the economic crisis has, 
in all probability, increased the amount and the incidence of undeclared work. 
As we will see, however, the situation is far from being so simple.
Before going into details on these possible effects, let us have an a priori look 
at the changes the crisis could have induced in the first place in the incidence 
and the relative share of declared employment vs. undeclared employment or 
pretended subcontracting in a company or firm. Table 5.3 provides a summary 
of the different types of such changes or reactions. We distinguished 13 differ-
ent types of these in the table. Each of these starts out from the characteristics 
of the pre-crisis employment and the nature of the related payment packages 
chosen by the employer and accepted by the employee (this serves also as the 
basis for the division of the table into three main blocs). The outcome or result 
is the change: a shift or a modification of the type of employment relationship 
occurring as a result of the crisis (2nd column). In the table we have indicated 
separately (3rd column) how the given change appears – if it does at all – in the 
official wage and labour statistics reflecting declared work and reported income.
Table 5.3: Possible effects of the crisis on the choice between declared (reported) 
and undeclared (unreported) forms of payment
Type Changes caused by the crisis Change appearing in labour and wage statistics
Before the crisis: declared employment
1. Wage reduction in declared employment and paying on 
invoice appears
Reduction of gross wage
2. Wage reduction in declared employment and cash in 
hand appears
Reduction of gross wage
3. Wage reduction in declared employment, cash in hand 
and paying on invoice appear
Reduction of gross wage
4. Layoffs, paying on invoice Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
5. Layoffs, cash in hand Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
6. Layoffs, paying on invoice and cash in hand Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
7. Layoffs Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
Before the crisis: declared employment with payments avoiding/evading taxes and contributions  
(paying on invoice or paying cash in hand)
8. Wage reductions and a growing share of paying on invoice 
within all payments
Reduction of gross wage
9. Wage reductions and growing share of cash in hand within 
all payments
Reduction of gross wage
10. Wage reduction and growing share of paying on invoice 
and cash in hand within all payments
Reduction of gross wage
Before the crisis: undeclared work or employment masked as subcontracting
11. Decrease or cessation of cash in hand Does not appear
12. Decrease or cessation of pay on invoice Does not appear
13. Decrease or cessation of pay on invoice or cash in hand Does not appear
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All but the last three (types 11–13) of the types listed clearly indicate an in-
crease of the share of undeclared or masked employment, either in such a way 
that the change in the payment package directly increases the share of unde-
clared or masked employment, or indirectly, so that it involves a reduction of 
declared employment, while at the same time it does not change the amount 
of undeclared work or masked employment (e.g. type 7).
We can distinguish three types of corporate decisions related to wages and 
employment, occurring as a result of the crisis, according to how deeply they 
affect the company’s internal regulations and organization.
“Low intensity” adaptation. It does not affect either the size of the work-
force or the internal proportions of the payment packages applied: freezing or 
reduction of wages.
“More intensive” adaptation that affects employment as well as the internal 
proportions of payment packages: switching to part-time employment, and in-
troducing payment packages that make undeclared work and pretended subcon-
tracting possible.
Adaptation having fundamental importance from the aspect of the compa-
ny’s internal organization and internal corporate regulations. Layoff, followed 
by re-employment, this time completely as undeclared work or pretended subcon-
tracting belongs to this third type.
Hungarian companies under the influence of the crisis can take the above 
steps, or a combination of these steps, and thus can have an effect on the inci-
dence and volume of undeclared work within the competitive sector.
If a company only used declared employment before the crisis, i.e. if employ-
ment in the company complied with the rules of paying taxes and contribu-
tions, then under the influence of the crisis, as part of the cost-cutting steps, 
the company may decide to freeze or reduce wages, while in order to cut down 
on payroll taxes, it may begin in certain groups of employees to apply payment 
packages involving cash in hand payments or payments on invoice. These forms 
of adaptation do not involve layoffs, but reduce gross wages that the Statistical 
Office can keep an eye on, thus distorting official wage statistics.
Company reactions can be represented as new types if these reactions include 
the dismissal and, in some form or other, the hidden re-employment of the same 
employee (types 4–6). At these times one can see a reduction of employment in 
the official statistics, while actual employment did not change: the same person 
continues to work in the same place, maybe for the same (net) wage, as earlier, 
only now they do this in the black market. However, the effect of this practice 
on the documented average wages is uncertain as we do not know whether 
these dismissals and hidden re-employments affected mainly employees with 
lower-than-average or with higher-than-average wages.
The weight of undeclared work and pretended subcontracting is increased 
by the 7th type of adaptation as well, although indirectly: if an employee in 
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declared employment is dismissed and then later does not find work either on 
the formal or the informal labour market, while everything else is held con-
stant, the share of undeclared work or employment masked as pretended sub-
contracting within the total will increase in this case as well.
If a company also used the types of payment typical of undeclared work and 
work masked as subcontracting already before the crisis (as in adaptation types 
8–10), it can increase the share of these kinds of tax- and contribution-saving pay-
ments within the labour compensation package under the influence of the crisis 
without ever changing the number of employees in any way. Then in the official 
statistics we can see a decrease or just a slight increase of wages, while, in fact, there 
could have been a wage increase larger than what could be seen in the statistics.
We left those types that do not increase, but decrease the share of undeclared 
work in the economy for the end. It is worth noting that the economic crisis 
does not only affect the market of declared labour. Why should we think that 
it leaves the market of undeclared work untouched? Of course, the crisis does 
not leave these markets unaffected either: the significant reduction of orders 
also reduces the business opportunities of companies that had also relied on 
undeclared work before the crisis, and typically paid the majority of the work-
ers cash in hand or on invoice. For these firms cost-cutting means the decrease 
of sums paid out in an undeclared form, or the dismissal of unreported em-
ployees, i.e. on these markets the economic crisis leads to the reduction of un-
declared work and its relative weight.
Let us just take the construction sector as an example, which, in Hungary, ap-
plies undeclared work and pretended subcontracting much more commonly than 
any other economic sector (Semjén et al., 2009a). By the end of 2009, the produc-
tion volume of the construction sector shrank to 77% of its 2005 level, and the 
declining tendency continued dramatically in the first six months of 2010, which 
saw another 14% reduction of the production volume of the previous year. The 
number of employees appearing in the official statistics also fell between 2007–
2009 from 330,000 to 293,000, i.e. by nearly forty thousand people66 – but we 
know that this decrease could also cover an actual increase of employment. The 
data describing the development of the production volume, however, suggest that 
undeclared employment or employment masked as subcontracting in the con-
struction industry could have reduced at a much more rapid pace in consequence 
of the crisis than the pace of reduction shown in the official employment data. 
This means, had it depended on the construction sector alone, undeclared em-
ployment would have decreased in the Hungarian economy as a result of the crisis.
Presumably, however, a process with the opposite direction was taking place 
in the economy as a whole: we must unfortunately presume that, in consequence 
of the crisis, undeclared employment and pretended subcontracting became 
more wide-spread, and within the total remuneration received for works done, 
the share of cash in hand payments and payments on invoice increased.
66 For data referring to produc-
tion and employment in the 
construction industry see KSH 
Stadat-system, http://por tal. 
ksh.hu/portal/page?_pageid= 
37,592051&dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL.
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The reasons behind this hypothesis are basically the effects enumerated in 
the first part of our paper. In the centre of these effects we can find unemploy-
ment. Examining it from the employees’ side, we can reach, through multiple 
cause and effect chains, from the fact of unemployment, or from its growing 
risk, to the growing probability and growing rate of accepting undeclared work.
Based on the findings of the population surveys made using questionnaires, 
employment involving cash in hand payments can be considered to be an inter-
mediary position on the labour market between completely legal employment 
and unemployment. Together with the increase of the level of educational at-
tainment the incidence of employment with cash in hand payments decreas-
es, while it is also well-known that the risk of unemployment increases exactly 
with the decrease of educational attainment. The reverse correlation between 
educational attainment and cash in hand payments can be partly explained 
by the fact that payment packages involving cash in hand are often refused be-
cause of “uncertain pay” and “bad working conditions”. Taking these aspects 
into consideration is more typical of people with higher qualifications than of 
those with a lower level of schooling. In this respect we may conclude that the 
higher level of educational attainment simultaneously diverts the employees 
from accepting compensation packages including cash in hand payments and 
helps reduce the risks of unemployment.
Unemployment, however, is also directly connected with the incidence of 
undeclared work and cash in hand payments or paying on invoice. We could 
see earlier that unemployed people and casual workers showed a higher propen-
sity of accepting work offers with cash in hand payments or paying on invoice 
than employees. Thus it is obvious that the growth of unemployment raises the 
probability of accepting remuneration packages that include cash in hand pay-
ments or paying on invoice, and so it increases undeclared employment. In the 
broader sense, the risk of unemployment referred to by the former “experience 
of unemployment” makes the employee inclined to take undeclared work. It 
shows in the same direction if we extend the interpretation of the risk of un-
employment from the employee to the employee’s household. If one member of 
the household has already been out of job, this fact makes (black or on-invoice) 
employment in the form of undeclared work more likely. We can render these 
effects probable not only on the basis of logical considerations, their existence 
is also confirmed by more sophisticated mathematical-statistical analysis (Sem-
jén et al., 2009a, Fazekas et al., 2010).
In harmony with the above, the demand for undeclared work and employ-
ment masked as subcontracting presumably increases in the first stage of the 
crisis in those economic sectors and local labour markets in which and where 
the crisis caused unemployment to grow – so primarily in the centre and in 
the developed regions of the Dunántúl. It seems also likely that later – when 
the orders of companies stopped falling or started to increase in these regions 
(late 2009 or early 2010), unemployment could not grow any higher and em-
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ployment also increased slightly, and together with these the incidence of un-
declared employment or pretended subcontracting also started to decline.
This is not the case, however, with the regions regarded as backward already 
be fore the crisis: here unemployment showed a high level before the crisis as 
well, and the crisis worsened this situation further with effects that could also 
lead to the reduction or the elimination of undeclared employment (this could 
be typical of the regions of North-West Hungary). Amidst the economic cri-
sis, the labour market of these regions is (hardly) kept alive by public sector 
employment, state subsidies and communal works.
Appendix
The surveys
We have used findings from two questionnaire surveys in our analysis. One of 
the surveys referred to the savings behaviour of the population in relation to pen-
sions, and was conducted using questionnaires during personal interviews taken 
between October and 9th November. This survey was prepared for the Economic 
and Enterprise Research Institute of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. The survey sample of one thousand people consisted of people in their 
active working age, and was representative in terms of their types of settlements, 
regions, gender and age group. The second survey was commissioned in 2008 by 
the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and it explic-
itly aimed at surveying the participation in the hidden economy and opinions 
about this. This research was also carried out on a sample of 1000 people repre-
senting the adult population of the country between 18 and 60.
Surveying undeclared employment was carried out using similar questions 
in both cases. In both surveys the respondents were asked whether they had 
ever received a part or the whole of their pay as cash in hand. They were then 
asked about the share of the payment they had received as cash in hand the last 
time as compared to the total remuneration for the job.
Similarly, the respondents were also asked whether they had ever received 
a part or the whole of their remuneration for their work on invoice, as a fee 
from pretended subcontracting. If the answer was “yes”, they were also asked 
what part of the total payment they had received was paid in this way. In spite 
of the similar formulation of the questions, however, there are also two differ-
ences between the two research projects in surveying employment in the hid-
den economy. On the one hand, in the 2007 survey the questions referred to 
the preceding one year (i.e. 2006), while in the 2008 survey the questions re-
ferred to the two years preceding the survey (i.e. 2006 and 2007). The other 
difference is that in the 2007 survey we asked these questions referring to un-
declared employment only from those who were either under an employment 
contract at the time of the survey, or who worked as casual workers at that time. 
So here we did not receive responses from the self-employed, the unemployed 
and the economically inactive.
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6. THE EFFECT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON HOUSEHOLDS:  
A MICROSIMULATION ANALYSIS*
Katalin Gáspár & Áron Kiss**
Introduction
This study examines how job losses in the first year of the economic crisis af-
fected the income position of households across the income distribution. We 
use two individual-level data sources. First we estimate the probability of job 
loss of individuals with different characteristics based on the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). Then we 
use the results to estimate the probability of job loss of individuals observed 
in the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the HCSO and analyse the impli-
cations of job loss on household income.
Our research is based on two data sources, because only the LFS gives up-to-
date information about the state of the labour market but only the HBS con-
tains detailed information on households and their incomes.
Analysis
Probability of job loss
We model the job loss probability of employees based on the LFS. In the quar-
terly waves of the LFS each individual is surveyed for six consecutive quarters 
(save for attrition). Calculating the job loss probability of individuals from one 
quarter to the next, we use the panel structure of the survey: we look at those 
individuals who are observed for at least two consecutive quarters.
We observe a job loss if an individual of age 15 to 64 is employed in one quar-
ter but unemployed in the next, according to the LFS definitions.67 By defin-
ing job loss this way, we exclude those individuals who become inactive, as op-
posed to unemployed, after losing their job. The alternatives are, in our view, 
even more problematic: if we had taken into account those who had become 
inactive, we would have misclassified as unemployed those individuals who 
retire or take maternity leave, and this in turn could have biased our estima-
tions. Figure 6.1 shows the ratio of job losses to employment for the age group 
15 to 64 years and the period Q1–2003 to Q1–2010.
The figure shows the seasonality of job losses: the jump recurring every fourth 
quarter indicates that there are many individuals who are employed in the 
fourth quarter of a given year but unemployed in the first quarter of the fol-
lowing year. The figure also shows that job losses surged from mid-2008, the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. During the relatively stable period of 
Q1–2003 to Q2–2008 the share of quarterly job losses was between 0.5% and 
* The authors would like to thank 
Péter Elek and Péter Harasztosi 
for useful discussions. Any re-
maining errors are ours.
** Opinions expressed in this 
article are those of the authors 
and do not reflect the views of 
their institution.
67 The LFS classifies the labour 
market status of individuals ac-
cording to their activity during 
the week before the interview. 
(HCSO 2006, 2009). Individuals 
are employed if they have carried 
out at least one hour of paid work 
during the week surveyed or if 
they were temporarily absent 
from a workplace (e.g., because 
of sick leave). Individuals are 
unemployed if they (1) neither 
worked during the week sur-
veyed, nor did they have a job 
from which they were temporar-
ily absent, (2) if they searched for 
a job during the previous four 
weeks, and (3) if they could start 
working in the following two 
weeks provided they found a job, 
or they already have found a job 
where they will start working 
within 90 days.
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1.2% of total employment, with an average of 0.75%. During the period start-
ing with Q3–2008 the average share of quarterly job losses was about 1.5%, 
reaching 2% in the last quarter of both 2008 and 2009.
Figure 6.1: The ratio of job losses to employment, Q1–2003 to Q1–2010
Note: A job loss from quarter t to quarter t+1 is recorded as a period-t job loss. Individuals 
were weighted using the original LFS weights.
The econometric method
We estimate a probit model of job loss. The dependent variable is binary: in-
dividuals either lose their job or they remain employed. The event of job loss is 
explained by characteristics of the employees. These characteristics are sex, age, 
education, county of residence, and the industry of the employment.68 Besides 
the obvious selection criterion of explanatory power, we had to select those 
explanatory variables that are observed in both data bases we use, because we 
are to estimate the probability of job loss for individuals observed in the HBS 
based on the model estimated in the LFS.
We base our study on the period in which, as can be seen in Figure 6.1, the 
economic crisis had the most serious effects on the labour market: this period 
is between Q3–2008 and Q1–2010. We thus use 7 consecutive waves of the 
LFS, observing 6 waves of labour market transitions in the rotating panel. The 
unit of observation is the transition: one observation is an individual who is 
employed in quarter t and is observed in period t+1. We use a pooled panel es-
timation, that is, individuals for whom we observe more than one transition are 
taken into account as multiple independent observations. We observe 86,076 
transitions in total, with a uniform distribution among the quarters.
We define the control variables as follows. To control for age we define dum-
my variables of age groups 15–24, 25–34,…, 55–64. In the estimation age group 
15–24 serves as a comparison group. Another control variable is the highest at-
tained education of individuals. Here we define four groups: those with prima-
ry school education; vocational training; high-school graduates (matura or, in 
Hungarian, “érettségi”); and finally those with completed tertiary education. In 
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68 Similar calculations have been 
performed by Reizer (2009). His 
results have been reported in a 
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the estimation, the first group serves as the reference group. Finally, we include 
control variables for the county of residence and for the industry of employ-
ment. Reference groups are Budapest and “Agriculture, forestry and fishing”.
The estimation results are shown in Table 6.1. The table shows not the esti-
mated coefficients (as these alone do not have an economic interpretation in the 
probit model), but the marginal effects as calculated from the coefficients. Mar-
ginal effects of a dummy variable (e.g. one indicating that an individual works 
in “Manufacturing”) show by how much an otherwise average individual’s job 
loss probability differs from those belonging to the reference group (in this ex-
ample, “Agriculture”). Marginal effects are thus interpreted as probabilities.
Table 6.1: The effect of individual characteristics on the probability of job loss, 
employees of age 15–64, results from a probit estimation
Individual characteristics Marginal effect Robust standard errors
Female –0.001 0.001
Age 25–34 –0.006*** 0.001
Age 35–44 –0.010*** 0.001
Age 45–54 –0.011*** 0.001
Age 55–64 –0.011*** 0.001
Vocational training –0.006*** 0.001
High school graduate –0.010*** 0.001
Tertiary education –0.012*** 0.001
Békés county 0.010*** 0.004
Borsod county 0.005* 0.003
Fejér county –0.004*** 0.002
Hajdú-Bihar county 0.008** 0.003
Heves county 0.007** 0.003
Nógrád county 0.006* 0.003
Pest county –0.004*** 0.001
Szabolcs county 0.010*** 0.003
Szolnok county 0.005* 0.003
Manufacturing 0.009*** 0.002
Construction 0.018*** 0.004
Trade and repair of motor vehicles 0.006*** 0.002
Accommodation and food service activities 0.014** 0.006
Financial and insurance activities 0.009** 0.004
Real estate activities 0.007* 0.004
Further county and industry dummies not significant
Constant yes
No. of observations 86,076
Pseudo-R2 0.058
*** p<1% ** p<5% * p<10%
The table shows that the probability of job loss is affected by all factors except 
for sex. According to the estimation there is only a negligible (and statistically 
insignificant) difference between the job loss probability of men and women. 
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Looking at the age groups, the probability of job loss decreases with age (al-
beit to a decreasing degree).69 There is a difference of 0.6% to 1.1% (strongly 
statistically significant) between those between 15–24 years and the older age 
groups. It is possible that our methodology underestimates the job loss prob-
ability of age group 55–64, since it does not take into account those who enter 
retirement earlier than they would have absent the crisis. Looking at education 
we see that individuals with primary education had the highest probability of 
job loss: those with vocational training had a 0.6% lower quarterly probability, 
while those with high school education or higher had a 1–1.2% lower quarterly 
probability (these effects are also strongly statistically significant).
Of the county and industry dummies Table 6.1 only shows the ones that are 
statistically significant, but all were included in the estimation. Looking at re-
gional differences, 9 counties had a job loss probability that was statistically 
different from Budapest’s on the 10% significance level. The probability of job 
loss was higher than Budapest in the counties of Eastern Hungary (i.e., Békés, 
Szabolcs, Hajdú-Bihar, Heves, Nógrád, Borsod and Szolnok); while it was low-
er in Central Hungary (counties Fejér and Pest). Looking at the differences 
among industries, very high job loss probabilities were measured in the con-
struction industry as well as in “Accommodation and food services” (a quarterly 
probability 1.8% and 1.4% higher, respectively, than in “Agriculture”). High 
job loss probabilities were further measured (in decreasing order) in “Manu-
facturing”, “Finance and insurance”, “Real estate activities” and “Commerce”.
Analyzing the probability and the effects of job loss using the HBS
After identifying what factors affect workers’ probability of job loss using the 
LFS, we transfer the estimated coefficients over to the HBS in order to calculate 
the annual probability of job loss of each employed person in the HBS dataset.
The HBS is an annual survey which contains information regarding the per-
sonal characteristics of each household member. Also, households are asked 
to record their consumption and income in a diary. The dataset therefore can 
be used to analyze households’ income distribution, as well as the effects of 
modifications in the tax and transfer system.70 We use HBS data from 2007 
for our analysis, since the structure of the latest version of HBS (from 2008) 
has changed and no longer includes income data. In our methodology, we at-
tempt to simulate the effects of the recession on data that were recorded prior 
to the recession. Since the economic downturn was already noticeable at the 
end of 2008, HBS data from 2007 serves as a better base for our analysis than 
data from the following year would be.
The procedure for calculating households’ net income and evaluating the 
effects of job loss is the following. Income data from the 2007 HBS is indexed 
(“aged”) to 2009 levels. Individual net income is calculated from gross income 
using an algorithm following 2009 tax regulations, and household income is 
69 The job market position of the 
younger age groups is likely more 
severe than it appears in our esti-
mations since we do not take into 
account their lower probability 
of entry into employment.
70 See papers by Cseres-Gergely 
(2005), Firle and Szabó (2007), 
Havasi (2007), and Gáspár and 
Kiss (2009). When using HBS 
data one must take into consid-
eration the weaknesses of such 
questionnaire type surveys: the 
poorest and wealthiest house-
holds are underrepresented and 
the response rate is not inde-
pendent of the level of education.
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calculated by adding up the net income of individuals in the same household. 
Finally, income deciles are determined based on household’s equivalent income. 
For this procedure we use a modified version of the HKFSZIM microsimula-
tion program created by Benedek, Elek and Szabó (2009).
In order to analyze the effects of the crisis we first calculate the probability 
of job loss of an employed person in 2009.71 We then re-create the same ex-
planatory variables we used in the LFS in the HBS database and recalculate 
the probability of job loss for each employed person. Since the result is a quar-
terly figure we use the following formula to convert it to an annual probability:
Pa = 1 – (1 – Pq)4.
We simulate job loss by placing each employed person in one of two groups 
(employed or unemployed) based on the realization of a random variable that 
reflects the individual’s probability of job loss. In every repetition of the simula-
tion the group of the unemployed will be different; but in the average of several 
simulation runs the results approximate the underlying odds well. The results 
presented below reflect the average of 100 simulation runs.
In order to analyze the effects of job loss we compare three states: 1) with-
out job loss: everyone is employed; 2) job loss has taken place; the newly un-
employed receive neither income nor unemployment benefits; 3) job loss has 
taken place; those among the newly unemployed who are eligible receive un-
employment benefit.
We use data regarding the length of employment and income (indexed to 
2009) recorded in the HBS to determine the eligibility for unemployment ben-
efit and the cash amount of benefits. To determine these exactly, we would need 
information on the individual’s employment history for the last four years.72 
Observing only one year, we fill the missing information by assuming that the 
individual had similar employment history during the three years prior to 2007.
Results
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the probability of job loss as an average of all simu-
lations in each equivalent household income decile.73 It is noticeable that job 
loss due to the recession affects each decile, but to a diminishing degree as in-
come increases. About 8.5% of employed individuals who ranked in the lowest 
decile based on their equivalent household income lost their jobs, while this 
ratio was 3% in the highest income decile.
In line with the finding that families with many children are more common 
in the lower income deciles, our calculations – not illustrated here – show that 
individuals in households with three or more children have a higher probabil-
ity (almost 7.1%) of job loss compared to households with no children, or one 
or two children (5.2–5.6%).
The picture is more complex when the average income change is analyzed 
across income groups. Moving towards groups with higher equivalent income 
71 The one-year period is partly 
arbitrary, but its advantage is 
that it is easy to interpret and the 
results can be re-scaled depend-
ing on what one assumes about 
the length of the recession.
72 According to the unemploy-
ment regulations of 2009 an 
individual must have had at 
least 365 days of social security 
contributions within the four 
years prior to the job loss.
73 This method categorizes the 
entire population into equivalent 
income deciles (i.e. according to 
household consumption units). 
We used the weights available in 
the HBS when estimating our 
results.
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the absolute loss of income increases, while the relative loss of income is similar 
in all deciles. Figure 6.3, which illustrates this relationship, does not take un-
employment benefits into account, that is it compares stages 1 and 2.
Figure 6.2: Probability of job loss among employed persons per income decile
Figure 6.3: Changes in average income due to job loss  
according to equivalent income deciles
Note: The figure illustrates results for all individuals compared to others within the same 
equivalent household decile.
The figure indicates that while an average individual in the lowest decile loses 
HUF 9,300 annual equivalent income due to job loss, an average individual 
from the highest income decile loses up to HUF 50,000 (including households 
who do not suffer any job loss).74 This is not only due to the fact that employed 
persons have higher income in the higher deciles, but also because higher in-
come deciles also have higher employment rates (see Figure 6.4). Since the num-
ber of employed persons increases with household income the number of job 
losses per person declines at a slower rate than the probability of job loss. This 
partly explains why lost relative income is similar among the income deciles 
(and why it is not a monotonic function of income): as seen on Figure 6.3, in-
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74 To convert incomes denom-
inated in Hungarian Forint 
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dividuals in every decile lose about 1.7–2.4% of their equivalent income. The 
differences in average lost income between income groups are influenced by 
the household structure prevalent within the various income groups (i.e., the 
average number of employed and dependents). This is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Average number household members and employed per household
In order to shed light on this relationship let us compare income deciles 5 and 
6 in the last three figures. According to Figure 6.2 the probability of job loss 
among the employed is almost identical between these deciles. But since equiv-
alent income in the 6th decile is higher, the average loss of absolute income is 
also higher than in the 5th decile (Figure 6.3). If the average makeup of house-
holds in the two deciles were the same, the loss of relative income would also 
be equal. In Figure 6.4 we see that this is not the case: while the household 
size is almost identical in the two deciles, the number of employed is higher in 
the 6th decile. Since employed persons have the same probability of job loss in 
these two deciles, this leads to more job loss and higher loss of relative income 
in the 6th decile.
Next, we analyze how unemployment benefits influence crisis-related income 
changes. In order to do this, we compute the probable amount of unemploy-
ment benefit for each simulated unemployed according to 2009 regulations 
and eligibility requirements mentioned above.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the effects of unemployment benefits on relative loss 
of income. The loss of relative equivalent household income decreases by 0.4–
1.1% even though the compensation-ratio was relatively stable across groups. 
The compensation-ratio was only lower than 0.7 in the highest income decile.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the short-term effects of crisis: the unem-
ployment benefits that we took into consideration on average cover the first year 
of unemployment, but they cannot be granted beyond that point.75 Those who 
were not able to find employment within one year may be eligible for social wel-
fare (of which there are two types since 2009: the one is conditional on being 
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prepared to undertake public work [“RÁT”] and the other – meant for those 
unable to work – is not [“RSZS”]) or they become inactive. The medium-term 
effect of the crisis on those who become inactive is illustrated in Figure 6.3, 
where we did not include unemployment benefits in our calculations. In addi-
tion to this income, those eligible for social welfare receive the legal minimum 
pension (HUF 28,500 in 2010), while those eligible for government subsidized 
work receive the minimum wage (and social security benefits).
Figure 6.5: The effect of unemployment on the relative loss of income
Note: The figure illustrates results for all individuals compared to others within the same 
equivalent household decile.
Flows into employment and counterfactuals
In the main analysis we simulated the flows into unemployment during the 
first year of the crisis. We used a “gross” probability of job loss, that is, we did 
not take into account the flows in the opposite direction. Thus, our estimation 
can be understood as an upper bound on the effect on household income. In 
this section we show two calculations that correct for this issue.
One way to correct the gross probabilities is to take into account that some 
individuals find employment quickly after a job loss (perhaps because their job 
loss is an instance of a “normal” labour market transition). To deal with the 
issue of the re-employed, we repeated our calculations with one difference in 
the procedure: we followed the individuals in the database for an additional 
quarter. A job loss occurs in this calculation if an individual is employed in 
quarter t, unemployed in t+1 and not employed in t+2. This procedure is more 
demanding on the data: we lose some observations in cases where an individual 
disappears from the data base directly after a job loss.76 According to our cal-
culations 22% of those individuals who lost their jobs in the first four quarters 
of the crisis found employment in the following quarter. Running the probit 
model to explain this alternative job loss event and applying the probabilities to 
individuals in the HBS we find that job loss probability decreases by a similar 
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amount in all income deciles, by 27% on average, as compared to the calcula-
tion without taking re-employment into account. Based on this, we conclude 
that re-employment diminishes the estimated effect by about a fourth, but it 
does not affect its distribution.
The other method is based on the question what share of the job losses would 
have occurred in the absence of the crisis. Our basic “gross” calculations would 
be exactly equal to the real (“net”) effect if we could assume that (1) before the 
crisis every single instance of job loss was counterbalanced by a labour mar-
ket transition in the opposite direction (that is, an individual gaining employ-
ment), and that (2) during the crisis no individual gained employment at all 
to counterbalance job losses. Assumption (1) is plausible (and might even be 
too pessimistic as the economy was adding jobs in the period before the crisis. 
Assumption (2) is, however, clearly not fulfilled, even though the probability 
of finding a job decreased during the crisis. (According to our calculations, 
the probability with which an unemployed individual found employment de-
creased from 27% before the crisis to 22% during the crisis.)
As a second approximation we make a calculation that gives a lower bound 
estimation on the income consequences of job losses during the first year of 
the crisis. In this procedure we estimate the job loss probabilities (similarly to 
the results shown in Table 6.1) in the LFS for the pre-crisis period Q1–2003 
to Q1–2008. Using these results we calculate the job loss probabilities of in-
dividuals observed in the HBS to see the income consequences of pre-crisis 
job losses. Finally, we calculate the difference between the crisis and pre-crisis 
effect. This procedure would provide the real “net” effect if flows into employ-
ment were unaffected by the crisis. Since the probability of finding employment 
decreased by a fourth during 2009, this condition is not fulfilled. Thus, the cal-
culation underestimates the effect of the crisis. Results are shown in Figure 6.6.
The estimated effect shown in Figure 6.6 is about one-third to one-half of 
that obtained in our main calculations (Figure 6.3). Figure 6.6 shows also that 
the distribution of the income loss is similar to our main calculations, although 
there is a bigger difference between the methods for lower-income groups than 
for higher-income groups. This might reflect the fact that individuals in the 
lower income groups change their labour market status more often than those 
in higher-income groups even in normal times, and these “normal” labour 
market transitions appeared wrongly as crisis-related in our main estimation.
To place the real “net” effect between our upper- and lower-bound estimates 
we turn to macroeconomic aggregates. In our main estimation – calculating 
“gross” job loss probabilities – we obtain an average job loss probability of 5.5%, 
while we estimate the average pre-crisis job loss probability to be 3.6%. Figure 
6.6 thus reflects the difference of these figures, a job loss probability of roughly 
2%. Meanwhile, data published by Hungary’s Central Statistical Office show 
that employment declined by 4% between Q3–2008 and Q3–2009. This im-
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plies that our lower-bound estimation underestimates the real effect by about 
one half, while our main estimate overestimates it by about one-fourth. Mac-
roeconomic indicators are thus closest to the version of our results where we 
take into account re-employment after one quarter.
Figure 6.6: A lower bound estimate of crisis-related job losses
Concluding remarks
The aim of this study was to assess the impact of the first year of the crisis on 
the income of households in Hungary. We estimated, based on the LFS, how 
various individual characteristics affected the probability of job loss during 
that year and used the estimation results to assign job loss probabilities to in-
dividuals in the HBS. Based on this information, it was possible to estimate 
the change of household income of various income groups of the population.
The results showed that the probability of job loss was much higher for less 
educated and younger individuals, and in some regions and sectors. The edu-
cation and regional effects seem to exacerbate the disadvantage of groups that 
were in a worse position in the first place. This conclusion is supported by the 
analysis in the HBS: according to our estimations the job loss probability in 
lower-income groups is two to threefold of that in higher-income groups. As 
a result income loss, in absolute terms, is higher for high-income groups while 
income loss, as a percentage of income, is fairly constant (between 1.7–2.4%) 
across income groups. Lost income is partly compensated by unemployment 
benefits: the replacement ratio (abstracting from the issue of take-up) is higher 
for lower-income groups.
Our calculation can be taken as an upper bound because they do not take 
into account flows into employment (and its changes during the crisis). We 
employed two methods to correct our “gross” effect to get the real (“net”) ef-
fect: both pointed to a conclusion that the “gross” effect exceeds the “net” ef-
fect by about a fourth.
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7. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND LIVING DIFFICULTIES IN THE MIDST OF 
CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMMES AND CRISES IN HUNGARY*
István György Tóth & Márton Medgyesi
Introduction
In this paper the possible effects of the crisis on the Hungarian population 
are analysed, as far as the data allow, through the results of a survey conduct-
ed in 2010 (the latest wave of the Tárki Household Monitor Survey) with 
questions referring to 2009. Our latest volume of studies, based on 2007 
Household Monitor Survey data, analysed the impact of the budget expan-
sion of the period between 2003 and 2006 and then the fiscal consolidation 
of 2006–2007 (Szivós & Tóth, 2008). Some of the actual social effects of the 
fiscal consolidation programme, however, appeared after the publication of 
the volume in 2008 (i.e., in 2008–2009). It was this process with which the 
first wave of the global economic crisis (the onset of the financial market cri-
sis and the real economy crisis) met in the summer or autumn of 2008. Some 
of the macro-economic crisis-relief measures introduced following the gov-
ernment crisis in spring 2009 already had their effects felt during the refer-
ence period of our analysis, but not all of them and not to their full extent. 
The effects of some other fiscal consolidation measures introduced in 2009, 
however, emerge gradually and cumulatively, and thus it would be too early 
to analyse them in this study.
With respect to the social effects of the economic crisis, its different phases 
should be distinguished.
1. In the second half of 2008, the crisis was primarily of a financial nature 
and affected those who had substantial savings. Some of the losses were “vir-
tual” in the sense that those who could afford to keep their securities or sav-
ings thus avoided realising the loss. Those, however, who for some reason had 
no choice but to realise their loss suffered an effective loss of assets.
2. The next phase of the crisis essentially reached households through two 
channels. One was the volatility created by financial market processes, spe-
cifically related to Hungarian Forint exchange rates. The people affected by 
this before anyone else were those repaying foreign currency denominated 
(housing or car) loans. The unfavourable movement of Forint exchange rates 
led to an increase first in the interests on foreign currency loans and then in 
their repayment instalments. As a result, the living standards and consump-
tion potential of affected households were substantially narrowed, but the ef-
fects were not directly reflected in income distribution statistics. Households 
were affected by another process through the plunge in employment and the 
rise in unemployment.
* This paper is a revised and 
extended version of Chapter 
1 (Tóth, 2010) of the final Re-
search Report (Tárki, 2010) of 
the Tárki Household Monitor 
survey series.
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3. In the third phase, the effects brought on by the crisis were mediated by 
the crisis-relief programmes announced in spring 2009: cuts in government 
spending with social consequences and the scaling back of the welfare system. 
Specific measures include cuts in pension costs (the 13th month’ pension was 
abolished), in family support (a freeze was put on child benefits) and in social 
transfers (an upper limit was introduced on the number of entitlements per 
household). Households responded to these measures by showing consider-
able, perhaps overcautious, restraint in spending, which further exacerbated 
the economic downturn.
Of all waves of the Tárki Household Monitor so far, the data for the latest 
was collected under the worst macro-economic circumstances (Tóth, 2010). In 
2009 GDP plunged to a substantial extent (about 7 per cent in the first three 
quarters and about 4 per cent in the fourth quarter). Although inflation rates 
had been higher during previous data collection periods (at the time of the 2001 
and 2007 surveys, for instance), the rate in 2009 showed a steady rising trend 
from one quarter to the next. The average inflation rate for 2009 was, however, 
below the rate observed during the previous survey (3–5 per cent compared to 
5–8 per cent). In 2009 there was a substantial decline in household consump-
tion. The decrease of consumption roughly corresponded to that of GDP. In-
terestingly, the saving behaviour of households did not mirror these downward 
trends. The rate of saving relative to GDP remained positive throughout 2009 
in contrast with the (declining) figures for the first three quarters of 2008.
In 2007, the decrease in net real wages was far more pronounced than the 
decline in gross real wages as a combined effect of fiscal austerity measures and 
tax increases. In 2009, in contrast, there was a significant fall in gross real wages 
accompanied by a relatively moderate decline in net real wages. The plunge in 
net real wages experienced during the period of fiscal consolidation in 2007 
was substantially greater than the decrease during the later period (of crisis-
relief measures).
During these periods some of the social effects of the crisis concerned the 
distribution of incomes, while others bore on the use of incomes (consump-
tion, savings and borrowing). The next section of this paper looks at the trends 
in income distribution during the different phases of the crisis. We then turn 
to the public perception of living difficulties. Finally, the level and structure 
of indebtedness of the various income groups are analysed using Tárki House-
hold Monitor survey data.
Major indicators of income distribution
The ratio of the average of the highest to the average of the lowest income decile 
increased from 6.8 in 2007 to 7.2 in 2009 (Table 7.1). The increase is statistical-
ly significant but not especially large.77 The Gini index calculated over income 
per capita characterising the overall income distribution increased slightly. The 
77 Cross-country comparisons 
of the breadth of the income 
distribution are discussed for 
the EU-27 in Ward et al (2009) 
and for the OECD countries in 
OECD (2008). The Tárki income 
distribution data is presented in 
more detail in the OECD publi-
cation although the occasional 
contradictions displayed by the 
Hungarian data are also ana-
lysed in the former volume. See 
also Medgyesi (2010).
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data reveals a relatively significant drop (from 3.5 per cent to 3.1 per cent) in 
the share of the lowest decile in the total income. A drop of this magnitude was 
last measured during the period from 1992 to 1996. The share of the top decile 
also fell to some extent, effectively continuing the trend experienced starting 
with the period between 2003 and 2005.
Table 7.1: Major inequality indicators of the distribution of household income  
per capita* in Hungary, 1987–2009**
Indicator 1987 1992 1996 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009
P10/P50 0.61 0.60 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.46
P90/P50 1.73 1.83 1.91 1.93 1.92 1.92 1.78 1.89
P90/P10 2.81 3.07 3.95 3.78 3.90 3.78 3.53 4.11
S1 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.1
S5+S6 17.9 17.4 17.5 17.3 17.1 17.1 17.7 18.0
S10 20.9 22.7 24.3 24.8 25.7 25.1 23.6 22.6
S10/S1 4.6 6.0 7.5 7.6 8.1 7.6 6.8 7.2
Robin Hood 17.0 18.5 20.7 21.2 21.8 21.4 19.9 20.5
Gini 0.244 0.266 0.300 0.306 0.316 0.308 0.288 0.292
N 56459 5538 4972 5253 5909 5209 5054 4849
* P10 (P90): the ratio of the upper (lower) cut-off point of the lowest (top) income decile 
to the median (P50) income (per cent). S1, S5, S6 and S10: the shares of the lowest, 
the fifth, the sixth and the top income deciles in the total income; Gini index:
(where n is the number of observations in the sample, yi is the income of individual 
i), Robin Hood index: the sum of the deviations from the decile ratios of an equal 
distribution.
** For 1992–2007, the year shown corresponds to the year of data collection. For 1992–
2001, each reference period covers the period from April in the previous calendar 
year to March in the current calendar year. For 2003, 2005 and 2007 the reference 
period starts in October and ends in September, and for 2009 data collection took 
place in February and March 2010.
Source: 1962–1990: KSH; 1991–1996: Tárki Household Monitor Survey; 1998–2009: 
Tárki Household Monitor Survey.
In 2009 the average net household income per capita was HUF 74 thousand 
across all persons. Compared to the average income measured in the 2007 
survey (HUF 69 thousand), this constituted a nominal increase of about 7 
per cent. The consumer price index for the period of somewhat less than two 
and a half years between the two data collection waves was about 114 per cent. 
Overall, therefore, average household incomes lost approximately 7 per cent 
of their real value with considerable variation across income deciles. In terms 
of nominal value, above average increases are observed in the incomes of the 
upper-middle strata (6th, 7th, 8th and 9th deciles), but even these are lower 
than the inflation index for the period (Figure 7.1). The two extremes of the 
income distribution deviate from the average trend in significantly different 
ways. While the average incomes of the lowest decile fell even in nominal value, 
the average nominal incomes of the top decile remained constant.78
78 It should be noted that at the 
two extremes of the distribu-
tion, averages always cover (up) 
a much larger internal disper-
sion. This question should be 
specif ical ly addressed when 
analysing inequality indicators 
asymmetrically sensitive to the 
two ends of the distribution. We 
should also note here that the 
Household Monitor survey cer-
tainly cannot capture the lowest 
or the top 3 per cent of the total 
Hungarian income distribution, 
which means that the disper-
sion values given here must be 
conservative estimates.
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Figure 7.1: Evolution of mean incomes of equivalised income* 
 (e = 0.73) deciles, 2007–2009
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79 Household equivalised income 
refers to income per consump-
tion unit, i.e., the equivalised 
income adjusts for differences in 
household size. This study uses 
an equivalence scale defined by 
the elasticity coefficient e = 0.73, 
which means that household to-
tal income is divided by L0.73 
where L stands for household 
size.
* See Footnote 79.
Source: Tárki Household Monitor 2007 and 2009.
The figure displays the growth curves of average incomes in the various deciles 
over the period between the surveys of 2007 and 2009. During the roughly 
two and a half years covered by the period, the inflation rate was 14 per cent 
(dashed line). If each decile had increased at the average rate during this pe-
riod, we would see a uniform 7 per cent increase (dotted line). The solid line 
illustrates the stable curve of the nominal value.
The most recent figures therefore show that between 2007 and 2009, the 
relative share of the lowest decile decreased to a considerable extent. That is, 
during the latest period of analysis there was a decline in the income positions 
of both the rich and the poor, but the decline experienced by the poor was sub-
stantially steeper.
The general trends in income distribution discussed above are also reflect-
ed in the figures based on individual equivalised incomes (with an elasticity 
coefficient of e = 0.73)79 rather than on per capita incomes see Table 7.2 and 
Tárki, 2010).
These indicators do not always show consistent results. The indicators sensi-
tive to the centre of the distribution and those symmetrically sensitive to the 
two extremes paint an ambiguous picture. The Atkinson index with its param-
eter set to 1, the Gini coefficient and the generalized entropy index with its pa-
rameter set to 0 [GE(0)] show essentially no change. The S10/S1 index measur-
ing the ratio of the share of the top decile to the share of the lowest decile and 
the P90/P10 index measuring the ratio of the lower cut-off point of the 90th 
percentile to the upper cut-off point of the 10th percentile show an unequivo-
cal increase. Finally, the generalized entropy index with its parameter set to 
1, the so-called Theil index [GE(1)], decreased. The indicators sensitive to the 
upper end of the distribution show similarly contradictory results.
The value of the Atkinson index with its parameter set to 0.5 [A(0.5)] (i.e., 
showing special sensitivity to the highest incomes) did not change, the GE(2) 
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index (showing simple statistical variation) substantially decreased, while the 
ratio of the lower cut-off point of the 90th percentile to the median income 
(P90/P50) somewhat increased. The indicators sensitive to the lowest segment 
of the distribution once again show an unequivocal decline in the position of 
those at the lower end of the income scale. The ratio of the upper cut-off point 
of the top decile (P10) to the median income (P50) dropped from 55 to 51 per 
cent, and the value of the Atkinson index with its parameter set to 2 (i.e., show-
ing special sensitivity to changes in low incomes) increased from 0.228 to 0.233.
Table 7.2: The distribution of equivalised (e = 0.73) incomes  
between 1987 and 2009 by inequality measures sensitive  
to the different segments of the income distribution*
Index 1987 1992 1996 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009
Indices sensitive to the upper end
P90/P50 1.69 1.86 1.90 1.92 1.92 1.91 1.74 1.81
GE(2) 0.116 0.168 0.236 0.207 0.261 0.260 0.205 0.155
A(0.5) 0.046 0.059 0.071 0.072 0.078 0.073 0.064 0.062
Indices sensitive to the centre or symmetrically to the two extremes of the distribution
S10/S1 4.55 5.52 6.62 6.63 7.30 6.68 6.00 6.35
P90/P10 2.8 3.1 3.6 3.5 3.58 3.42 3.16 3.53
GE(0) 0.092 0.119 0.143 0.147 0.156 0.145 0.127 0.128
GE(1) 0.097 0.127 0.156 0.155 0.175 0.163 0.140 0.128
Gini 0.236 0.263 0.290 0.292 0.302 0.291 0.271 0.272
A(1) 0.088 0.112 0.133 0.137 0.144 0.135 0.119 0.120
Indices sensitive to the lower end
P10/P50 0.60 0.59 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.51
A(2) 0.164 0.219 0.244 0.294 0.259 0.243 0.228 0.233
* See Note to Table 7.1. and:
where n is the number of observations in the sample, yi is the income of individual i, µ 
is the arithmetic mean of all yi; and α and ε are parameters set according to the weight 
placed on our observation units’ level of well-being in different segments of the in-
come distribution. Lower values of α increase the indicator’s sensitivity to the lower 
end of the income distribution, while higher values of α increase the sensitivity of the 
indicator to the upper end of the income distribution.
Source: 1987: Hungarian Central Statistical Office Income Survey; 1992, 1996: Hungar-
ian Household Panel; 2001–2009: Tárki Household Monitor.
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Polarization trends
Internal changes of distribution may be mapped through the analysis of po-
larization trends. Two types of analysis are performed here: First, income po-
larization across different income groups is shown and second, employment 
polarization is discussed in relation to the distribution of employment across 
households.
The process of income polarization involves social groups at the ends of the scale 
moving further away from the centre with the result that the relative shares of 
the poor and the rich increase in parallel. The phenomenon may be measured by 
ranking all respondents according their personal equivalised income at the be-
ginning of the period under analysis in order to establish the incomes of those at 
the cut-off points of the various deciles. As the next step, the decile cut-off points 
are deflated (by the growth dynamics of median incomes, in our case), and we 
can look at the percentage of the population falling in between the boundaries 
of the various deciles defined this way. In Figure 7.2 the decile cut-off points are 
deflated by the figures for 2005, which of course leaves exactly the same percent-
age (10 per cent) of people in each decile for 2005. If no change had taken place 
in the relative values of the decile boundaries, exactly 10 per cent of the popula-
tion would remain in each of the 2005-based decile categories in 2007 and 2009.
Figure 7.2: Distribution of individuals in 2005, 2007 and 2009  
across the income categories defined by the cut-off points  
of the 2005 decile distribution deflated by median income (per cent)
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
In our analyses of the surveys of 2007 (see Szivós & Tóth, eds., 2008), a pro-
cess of depolarization was observed (i.e., the upper middle classes moved down 
while the lower middle classes moved up on the income scale), which was at-
tributed to the combined effects of the so-called welfare regime change taking 
place around 2003 and the fiscal consolidation package of 2006–2007. The 
most significant change shown by our most recent data is polarization at the 
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lower end of the income distribution, i.e., an increase in the percentage of low-
income households as defined by the deciles of 2005. Figure 7.2 also reveals 
flows from the 7th and 8th deciles to lower income categories and – to a lesser 
extent – flows to the top two income categories.
In the analysis of employment polarization, households are categorised into 
five types according to their labour market ties. The first category comprises 
those where the head of the household is employed but other household mem-
bers are not (either because there are no other adults in the household or be-
cause all other adult members are inactive). Households where both the head 
and one or more further members are employed belong to a second category. 
This is a heterogeneous category in the sense that the only criterion is the pres-
ence of at least two workers and the number of inactive members is unspecified, 
i.e., there may be any number of them. Households in the third category have 
an inactive head (either unemployed or economically inactive with no labour 
market ties). By definition, these households have no economically active mem-
bers. The next two categories are both pensioner headed households but while 
there are one or more working members in one, there are none in the other.
According to our estimates, the percentage of households with working heads 
decreased between 2007 and 2009 among the population of Hungary. The de-
crease is especially marked for households where there were at least two work-
ers in the first year of analysis (Figure 7.3).
Figure 7.3: Number of people living in households of various compositional 
categories in 2007 and 2009 (estimate, thousand people)
Source: Tárki Household Monitor 2007 and 2009.
There is an increase, however, in the percentage of people living in households 
with no active workers (where the head is inactive or a pensioner). The employ-
ment effects of the crisis can therefore be summarised as follows: Households 
having at least two economically active earners were especially severely affected 
by the decline in the probability of living in a working household.80
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80 There were also slight changes 
in the relative income position 
of the household types defined 
above. The relative income posi-
tion of those living in a house-
hold with at least one employed 
worker improved slightly (or, 
looking at real values, declined 
less), while the position of the 
others (at least in a relative sense) 
remained essentially stable.
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Low income, living difficulties and household indebtedness
As was mentioned in the Introduction, as a result of the crisis, household liv-
ing difficulties, indebtedness and loan repayment problems were exacerbated 
through two channels: the decrease in incomes and the unfavourable changes 
in exchange rates. The decline in household labour incomes was the result of 
decreased employment levels and increased unemployment, while household 
welfare transfer incomes (pensions, family support and social security assis-
tance) were reduced as a result of crisis-relief measures.
Reduced income levels and debts are both important factors in the impact of 
the crisis on household finances. Should a household need to face both, they will 
struggle both with meeting their consumption needs and with repaying their 
loans, and may even accumulate further debts with their banks or with their 
public utility providers. Other households take out bank loans or borrow from 
elsewhere (from family members, other private individuals, their employers, 
etc.) to help them overcome the financial difficulties brought on by the crisis. 
That is, household indebtedness (in the form of personal loans, unrestricted 
loans or informal loans) may even increase as a consequence of the crisis.
Repayment of foreign currency denominated loans may become especially 
difficult during the economic crisis. The steep rise in population debt start-
ing with the middle of the decade was due to the extensive spread of foreign 
currency loans, which became so popular that by the end of 2007 the ratio of 
foreign currency consumer or other type of credit to GDP exceeded the ratio 
of Hungarian Foreign denominated credit. During the crisis the Hungarian 
currency fell compared to the foreign currencies in which household debts 
had typically been accumulated (Swiss Francs, for instance), which led to a 
significant increase in repayment obligations. With decreased incomes and 
increased repayment instalments, it becomes more difficult to repay existing 
foreign currency loans with the result that some households are in arrears with 
their loan repayments.
The next section of the study looks at the unfavourable changes triggered by 
the crisis in the proportion of households struggling with living difficulties, at 
the probabilities of household indebtedness during the past decade, and at the 
proportion of households having difficulties repaying their loans. Indebtedness 
and repayment difficulties are analysed by income group on the assumption that 
these problems are most likely to be experienced by low-income households. 
Our analyses divide households into five equal groups (quintiles) according to 
equivalised household incomes.
Living difficulties
The Tárki Household Monitor surveys allow two different approaches to the 
analysis of changes in living difficulties over time. One measure concerns house-
holds’ self-assessment of their financial situation, specifically, whether they re-
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port that 1. they usually have no financial worries, 2. they make ends meet if 
they economise on their spending, 3. they can just make ends meet, 4. they have 
financial hardships, or 5. they live in financial need. The time series shown in 
Table 7.3 indicate a stability in responses over time: Between 2001 and 2007, 
half of respondents chose the middle category (“they can just make ends meet”), 
with 26–28 per cent saying that they made ends meet if they economised, and 
only 1–2 per cent feeling that they were living without financial worries. Over 
this period almost one in five households said that they had financial worries 
and 4 per cent said they were living in need. The proportion of those reporting 
material deprivation grew from 4 to 8 per cent over the last two years of the 
time series, i.e., during the period encompassing the crisis. At the same time, 
the proportion of households having financial worries increased from 19 to 22 
per cent. The frequencies of the responses “they make ends meet if they econo-
mise” and “they can just make ends meet” decreased accordingly.
Table 7.3: Households’ self-assessment of their financial situation (per cent)
Assessment 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
They live without financial worries 2 2 3 1 2
They make ends meet if they economise 26 28 28 26 22
They can just make ends meet 49 49 48 50 47
They have financial hardships 19 17 18 19 22
They live in financial need 4 4 4 4 8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 5208 5917 5206 5056 4842
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
The effects of the crisis are therefore reflected in households’ subjective percep-
tion of their position. The second measure related to changes in living difficul-
ties over time shows the proportion of households that could not afford to pay 
their rent or their public utility bills on at least one occasion during the year 
preceding data collection. In 2001, 15 per cent of households had this experi-
ence, and 12 per cent in 2007. In the last years of the decade, however, there 
was an increase in the proportion of these households. In 2009, 18 per cent of 
households said they had experienced difficulties of this type.
Indebtedness and difficulties with loan repayments
As indicated by the data of the annual Tárki Household Monitor survey of 
2009, 35 per cent of households had debts with banks or other financial insti-
tutions, which constituted a 15 per cent increase compared to the beginning 
of the decade. A large part of the increase took place in the first half of the dec-
ade, when the proportion of households repaying bank loans rose from 19 to 
31 per cent. The upward trend did not stop at this point, however, since by the 
end of the decade there was an increase of 4 percentage points compared to 
the figure for 2007.
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In parallel with this process, we can observe a convergence in the frequency 
of debts between households at the extremes of the income distribution (Figure 
7.4). At the beginning of the decade, the proportion of households repaying bank 
loans was substantially higher in the richest income quintile than in the lowest 
income quintile (29 versus 14 per cent). While for the lowest quintile, however, 
the increase characterising the first half of the decade continued after 2005, the 
figures for the top quintile show no significant change during this period. As 
a result, in 2009 the proportion of households repaying loans was slightly over 
40 per cent for both ends of the income distribution. The corresponding figure 
for households in the middle quintile was lower, about 30 per cent.
Figure 7.4: Percentage of households repaying bank loans by income quintile*
* The quintiles are defined according to equivalised household income.
In addition to housing mortgage loans and personal loans, bank loans include current 
account credits, hire purchase credits, car loans, lombard loans, student loans and 
others.
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
We can distinguish three groups of bank loans: housing mortgage and other 
secured loans; car loans; and personal and hire purchase loans. The proportion 
of households having various housing mortgage and other secured loans rose 
from 7 per cent in 2001 to 15 per cent in 2007. The upward trend continued 
during the last two years with the proportion of households repaying loans of 
this type reaching 20 per cent in 2009. In the lowest income quintile of house-
holds, the increase in the incidence of mortgage loans commenced around 2003 
and continued without interruption for the rest of the decade. During the last 
years of the decade, the proportion of households with mortgage loans in the 
lowest quintile rose from 18 per cent in 2007 to 24 per cent in 2009, which 
corresponds precisely to the figures observed for the top quintile. The propor-
tion of households repaying car loans increased during the first half of the dec-
ade (from 2 per cent in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2005) and remained essentially 
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constant afterwards. At the beginning of the decade none of the households 
in the lowest quintile had debts of this type, while at the end of the decade the 
incidence of car loan debts was only marginally lower in the lowest quintile (7 
per cent) than in the top quintile (9 per cent). The overall proportion of house-
holds with personal loans or hire purchase contracts did not show significant 
changes during the decade, although some increase can be observed towards 
the end of the period (from 11 to 14 per cent). The pattern for the lowest quin-
tile deviates from the average curve: there was a strong increase during the dec-
ade, most of which occurred during the first years (from 7 to 12 percent) and 
between 2007 and 2009, i.e., during the period encompassing the months of 
the crisis, when the proportion of households with personal or hire purchase 
loans rose from 12 to 17 per cent. In the top quintile, in contrast, the incidence 
of these loan types declined at the beginning of the decade and settled at about 
12–14 per cent of households in the second half.
Household debts may be accumulated not only with financial institutions but 
also with other institutions or private individuals. Loans may be issued by local 
governments or employers, people may borrow from family members or other 
private individuals, and they may be in arrears with their payment of public 
utility bills (which is of course not a credit relationship). Overall, the propor-
tion of households with non-bank debts did not show significant difference 
between the beginning of the decade and the end (12 per cent in 2001 and 11 
per cent in 2009) but there was a considerable increase during the last few years 
(from 7 per cent in 2007 to 11 per cent in 2009). A large share of this increase 
is explained by the rising incidence of arrears in payments to public utility pro-
viders, which increased from 3 per cent to 8 per cent during the last two years 
of the period. Looking at non-bank debts by income group (Figure 7.5), we can 
see an increase during the last two years among the low-income quintiles: The 
proportion of households having regular repayment obligations for non-bank 
debts increased from 12 to 20 per cent in the lowest quintile, from 5 to 10 per 
cent in the second quintile and from 7 to 11 per cent in the middle quintile.
On the whole, therefore, the rising trend in the proportion of indebted house-
holds characterising the entire decade did not stop in the last two years whether 
we look at loans issued by financial institutions or debts accumulated in other 
ways. The various bank loans reached low-income groups as well. At the end 
of the decade the proportion of low-income households repaying various bank 
loans roughly corresponded to the average level. The increasing trend in the fre-
quency of households with regular debt payment obligations continued over 
the last two years among those with low incomes: The incidence of non-bank 
debts displayed an unequivocally above-average increase, but even the propor-
tion of households with bank loans rose at about the average rate (for mort-
gage loans) or more sharply than average (for personal loans and car loans). It 
could be the case, of course, that the explanation for this phenomenon is that 
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middle class families that had taken out loans at some earlier date experienced 
a substantial decline in their income level moving them to the lowest income 
quintile. It is also possible, however, that the explanation lies in households in 
the lowest income quintile taking out loans.
Figure 7.5: Percentage of households with regular non-bank  
debt repayment obligations by income quintile*
* The quintiles are defined according to equivalised household income.
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
The data from the Household Monitor survey of 2009 allows us to approach 
the question of households’ difficulties with paying their debts in two differ-
ent ways. First, we can look at the ratio of the monthly instalments paid by the 
households to household income, which gives us an indirect measure of the 
burden that the debts place on the households. Second, households were asked 
directly whether they were in arrears with their repayments at any time dur-
ing the reference period.
Table 7.4 displays the average size of repayment instalments among house-
holds repaying bank loans, the average size of repayment instalments for for-
eign currency loans, and the average household income (regardless of house-
hold size). The figures show that households with bank loans paid on average 
about 20 per cent of their total income towards their bank loan debts in January 
2010. There is considerable variation across income groups, however. In January 
2010, households with loans in the lowest income quintile paid 29 per cent of 
their income towards their bank loan debts, while the corresponding figure is 
14 per cent for households in the top income quintile. The indirect approach 
therefore indicates that bank loan repayment obligations place a substantially 
heavier burden on low-income households than on affluent households, even 
though in absolute terms, the former group pay lower instalments. Table 7.4 
also reveals, however, that the share of foreign currency loan repayments is at 
about the average level among low-income groups, that is, the above-average 
dependence on exchange rates does not constitute excess risk among them.
0
5
10
15
20
Top quintile4th quintile3rd quintile
2nd quintileBottom quintile
2009200720052003
Per cent
in focus
182
Table 7.4: Bank loan repayment instalments and household income among 
households with bank loans, January 2010
Income quintile
Bank Foreign  currency
Share of foreign 
currency loan 
repayment 
instalments  
(per cent)
Total  
household 
income 
 (HUF)
Ratio of instal-
ments to house-
hold income 
(per cent)
NRepayment instalments 
among bank loan  
households (forint)
Lowest quintile 35,156 16,468 47 119,324 29 169
2nd quintile 44,501 22,966 52 173,828 26 104
3rd quintile 47,261 20,241 43 174,091 27 122
4th quintile 45,515 23,842 52 242,869 19 95
Top quintile 51,269 26,399 51 353,910 14 144
Total with bank loans 44,232 21,669 49 210,502 21 634
Note: The quintiles are defined according to equivalised household income. The total 
household income (Column 5) is not, however, adjusted for household size.
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2009.
In terms of debt repayment burden, the gap between low-income and high-in-
come groups is even greater if we look at households’ repayment obligations for 
both financial institution loans and non-bank loans. In January 2010, house-
holds having regular repayment obligations of any type paid a quarter of their 
total income towards debts. The corresponding figure is 43 per cent for house-
holds in the lowest income quintile and only 15 per cent for the top quintile.
Besides the comparison of repayment instalments to household income, we 
also have direct information assessing households’ difficulties with repayment 
obligations. Table 7.5 displays the proportion of households that could not af-
ford to pay their housing mortgage loan obligations on at least one occasion dur-
ing 2009, and the proportion of those who had a similar experience with any of 
mortgage loan, hire purchase credit or other loan obligations. Mortgage loan ar-
rears due to financial difficulties were experienced by 4 per cent of households, 
while arrears on loan repayment obligations of any type were reported by 9 per 
cent of households. In both cases, there is considerable variation across income 
groups. For housing mortgage loans, 8 per cent of households missed payments in 
the lowest income quintile, while only 1 per cent of households had this experi-
ence in the top quintile. The gap between income groups is even wider if all types 
of loan are considered. 17 per cent of households in the lowest quintile, 8–9 per 
cent in the second and third quintiles, and only a vanishingly low percentage of 
households in the top quintile struggled with their loan repayment obligations.
As was mentioned in the Introduction, households taking out foreign cur-
rency denominated loans are at even higher risk of repayment difficulties, since 
their repayment instalments may increase substantially with exchange rates 
fluctuations. As we can see in Table 7.5, 17 per cent of households had foreign 
currency loans at the time of data collection, and 5 per cent of all households 
experienced difficulties with paying their instalments on time. Once again, it 
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is clear from the data that the incidence of missed payments varies greatly with 
the income position of households. Making payments towards foreign cur-
rency loans places a perceptibly heavier burden on low-income families, since 
9 per cent of these households were in arrears with their repayments at some 
point compared to 5 per cent of households in the second quintile and only 2 
per cent of households in the top quintile.
Table 7.5: Percentage of households who could always afford  
to meet their repayment obligations and of those  
who could not always afford to meet their repayment obligations in 2009*
Mortgage loans (N = 1956) Mortgage, hire purchase  or cash loans (N = 1957)
Foreign currency loans 
(N = 1901)
Could always 
afford to pay
Could not 
always afford 
to pay
Could always 
afford to pay
Could not 
always afford 
to pay
Could always 
afford to pay
Could not 
always afford 
to pay
Lowest quintile 23 8 35 17 10 9
2nd quintile 22 5 34 9 9 5
3rd quintile 22 4 37 8 11 4
4th quintile 30 1 41 5 10 3
Top quintile 34 1 51 2 19 2
Total sample 26 4 39 9 12 5
* Mortgage loans (Columns 1 and 2) and all loans (Columns 3 and 4) include both For-
int and foreign currency loans. The columns on foreign currency loan repayments 
(Columns 5 and 6) cover all loans denominated in a foreign currency, including 
housing mortgage loans and other foreign currency loans.
Source: Tárki Household Monitor, 2009.
We also looked at differences in the incidence of repayment difficulties across 
different demographic groups (Table 7.A1). With respect to age, households 
with heads under the age of 50 were more likely than average to miss a mort-
gage loan repayment because of financial difficulties, while older household 
heads were substantially less likely to have experiences of repayment difficulties. 
Among those having housing mortgage loans, 11 per cent of 51–60 year-olds, 
and 6 per cent of 61–70 year-olds experienced repayment difficulties compared 
to 18 per cent of 31–40 year-olds. A similar pattern can be observed for the 
sample of households with any type of loan (mortgage, hire purchase or other 
loan). The repayment of foreign currency loans is also less likely to pose prob-
lems for older people, although the difference is less pronounced. Among those 
having foreign currency loans, one in five 51–60 year-olds and a quarter of 61–
70 year-olds missed repayments at some point because of financial difficulties.
Turning to household structure, the incidence of repayment difficulties is 
higher than average for large households and those with active heads. Among 
respondents having mortgage loans, repayment difficulties were reported by 
30 per cent of households of five or more members compared to 9 per cent of 
single-person households. A similar gap can be observed when all types of loan 
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are taken into consideration. Large households also show higher vulnerability 
than all others to repayment difficulties with foreign currency loans: 38 per 
cent had experiences of this kind, while the corresponding figure is only 20–
23 per cent among smaller households. A reasonable explanation for this pat-
tern is that larger households tend to have more dependent (child) members.
Household heads’ educational attainment and labour market status are 
strongly correlated with household income position and, consequently, with 
the incidence of repayment difficulties. Among mortgage loan repayers, 22 
per cent of those with at most primary education missed repayments at some 
point because of financial problems. This contrasts with secondary school or 
higher education graduates, only 6–7 per cent of whom were in this situation. 
The pattern of differences by educational attainment is also observed for all 
loans and for foreign currency loans.
The labour market status of household heads is a further factor affecting the 
incidence of repayment difficulties. Jobless households are the most likely to 
experience repayment difficulties. Among households having housing mort-
gage loans, 31 per cent of jobless households reported repayment difficulties 
compared to 13 per cent of the total mortgage household sample. The unem-
ployed are also about twice as likely to struggle with the repayment of any type 
of loan and of foreign currency loans. The incidence of mortgage loan repay-
ment difficulties is lowest for employed and pensioner households. Pensioners, 
however, experienced difficulties with foreign currency loan repayments with a 
comparatively high frequency (30 per cent), although relatively few pensioner 
households had foreign currency loan repayment obligations. While we only 
have a small number of observations in the sample, it is a striking observation 
that that the overwhelming majority (86%) of other inactive households were 
late with their repayments at some point.
The probability of having repayment difficulties also varies by settlement 
type and geographical region. Households in Budapest are somewhat less likely 
to experience repayment difficulties with either mortgage loans or all types of 
loan, while households in towns or villages had experiences of this kind with 
about average frequency. The pattern is slightly different for foreign currency 
loans, where Budapest households do not deviate significantly from the average 
(28 per cent had difficulties). With regard to region, among households with 
mortgage loans, those living in the South-Great Plains were the most likely to 
experience repayment difficulties (22 per cent compared to 13 per cent on av-
erage). Looking at all types of loan, however, the highest incidence of delays 
with repayments due to financial difficulties is observed in North-Hungary 
and in the North-Great Plains. Repayment difficulties with foreign currency 
loans are also more frequent among households living in North-Hungary than 
in any other region.
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Summary
The factors shaping the patterns characterising the period analysed in our study 
are the fiscal consolidation programme of 2006, the increasingly heavy pres-
ence of the economic crisis starting with 2008, and the macro-economic cri-
sis-relief policies of 2009. It is an exceptionally difficult task to separate these 
effects from each other, and our study only made limited attempts to do so.
Our analyses reveal that most indicators of income distribution show the 
growth of inequalities over the period between 2007 and 2009. As the gap be-
tween the two ends of the distribution widened, both households at the low 
end and those at the top end had to face losses, but the sharpest decrease in real 
incomes was suffered by the lowest decile of the population. Although the value 
of the usual Gini co-efficient did not change statistically significantly, several 
other indicators show an increase in inequalities.
The crisis was also accompanied by the polarization of income and employ-
ment or labour market positions. The extent of income polarization was inten-
sified by the asymmetrical effects observed at the two extremes of the distribu-
tion. Employment polarization remained moderate, however. The increase in 
unemployment appears to be felt more by households that previously had at least 
two paid working members. In a separate analysis, we looked at the effects of the 
economic crisis on household living standards. The decline in incomes accom-
panying the crisis was most likely to cause financial difficulties for households 
having loan – especially foreign currency loan – repayment obligations. House-
hold indebtedness was therefore analysed with reference to income position, 
and difficulties related to meeting repayment obligations were also examined.
Hungarian households could not avoid feeling the effects of the crisis. Af-
ter a decade of stagnation, the last two years of the past decade (i.e., a period 
encompassing the crisis period) saw an increase in the percentage of house-
holds experiencing material deprivation or financial difficulties. Over these 
two years, the proportion of households having difficulties paying their rent 
or utility bills also increased (from 12 to 18 per cent). The rising trend in the 
frequency of households having loan repayment obligations characterising the 
entire decade continued during the last two years, both for bank loan debts and 
for non-bank loan debts. The various bank loans also reached low-income groups; 
the incidence of loan debts among them roughly corresponds to the average. The 
proportion of households with regular loan repayment obligations among low-
income groups continued to grow during the last two years.
As expected, low-income households suffer the most from the burden of loan 
repayment obligations. The evidence for this claim is that indebted households 
in the lowest income quintile pay a higher share of their income towards their 
debts, and they are also more likely to be in arrears with their repayments be-
cause of financial difficulties. Our analysis of differences between various de-
mographic groups also indicates that the incidence of repayment difficulties 
is higher for typically low-income population groups (those with low educa-
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Appendix 7
Table A7.1: Percentage of households that could not afford to pay their loan repayment instalments  
on one or more occasions during the previous year
N
Households with  
mortgage loans
Households with mortgage,  
hire purchase or cash loans
Households with  
foreign currency loans
Frequency  
(per cent)
Percent having 
repayment 
difficulties
Frequency  
(per cent)
Percent having 
repayment 
difficulties
Frequency  
(per cent)
Percent having 
repayment 
difficulties
Age of household head
Under 30 164 40 12 62 17 28 34
31–40 years 348 44 18 64 21 33 27
41–50 years 322 32 22 59 25 27 35
51–60 years 482 26 11 46 17 16 20
61–70 years 291 22 6 38 12 8 26
Over 71 346 25 3
Household type
Active age head, Single person 257 26 9 40 12 11 22
Active age head, 2 persons 335 30 13 49 19 20 23
Active age head, 3 persons 318 34 12 60 17 29 20
Active age head, 4 persons 262 41 20 66 23 32 39
Active age head, 5+ persons 144 43 30 73 32 38 38
Older household, single person 315 18 5 25 11 2 15
Older household, more than one person 322 25 2 37 6 7 25
Educational attainment of household head
At most primary school 509 22 22 37 27 9 45
Vocational training 738 28 16 50 21 21 33
Secondary school 445 36 7 52 12 21 22
Higher education 261 41 6 56 7 22 13
Labour market status of household head
Employed 911 38 12 60 17 28 23
Unemployed 171 29 31 53 35 19 53
Pensioner 834 22 9 33 13 7 30
Other inactive 37 23 20 51 24 21 86
Settlement type
Budapest 390 33 8 45 11 10 28
County seat 293 35 15 54 19 22 23
Town 656 30 15 49 21 21 33
Village 613 26 13 46 17 18 25
Region
Central-Hungary 160 26 11 40 9 8 27
Central-Transdanubia 213 40 10 61 16 27 26
West-Transdanubia 194 32 8 50 11 20 19
South-Transdanubia 185 16 17 36 14 16 23
North-Hungary 239 25 14 43 26 22 41
North-Great Plains 301 28 16 49 28 19 30
South-Great Plains 270 35 22 54 22 23 28
Budapest 390 33 8 45 11 10 28
Total sample 1953 30 13 48 18 18 28
tional attainment, the unemployed, large households and households in dis-
advantaged geographical regions).
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7.A) HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOUR IN THE HOUSING AND MORTGAGE MARKETS
Zsuzsa Kapitány
Over the past decade, the consumption behaviour of 
Hungarian households has been characterised by a 
strong preference for home ownership, a reluctance 
to move house, a high propensity to take out mort-
gages and a very low level of savings.81 With the re-
structuring of welfare programmes (pension, unem-
ployment benefit and subsidy schemes), the fear of 
job loss and the importance of self-sufficiency have 
become increasingly dominant in households’ lives. 
These concerns tend to encourage increased saving, 
reduced consumption and more restrained borrow-
ing. Yet, at the beginning and in the middle of the 
2000s household consumption behaviour was char-
acterised by a low saving propensity coupled with a 
preference for consumption on credit and for home 
ownership investments. By international compari-
son Hungarian households have a very low level of 
monetary assets and an exceptionally high level of 
investment assets (Vadas, 2007, Bethlendi, 2007).
To a significant extent, the continuance of this con-
sumer behaviour has been shaped by the almost un-
limited choice of mortgage loans and bank loans 
offered from the beginning of the decade, the rapid 
increase in household debts and the sudden rise in 
real wages in 2002. The surge in the demand for self-
owned housing and mortgage loans coupled with 
a relatively inflexible supply of home construction 
programmes at the beginning of the decade led to 
a rapid rise in housing prices. Exploiting the highly 
favourable, or seemingly favourable, credit oppor-
tunities, households further increased rather than 
decreased their consumption spending and hous-
ing investments. As a result, savings were depleted 
and the self-financing and credit repayment abil-
ity of households greatly declined. These processes 
turned round in the middle of the decade, when gov-
ernment measures constraining the housing market 
and mortgage lending in combination with insecu-
rity about the future had the effect of decreasing the 
demand for residential housing. This in turn led to 
the stagnation or in some cases the decline of prop-
erty prices.
The literature on the housing and the mortgage loan 
market usually relies on two methods of analysis: 
macro-models of household behaviour and micro-
level household data analysis.82 Given the brevity of 
the period since the autumn of 2008 (the onset of the 
crisis), neither of these methods can be used here. 
Our study, therefore, relies on brief reports issued 
by the Hungarian National Bank, the Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority and the Hungar-
ian Central Statistical Office.
The effects of the crisis on household bank loans 
and mortgage loans
During the months preceding the crisis, almost 90 
per cent of bank loans were denominated in Swiss 
Francs. In the first half of 2010, however, Hungarian 
Forint loans took over. According to Central Bank 
figures, in June 2010 most loans issued to house-
holds were denominated in Hungarian Forints, and 
the share of foreign currency denominated loans in 
all household loans dropped to below 70 per cent. In 
all housing related credit, the share of foreign cur-
rency loans was just over 50 per cent (MNB, 2010a, 
2010b). For households living from one month to 
the next and lacking significant savings, it came as 
a shock when starting with the first half of 2009, 
foreign currency denominated loans were revalued 
to an unusual degree as a consequence of Forint ex-
change rate fluctuations. Just over the period be-
tween the end of 2008 and the end of the first quar-
ter of 2009, the Hungarian Forint fell 15 per cent 
relative to the Swiss Franc and 17 per cent relative 
to the Euro, substantially increasing the nominal 
credit stock and creating household insolvency or 
near insolvency. Household insecurity further in-
creased when in the second quarter of 2009 the re-
verse process was experienced, i.e., the Forint rose 12 
per cent relative to the Euro and to the Swiss Franc, 
81 In the literature analysing the housing market in combination 
with the housing mortgage credit market, some groundbreak-
ing studies are Hegedüs & Somogyi (2004), Hegedüs & Struyk 
(2005), Kiss & Vadas (2006), Vadas (2007) and Bethlendi (2007).
82 Holló (2007), Holló & Papp (2007). See also the chapter preced-
ing this brief report by István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi.
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which decreased the nominal value of credit stock. 
The insecurity did not end there: in 2010 changes in 
the exchange rate of the Swiss Franc effected anoth-
er substantial increase in the nominal credit stock.
Following a decline in 2008, the net monetary as-
sets of households again increased in 2009 but this 
increase was simply a consequence of the subsidence 
of the extensive loan boom of previous years. In con-
trast with the trend of the previous years, in 2009 
foreign currency nominated loans stopped grow-
ing and household credit levels remained essentially 
constant. The crisis had a dramatic effect on house-
hold mortgage loans in 2009 (KSH, 2010b). Similar-
ly to bank loans, housing related credit also settled 
at an essentially constant level in 2009 following a 
two-digit increase during the previous years. At the 
end of 2009 housing mortgage loans amounted to 
3,920 billion HUF, which is equivalent to 15 per cent 
of GDP for that year. 63 per cent of housing mort-
gage loans were denominated in a foreign currency. 
Compared to 2008, there was a 62 per cent decrease 
in the number of mortgage loan approvals and a 66 
per cent decrease in their value. The number and 
value of mortgage loan payments also changed con-
siderably: Half as many were paid in 2009 than in 
2008, and their value dropped by almost two-thirds.
While every household felt the negative effects of 
the crisis, the households that suffered most were 
those having loan repayment obligations and no 
savings. The crisis forced households to reduce sub-
stantially their consumption and to limit their bor-
rowing, especially housing mortgage loan borrow-
ing. In 2009, household loan repayments exceeded 
the value of new loans, and in terms of their nomi-
nal receivables and liabilities the household sector 
had a negative balance (KSH, 2010a). The repay-
ment capacity of households continued to grow 
in 2010. Preliminary Central Bank figures (MNB, 
2010c) put it at 4.7 per cent of GDP in the one-year 
period up to the second quarter of 2010 and at 7.2 
per cent of GDP in the second quarter of 2010 [see 
Table 7.A)1].
What do the two time series of the changes of fi-
nancial assets and liabilities mean at the micro-level 
of individual household finances? It simply means 
that in some of the quarterly periods under analy-
sis the balance of assets and liabilities was such that 
Hungarian households together were able and pre-
pared to increase their debt repayment to a level ex-
ceeding their concurrent borrowing. We know little, 
however, about future changes in this capacity and 
readiness in the face of exchange rate fluctuations. 
For most households, the decline in their consump-
tion and propensity to borrow does not guarantee 
that their saving and repayment capacity and pro-
pensity will increase. An increasing proportion of 
households having loans are struggling with serious 
repayment difficulties. According to the Hungari-
an Financial Supervisory Authority (PSZÁF, 2010) 
there is a growing number of people who cannot 
repay their debts or are in arrears with their repay-
ments [see Table 7.A)2].
The incidence of delinquencies among residential 
housing mortgage loans shows a higher than aver-
age increase and this rises at an accelerating rate.83 
Delinquencies occur with a 26 per cent frequency 
among residential loans and a 22 per cent frequency 
among mortgage loans. For residential loans, 10 per 
cent of loan repayments are more than 90 days over-
due, which is also a substantial increase compared 
to just 5 per cent observed in December 2008. For 
residential mortgage loans, the default rate is more 
than 7 per cent, which is almost two and a half times 
as much as the 3 per cent value measured in Decem-
ber 2008. At the end of March 2010, 97 thousand 
residential mortgage loan borrowers were classified 
as being at immediate risk as they were more than 
90 days in arrears with their repayments. Although 
the government extended the moratorium on evic-
tion until April 2011, this does not solve the problem 
of being unable to pay, since the banks cannot sell 
the property securing the mortgage loan, and thus 
the debts continue to accumulate. The causes of de-
linquency vary widely. Those repaying foreign cur-
rency denominated loans usually fail to repay their 
debts because of financial difficulties caused by ex-
83 The effects of the crisis on residential incomes and savings/
loans were also analysed by Tóth and Medgyesi. The authors found 
that already in 2009, 4 per cent of households were in arrears 
with their loan repayments at some point. Among households 
in the lowest income quintile, 8 per cent had this experience.
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change rate fluctuations. Several borrowers, how-
ever, cannot meet their obligations because they are 
in long-term unemployment.
Crisis in the housing market and in home con-
struction
The first signs of the crisis appear with a delay both 
in household statistics and in home construction 
figures, since the construction and sale of new hous-
ing take at least two years, and the average period 
from the issue of building permits to taking posses-
sion of the new home is almost three years. However, 
the most recent reports of the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office concerning housing construction 
and building permits in the first half of 2010 (KSH, 
2010d) unequivocally show a marked slowdown in 
housing construction: In the first half of 2010, only 9 
thousand homes were given occupancy permits, and 
building permits were issued for only 10 thousand 
new homes. New home occupations decreased by 30 
per cent and the issue of new permits by 40 per cent 
compared to the first half of 2009. In the first half of 
2010, approximately the same number of new homes 
were occupied as at the beginning of the 2000s, i.e., 
before the housing boom. 
Table 7.A)1: Household net repayment capacity, percent of GDP
2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Current quarter –0.4 –0.8 –1.7 7.3 4.5 0.7 1.7 6.1 3.6 7.2
Past 4 quarters 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 2.3 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.1 4.7
Source: MNB (2010c).
Table 7.A)2: Loan repayment arrears, 2008–2010
December 2008 December 2009 March 2010
Value and share of arrears
Billion HUF % Billion HUF % Billion HUF %
All arrears 3,092 12.3 4,152 17.3 4,514 19.1
Residential loans 1,474 16.8 2,146 24.1 2,334 26.0
Of those: mortgage loans 765 12.5 1,282 20.0 1,409 21.8
Number and frequency of delinquencies
Thousand  
occurrences
% Thousand  
occurrences
% Thousand  
occurrences
%
All delinquencies 3,018 31.1 3,622 38.5 3,652 38.8
Residential loans 2,799 31.0 3,357 38.3 3,388 38.6
Of those: mortgage loans 190 15.1 246 19.2 258 20.3
Value and share of arrears overdue for over 90 days
Billion HUF % Billion HUF % Billion HUF %
All arrears 967 3.9 1,875 7.8 1,972 8.3
Residential loans 420 4.8 829 9.3 908 10.1
Of those: mortgage loans 180 3.0 419 6.5 468 7.3
Number and frequency of delinquencies of over 90 days
Thousand  
occurrences
% Thousand  
occurrences
% Thousand  
occurrences
%
All delinquencies 1,710 17.6 2,183 23.2 2,154 22.9
Residential loans 1,590 17.6 2,022 23.1 2,001 22.8
Of those: mortgage loans 67 5.3 92 7.1 97 7.6
Source: PSZÁF (2010).
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Besides the marked decrease in construction pro-
jects, the slowdown in residential building construc-
tion is also indicated by the substantial decline in the 
number of completed and occupied housing units. 
Since 2007 the Hungarian Tax Authority has given 
the Central Statistical Office access to standardised 
and cross-system comparable databases of quarterly 
housing price figures. As shown in the KSH (2010c) 
report on the housing market and residential build-
ing construction, after a sharp rise of 15 per cent in 
2002 and 21 per cent in 2003, the upward trend in 
housing prices slowed down considerably commenc-
ing with 2004, and the price level has since been 
essentially constant. In 2008, housing price indi-
ces corrected for composition effects still showed a 
slight (roughly 2 per cent each) annual increase in 
both new and used housing prices. In 2009, howev-
er, there was a 1.4 per cent drop in the price of new 
homes and a 5.2 per cent drop in the price of estab-
lished housing, while the annual consumer price 
index was 6.1 per cent up in 2008 and 4.2 per cent 
up in 2009. As a result of the significantly tighter 
conditions of access to housing mortgage loans and 
the very high transaction costs, cash transactions 
not relying on loans have been at a clear advantage 
and in the majority on the buyer side of the housing 
market. Also, the number of sales has significantly 
decreased. Exploiting their bargaining advantage, 
potential buyers attempt to achieve drastic cuts in 
prices. For most households having a low level of fi-
nancial assets and a relatively high level of real prop-
erty assets, the steady devaluation of real property 
predicts a rapid and significant change in household 
consumption behaviour.
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8. THE OVERALL PICTURE. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OF “IN FOCUS”
György Molnár
The seven extended and five brief studies included in In Focus undertook to 
map the labour market effects – in a broad sense – of the crisis relying on 
the available results of Hungarian empirical research efforts. The authors at-
tempted to widen the scope of their inquiries with the aim of bringing into 
focus the group of households in the centre of the process of the reproduction 
of labour. Their efforts were to some extent constrained, however, by the crite-
rion of evidence-based research. The most recent data available at the time of 
writing the papers covers the first half of 2010 for some of the topics, but only 
2009 for most of them. In some cases the only information available is even 
older. In the absence of suitable data, we were forced to relinquish our original 
plans of discussing changes in household consumption and their relationship 
to the labour market. For some of our topics – the evolution of real wages, for 
instance – it was not possible to make evidence-based international compari-
sons. As the crisis is not quite over yet, it is often impossible to decide whether 
it is the crisis or the pre-crisis Hungarian fiscal consolidation measures that can 
be held responsible for the observed phenomena. We have similarly no way of 
knowing whether recent changes in various processes constitute a turn in the 
trend or are simply temporary fluctuations.
Despite having to face all these constraints, we are confident that our stud-
ies provide a reasonably comprehensive and diversified picture of the impact of 
the crisis on the Hungarian labour market. Rather than presenting new results, 
this closing chapter of In Focus attempts to sketch an overall picture by simply 
summarising the most important conclusions of the 12 studies and pointing 
out the links and parallels between them.84
Labour market responses to the crisis
The public and the private sectors adjusted in diametrically opposed ways to 
the changes in the economy brought about by the crisis, i.e., the decrease in de-
mand and the contraction of the credit market. While the public sector typi-
cally responded by wage cuts, the private sector tended to reduce the workforce 
(see the introductory chapter by Mónika Bálint, Zsombor Cseres-Gergely and 
Ágota Scharle; and Chapter 1 by János Köllő). That is, any figures applying to 
the economy as a whole aggregating the two sectors may be seriously mislead-
ing. The drop in public sector wages is primarily explained by the retraction of 
the 13th month pay and the suspension of pay increases. In this sector, there-
fore, there are no significant structural changes awaiting explanation (Köllő). 
84 In doing so, some sections 
of the original texts are cited 
word for word or almost word 
for word, but while the source 
of the ideas is mentioned, quota-
tions marks are omitted for the 
sake of readability.
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The studies in In Focus accordingly turn most of their attention to processes 
observed in the private sector.
János Köllő’s model estimations based on corporate panel data lead to sev-
eral interesting conclusions beyond the dominance of workforce downsizing. 
Decreases in staff size and wages were more pronounced than average among 
companies with predominantly male employees. This result suggests that com-
panies involved in production and typically employing male workers fared 
worse than average both in terms of employment and with respect to wages. 
Interestingly, the data paints a different picture of major layoffs: women were 
marginally more likely to be affected by this form of job separation (Busch & 
Lázár, Chapter 3).
Returning to the results of János Köllő’s models, changes in workforce size 
had a relatively strong, while changes in working time had a relatively weak 
relationship with company size. With the companies ranked from smallest to 
largest, there was a steady increase in the extent of workforce reduction. With 
respect to working time, only the largest companies stood out: they implement-
ed more extensive cuts. One explanation may be that the extent of dependence 
on export demand varied with company size. (Let us remember that the estima-
tions are based on data for the first year of the crisis.) The relative employment 
advantage of small companies was substantially greater in manufacturing than 
in other sectors. Citing, once again, the results of Busch & Lázár’s study, half 
of the workers displaced through major layoffs, which typically affected large 
enterprises, were made redundant in the manufacturing industry, which is al-
most two and a half times the share of manufacturing in overall employment.
In terms of the changes in workforce size, the construction industry and 
real estate businesses did not differ significantly from manufacturing: these 
three experienced the heaviest cuts in employment. The labour force statistics 
were considerably more favourable for the water, energy and transport indus-
tries, financial services, personal services, private health care and agriculture. 
Workforce reductions were of a smaller scale at public sector companies than 
at private firms, and companies having collective agreements also lost fewer 
jobs than average.
Wages increased more at companies employing a larger share of workers on 
the minimum wage than at other firms. There was, however, virtually no change 
in real wages at wage levels unaffected by the regulations on the minimum 
wage. During the first year of the crisis, companies in the business sector left 
wages essentially untouched. In the rare cases where there was a change in the 
average wage, this had no systematic relationship with industry, geographical 
region, company size, ownership, labour force composition or the presence/
absence of trade unions.
The analysis of working time cuts suggests that this tool of cost saving did 
not spread beyond the group of companies receiving job preservation support. 
molnár: the overall picture
193
Within-company changes in employment and in wage rates were independent 
of each other, just as the changes in employment and in working hours were.
Further details are added to this picture – especially with respect to wages – 
by Semjén & Tóth in their brief report 1.B) supplementing Chapter 1. The 
authors discuss the results of a corporate survey conducted in three cycles (in 
March 2009, June 2009 and March 2010), in which company managers were 
interviewed about adjustment strategies in response to the crisis. These strate-
gies of course include measures unrelated to the labour market. In the second 
and third cycles, around 80 per cent of companies mentioned the freezing or 
lowering of wages and other forms of labour compensation as crisis-relief meas-
ures. While at the beginning of 2009 relatively few companies resorted to job 
cuts, in July 2009 the proportion of companies implementing layoffs was over 
40 per cent. The incidence of job cuts returned to a substantially lower level 
by January 2010. The option of part-time employment or reduced working 
hours was chosen by a relatively small, but gradually increasing, percentage of 
companies. Qualitative interviews cannot, of course, provide information as 
to the extent of any of the implemented measures. Comparing these observa-
tions with János Köllő’s results, we may conclude that employment reduction 
measures affected a smaller number of the companies but were substantially 
more drastic than wage-related measures. It is also reasonable to assume that 
managers regarded the policy of keeping real wages level by suspending regular 
pay increases or reducing their usual rate as a crisis-relief measure. It is worth 
noting, however, that among the respondents of the 2010 cycle, the strategy 
of reducing wages and other compensation or keeping them level was, retro-
spectively, far more likely to be seen as an efficient measure than was down-
sizing (15 versus 4 per cent). Of all possible strategies, working time reduction 
was the least likely to be listed as an efficient measure, which may explain its 
infrequent incidence.
As a brief detour, it is worth mentioning that companies typically imple-
mented a number of different crisis-relief measures in parallel (with non-la-
bour market reactions included). The measures included quick solutions (such 
as improving liquidation indicators, cost reduction and credit conversion) as 
well as proactive actions with long-term effects (such as search for new markets, 
organisational restructuring or altering production structure). Companies did 
not seem to develop a special unified crisis-relief strategy. One pattern that 
emerged from the data is that export companies tended to introduce a wider 
range of measures than non-export firms [brief report 1.B) by Semjén & Tóth].
Returning to the question of employment, the data from the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office (HCSO) Labour Force Survey shows that the key 
explanation for the decrease in employment rate is that companies did not 
hire new employees to fill positions vacated through a natural process. The 
probability of exiting employment displayed a rising trend between 2006 and 
in focus
194
2009, but did not soar during the crisis. The not much faster than usual rate 
of job separations was accompanied, however, by difficulties with fast re-em-
ployment, which led to a substantial increase in unemployment. Presumably, 
this strategy of downsizing – i.e., avoiding major layoffs – was one of the rea-
sons why the soft tools of adjustment, wage and working time reduction, were 
given less weight (Köllő).
The conclusions drawn from the labour survey are corroborated by Busch and 
Lázár’s data in Chapter 3, which relies on obligatory announcements of major 
layoffs. In the time series of major layoffs, only one quarter stands out (the first 
quarter of 2009) while the total number of layoffs in 2009 is barely more than 
the values observed in 2003 and 2004. Also, there were fewer job separations 
during the first half of 2010 than there had been before the crisis. The sharp 
increase in the number of registered unemployed is explained at least as much 
by the decline in outflows than by the increase in inflows.
In their analysis of labour policy reactions to the newly emerged situation, 
both János Köllő’s chapter and Elek & Scharle’s associated brief report 1.A) 
come to the conclusion that the top priority of the Hungarian government 
– similarly to other countries in the region – was to prevent a surge in unem-
ployment by preserving and boosting labour demand. Jobs in the public sec-
tor were protected by the introduction of wage reduction measures while in 
the private sector the primary means of supporting job preservation was the 
expansion of employment subsidies (Köllő). In 2009, the reduction of wage 
costs, specifically the lowering of employer contribution rates, constituted 
one third of government spending on labour demand stimulation. This tool 
has the disadvantage of overly broad targeting as it can affect jobs other than 
those that are at risk and are worth saving. It was, however, a necessary step in 
the restructuring of the Hungarian taxation system, which was needed inde-
pendently of the crisis (Elek & Scharle).
The increase of about 110 thousand people in the number of workers benefit-
ing from job preservation subsidies and public works programmes was achieved 
at the expense of other employment support programmes (wage subsidies for 
those returning to work from unemployment or from maternity leave and for 
new labour market entrants, training programmes and business start-up sup-
port) (Köllő). The neglect of these active employment tools – especially of train-
ing – was virtually unique to Hungary among both the EU and the OECD 
countries. Also unique was the Hungarian decision to reduce substantially the 
staff of the Public Employment Service. The strategy of short-time employ-
ment substantially reduced the number of job separations in several countries. 
In Hungary, slightly less than 1 per cent of employees participated in such a 
programme, which is about the average international level but the efficiency of 
this tool proved to be far lower in Hungary than its average efficiency in other 
countries. (Elek & Scharle).
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It should be mentioned in this connection that about half of the workers dis-
placed through major layoffs and participating in unemployment programmes 
received operative employment services. The share of those benefiting from ac-
tive employment schemes was merely 13 per cent (Busch & Lázár).
The number of those becoming unemployed greatly exceeded the number of 
participants in job preservation or public works programmes (most of the latter 
having been unemployed for a while as specified by the conditions of participa-
tion in the Back to Work programme). Considering the social consequences, it 
is especially distressing that there was a significant increase in the number of 
unemployed workers not receiving individual support, when a growing propor-
tion of the same population – especially recently displaced workers – wanted 
to return to work or were actively involved in job search (Köllő). In most EU 
member states, unemployment compensation was relatively high to begin with 
and was now further increased in some of the countries. The period of entitle-
ment to wage-proportional unemployment compensation is exceptionally short 
in Hungary compared to the rest of Europe (Elek & Scharle).
Decisions in this area were heavily constrained by Hungary’s poor budget 
position quite independently of the crisis. It remains questionable, however, 
whether the policy focusing on job preservation and public job creation was 
well suited to the task of minimising social losses.
Boda and Neumann’s interview data on a small number of companies (Chap-
ter 2) cannot be generalised to the entire private sector but the authors’ find-
ings provide illustrative examples for the conclusions of quantitative analyses, 
large-scale surveys and model estimations. They further have an exploratory 
value, providing ideas for future surveys. Among the companies included in the 
case studies, the majority of job separations were limited to temporary ancil-
lary workers hired from agencies at “peak times”. Permanent contract staff were 
only laid off at companies typically employing unskilled workers and regularly 
relying on the tools of quantitative flexibility. The oversupply of labour in the 
market allowed quality substitutions, and workers of relatively insecure status 
(those on fixed term contracts, working pensioners and those past the statu-
tory retirement age) were the most likely to be discharged. At the same time, 
companies made better use of the skills of staff with several years’ experience 
at the company and qualified to perform a variety of tasks. The case studies 
included large automobile manufacturers and it was these that implemented 
layoffs of the largest scale.
The analysis of corporate major layoffs supports these observations. More 
than 40 per cent of workers displaced through major layoffs had no more than 
primary education, which is 10 percentage points higher than their proportion 
among the unemployed and 30 per cent higher than their proportion among 
the employed population. While the probability of secondary school gradu-
ates being displaced through major layoffs corresponded to their share among 
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the employed population, the position of qualified skilled workers contrasted 
with that of primary school educated employees: the former were significantly 
underrepresented among major layoff job separations. Comparing occupations, 
assembly line assemblers were far ahead of all others in the major layoff ranking 
with other elementary workers coming next (Busch & Lázár).
The company case studies also reveal that the various forms and possibilities 
of working time management were strongly related to the technology used at 
the factories (Boda & Neumann). Most of the companies introduced a working 
time account system before the crisis, which – unlike in the case of American 
and West European examples – unilaterally benefits the employer. This tool 
permits the flexible use of working time but to what extent its possibilities are 
exploited is difficult to trace in official statistics.
The crisis presented a new kind of challenge for corporate trade unions and 
works councils. They had to abandon the bargaining strategy they had followed 
since the mid-1990s focussing almost exclusively on pay rises and employee 
compensation packages. The protection of jobs now came to the forefront. 
(As shown by János Köllő’s chapter, they had certain success in this effort.) It 
is worth noting that, among the case studies, the practice of regular consulta-
tions between the management and the trade union or works council was only 
observed at multinational companies with foreign owners. The trade unions 
and works councils have relatively little power, i.e., they are in a weak bargain-
ing position compared to their West European counterparts. At multinational 
companies, the central management coerces competition between the compa-
ny’s factories with similar technologies and roughly equivalent expenditure. 
“Positive compromises” were mainly reported by the trade unions of companies 
relying on skilled labour and yielding high added value (Boda & Neumann).
The impact of the crisis on regional inequalities
Several mentions have been made of the individual phases of the crisis as it 
spread in Hungary, and the evolution of unemployment figures. In Chapter 4, 
Hajnalka Lőcsei discusses this question along the two dimensions of time and 
space. The duality of the Hungarian economy emerging in the wake of the sys-
tem change, which manifests itself in corporate productivity and in the presence 
of foreign capital, also has some spatial implications. The country is divided 
into two parts: the one in the more favourable position is competitive, capable 
of adjusting to new circumstances and exploiting new possibilities, while the 
other is relatively underdeveloped, fails to attract significant foreign capital 
and falls further and further behind. The main thread running through the 
study is the question of the effects of the recession brought on by the crisis on 
the spatial developmental structure of the Hungarian economy.
The period from autumn 2008 to summer 2010 can be divided into 4 phases: 
1. October 2008 – January 2009: onset of increase in (registered) unemploy-
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ment; 2. January 2009 – June 2009: drastic rise in unemployment; 3. June 2009 
– February 2010: continued but slower increase; 4. February 2010 – August 
2010: gentle decline in unemployment.
During the first phase, the steepest increase in the number and percentage of 
job seekers was observed in the northern and northeastern parts of Transdanu-
bia, which had previously been a stronghold of industrial production. Within 
this area, the crisis hit hardest in regions where the majority of workers com-
muted to manufacturing sites in nearby towns or cities. This phenomenon is re-
lated to the observation mentioned above that export-oriented companies were 
more likely to be affected by the crisis. (This is also corroborated by Busch and 
Lázár’s data on major layoffs.) Some of the heaviest losses were, however, expe-
rienced by micro-regions situated in other, less developed parts of the country. 
This becomes especially clear if we replace the growth index of unemployment 
by a measure of changes expressed in percentage points, since underdeveloped 
micro-regions were characterised by a far higher initial unemployment level.
It is worth comparing these findings with the results of Albert Faluvégi’s brief 
report 4.A) showing that between the third and fourth quarters of 2008, the 
33 most disadvantaged micro-regions suffered a substantially steeper overall 
increase in unemployment (3.8 percentage points) than did the group of dis-
advantaged (0.5 percentage points) or the group of relatively developed (0.2 
percentage points) micro-regions. This breakdown of the data shows that the 
marked increase in unemployment characterising the micro-regions of North- 
and West-Transdanubia was offset by the developed micro-regions in other 
parts of the country.
Returning to Hajnalka Lőcsei’s study, in the next phase of the period the ef-
fects of the crisis were no longer limited to the surroundings of export-oriented 
manufacturing plants but spread to a growing number of industries and regions 
while still remaining concentrated along the internal periphery of northwest 
Hungary. During this phase, proximity played an important role as the effects 
of layoffs at one or another large company propagated throughout the area. 
There was little change in the capital city or its surroundings and the Lake Bal-
aton area was also spared although the “untouched” zone steadily contracted.
During the third phase, when changes in the number and percentage of job 
seekers are primarily determined by seasonal effects, the spatial structure of the 
rise in unemployment remained relatively stable. The effects of the crisis were, 
however, increasingly felt in Central-Hungary, which is explained by the fact 
that the economy of the capital is dominated by the service sector, where most 
losses were suffered later than in export-oriented industrial sectors. The only 
areas not showing a decline were the most underdeveloped internal and exter-
nal peripheries of the country, where unemployment figures were already very 
high at the start. In some micro-regions, in fact, there was an improvement, 
perhaps as a result of public works programmes.
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In line with the above pattern, Albert Faluvégi’s analysis, ending with De-
cember 2009, shows that while unemployment rose steadily throughout the 
year in the relatively developed regions of the country, some improvement could 
be observed in the most disadvantaged micro-regions in the first half of 2009 
(although the figures did not reach their pre-crisis level) and the unemploy-
ment curve stabilised in the second half of the year. As a result of these process-
es the unemployment rate among the most disadvantaged micro-regions first 
increased from about 2.3 times to 2.7 times the national average by the end of 
2008, and then decreased to 1.9 times the national average by the end of 2009.
During the fourth phase, starting in February 2010, partly owing to seasonal 
effects there was a decrease in the percentage of job seekers in the agricultur-
al areas of Eastern Hungary, in the regions around Lake Balaton, and in the 
most disadvantaged regions with the highest unemployment levels (Cserehát, 
Szatmár and Ormánság). This phenomenon is best attributed to the effects of 
public works programmes (Lőcsei).
All these changes together led to a distinctive regional convergence, which 
was effected not by an improvement in the circumstances of regions in unfa-
vourable positions but by a steeper decline in the employment rates of relative-
ly developed regions. The convergence process continued in spring 2010 but 
now, unlike before, the underlying cause was the improvement experienced by 
relatively underdeveloped micro-regions. Notwithstanding these changes, the 
spatial structure of unemployment was not significantly altered by the crisis. It 
remains a fact that unemployment rates are substantially higher than average 
in the micro-regions of South-Transdanubia and in the micro-regions located 
east of the Balassagyarmat-Békéscsaba axis, the only exceptions being the la-
bour catchment areas of regional urban centres.
It remains an open question whether this convergence can be maintained 
in the long term or – since the improvement is not supported by an economic 
boom – we can expect the gap, which remains considerable and generates so-
cial tensions, to stretch further.
On the whole, the percentage of job seekers increases with a decrease in the 
population size of settlements, but this rule applies less strictly to more devel-
oped regions. The various categories of settlements only showed significant 
differences for the phases of the crisis characterised by either a sharp surge or a 
sudden dip in the number of job seekers. During the spreading phase, the rel-
atively large regional urban centres typically “delegated” the negative effects 
to smaller settlements.
The issue of commuting is therefore a key factor in the evolution of regional 
employment differences. A likely explanation for the local labour market inflex-
ibility of underdeveloped regions is that the populations of their villages incur 
high commuting costs if they take up employment in towns. The brief report by 
Tamás Bartus in Chapter 4.B) explores the wage advantage of unskilled workers 
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living at a given distance from the labour market of an urban centre. The study 
asks whether the wage returns to commuting cover the costs of travelling to 
work. The available data suitable for model estimations only covers the pre-crisis 
period but important conclusions can be drawn from the model nevertheless.
The study looks at the spatial distribution of paid labour opportunities in the 
local labour market areas of Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen, Nyíregyháza and Miskolc 
with Győr being used as a control town. The results of the model reveal that 
average hourly wage rates in villages decrease with the increase of the distance 
between the village and the regional urban centre. The effects of distance from 
the centre are strongest in the labour market of Győr, where the wage advan-
tage fully compensates for the costs of even half an hour’s journey. In disad-
vantaged regions, however, the estimated costs of time lost by commuting are 
equal to or exceed the accessible wage surplus.
Undeclared employment
The authors of the studies discussed so far drew their conclusions from employ-
ment and unemployment data provided by various statistical sources, which, 
necessarily, prevented them from including undeclared employment in their 
analyses. The available empirical evidence related to this question is unfortu-
nately limited to the pre-crisis period. In Chapter 5 András Semjén and István 
János Tóth discuss the results of two population surveys, one ran in autumn 
2007 and the other in spring 2008, and attempt to estimate the possible effects 
of the crisis in connection with undeclared employment. As such, the study 
raises some fundamental questions in this research area demonstrating the im-
perative need for repeated cycles of the previous surveys. There is also plenty to 
learn, however, from the information gained concerning the pre-crisis period.
Within undeclared employment, the authors focus on two types: “cash in 
hand” (non disclosed payment), which usually supplements legal pay and “in-
voice payment”, when some of the wages are paid into an employee’s business 
account as if he or she was a subcontractor. Altering the internal structure of 
labour compensation packages containing both tax compliant and tax evasive 
elements in favour of the latter may constitute an interesting cost reduction 
strategy used by companies in addition to those discussed so far.
In spring 2008, one in four workers aged between 18 and 60 received cash in 
hand or invoice payments during the two years preceding the interview. Both 
types of payment, but especially cash in hand, were more likely to be received 
by men than by women. Cash in hand was substantially more frequent among 
young workers than among older people. In most cases either one or the oth-
er payment option was used and the targets of the two payment methods had 
characteristic distinguishing features: while cash in hand was typically given 
to workers with at most primary education, invoice payments tended to be 
made to higher education graduates.
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The regional characteristics of undeclared employment show an interesting 
relationship with the geographical distribution of unemployment. Undeclared 
employment is considerably more frequent in the counties of eastern Hungary, 
while it is less frequent than average in western Hungary. In eastern Hungary, 
40 per cent of employees and casual labourers received cash in hand or invoice 
payment. The incidence of undeclared employment is highest among workers 
performing non-regular jobs (casual labourers and the unemployed). More than 
half of this population had jobs involving tax evasion by one or another means 
(usually through cash in hand) during the two years preceding the interview.
Based on the results of their analysis, the authors distinguish a total of 13 
categories of change in compensation packages and look at companies’ possi-
ble responses to the crisis in terms of the ratios of declared versus undeclared 
employment or employment disguised as subcontracted services. The authors 
conclude that the economic crisis is highly likely to have been accompanied 
by an increase in the incidence and quantity of undeclared or disguised em-
ployment, as both the majority of viable corporate adjustment strategies and 
employers’ interests point in this direction. There is no doubt, however, that 
not all evidence converges. In the construction industry for instance – where 
undeclared labour is far more frequent than in other industries – the volume 
of production fell substantially more sharply than did declared employment, 
which suggests that cuts were more likely to affect undeclared employment.
The effect of the crisis on households
The two closing chapters of In Focus and a brief report look at the impact of the 
crisis on households focusing, in the absence of consumption data, on household 
income. Chapter 6 by Gáspár and Kiss first analyses the panel data of the Labour 
Force Survey to identify the factors influencing the probability of becoming un-
employed during the crisis period. The authors’ results appear to show a greater 
crisis-induced increase in the incidence of job losses compared to János Köllő’s 
figures (see Figures 1.4 and 6.1). As an explanation, we should point out an im-
portant methodological difference between the two studies, which follows from 
their differing aims. While János Köllő used employment to non-employment 
transitions as data, Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis disregarded job losses where 
the worker became inactive rather than unemployed. The latter study therefore 
explores the income effects of entering unemployment. (Household incomes in 
2009 are discussed in Chapter 8 by Tóth and Medgyesi).
Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis’s model includes gender, age, educational at-
tainment, geographical location and economic sector as explanatory variables. 
The authors conclude that with the exception of the employee’s gender, all of 
the factors have a strong effect on the probability of job loss. The youngest co-
hort are more likely to lose their jobs compared to older cohorts and the prob-
ability of job losses continues to decrease slowly with the advance of age. This 
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probability also decreases with higher educational attainment. Looking at 
economic sectors, the construction and the accommodation and food service 
activities show an outstandingly high job loss probability. The likelihood of 
job loss is also high in manufacturing.
In the next section of the chapter, the authors link the job loss probabilities 
among the employed population to the data of the Household Budget Survey 
of 2007, and using this pre-crisis data, ran a simulation of the rise in unemploy-
ment, which is – from the households’ point of view – perhaps the most im-
portant consequence of the crisis. Household incomes were indexed to 2009 
price levels and taxes corresponding to 2009 tax regulations were deducted.
Katalin Gáspár and Áron Kis conclude that the probability of job loss de-
creases with the increase in household income: job losses in the lowest income 
decile are almost three times as frequent as they are in the top decile. While 
the absolute value of the average income loss incurred with a job loss increases 
with income, the relative income loss is similar across the income groups. In 
another model, the data was corrected for the fact that job losses would have 
also occurred independently of the crisis. In this model there were weaker in-
come effects but the distribution of the effect was essentially the same, with 
only one difference: the relative income loss was somewhat lower for lower in-
come deciles compared to higher income deciles.
The authors also investigate to what extent unemployment benefits (specif-
ically job seeker’s allowance and job seeker’s support) compensate for losses. 
The benefits lowered households’ relative income losses by 0.4–1.1 percentage 
points; the level of compensation was relatively stable across the income groups 
with the exception of the top decile, where it was lower.
In Chapter 7, István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi analyse Tárki 
Household Monitor Survey data to show the long-term evolution of the ma-
jor indicators in income distribution, with special emphasis on the changes be-
tween 2007 and 2009. These processes reflect the effects of not only the current 
crisis but also the fiscal consolidation programmes of previous years. The first 
phase of the crisis in the second half of 2008 primarily affected those who had 
significant savings and for some reason had no choice but to realise losses in 
their savings. The next phase of the crisis reached households firstly through 
the increases in loan repayment instalments and in the interest on foreign cur-
rency denominated loans and secondly through the rise in unemployment. In 
the third phase of the crisis, the effects were mediated by the cuts in govern-
ment spending which had public consequences and by the contraction of the 
government’s welfare system.
Between 2007 and 2009, there was a decline in the income position of both 
the rich and the poor, and household incomes on average lost about 7 per cent 
of their real value. The decline was, however, substantially greater among the 
poor: even their nominal income showed a decrease, and the ratio of the top 
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to the lowest income decile average income grew from 6.8 to 7.2. The relative 
position of those in the 7th-9th deciles improved however. It is probably the 
complexity of the change that accounts for the fact that the various inequality 
indicators show some inconsistencies.
A previous analysis of 2007 data revealed a process of income depolarization 
whereby the upper middle classes moved down while the lower middle classes 
moved up on the income scale. The most significant change shown by the most 
recent data is polarization at the lower end of the income distribution, i.e., an 
increase in the percentage of low-income households as defined by the decile 
boundaries of 2005. Looking at employment polarization, the authors con-
clude that households having at least two workers in the previous period suf-
fered more than any other type of household from the decrease in employment.
The second part of the study looks at household debts and repayment dif-
ficulties. One process to consider in this regard is the decrease in household 
income while the other process is the increase of loan repayment instalments 
due to exchange rate fluctuations. In her brief report 7.A), Zsuzsa Kapitány 
shows that in the early and mid-2000s, household consumption behaviour was 
characterised by a low propensity to save and a preference for consumption on 
credit and for home ownership investments. As a result, there was a surge in 
borrowing with an especially sharp increase in foreign currency loans.
The Tárki data reveal that following a period of stability, the proportion of 
households reporting that they were living in financial need or having finan-
cial difficulties increased between 2007 and 2009. Loan repayment difficulties 
became more frequent especially among comparatively low-income groups. In 
2009, 35 per cent of households had debts with a bank or financial institution, 
which is a 15 per cent increase compared to the beginning of the decade. At the 
same time, there was a convergence between households at the two ends of the 
income distribution in terms of the likelihood of having bank loans. While 
in 2001, the gap between the top and the lowest income quintiles was more 
than 10 percentage points in terms of the likelihood of having bank loans, this 
difference completely disappeared by 2009. Among households in the lowest 
income quintile, the incidence of bank loans started increasing around 2003, 
and this trend continued uninterrupted for the remainder of the decade. That 
is, a considerable share of these households joined the loan fever just as the 
loan opportunities were coming to an end. The increase in the proportion of 
households taking our personal loans was higher than average among the poor, 
which is probably explained by their need to overcome financial difficulties.
It could be the case, of course, that the explanation for the convergence is 
that middle class families that had taken out loans at some earlier date expe-
rienced a substantial decline in their income level moving them to the lowest 
income quintile but it could also be the result of households in the lowest in-
come quintile taking out loans.
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Households with bank loans on average paid about a fifth of their total in-
come towards bank loan debts in January 2010. For the lowest income quintile, 
however, the corresponding figure is 29 per cent. With non-bank loans taken 
into consideration, the gap between the income groups becomes considerably 
larger. On average, households paid a quarter of their income towards debts, 
while the lowest quintile spent 43 per cent of their income on repayment in-
stalments.
In 2009, about 9 per cent of households with loans reported that they could 
not always afford to pay their instalments. The corresponding proportion was 
17 per cent for the lowest quintile.
The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority data analysed in the brief 
report by Zsuzsa Kapitány indicates a substantially higher frequency of loan 
repayment arrears. The incidence of repayment delays of over 90 days increased 
from 17.6 per cent in December 2008 to 22.9 per cent in March 2010. There 
may be a number of factors accounting for the discrepancy between the results. 
First, a household may have more than one loan and those with more loans are 
more likely to be in arrears with their repayments. Second, while the House-
hold Monitor Survey data applies to 2009, the Financial Supervisory Author-
ity figures show cumulated values.
The crisis forced households to limit their borrowing substantially, especially 
their housing mortgage loan borrowing. In 2009, household loan repayments 
exceeded the value of new loans, and in terms of their nominal receivables and 
liabilities the household sector had a negative balance.
The credit crisis also led to a slowdown in residential building construction 
and by 2009 even nominal house prices were on the decline. For most house-
holds having a low level of financial assets and a relatively high level of real 
property assets, the steady depreciation of real property predicts a rapid and 
significant change in household consumption behaviour.
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INTRODUCTION
The previous issues of the Labour Market Review each year provided an over-
view of the main changes in the legal and institutional context of the labour 
market and the reasons for these changes. From this year instead of the changes 
the current regulations will be reviewed. For an easier understanding the con-
ditions of benefits will be presented in a standardised format in the Appendix.
The legal foundation of the current labour market institutions was laid down 
by Act 4 of 1991 on the Promotion of Employment and Unemployment Com-
pensation (Employment Act), which:
– created an insurance stream for unemployment benefits,
– established the institutions of organised social dialogue,
– established a single public employment service (PES),
– extended the range of active labour market policies.
The current legislative framework will be reviewed below.
1. THE SYSTEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
From November 1, 2005 the various types of unemployment provisions have 
been replaced by different jobseeker’s support schemes that are available for 
individuals who want to return to work and are actively seeking employment.
1.1. Jobseeker’s benefit
The eligibility conditions of the jobseeker’s benefit have both contribution-
based and social welfare elements, and were designed to encourage return to 
work, thus the amount of the benefit decreases based on the length of time 
spent out of work.
The jobseeker’s benefit can be claimed by jobseekers who were employed or 
self-employed for a minimum of 365 days within a period of four years up to 
becoming unemployed and who paid contributions. Jobseekers are eligible for 
the benefit if they are not successful in finding work or the employment service 
cannot offer them any suitable jobs. As one day benefit entitlement requires five 
days in insured employment, the minimum period for which the benefit can 
be paid is 73 days and the maximum period is 270 days (Table A1). The rate of 
the jobseeker’s benefit is 60% of the average earnings after which the contribu-
tions had been paid, the minimum and maximum amounts are linked to the 
statutory minimum wage (Table A2).
Current types 
of unemployment 
compensation
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The benefit period consists of two phases:
– In the first phase which is half of the eligibility period but up to 91 days, the 
jobseeker’s benefit equals to 60% of the recipient’s previous average earnings with 
a fixed minimum and maximum amounts. The minimum amount is 60% of the 
statutory minimum wage and the maximum is the double of this.
– The second phase is the number of days left from the eligibility period but up 
to 179 days. The benefit in this phase is paid at a flat rate of 60% of the statutory 
minimum wage. (However if the previous earnings were less than the minimum 
benefit, its amount is equal to the average earnings in both phases.)
Active job-seeking is a key requirement in order to qualify for the benefit. 
This is set out in an agreement between the jobseeker and the local job office. In 
this document the two parties agree on a series of activities to assist the claim-
ant in returning to work, including intensive and active job search. If the job-
seeker fails to comply with the provisions of the job-search agreement for reasons 
attributable to him/her, the payment of the benefit must be terminated.
The bonus payment for successful jobseekers was introduced to encourage 
people to return to work as quickly as possible. Jobseekers qualify for this bo-
nus payment if they take up full-time, or part-time employment of at least four 
hours a day with a permanent contract before the end of their eligibility to the 
jobseeker’s benefit and stay in employment. If they fulfil the requirements they can 
claim a part of their remaining benefit paid as a lump-sum. This period should 
be regarded as if the individual had exhausted its entitlement to the benefit. 
To encourage an early return to work the amount of the lump-sum bonus dif-
fers: if the jobseeker takes up employment during the first phase of claiming 
the benefit the bonus is 80% of the remaining entitlement; if this happens in 
the second phase, it is only 30%.
1.2. Jobseeker’s allowance
At the reform of the system of unemployment compensation policy-makers 
aimed to ensure that no group of unemployed people are worse off in the new 
system; and any reduction in the average daily rate was compensated for by a 
longer entitlement period. Therefore a new form of assistance, the jobseeker’s 
allowance was introduced for those who:
– are no longer eligible for jobseeker’s benefit;
– are close to pensionable age;
– or who have worked for a relatively long period of time but due to changes 
in the eligibility conditions they do not qualify for the jobseeker’s benefit.
The allowance is a paid at a fixed rate of 40% of the statutory minimum wage. 
It counts towards social insurance benefits, thus the allowance is subject to 
health insurance and pension contributions paid by the employment service 
and the individual. (The eligibility conditions and payment of the jobseeker’s 
allowance are summarised in Table A3.)
Bonus payment  
for taking up  
employment
The multi-purpose 
 jobseeker’s allowance
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Paid work is not permitted while claiming jobseeker’s benefit except for sea-
sonal or temporary work under the simplified employment rules. The same 
conditions apply for individuals receiving jobseeker’s allowance who are also 
allowed temporary or seasonal work without affecting their allowance payment.
1.3. From Regular Social Assistance to Stand-by Allowance
Individuals who are receiving jobseeker’s allowance and have a low income or 
have exhausted their entitlement can claim social assistance from municipal 
governments. Regular Social Assistance can be paid to individuals of working 
age who are out of work and not getting any jobseeker’s provision if they or their 
household have no other sources of income.
On July 1, 2006 Regular Social Assistance was transformed into a family al-
lowance. In the new system the number of dependent children is taken into ac-
count: both eligibility and the amount of the allowance depend on the house-
hold’s monthly income per consumption unit.1 According to the new eligibility 
criteria the income per consumption unit in the applicant’s household must be 
less than 90% of the statutory old-age minimum pension. The allowance tops 
up the income to this level; 90% of the minimum pension. Only one member 
of the household is eligible for Regular Social Assistance in a given period. The 
benefit is paid to people who are out of work, actively seeking work and not 
eligible for jobseeker’s provision. Another criteria is active job search and if a 
suitable job is offered they have to accept it. Claimants also have to take part 
in a reintegration programme, that often includes regular contact with the local 
job office and participation in community service work organised by the munici-
pal government.
A comprehensive set of measures2 was introduced on January 1, 2009 to help 
long-term unemployed people receiving Regular Social Assistance return to 
the labour market. This target group of approximately 200,000 people were 
divided into two groups (Table A4). The first group who – at least in the short 
run – are not ready to take up employment continues to receive Regular Social 
Assistance. However, the other group is made up of individuals who are able 
to work and therefore are expected to work. If there are no work opportunities 
in the jobs market, they can take part in any form of community employment. 
Out of this population of approximately 100,000 people the number of early 
school leavers is estimated at 7–8,000. They must finish school first and then 
they might continue into vocational training in areas sought after by employers. 
If people of working age cannot take part in any of these opportunities, they 
receive Stand-by Allowance. The amount of this is equal to the statutory old-
age minimum pension regardless of the size and composition of the household.
Long-term unemployed people who are capable of work must register as job-
seekers with the local office of the employment service and sign a jobseeker’s 
agreement. If they are under 35 years and have not finished lower secondary ed-
1 The consumption unit is a 
measure of the household ’s 
consumption structure, where 
the ratios are as follows:
The first adult: 1.0, for single 
parents + 0.2
Spouse or partner: 0.9
First and second child: 0.8 per 
child
Third and any further children: 
0.7 per child
Disabled child: 1.0
If the first adult or the spouse 
(partner) is receiving a disability 
benefit their ratio is increased 
by 0.2.
2 The Act 107 of 2008 on the 
amendment of certain social 
and employment regulations 
was adopted by the Parliament 
on the 15th of December 2008. 
Among others it amended Act 3 
of 1993 on social administration 
and social assistance.
Pathway to Work 
programme
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ucation, they must finish school first. If there is no opportunity to start school 
within 30 days then they must take part in community service work like oth-
ers in the target group.
People receiving Regular Social Assistance – except those with disabilities 
or a long-term condition – must co-operate with the service designated by the 
municipal government – typically the family counselling service – if they want 
to keep their entitlement. The content of the co-operation is set out in the re-
integration programme and can include skills development, lifestyle counsel-
ling or training.
2. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES, SERVICES AND PROGRAMMES 
IN THE EMPLOYMENT ACT
Section 1 of Article 5 of Act 4 of 1991 (Employment Act) declares that employ-
ment services and employment promoting subsidies should be the primary means 
of solving, managing and mitigating tensions in the labour market, as well as 
preventing, reducing and alleviating the negative effects of unemployment. 
Employment subsidies are usually referred to as active labour market policies 
because they aim to prevent unemployment or help people to return to work 
as quickly as possible. The administration of active labour market policies in-
cluding accepting claims, making payments and monitoring is the responsibil-
ity of the local offices of job centres funded by the Decentralised Employment 
Sub-Fund (DESF) of the Labour Market Fund (LMF).3 In general, there is no 
guaranteed entitlement to active labour market policies – in contrast to passive 
LM schemes – neither for employers nor unemployed people even if they meet the 
eligibility criteria laid down in the Act.
This chapter gives an overview of active labour market policies in Hungary. 
Their target groups, eligibility criteria and conditions of payment are present-
ed in Table A7.
2.1. Labour market training
Labour market training aims to provide jobseekers and people at risk of un-
employment with sought-after skills and knowledge to help them return to 
work or keep their job. The training can lead to a formal vocational qualifica-
tion, provide the necessary skills for a specific job or strengthen skills to im-
prove performance in their current job. In accordance with the Act on Adult 
Education only adults studying in accredited adult education institutions can be 
subsidised from the Labour Market Fund.
Regional job centres support the labour market training of:
– jobseekers;
– young persons aged under 25 years – graduates under 30 years – who do not 
qualify for jobseeker’s benefit or allowance after leaving school;
– people receiving different types of parental benefits or carer’s support;
3 The detailed eligibility condi-
tions for active labour market 
policies are set out in the Min-
istry of Labour Regulation no. 
6/1996 (16. 07) on employment 
aid and aid to mitigate the effects 
of employment crises.
Active labour market 
policies regulated by 
the Employment Act 
and accessible through 
the public employment 
service
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– people claiming rehabilitation allowance;
– workers who will become redundant within a year and where the employer 
has given written notice of this to the employee and the employment service;
– people who take part in community employment scheme; or
– people who are employed but are likely to become unemployed without train-
ing.
The latter group of employees only qualify for the subsidy if their employer 
contributes to the cost of training and agrees to continue their employment 
for at least the duration of the training after it has finished. Employers are not 
required to contribute to the cost of the training if the employee is 45 years or 
older at the time of application.
The Labour Market Fund can support training in the following categories:
– vocational training as defined by the Vocational Education and Training Act;
– training in basic skills necessary in order to start vocational education or 
training;
– job search skills and career advice;
– language training for people who already have vocational qualifications;
– driver training for road vehicles.
Unemployed people have two options as regards starting training or edu-
cation once they have obtained the approval of the job centre: they can either 
enrol in one of the training courses offered by the job centre, or 2) find an ac-
credited training course offered by an accredited training institution. There are 
two types of financial assistance for training participants: income supplement 
and income replacement allowance, furthermore training-related expenses can 
also be reimbursed. The income replacement allowance is paid at the rate of 60 to 
100 per cent of the statutory minimum wage (Table A2). A higher rate must be 
paid to those who are studying towards their first qualification or for a quali-
fication in areas of employment where there is a shortage of candidates. Single 
parents with one or more children are also entitled to the higher payment. In-
come replacement can only be paid to those who are no longer eligible for job-
seeker’s allowance. Those who are not eligible for jobseeker’s allowance might 
be paid income replacement allowance.
People claiming parental benefits and carer’s support can only receive assis-
tance towards their training-related expenses. They are permitted to participate 
only in courses that are less than 20 hours per week.
The training of workers is usually initiated by the employer. In this case, as-
sistance might be given on a discretionary basis towards training expenses and 
participants can qualify for an income supplement to compensate for any loss of 
earnings during the course. The amount of this is up to the difference between 
average earnings and the earnings while in training.
The other component of training-related expenses is the course fee. For rec-
ommended (collective) training courses the full fee is reimbursed, for approved 
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(individual) training the rate is typically 70–100 per cent. In addition, train-
ing participants can qualify for the full or partial reimbursement of travel, ac-
commodation and food expenses.
2.2. Wage subsidy to employers hiring the disadvantaged
Wage subsidy can be paid from the de-centralised employment fund of regional 
job centres to employers that employ disadvantaged people. Wage subsidy can 
also be paid to those employers who continue to employ disadvantaged work-
ers who are at risk of redundancy. The subsidy is paid at a rate of up to 50% of 
the wage and contributions, 60% for people with disabilities, with the follow-
ing conditions:
– employment will be maintained for at least the duration of the subsidy, and
– workers in similar jobs have not been made redundant within the 12-month 
period up to claiming the subsidy, and
– will not be made redundant while receiving the subsidy.
As a general rule wage subsidy can be paid for up to 12 months, and 24 months 
for people who have been registered as jobseekers for at least 24 months.
2.3. Support for employing people claiming Stand-by Allowance
From 2010 businesses that employ people receiving Stand-by Allowance can 
qualify for a wage subsidy equal to the amount of the Allowance paid by the 
job centres. In order to qualify for this subsidy employers must increase the net 
headcount of the business by hiring the person receiving Stand-by Allowance 
compared to the average of the previous 12 months. No other subsidies can be 
claimed simultaneously besides the contribution relief attached to Start Cards 
and travel-to-work subsidies. The aid intensity of employment subsidies for peo-
ple receiving Stand-by Allowance must be lower than 50% of the average wage 
cost during the 12-month period after hiring them. Employers must apply for 
the subsidy that is paid in arrears by the job centre each month.
2.4. Subsidies for community employment
From the point of view of employment policy, community employment serves 
the following purposes:
– increasing the number of job vacancies offered by the job centres;
– testing the work-readiness of jobless people;
– providing income to those who are no longer eligible for unemployment as-
sistance;
– in the absence of other opportunities, providing a possibility to earn entitle-
ment to unemployment assistance and pension;
– providing a job opportunity for those who have no chance of finding a regu-
lar (non-subsidised) job; and
– giving the opportunity to gain work experience and improving the job pros-
pects of the individual.
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Employers who hire unemployed people to carry out jobs in the community 
can claim back 70% of the direct labour-related expenses if they do not get paid 
for the work carried out. In community employment schemes two types of pro-
jects can be supported: projects that undertake mandatory tasks of municipal 
governments, and projects that carry out non-mandatory tasks that directly 
benefit the local community. More deprived municipal governments can find 
it difficult to contribute even 30% of the costs, therefore the rate of funding 
from the decentralised Employment Sub-Fund can be increased up to 90% of 
the cost for areas where this is justified according to the employment service. 
If the source of funding is the central budget of the Labour Market Fund, the 
Management Committee of the Labour Market Fund can also increase this 
rate to 90% for a period of up to two years.
In community employment only registered jobseekers placed by the Public Em-
ployment Service (PES) can be employed. Employment should be additional, 
meaning that the headcount should increase in comparison to the previous 
month. The maximum duration of employment in community employment for 
a jobless person is one year. This can be repeated within two years if the person 
at the time of placement is not eligible for jobseeker’s benefit.
The community employment of jobseekers aged 45 or over can be subsidised for 
up to 18 months and jobseekers aged 50 or over for up to 24 months in the field 
of health and social care, culture, education or the protection of the environ-
ment. If Roma people are employed it is not required to increase the headcount. 
The rate of the subsidy in this case can be up to 90% of the direct labour-related 
costs for a period of up to two years.
The costs eligible for subsidy in community employment are: wage and con-
tributions, work wear and protective clothing, tools and equipment, transpor-
tation of workers and the costs of additional management tasks.
2.5. Business start-up subsidies for jobseekers
Business start-up subsidies can be paid for jobseekers who have been registered 
with the job centre for at least three months and who will become self-employed. 
There are different types of business start-up subsidies:
– a subsidy of up to 3 million forints either as an interest-free credit or non-re-
payable grant, and
– a monthly allowance of up to the statutory minimum wage for up to six 
months regardless of whether the individual qualifies for jobseeker’s benefit.
The subsidies can be paid together or separately. To qualify for the inter-
est-free credit jobseekers must have at least 20% of the start-up costs and 
adequate collateral (for example assets, property, bank guarantee etc.). The 
Employment Act was amended to allow persons receiving rehabilitation 
allowance to claim business start-up subsidy if they become self-employed 
from January 1, 2008.
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2.6. Incentives for the employment of people with disabilities
According to Article 41/A of the Employment Act, in businesses with more 
than 20 workers, no less than 5% of the workforce must be people with dis-
abilities (quota). If they fail to meet the quota they must pay a rehabilitation 
contribution for the missing headcount (in 2010 this was 964,500 forints/
person/year). The contribution must be paid quarterly and in advance, based 
on quarterly workforce statistics.
2.6.1. Main elements of the system promoting the employment of 
disabled workers
The accreditation of companies employing workers with disabilities has been 
in place since November 2006.4 This consists of the job-focused assessment of 
the company. The accreditation certificate can be issued for a different period 
at any of the three assessment levels:
– the basic certificate is valid for five years,
– the rehabilitation certificate is valid for three years,
– the higher certificate is valid for 2 years.
The latter entitles the company to use the title of sheltered organisation.
Accreditation is available to all employers with two specific, headcount-re-
lated conditions:
– If the number of disabled employees is no less than 20 and they make up 40% 
of the workforce the basic certificate cannot be awarded, only the rehabilita-
tion and higher certificates if the appropriate conditions are met.
– The higher (and temporary) certificate can only be awarded to employers with 
at least 50 workers and where at least 50% of them have less than 50% par-
tial work capacity.
Accreditation is carried out for each division and the process is managed by 
the Employment and Social Office. Accreditation has been a general require-
ment to access public subsidies since July 1, 2007.
2.6.2. Support to employers
1. Support to the long-term employment of disabled workers. The current system 
has both statutory and discretionary components. The first includes the wage sub-
sidy to the employment of disabled people that has been presented in section 2.2. 
It is possible to reimburse the wage of personal assistants at the workplace5 pro-
rata based on the time spent in assisting the individual in work, up to 100% 
depending on the support needs of the individual (people who provide social, 
mental health or health care support are not eligible for the subsidy).
2. Wage subsidies for the employment of disadvantaged jobseekers that are avail-
able for employers of people in certain life situations (such as young entrants, 
people caring for children or immediate family members, people aged over 50 
years or people with a low level of education) can also be claimed for the em-
4 Regulations: 176/2005. (IX. 
2.) Government Regulation; 
14/2005. (IX. 2.) Ministry of 
Employment and Labour Reg-
ulation: 26/2005. (XII. 27.) 
Ministry of Employment and 
Labour Regulation; for detailed 
information see: www.afsz.hu.
5 Workplace personal assis-
tants are individuals who are 
employed by the employer of 
the disabled worker to provide 
direct job-related assistance or 
coaching to the individual (but 
this does not include performing 
the job itself).
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ployment of jobseekers with partial work capacity in these groups, regardless of the 
level of their work capacity.6 The subsidies can be claimed with the Start Cards 
that will be discussed later.
3. Capital investment aid for the employment of people with partial work ca-
pacity: this scheme is part of the system of employment aids and promotes the 
employment of people with disabilities by contributing to capital investment.7
Funding is allocated through open competition from the Rehabilitation 
Sub-Fund of the Labour Market Fund for the employment of people with 
disabilities:
a) for the adaptation of existing production and service facilities to the needs 
of disabled workers,
b) for the purchase or adaptation of equipment and tools to the needs of disa-
bled workers,
c) for the renovation or refurbishment of the workplace and equipment to ac-
commodate the needs of disabled workers,
d) for investment that creates, upgrades or develops jobs for people with disa-
bilities, contributes towards the building of new facilities, renovation or the 
refurbishment of existing buildings in order to expand them or make them 
safer, or contributes towards the purchase and transformation, or increases 
the safety of equipment.
Employers who meet the criteria receive the assistance for workplace inclusion 
[points a-c)] according to the rules of de minimis state aid. Aid for vocational 
rehabilitation [point d)] is awarded according to the relevant EU rules on em-
ployment aid for sheltered companies. Aid for the creation of new jobs within 
both schemes can only be given for workers with less than 50% work capacity. 
Aid can be repayable and non-repayable or a combination of both.
4. The possibility of preferential treatment of businesses employing workers with 
disabilities in public procurement8 Under certain conditions set out by the law 
there is a possibility or an obligation to limit the scope of potential suppliers, 
contractors or service providers to sheltered companies where more than 50 
per cent of the workforce has a partial work capacity, or companies that pro-
vide vocational rehabilitation for people living in social care institutions and 
where more than 50 per cent of the employees have a disability.
5. Subsidies for collective vocational rehabilitation. This grant scheme gives 
compensation to sheltered companies for their expenses and to non-profit com-
panies employing people who cannot participate in the open labour market 
for rehabilitation-related expenses.9
Service users of social care institutions can be involved in two new forms of 
employment: vocational therapy, and vocational rehabilitation (under a fixed-
term contract of employment) – jointly referred to as institutional employ-
ment. Institutions can use external companies in the vocational rehabilita-
tion of service users.
6 – Act 123 of 2004 on promot-
ing the employment of young 
entrants, unemployed persons 
aged over 50, people returning to 
work after caring for a child or a 
family member and on graduate 
work placements; 31/2005. (29. 
09) Ministry of Finance Regu-
lation on the conditions of use 
of the Start Card, claiming the 
reduced contribution rates and 
the detailed rules of financial 
reporting.
7 – Ministry of Labour Regula-
tion no. 6/1996 (16. 07) on em-
ployment aid and aid to mitigate 
the effects of employment crises
8 – Act 129 of 2003 on public 
procurement, article 17/A; 
302/2006. (23. 12) Government 
Regulation on the conditions 
of preferential treatment of 
sheltered companies in public 
procurement.
9 – 177/2005. (02. 09) Govern-
ment Regulation and 15/2005. 
(02. 09) MoEL Regulation.
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2.6.3. Incentives for employees
There have been two types of assistance in the rehabilitation system since Janu-
ary 1, 2008. People with disabilities who are capable of working and who meet 
the criteria set out by the law are paid a Rehabilitation Allowance, while those 
who are not capable of working receive disability pension.
The Rehabilitation Allowance can be paid to persons who:
– have reduced work capacity of 50–79% and due to their long term condition 
cannot be employed in their previous job or in a similar job without voca-
tional rehabilitation,
– they are out of work, or
– their earnings are no less than 30% lower than the average earnings in the 
four months up to the loss of work capacity, and
– they are, or can be made, capable of working, and
– have accumulated enough years of service based on their age to qualify for 
a disability pension.
People receiving Rehabilitation Allowance must co-operate with the job cen-
tre and sign an agreement. The rehabilitation plan forms part of this agreement, 
it sets out the direction of vocational rehabilitation and identifies rehabilita-
tion services and supports based on medical, social and vocational need. The 
implementation of the plan means that rehabilitation is successful.
2.7. Support for job creation
Aid for job creation can be paid in two main forms:
a) as regional support for one or more of the following: cost of investment in 
material and non-material assets, building and labour costs of the jobs di-
rectly created by the investment project, or
b) as employment support for labour costs of the jobs directly created by the in-
vestment project.
Support for job creation is allocated through open competition, not only for job 
creation but the safeguarding of jobs as well. On top of this sum additional sup-
port is available – from the regional job centres – for any or all of the follow-
ing criteria:
– if the investment takes place in an area classified as disadvantaged in any of 
the following categories: regional development, socio-economic and infra-
structural development, and employment, or in regions with labour market 
disadvantages an additional HUF 200,000 can be granted for each new job;
– if the vacancies created as a result of the investment are filled with jobseekers 
registered with the public employment service, an additional HUF 200,000 
can be awarded;
– if the vacancies are filled with Roma workers an extra HUF 100,000 can 
be granted.
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Investment aid for the creation of high-value-added jobs. This state programme 
supports projects involving relatively low levels of capital expenditure and a 
high volume of new jobs that are filled by qualified staff with higher educa-
tion, mostly recent graduates. Businesses can receive a contribution towards 
their personnel expenditure associated with the expansion of their workforce. 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises are required to safeguard jobs created for 
young entrants, registered jobseekers or workers threatened by redundancy for 
two years, other businesses for three years.
Job creation aid for large investment projects. The following eligibility crite-
ria apply:
– it is awarded on a case-by-case basis by the Government from the Budget for 
Investment Promotion;
– the project must take place in a disadvantaged or most disadvantaged area 
listed in the relevant legislation;
– must create a minimum of 500 new jobs – or 200 in the most disadvantaged 
areas;
– no less than 50% of the newly created jobs – 30% in the most disadvantaged 
areas – must be filled by registered jobseekers.
Aid for the creation of teleworking jobs. Teleworking programmes continue 
to promote the spread of on-line working. They provide a wage subsidy and 
funding for the purchase of equipment and training for businesses and public 
authorities creating teleworking opportunities.
2.8. Support for job-protection
Employers can qualify for assistance if they are planning to make redundancies 
due to business difficulties and they have given written notice to the job cen-
tre 30 days before the redundancy together with their claim. To be eligible for 
the subsidy they must agree to retain workers who have been employed for at 
least six months and are affected by the redundancy for twice the duration of 
the subsidy. During this period the average headcount must not decrease and 
they cannot make any redundancies. The duration of the subsidy can be up to 
one year. The grant is generally paid at a rate of 25 to 75 per cent of the wage 
and contributions. Wage costs can be reimbursed at a rate of 50 to 90 percent, 
if 1. the worker’s fixed monthly pay or the guaranteed part of the piece-rate 
pay is equal to the statutory minimum wage; or 2. he or she has a disability; 3. 
already works reduced hours, more than four but less than six hours per day, 
to prevent redundancy.
2.9. Mitigating the negative impact of group redundancies
Employers can qualify for assistance to alleviate the negative impact of a 
planned mass redundancy on the employees. The assistance is conditional upon 
the completion of the statutory consultation procedure and the setting up of 
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an outplacement committee in the divisions affected by loss of jobs. The grant 
contributes to the operation of this committee with up to 1,000,000 forints 
that must be used within 12 months.
2.10. Travel-to-work subsidies
Travel-to-work subsidies can be claimed by both the employer and the employ-
ee. To qualify for this subsidy the employer must hire a jobseeker who has 
been registered with the job centre for at least six months, in the case of young 
entrants and people with disabilities for three months, and has not made any 
workers redundant holding a similar position in the previous six months. The 
subsidy can be paid for up to a year and can cover the full or a part of the travel 
expenses to work. If the employee also claims the subsidy for his or her share of 
the travel expenses, the claim must be made jointly with the employer before 
signing the employment contract.
The subsidy can also be paid for shared transportation, own or hired, if at 
least four workers are travelling together. To be eligible for this subsidy the time 
spent travelling to work must be more than two hours per day. The maximum 
rate of the subsidy is equal to the employer’s statutory contribution rate towards 
the cost of the bus pass between the home of the worker and the workplace.
2.11. Employment services
According to the Employment Act employment services include:
– the provision of information on vacancies and jobs;
– job, career, job-search, vocational rehabilitation and local (area) employ-
ment guidance;
– job brokerage.
The contents of these are defined by the regulation on employment services10 
which also defines provision requirements. The regulation lists those services 
that are delivered to customers primarily by the regional job centres and the 
local job offices. In addition, the regulation also allows the purchase of cer-
tain services from external providers to increase availability. A novelty is that 
regional training centres and the Employment and Social Office can also di-
rectly deliver services. The employment services are available free of charge to 
unemployed people, employers and employees.
2.12. Labour market programmes
Four fifths of the registered jobseekers are not new but returning customers 
of the employment service. Their problems are unlikely to be solved by a sin-
gle active labour market policy. A combination of labour-market measures or 
especially participation in a labour market programme is necessary to address 
their complex problems. Labour market programmes were introduced in the 
Employment Act on February 1, 2000; which defines them as follows: “The La-
10 – 30/2000. (IX. 15.) Min-
istry of Economy Regulation 
on employment services and 
their financing. This regula-
tion was amended by 6/2008. 
(IV. 23.) Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Labour Regulation 
on the amendment on certain 
employment-related ministe-
rial regulations that entered into 
force on April 26, 2008. The most 
important changes were the fol-
lowing::
– mentoring was included among 
the services;
– new rates of assistance for 
the providers of employment 
services,
– new rate of income replace-
ment for people using employ-
ment services.
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bour Market Fund can support the implementation of programmes that aim to 
achieve local employment objectives, influence the local employment situation 
and promote the employment of people disadvantaged in the labour market. 
These programmes can combine employment services and financial assistance.”
With regard to subsidies provided within the programmes, certain condi-
tions specified in the Employment Act and its implementing regulations can 
be left out of consideration. For example in that case:
– the target group of the programme can be involved in all programme com-
ponents regardless of their individual eligibility,
– subsidies can be paid during the whole programme period,
– with regard to subsidies for community employment, the duration of the 
programme is unlimited.
Labour market programmes can be countrywide or regional. The decision 
about countrywide labour market programmes is made by the Minister fol-
lowing a consultation with the Management Committee of the Labour Mar-
ket Fund. Regional labour market programmes are based on the decision of 
the directors general of job centres following a consultation with employment 
councils. The employment service tenders out the design and implementation 
of labour market programmes. Bids must present the planned structure, im-
plementation and monitoring of the programme and define eligibility for each 
programme component. Ten per cent of the programme’s cost is retained and 
paid only after the successful closure and approval of programme outcomes.
A new active measure was introduced in 2007, the wage cost subsidy that is 
only available as part of a labour market programme and allows a reimburse-
ment of up to 100% of wage costs including contributions for up to three years. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the implementation of the programmes 
would be very difficult without professional management, the new measures 
– besides contributing to the labour cost of participants – can also pay the la-
bour cost of the programme management staff.11
3. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT ACT
In addition to the active labour market policies discussed in the previous chap-
ter there are a range of other subsidies that are governed by regulations other 
than the Employment Act but are provided by the public employment service.
3.1. Promoting the employment of jobseekers by micro, small- 
and medium-sized enterprises
In the SME+ programme micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises as well 
as voluntary organisations that employ at least 250 staff and have been estab-
lished for at least six months are eligible for a subsidy if they hire people who 
are not claiming any assistance and:
11 If the recipient of the subsidy 
is a business de minimis rules 
should be applied.
Active labour market 
policies outside the scope 
of the Employment Act 
but managed by the PES
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– have been registered as a jobseeker with the PES for a minimum of three 
months; or
– have been out of work for a year or more; or
– have been made redundant in a group redundancy within the previous three 
months.
The subsidised employment should increase the average yearly headcount and 
should be maintained for at least the duration of the subsidy. If they hire anyone 
from the above groups they are exempt from social security contributions and 
employer’s contribution for up to a year. The subsidy can be paid after wages up 
to 130% of the statutory minimum wage in the case of full-time employment.
3.2. Supporting the re-employment of people made redundant as 
a result of the crisis
This aims to support the re-employment of people who have been made redun-
dant due to the economic downturn by using their jobseeker’s benefit as a wage 
subsidy for the rest of their eligibility period. The subsidy is paid to employers 
that hire people claiming jobseeker’s benefit for full-time employment. A fur-
ther condition is that the individual is eligible for at least 180 days of jobseek-
er’s benefit when commencing the employment.
The subsidy is paid at a rate of up to 60% of the statutory minimum wage 
and contributions. If the jobseeker’s earnings prior to becoming eligible for the 
benefit have been lower than the minimum wage, this sum should be adjusted 
accordingly. If the employee has a Start card then the reduced rate contribution 
can also be used at the same time as the subsidy. The duration of the subsidy is 
equal to the number of entitlement days remaining from the jobseeker’s ben-
efit when starting employment. The subsidy is paid in arrears to the employer 
by the job centre.
3.3. Supporting part-time work to prevent redundancies12
The aim of the measure is to support the retention of workers threatened by 
redundancy in part-time employment. Employers are eligible for support if 
instead of laying-off redundant workers they continue to employ them part-
time, at least four hours per day. As a condition of the subsidy the employer is 
required to give prior notification of planned mass dismissal to the local labour 
centre. The rate of the subsidy is up to 80% of the difference between the full-
time and the part-time wage and contributions. The maximum wage eligible 
for subsidy is capped at 150% of the statutory minimum wage. The subsidy can 
be paid for up to 12 months. Further conditions are that the subsidy is paid to 
workers monthly, in advance; the employer must not implement a mass layoff; 
must maintain the initial headcount and retain the workers for at least the same 
duration as the subsidy has been paid. Employers need to apply for the subsidy 
for the workforce affected by redundancy at the job centre.
12 – 70/2009. (02. 04) Govern-
ment regulation on support to 
the work experience of young 
entrants with a vocational quali-
fication and part-time employ-
ment to prevent mass layoff. It 
entered into force on April 5, 
2009.
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3.4. Supporting the work experience of young entrants with a 
vocational qualification13
The scheme supports the work experience of young people with sought-after 
qualifications who have not been able to find a job after 90 days of job search 
either independently or with assistance from the employment service. Em-
ployers are eligible for the subsidy if they hire school leavers with certain vo-
cational qualifications – defined by the regional labour centre together with 
the regional labour council and regional development and training commit-
tee – in jobs that will provide them with relevant work experience. The sub-
sidy is paid for the period of employment but up to 365 days. The rate of the 
subsidy is 50–100% of the wage costs; if it is paid at the 100%-rate, then it 
cannot be higher than:
– the statutory minimum wage for school leavers with basic level vocational 
qualifications;
– 150% of the minimum wage for school leavers with medium-level vocational 
qualifications;
– 200% of the minimum wage for school leavers with high-level vocational 
qualifications or higher education.
The scheme is implemented by the employment service. The source of the 
subsidy is the decentralised budget of the Labour Market Fund’s Employment 
Sub-Fund. Young entrants who hold a Start Card are also eligible to take part 
in the work experience scheme if they have a sought-after vocational qualifica-
tion and have been searching for a job for at least 90 days with assistance from 
the employment service. In this case the subsidy is paid on the wage costs re-
duced according to the Start relief.
4. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET MEASURES AND POLICIES OUTSIDE THE 
SCOPE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE
This chapter presents active labour market policies that are not only outside 
the scope of the Employment Act but also administered outside the public 
employment service.
4.1. There are two other forms of community employment: 
community service work and public work
The stated aim of public work14 is to support development and renovation pro-
jects, especially in the fields of infrastructure-development, protection of the 
environment and the provision of public services in regions lagging behind 
that are suitable for reducing territorial disparities and unemployment by of-
fering job opportunities for the unemployed and those who are no longer eli-
gible for assistance. Funding is available upon submission of a proposal, typi-
cally from the state budget.
13 – 70/2009. (02. 04) Govern-
ment regulation on support to 
the work experience of young 
entrants with a vocational quali-
fication and part-time employ-
ment to prevent mass layoff. It 
entered into force on April 5, 
2009.
14 – 199/2008. (04. 08) Govern-
ment Regulation on support for 
public works programmes
Active measures 
outside the scope of the 
Employment Act 
and the PES
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From the perspective of employment policy employment in public work has 
the following roles:
– involving people who have adequate experience or qualifications and are 
ready for work in on-the-job training;
– offering a “larger-scale” solution in local areas where municipal governments 
are the only employers;
– promoting corporate social responsibility towards the problem of unemploy-
ment (cooperation, financial contribution);
– promoting coordination and cooperation of municipal governments in tack-
ling unemployment at the level of micro regions.
In public work projects at least 40% of the workforce has to be claiming Regular 
Social Allowance or Stand-by Allowance since 2008.15
Community service work is regulated by the Social Act, which stipulates that 
municipal governments organise employment to improve the labour market 
situation of jobless people. This can be either community employment, public 
work, or community service work.
The Pathway to Work programme introduced in 2009 offers participation 
in public employment programmes to people claiming social assistance who 
are capable and ready for work. The main form of employment is community 
service work projects organised by municipal governments. Municipal govern-
ments together with the public employment service are required to prepare a 
public employment strategy. Participants in the programme get a fixed-term 
employment contract for a minimum of 90 days and the working time is at least 
six hours per day. Ninety-five per cent of the expenses (wage and contributions) 
arising in relation to community service work for municipal governments are 
reimbursed by the state budget and the remaining five per cent is paid together 
with the statutory state contribution to social assistance.
4.2. Start Card16
Contribution reliefs for employing disadvantaged workers are an important 
tool in improving their labour market chances. They are available to employers 
hiring school leavers, people returning from parental leave and the long-term 
unemployed (particularly those aged 50 or over and the low-skilled). The tar-
geted reduction increases the chances of disadvantaged jobseekers when ap-
plying for a job.
a) The Start Programme aims to support the labour market entry of young per-
sons by reducing the costs associated with their employment. The programme 
offers two years of work experience to young entrants while their employers are 
paying reduced rate contributions. Employers who hire young entrants with the 
Start Card are eligible for a subsidy up to twenty-four months. The subsidy is a 
universal discount on the contributions paid by employers as follows:
15 – 199/2008. (04. 08) Govern-
ment Regulation amending the 
49/1999 (26. 03) Government 
Regulation on support for public 
works programmes
16 – Act 123 of 2004 on promot-
ing the employment of young 
entrants, unemployed persons 
aged over 50, people returning to 
work after caring for a child or a 
family member and on graduate 
work placements; 31/2005. (29. 
09) Ministry of Finance Regu-
lation on the conditions of use 
of the Start Card, claiming the 
reduced contribution rates and 
the detailed rules of financial 
reporting.
Start Cards to reduce 
the costs of employing 
disadvantaged people
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– Ten per cent of the gross wage in the first twelve months;
– Twenty per cent of the gross wage in the second twelve months.
As of January 1, 2010 the employers of graduates with a Start Card can only 
claim the contribution relief for 12 months: for nine months they pay ten per 
cent and for three months they pay 20% as a contribution. To take part in the 
scheme and claim the discounted rate, the individual must hold a Start Card 
which is issued by the tax authorities. The young person must have the Card 
or a proof of application before starting employment in order to receive the 
discount.
b) The Start Plus scheme aims at supporting long-term unemployed, parents 
with young children and people caring for family members to return to work. 
They are entitled to a reduction of the contributions paid by their employers 
for up to twenty-four months. To be eligible for the discount, they must be em-
ployed for at least 30 days and the working time must be no less than four hours 
per day. (Therefore the discount can also be used for part-time employment.) The 
employer pays a reduced contribution each month as follows:
– Ten per cent of the gross wage in the first twelve months;
– Twenty per cent of the gross wage in the second twelve months.
To receive the discount, the individual must hold a Start Plus Card which 
is issued by the tax authorities upon request by the individual. The employee 
must have the Start Plus Card or a proof of application before starting employ-
ment in order to receive the discount.
c) The Start Extra Card aims to support the employment of groups most 
disadvantaged in the labour market: people aged over 50 years, people with 
low education and as of January 1, 2009 people claiming Stand-by Allowance. 
They are entitled to a reduction of the contributions paid by their employers 
for up to twenty-four months. The employer pays a reduced contribution each 
month as follows:
– No contributions paid in the first twelve months.
– Ten per cent of the gross wage in the second twelve months.
d) The Start Region scheme was introduced on January 1, 2009 linked to the 
Pathway to Work programme. It aims to promote the employment of people 
claiming Stand-by Allowance. Employers that hire an eligible person are exempt 
from paying contributions for three years if they meet the following conditions:
– the employee holds a valid Start-Extra Card and he lives in a socio-economi-
cally and infrastructurally most disadvantaged small region or community 
with high unemployment;
– by hiring a new worker, the average yearly headcount increases; and
– this is maintained during the three years of exemption;
– the employer signs an agreement with the job centre to receive the relief.
The eligible groups and criteria are presented in tables A5 and A6.
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4.3. Simplified employment
Simplified employment has replaced the temporary employment with the work 
log book. Its main rules are set out in Act 75 of 2010 on simplified employ-
ment that entered into force on August 1, 2010. The Act covers two types of 
employment:
– seasonal employment in agriculture and tourism, and
– temporary work.
In the case of seasonal work there is no limitation on the number of workers 
employed under the simplified rules. Nevertheless, for temporary work cer-
tain limits apply depending on the size of the business. These are as follows:
– businesses with no permanent employees: one temporary worker;
– businesses with one to five permanent employees: two temporary workers;
– businesses with six to twenty permanent employees: four temporary workers;
– businesses with more than 20 permanent employees: up to 20% of the head-
count.
The same person can be employed in a seasonal job for up to 120 days and 
90 days in a temporary job each year. However, the combined number of days 
in seasonal and temporary employment must be no more than 120 days. In 
seasonal employment work can be continuous for up to 120 days, however in 
temporary jobs it can be:
– up to five days in a row,
– no more than 15 days in a month,
– up to 90 days in 12 months.
There is no need for a written employment contract, however the employer 
must register the simplified employment. Employees do not have to pay con-
tributions, employers pay a flat-rate of 500 forints/day for seasonal workers in 
agriculture and tourism and 1,000 forints/day for temporary workers regard-
less of the working hours and wage. This creates entitlement for:
– pension,
– emergency healthcare, and
– jobseeker’s assistance.
SUMMARY
This year the legal and the institutional environment of the labour market has 
been presented in a new format. Instead of presenting the changes together with 
the reasons and motivations behind them and their consequences as in pre-
vious years, the review this year has focussed on the current rules. They have 
been presented in a concise manner with standardised tables for an easier un-
derstanding. These can be found in the Annex.
The review of the legal and institutional environment of the labour market 
has been divided into four parts. The first chapter has presented the income 
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replacement assistance for jobseekers, the second chapter has looked at the ac-
tive labour market policies, services and programmes that are regulated by the 
Employment Act and can be accessed through the employment service. The 
third chapter has discussed the active labour market policies outside the scope 
of the Employment Act that are provided by the PES. Finally, the fourth chap-
ter has reviewed policies outside the scope of the Employment Act and the PES.
The main features of passive and active assistance are presented in a stand-
ardised format in the Annex. Tables A1-A4 give an overview of the conditions 
of financial assistance for jobseekers. Table A5 presents the groups who can 
qualify for different Start Cards and Table A6 presents the rate and the dura-
tion of contribution reliefs. Table A7 is an important part of the Annex; it gives 
a summary of the employment and training subsides regulated by the Employ-
ment Act as well as other legislation. The different subsidies have been catego-
rised according to their purposes as follows:
– wage and contribution subsidies,
– different forms of community employment,
– training subsidies,
– job creation subsidies,
– job protection subsidies, managing group redundancies,
– travel-to-work subsidies,
– other (support to services and programmes),
– main SROP (Social Renewal Operation Programme) programmes.
All subsidies have been described according to the same criteria: first, the 
target group was identified, then the eligibility conditions, then the rate and 
the duration of the subsidy and finally the legal source.
mária frey
232
ANNEX
Table A1: Eligibility criteria for jobseeker’s benefit
Introduction of  
jobseeker’s benefit Employment history
Duration Waiting days
minimum maximum In the case of  voluntary redundancy
When receiving  
redundancy pay
November 1, 2005 At least 365 days with-
in the four years prior 
to unemployment
73 days 270 days 3 months n/a
Table A2: Assistance for jobseekers, Income Replacement Allowance, Stand-by Allowance Statutory  
minimum wage in 2010: 73,500 forints/month (EUR275)
Assistance Minimum Maximum
Jobseeker’s BenefitFirst phase (half of the eligi-
bility period, up to 91 days) Article 26, section 
5, Act 4 of 1991
60% of eligible previous earnings, at least 60% 
of the statutory minimum wage applicable on 
the first day of eligibility: 44,100 forints/month 
(EUR165)
60% of eligible previous earnings, up to 120% of 
the statutory minimum wage applicable on the 
first day of eligibility: 88,200 forints/month 
(EUR330)
Jobseeker’s BenefitSecond phase (remaining 
days, up to 179 days)
60% of the statutory minimum wage applicable on the first day of eligibility: 44,100 forints/
month
Jobseeker’s Allowance 40% of the minimum wage: 29,400 forints/month (EUR110)
Income Replacement AllowanceArticle 14, sec-
tion 6, Act 4 of 1991Between 60–100% based 
on individual decision
44,100–73,500 forints/month paid to those who are attending a recommended or approved 
training course by the job centre at least 20 hours/week
Stand-by AllowanceAct 3 of 1993 Statutory old-age minimum pension: 28,500 forints/month(EUR106)
Table A3: Main features of the Jobseeker’s Allowance
Eligibility Duration
1. Individuals who have been eligible for Jobseeker’s Benefit for at least 
180 days but exhausted their eligibility and have not found a job.
90 daysAged 50 or over: 180 days
2. Jobseekers who have been employed for 200–365 days within the four 
years prior to becoming unemployed
90 days
3. Individuals who are within five years of reaching the pension qualifying 
age and have been paid Jobseeker’s Benefit for up to 140 days and 
exhausted their eligibility.
Until reaching the qualifying age for old age pension, but up to five years.
Table A4: Eligibility conditions for social assistance of working age adults
Regular Social Allowance (RSA) Stand-by Allowance (RA)
Not capable for work due to disability or long term condition  
Aged 55 or over  
No access to childcare for a dependent child aged under 14 (if the part-
ner is not claiming assistance)
No possibility of paid work including community employment due to a 
shortage of jobs.  
Taking part in a training course not eligible for income replacement.
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Table A5: The target groups of Start Cards (groups eligible for different types of Start Card  
according to Act 123 of 2004)
Start Young entrants eligible for Start Card Aged 25 or under – for graduates 30 or under – who have finished (or inter-rupted) their studies and who take up employment, including self-employment.
Start Plus The following groups qualify for a Start Plus card: – persons returning to work within one year of claiming paren-
tal benefits or carer’s allowance, or persons claiming child care allowance taking up work after the first birthday 
of the child, provided they are not employed – long-term jobseekers who have been registered with the PES for 
12 of the previous 16 months, or six of the previous eight months in the case of persons aged under 25
Start Extra Groups eligible for a Start Extra card: a) long-term jobseekers aged 50 or over, or with low education and no age 
limit, b) jobseekers claiming Stand-by Allowance
Start Region Employers can qualify for additional relief on top of the Start Extra card if: a) they hire an individual claiming 
Stand-by Allowance who has a valid Start-Extra Card and lives in a socio-economically and infrastructurally most 
disadvantaged small region or community with high unemployment; b) hiring this person increases the average 
yearly headcount; and this is maintained during the three years of exemption or twice the duration of the dis-
count; and c) will not make this person redundant or dismissed by mutual agreement or will not go into liquida-
tion while receiving the discount.
Source: Sándor Ádám, 2010: SROP Measure 1.2.1 – The Evaluation of Contribution Reliefs on the Employment of 
Disadvantaged Persons: Start Plus and Start Extra Programmes, manuscript.
Start Plus and Start Extra Programmes are part of SROP Measure 1.2.1 and co-financed by the ESF Service Provider 
Non-Profit Ltd.
Table A6: Contribution reliefs attached to Start Cards*
Period  
(after start of employment) Start Start Plus Start Extra Start Region
First year 17% in total**  
Source: national (LMF)
17% in total  
Source: ESF co-financed
Full exemption (100% relief)
Source: ESF co-financed
Full exemption (100% relief)
source: ESF co-financed on 
the basis of Start Extra
Second year 7% in total**  
Source: national (LMF)
7% in total  
Source: ESF co-financed
17% in total  
Source: ESF co-financed
Full exemption (100% relief)
source: 17% on the basis of 
ESF co-financing and Start 
Extra; 10% national (LMF)
Third year Full contribution paid, no 
relief
Full contribution paid, no 
relief
Full contribution paid, no 
relief
Full exemption (100% relief)
source: fully national (LMF)
* Contributions paid after the gross earnings of the employee: 27% social security contribution made up of 24% pen-
sion contribution, 1.5% health care services contribution, 0.5% health care benefits contribution, 1% labour market 
contribution.
** In the case of young graduates the 17% relief is only applicable for the first nine months of employment and the 7% 
relief from the second year applies for the following three months. The contribution relief can be claimed for a total 
of 12 months.
Source: Sándor Ádám, 2010: SROP Measure 1.2.1 – The Evaluation of Contribution Reliefs on the Employment of 
Disadvantaged Persons: Start Plus and Start Extra Programmes, manuscript
Start Plus and Start Extra Programmes are part of SROP Measure 1.2.1 and co-financed by the ESF Service Provider 
Non-Profit Ltd.
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Table A7: Employment and training subsidies regulated by the Employment Act and other regulations
Subsidy Eligibility Conditions Rate Duration Legal base
Wage and contribution subsidies
Job creation subsidy Employment of disad-
vantaged jobseekers 
or persons with dis-
abilities or workers at 
risk of redundancy
Workers in similar jobs have 
not been made redundant 
within the 12-month period 
before claiming the subsidy 
and will not be made re-
dundant while receiving the 
subsidy.
Typically 50% of the wage 
and contributions, 60% for 
persons with disabilities
The duration of the 
subsidy but up to 
one year; two years 
in the case of job-
seekers registered 
for two years of 
more
Art. 16, Act 4 of 
1991Art. 11, Minis-
try of Labour Regu-
lation 6/1996. 
(16. 06)
Supporting part-time 
work to prevent redun-
dancy
Part-time employment 
of workers at risk of 
redundancy
Decision not to implement 
a planned mass layoff; 
converting full-time employ-
ment to at least half-time 
employment; maintain origi-
nal headcount and retain-
ing workers receiving the 
subsidy for at least the 
duration of the subsidy after 
it has ended.
Up to 80% of the difference 
between the full-time and 
the part-time wage and 
contributions.  
The maximum wage eligible 
for subsidy is capped at 
150% of the statutory 
minimum wage.
Up to one year Government regula-
tion 70/2009 (02. 
04)
Supporting the re-
employment of people 
made redundant as a 
result of the crisis
Supporting the re-
employment of people 
receiving jobseeker’s 
benefit by converting 
the benefit into a 
wage subsidy for the 
rest of their eligibility 
period.
Full-time employment of 
persons receiving job-
seeker’s benefit; they are 
eligible for at least 180 
days of jobseeker’s benefit 
when starting the employ-
ment
Up to 60% of the minimum 
wage and contributions 
(73,500 forints in 2010)
Number of entitle-
ment days left from 
the Jobseeker’s 
Benefit
Government Regu-
lation 356/2009 
(30. 12)
Supporting the work 
experience of young 
entrants with a voca-
tional qualification
Young persons with a 
vocational qualifica-
tion who have been 
cooperating with the 
job centre for at least 
90 days but have not 
found employment
Regular employment of at 
least four hours/day; recipi-
ents of the subsidy cannot 
be made redundant
Between 50–100% of the 
wage (if it is paid at the 
100% it cannot be higher 
than:the statutory minimum 
wage for school leavers 
with basic level vocational 
qualification, 150% for 
medium-level and 200% for 
high-level vocational quali-
fications or higher educa-
tion.); the subsidy is paid 
on the wage cost reduced 
according to the Start relief
For the duration of 
employment but up 
to 365 days
Government Regu-
lation 70/2009. 
(02. 04)
Support to employing 
people claiming Stand-
by Allowance
Incentives to hire 
persons who are 
receiving Stand-by 
Allowance
Full-time employment for at 
least the duration of the 
subsidy; no workers have 
been made redundant in 
similar jobs within the 
previous 12 months and 
will not be made redundant 
while receiving the subsidy; 
new workers increase the 
average headcount
Sum equal to the Stand-by 
Allowance (28,500 forints 
in 2010); can be used 
together with the contribu-
tion relief of the Start Extra 
card
Up to one year Art. 16/B, Act 4 of 
1991 (Employment 
Act)
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Subsidy Eligibility Conditions Rate Duration Legal base
Promoting the em-
ployment of job-
seekers by micro, 
small- and medium-
sized enterprises
Person registered as a 
jobseeker for at least 
three months, person 
out of work for at least 
one year, or has lost his 
job in a mass layoff 
within the previous 
three months
Micro, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises as well as voluntary 
organisations that employ at least 
250 staff and have been estab-
lished for at least six months and 
increase their headcount
Exempt from health 
insurance and labour 
market contribution 
and pension contribu-
tion for up to 130% of 
the statutory minimum 
wage
One year Act 180 of 2005
Types of community employment
Community work Unemployed person 
placed by the job cen-
tre in community em-
ployment
Headcount from previous month 
must increase (except in the case 
of people aged 45 or over); the 
employer is not getting paid for 
the service from elsewhere or 
non-profit activities; cannot be 
paid for those days when the 
municipal government is receiving 
subsidy for community service 
work; no worker has been or will 
be made redundant in similar 
jobs.
Direct labour costs up 
to 70%; for persons 
aged 45 or over or 
employed by Romani 
Minority Government 
up to 90%, LMF Man-
agement Committee or 
the labour council 
might award up to 90% 
for up to 24 months 
from LMF decentralised 
budget.
Up to 12 months; 
for people aged 45 
or over18 months; 
for people aged 50 
or over or employ-
ment organised by 
Romani Minoriy 
Governments up to 
24 months
Article 16/A, Act 4 
of 1991;Articles 
12–15,  
6/1996 (16. 07) 
MoL Regulation
Community service 
work
Persons claiming 
Stand-by Allowance
Organised by the municipal gov-
ernment or an organisation desig-
nated by it on the basis of a com-
munity employment strategy; to 
provide community municipal 
services
Up to 95% of direct 
wage costs at munici-
pal governments; 50% 
relief on social security 
contributions for earn-
ings up to 130% of the 
minimum wage
At least 6 hours/day 
working time, at 
least 90 working 
days/year
Act 107 of 2008; 
Art. 36 of Act 3 of 
1993
Public work for the 
employment of 
jobseekers and the 
provision of com-
munity services
Jobseekers and people 
claiming Stand-by 
Allowance employed as 
employees or public 
servants.
The following organisations can 
qualify for subsidy: organisations 
financed from the central state 
budget, ethnic minority organisa-
tions, local development councils, 
municipal governments and their 
associations, companies manag-
ing public assets, non-profit or-
ganisations if they commit to 
employ a minimum of 100 people 
and their headcount increases as 
a result; a minimum of 10% own 
contribution to the costs of the 
programme; at least 80% of the 
subsidy is spent on wages and 
contributions; the employment 
service certifies that the positions 
can be filled with eligible jobseek-
ers and at least 40% of the posi-
tions are filled with people quali-
fying for Stand-by Allowance
Funding allocated 
through competition. 
Grant contributes to 
the following costs: pay 
and contributions, 
travel-to-work expens-
es, tests to assess the 
suitability of candi-
dates, purchase of 
workwear and protec-
tive equipment, and 
purchase of equipment 
up to 10% of direct 
employment-related 
costs, management 
and training expenses.
As set out by the 
agreement on the 
public work pro-
gramme
49/1999 (26. 03) 
Government Regu-
lation
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Subsidy Eligibility Conditions Rate Duration Legal base
Support for training
Training subsidy Jobseeker; aged 25/30 or 
under who has not be-
come eligible for job-
seeker’s benefit after 
leaving school; people on 
parental leave or carer’s 
allowance; claimants of 
rehabilitation allowance; 
people in community 
service work; early school 
leavers aged 35 or under 
claiming Stand-by Allow-
ance; people at risk of 
redundancy within a year 
or likely to become redun-
dant without training (LMF 
Management Committee 
can define further target 
groups)
In the case of people claiming jobseeker’s 
benefit training must be of at least 20 hours/
week; for people aged 35 or under and receiv-
ing Stand-by Allowance are supported to finish 
primary school or strengthen basic compe-
tences necessary to start vocational training
Jobseekers and 
young entrants can 
be paid income 
replacement allow-
ance up to 60–100% 
of the statutory 
minimum wage 
(44,100–73,500 
forints); for people 
receiving social 
assistance are eligi-
ble for the reim-
bursement of train-
ing-related expenses; 
this is also fully or 
partly reimbursed for 
workers who can also 
be paid an income 
supplement
Typically for the 
duration of 
training, but 
claimants of 
jobseeker’s 
benefit can only 
get this after 
they have ex-
hausted their 
eligibility for the 
rest of the train-
ing
Art. 14. Act 4 
of 1991Art. 
1–9. 6/1996 
(16. 07) MoL 
Regulation
Support for the creation of new employment opportunities
Aid for job crea-
tion
Creation of new jobs, 
expansion of existing jobs, 
purchase of equipment 
and non-material goods 
for the introduction of new 
technologies or work-
related costs in relation to 
job creation
Creation of long-term jobs for unemployed 
persons; job creation linked to investment 
projects; grant allocated through competition; 
a minimum of 25% own contribution
According to permit-
ted aid intensity
Funding allo-
cated through 
competition
Art. 18, Act 4 
of 1991Art 
18, 6/1996. 
(16. 07) MoL 
Regulation; 
85/2004. 
(19. 04) 
Government 
Regulation
Support for the 
employment of 
persons with 
disabilities
Employment of persons 
with disabilities (50% 
reduction of work capacity 
or higher risk of being 
unemployed or less able 
to keep a job because of 
physical or mental impair-
ment; job creation, con-
version of facilities, pur-
chase or transformation of 
special tools or equip-
ment, modernisation of 
equipment and workplace 
and all the above linked to 
capital investment
Funding allocated through competition; em-
ployer has been operating for at least a year 
and a minimum of 20% own contribution; 
proof of adequate collateral, employment of 
persons with disabilities for up to two years, 
has not been fined 100,000 to 500,000 for-
ints by the labour inspectorate within the 
previous two years; has fulfilled the conditions 
of any grant or subsidy paid from the LMF 
within the past two years, has not implement-
ed a mass layoff within the previous six 
months; has exceeded the statutory quota for 
the employment of persons with disabilities for 
the past 12 months, the average headcount in 
the previous six months was not less than 50 
employees and at least half of them have a 
disability, will start the investment before the 
end of the next calendar year and the new 
capacities will be maintained for at least five 
years, will safeguard the subsidised jobs for at 
least three years.
Funding allocated 
through competition 
(maximum aid inten-
sity up to 80%)
Funding allo-
cated through 
competition
Art. 19, Act 4 
of 1991Art 
19, 6/1996. 
(16. 07) MoL 
Regulation; 
85/2004. 
(19. 04) 
Government 
Regulation
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Subsidy Eligibility Conditions Rate Duration Legal base
Supporting the 
self-employment of 
jobseekers
Jobseekers regis-
tered for at least 
three months or 
persons claiming 
rehabilitation 
allowance becom-
ing self-employed
Proof of business activity; funding al-
located through competition; at least 
20% own contribution to the cost of 
business start-up and adequate collat-
eral.
Monthly payment equal 
to the statutory mini-
mum wage (73,500 
forints in 2010); inter-
est-free loan for up to 
three million forints, 
cost of business advice
For up to six months Art. 17, Act 4 of 
1991;Art 10, 
6/1996. (16. 07) 
MoL Regulation.
Supporting the 
self-employment of 
people with disabili-
ties
Unemployed and 
work capacity 
reduced by no less 
than 40%
Does not qualify for old age pension, not 
getting disability or accident-related 
disability pension, not claiming regular 
social allowance, transitional allowance, 
or miner’s health impairment benefit. No 
need to qualify for jobseeker’s benefit.
A monthly assistance 
equal to the amount of 
jobseeker’s benefit (for 
people who are not 
eligible for jobseeker’s 
benefit this is paid at 
the minimum rate) 
reimbursement of up to 
50% of business advice 
and up to 100% of 
necessary training cost, 
and up to 50% of the 
collateral value insur-
ance.
Monthly assistance: 
up to a further 12 
months collateral 
value insurance: up 
to 12 months.
Art. 15, Act 4 of 
1991Art. 10, 
6/1996. (16. 07) 
MoL Regulation; 
Art. 6, 11/1998 
(08. 04) MoL 
Regulation
Safeguarding jobs and managing redundancies
Support for safe-
guarding jobs
Can be paid to 
employers who 
plan to implement 
redundancies due 
to business dif-
ficulties
Notifying the job centre 30 days before 
implementing the redundancy and a 
written statement on why the efforts to 
avoid the redundancy and retain work-
force were not successful; not under 
administration or liquidation; the af-
fected worker has been employed by the 
same employer for at least six months; 
will retain the worker for at least the 
duration of the subsidy after it has 
stopped, maintains the average head-
count during this period, and has not 
been fined 100,000 to 500,000 forints 
by the labour inspectorate within the 
previous two years.
Between 25–75% of the 
wage and contribu-
tions; 50–90% for 
persons with disabili-
ties or if the pay equals 
the statutory minimum 
wage or reduced work-
ing hours (4–6 hours 
per day); up to 150% of 
the statutory minimum 
wage
Up to 12 months Art. 18, Act 4 of 
1991Art 18/A, 
6/1996. (16. 07) 
MoL Regulation;
Support to mitigate 
the impact of group 
redundancies
An employer plan-
ning to implement 
a group redun-
dancy
The employer has initiated the statutory 
consultation for the group redundancy, 
agrees to set up an outplacement com-
mittee in the affected divisions and 
states what support including financial 
contribution these committees will re-
ceive, agrees to submit a report on the 
expenses and activities of the committee 
and has applied for the subsidy before 
starting to implement the redundancies.
Grant of up to one 
million forints per 
committee (the actual 
amount depends on 
the labour market 
situation of the area, 
the number of workers 
affected by the redun-
dancy, and the amount 
of available funding) 
that can be used for 
operating expenses of 
the outplacement 
committee.
To be used within 
12 months
Art 21A-B, 
6/1996. (16. 07) 
MoL Regulation;
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Subsidy Eligibility Conditions Rate Duration Legal base
Support for commuting
Travel-to-work 
subsidy
Hiring a jobseeker who has been regis-
tered for six months, three months in 
the case of persons with disabilities and 
young entrants
Has not made any workers redun-
dant in a similar position in the 
six months before applying for the 
subsidy
Employer’s statutory 
contribution towards 
commuting expenses 
(as set out in 
78/1993.(13. 05) 
Government Regula-
tion) fully or partly
Up to one 
year
Art. 2, 39/1998 
(4. 03) Govern-
ment Regulation
Subsidy for 
shared transpor-
tation
Employers who arrange shared transpor-
tation for workers between their home 
and the workplace (no public transport 
or where using it would be an unreason-
able burden for the worker, i.e. time 
spent commuting would be two hours or 
more per day)
A minimum of four workers; pref-
erential treatment of employers 
who arrange transport for workers 
with disabilities or former job-
seekers.
Up to the employee’s 
statutory contribu-
tion towards a bus 
pass between the 
worker’s home and 
the workplace
Up to one 
year
Art. 3, 39/1998 
(4. 03) Govern-
ment Regulation
Other (support to services and programmes)
Support for the 
elaboration and 
full or partial 
implementation 
of labour market 
programmes
Art. 18, Act 4 of 1991Art 18/A, 6/1996. 
(16. 07) MoL Regulation;
Funding allocated through com-
petition, recipient signs an agree-
ment with the job centre (labour 
market services listed in the 
Employment Act and its imple-
menting regulations, employment 
promotion subsidies from the 
Employment and Rehabilitation 
sub-funds of the LMF)
As set out in the 
agreement
As set out in 
the agree-
ment
Art. 26/G, 
6/1996. (16. 
07) MoL Regula-
tion;
Support for la-
bour market 
programmes
A combination of services and subsidies 
provided to employers and workers, 
target group of the programme
Labour market programmes can 
be launched by the Management 
Committee of the LMF or the 
minister responsible for employ-
ment
As per programme As per 
programme, 
up to three 
years
Art. 19/B, Act 4 
of 1991Art 26, 
6/1996. (16. 
07) MoL Regula-
tion;
Wage subsidy for 
labour market 
programmes
Programme participants and those 
involved in the implementation
The elaboration and full or partial 
implementation of labour market 
programmes by legal entities, 
businesses without a legal entity, 
or private entrepreneurs
Up to 100% of wage 
and contributions
For the 
duration of 
the pro-
gramme, up 
to three 
years
Art. 19/B (sec-
tion 3), Act 4 of 
1991Art 11/A, 
6/1996. (16. 
07) MoL Regula-
tion;
Support for em-
ployment services
Legal entities, businesses without a legal 
entity, or private entrepreneurs who 
provide free of charge information on 
jobs and vacancies in disadvantaged 
areas or for disadvantaged people, fur-
thermore job, career, job-search, voca-
tional rehabilitation guidance and coun-
selling for jobseekers who have been 
offered these services by the job centre, 
local (area) employment guidance
Funding allocated through com-
petition; have been providing the 
same service for a minimum of 
one year before the submission of 
the proposal, ensure adequate 
material and human resources, 
confidentiality of personal data 
and information, registration of 
service users.
A grant, its rate is set 
out in the adminis-
trative decision on 
funding
Up to three 
years, as 
per admin-
istrative 
decision on 
funding
Art. 13/A (sec-
tion 3), Act 4 of 
1991Art. 21–25, 
30/2000. (15. 
09) MoE
Income replace-
ment for partici-
pants of employ-
ment services
Jobseekers participating in group activi-
ties (job club) offered by the job centre
A minimum of 15 days Equal to the income 
replacement allow-
ance provided to 
training participants
Up to 90 
days in any 
calendar 
year
Art. 26, 
30/2000. (15. 
09) MoE
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Main SROP Measures
Measure Target groups Aims of the project Components
SROP 1.1.1 Supporting the voca-
tional rehabilitation of people with 
disabilities
People who qualify for rehabilitation 
allowance; jobseekers whose work 
capacity is reduced by 40–49%, 
50–66% or 50–79%
The provision of vocational rehabili-
tation services for persons with 
partially reduced work capacity or 
persons with a disability to enable 
them to return to their previous job 
or find new employment.
Training, work experience through 
supported employment, job trials, 
self-employment and related ser-
vices
SROP 1.1.2. Decentralised pro-
grammes for the employment of 
disadvantaged people
People with lower secondary educa-
tion, young entrants, people aged 
50 or over; people who have been 
receiving parental benefits or car-
er’s allowance in the 12 months 
before joining the programme; 
disadvantaged groups defined by 
regional job centres; workers who 
have been made redundant
Supporting the labour market inte-
gration of disadvantaged people 
with individualised services and 
subsidies that also take into ac-
count the local employment situa-
tion and opportunities; taking into 
account the impact of the eco-
nomic downturn on jobs, market 
people who have been made redun-
dant have also been included in the 
target group; another priority target 
group are parents with young chil-
dren returning to work as a result of 
the reform of parental leave; eligi-
ble in the programme: the cost of 
child care or care for dependent 
family members.
Training, wage subsidies, job trials, 
work experience, support for com-
muting and shared transportation, 
self-employment, employment 
services
SROP 1.1.3 Pathway to the world of 
work
People who qualify for Stand-by 
Allowance on the basis of the Social 
Act when joining the programme
Supporting the labour market entry 
of jobseekers who are registered by 
the PES and qualify for Stand-by 
Allowance; the programme should 
be coordinated with the Pathway to 
Work programme.
Complex and individualised services 
and subsidies that also take into 
account the local employment 
situation and opportunities.
SROP 2.1.1 Take a step ahead! People with lower secondary educa-
tion and no vocational qualifica-
tion, or secondary education and no 
vocational qualification; people 
with a vocational qualification who 
can get a higher level qualification 
in the same area; people with an 
obsolete qualification
Training of people with no, low or 
obsolete qualification who are not 
reached by traditional training 
programmes; a component has 
been added to the programme 
which aims to promote the training 
of people claiming carer’s allow-
ance; this allows them to update 
their knowledge and develop their 
skills after a period away from the 
labour market and thus improve 
their chances of finding a job
Reimbursement of training ex-
penses, financial assistance during 
training or a bonus after the suc-
cessful completion of the course; 
contribution towards training mate-
rial
SROP 2.3.3 Support for the safe-
guarding of jobs combined with 
reduced working time and training
Workers at risk of redundancy as a 
result of the economic downturn
Supporting the training of workers 
to prevent unemployment and 
safeguard jobs, and by re-organis-
ing working time and reducing 
working hours maintaining the 
employment potential of busi-
nesses.
Component  
A) micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises;  
Component B) businesses with no 
less than 250 workers; 
Component C) micro enterprises 
from Central-Hungary Region.
Edited by
Mónika Bálint
Compiled by
Irén Busch
Zsombor Cseres-Gergely
Károly Fazekas
János Köllő
Judit Lakatos
STATISTICAL 
DATA
statistical data
242
Statistical tables on labour market trends that have been published in The Hungar-
ian Labour Market Yearbooks since 2000 can be downloaded in full from the web-
site of the Institute of Economics: http://adatbank.mtakti.hu/tukor
DATA SOURCES
ALMPs Active Labour Market Policies
NAV NTCA [National Tax and Cusotms Administration]
CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator
NFSZ NEO [National Employment Service]
FH EO [Employment Office]
FH BT EO Wage Survey
FH REG EO Unemployment Register
FH SREG EO Unemployment Benefit Register
FH PROG EO Short-term Labour Market Projection Survey
KSH Table compiled from regular CSO-publications [Central Statistical  
 Office]
KSH IMS CSO institution-based labour statistics
KSH MEF CSO Labour Force Survey
KSH MEM CSO Labour Force Account
MPA Labour Market Fund
NEFMI Ministry of National Resources
NEFMI STAT Ministry of National Resources, Educational Statistics
NGM Ministry of National Economy
NSZ Population Census
NYUFIG Pension Administration
ONYF Central Administration of National Pension Insurance
TB Social Security Records
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS
( – ) Non-occurence.
( .. ) Not available.
( n.a.) Not applicable.
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Table 1.1: Basic economic indicators
Year GDP
a Industrial 
productiona Export
a Importa Real  earningsa
Employ-
menta
Consumer 
price indexa
Unemploy-
ment rate
1989 100.7 95.0 100.3 101.1 99.7 98.2 117.0 ..
1990 96.5 90.7 95.9 94.8 94.3 97.2 128.9 ..
1991 88.1 81.6 95.1 105.5 93.0 92.6 135.0 ..
1992 96.9 84.2 101.0 92.4 98.6 90.3 123.0 9.8
1993 99.4 103.9 86.9 120.9 96.1 93.8 122.5 11.9
1994 102.9 109.7 116.6 114.5 107.2 98.0 118.8 10.7
1995 101.5 104.6 108.4 96.1 87.8 98.1 128.2 10.2
1996 101.3 103.2 104.6 105.5 95.0 99.1 123.6 9.9
1997 104.6 111.1 129.9 126.4 104.9 100.1 118.3 8.7
1998 104.9 112.5 122.1 124.9 103.6 101.4 114.3 7.8
1999 104.2 110.4 115.9 114.3 102.5 103.2 110.0 7.0
2000 105.2 118.1 121.7 120.8 101.5 101.0 109.8 6.4
2001 103.8 103.6 107.7 104.0 106.4 100.3 109.2 5.7
2002 103.5 102.8 105.9 105.1 113.6 100.1 105.3 5.8
2003 102.9 106.4 109.1 110.1 109.2 101.3 104.7 5.9
2004 104.6 107.4 118.4 115.2 98.9 99.4 106.8 6.1
2005 104.1 107.0 111.5 106.1 106.3 100.0 103.6 7.2
2006 103.9 109.9 118.0 114.4 103.5 100.7 103.9 7.5
2007 101.1 108.2 115.8 112.0 95.4 99.9 108.0 7.4
2008 100.6 98.9 104.2 104.3 100.8 98.8 106.1 7.8
2009 93.7b 82.3c 87.8 83.0 97.6 97.5 104.2 10.0
a Previous year = 100.
b First estimation.
c Manufacturing production index: based on sub-annual data.
Source: Employment: 1989–1991: KSH MEM; 1992–: KSH MEF. Other data: KSH; 
import-export: volume index.
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Figure 1.1: Annual changes of basic economic indicators
Source: KSH.
statistical data
244
Figure 1.2: Annual GDP time series (2000 = 100%)
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 1.3: Employment rate of population aged 15-64
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 2.1: Populationa
Year
In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual  changes
Population  
age 15-64,  
in thousands
Demographic dependency rate
Total  
populationb Old age
c
1980 10,709 103.6 n.a. 6,918.9 0.54 0.21
1990 10,375 100.4 –0.2 6,870.4 0.51 0.20
1995 10,337 99.6 –0.1 6,986.9 0.48 0.21
1998 10,280 99.1 –0.2 6,980.0 0.47 0.21
1999 10,253 98.8 –0.3 6,969.6 0.47 0.21
2000 10,221 98.5 –0.3 6,961.3 0.47 0.21
2001 10,200 98.3 –0.2 6,963.3 0.46 0.22
2002 10,175 98.1 –0.2 6,962.8 0.46 0.22
2003 10,142 97.8 –0.3 6,949.4 0.46 0.22
2004 10,117 97.5 –0.3 6,943.5 0.46 0.23
2005 10,098 97.3 –0.2 6,940.3 0.45 0.23
2006 10,077 97.1 –0.2 6,931.8 0.45 0.23
2007 10,066 97.0 –0.1 6,931.3 0.45 0.23
2008 10,045 96.8 –0.2 6,912.7 0.45 0.24
2009 10,031 96.7 –0.1 6,898.1 0.45 0.24
2010 10,014 96.5 –0.1 6,874.0 0.46 0.24
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
b (population age 0–14 + 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
c (population age 65 and above) / (population age 15–64)
Source: KSH.
Table 2.2: Population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 2,341.2 1,464.4 4,399.8 1,054.7 1,449.4 10,709.5
1990 2,130.5 1,445.5 4,231.4 1,193.5 1,373.9 10,374.8
1995 1,891.7 1,610.1 4,250.6 1,126.2 1,458.0 10,336.7
1998 1,792.8 1,593.0 4,262.6 1,124.4 1,506.9 10,279.7
1999 1,762.4 1,573.2 4,268.5 1,127.9 1,521.4 10,253.4
2000 1,729.2 1,526.5 4,291.4 1,143.4 1,531.1 10,221.6
2001 1,692.0 1,480.1 4,338.5 1,144.7 1,545.0 10,200.3
2002 1,660.1 1,436.9 4,378.0 1,147.9 1,551.9 10,174.9
2003 1,633.7 1,392.5 4,390.8 1,166.1 1,559.2 10,142.4
2004 1,606.1 1,355.0 4,401.6 1,186.9 1,567.1 10,116.7
2005 1,579.7 1,322.0 4,409.1 1,209.2 1,577.6 10,097.6
2006 1,553.5 1,302.0 4,399.8 1,230.0 1,590.7 10,076.6
2007 1,529.7 1,285.9 4,393.9 1,251.5 1,605.1 10,066.1
2008 1,508.8 1,273.3 4,377.1 1,262.3 1,623.9 10,045.4
2009 1,492.6 1,259.9 4,346.1 1,292.0 1,640.3 10,030.9
2010 1,476.9 1,253.4 4,293.7 1,326.9 1,663.5 10,014.4
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
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Figure 2.1: Age structure of the Hungarian population, 1980, 2010
Source: KSH.
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Table 2.3: Male population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–59 60–64 65+
Total
years old
1980 1,205.4 749.9 2,475.6 170.5 587.3 5,188.7
1990 1,090.4 740.3 2,366.9 259.9 527.5 4,984.9
1995 967.4 824.0 2,353.3 246.1 550.8 4,941.6
1996 950.5 823.7 2,358.3 239.5 557.2 4,929.2
1997 933.0 822.4 2,366.2 233.9 560.5 4,916.0
1998 916.8 815.4 2,375.5 229.3 564.7 4,901.8
1999 901.5 805.0 2,383.2 226.1 568.6 4,884.4
2000 885.0 780.9 2,403.8 224.8 570.8 4,865.2
2001 865.7 757.0 2,425.2 228.9 574.2 4,851.0
2002 850.1 733.9 2,446.1 233.0 573.8 4,837.0
2003 836.8 711.3 2,456.5 239.9 574.0 4,818.5
2004 823.0 691.9 2,470.3 244.4 574.5 4,804.1
2005 809.5 674.6 2,480.0 252.2 576.8 4,793.1
2006 796.7 664.0 2,493.7 249.3 580.9 4,784.6
2007 784.5 655.4 2,503.7 249.4 586.1 4,779.1
2008 773.9 649.2 2,501.3 252.5 592.8 4,769.6
2009 765.8 642.7 2,497.0 258.4 599.2 4,763.1
2010 757.7 640.4 2,488.8 261.7 608.3 4,756.9
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
Table 2.4: Female population by age groups, in thousandsa
Year
0–14 15–24 25–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 1,135.8 714.5 2,232.8 365.3 1,072.4 5,520.8
1990 1,040.1 705.2 2,144.4 327.6 1,172.5 5,389.9
1995 924.4 786.2 2,151.0 312.6 1,221.0 5,395.1
1996 908.3 786.0 2,152.4 316.4 1,228.8 5,392.0
1997 891.4 784.8 2,155.6 318.3 1,235.1 5,385.3
1998 876.0 777.6 2,156.0 324.4 1,243.9 5,378.0
1999 861.0 768.2 2,159.3 326.7 1,253.8 5,369.0
2000 844.3 745.6 2,170.5 334.8 1,261.3 5,356.5
2001 826.3 723.1 2,193.4 330.4 1,276.1 5,349.3
2002 810.0 703.0 2,211.6 328.6 1,284.7 5,337.9
2003 796.9 681.2 2,217.4 330.7 1,297.8 5,323.9
2004 783.1 663.1 2,220.8 338.5 1,307.1 5,312.6
2005 770.2 647.4 2,221.9 341.7 1,323.1 5,304.3
2006 756.8 638.6 2,213.0 356.6 1,327.0 5,292.0
2007 745.1 630.6 2,206.8 369.6 1,335.0 5,287.1
2008 734.9 624.1 2,194.5 373.2 1,349.1 5,275.8
2009 726.8 617.2 2,176.0 381.8 1,366.1 5,267.9
2010 719.2 613.1 2,145.5 396.8 1,382.8 5,257.4
a January 1st. Recalculated on the basis of Population Census 2001.
Source: KSH.
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Table 3.1: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male above 59  and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 4,887.9 0.0 300.8 370.1 259.0 339.7 1,269.6 6,157.5 570.3 0.0 1,632.1 2,202.4
1990 4,534.3 62.4 284.3 548.9 249.7 297.5 1,380.4 5,977.1 345.7 0.0 1,944.9 2,290.6
1991 4,270.5 253.3 335.6 578.2 259.8 317.1 1,490.7 6,014.5 249.5 0.0 2,045.2 2,294.7
1992 3,898.4 434.9 392.7 620.0 262.1 435.9 1,710.7 6,044.0 184.3 9.8 2,101.7 2,295.8
1993 3,689.5 502.6 437.5 683.9 270.5 480.1 1,872.0 6,064.1 137.5 16.3 2,141.2 2,295.0
1994 3,633.1 437.4 476.5 708.2 280.9 540.7 2,006.3 6,076.8 118.4 11.9 2,163.8 2,294.1
1995 3,571.3 410.0 495.2 723.4 285.3 596.1 2,100.0 6,081.3 107.5 6.4 2,180.6 2,294.5
1996 3,546.1 394.0 512.7 740.0 289.2 599.4 2,141.2 6,081.3 102.1 6.1 2,184.6 2,292.8
1997 3,549.5 342.5 542.9 752.0 289.0 599.9 2,183.8 6,075.8 96.9 6.3 2,189.0 2,292.2
1998 3,608.5 305.5 588.8 697.0 295.5 565.7 2,147.0 6,061.0 89.3 7.5 2,197.6 2,294.4
1999 3,701.0 283.3 534.7 675.6 295.3 549.8 2,055.4 6,039.6 110.4 1.4 2,185.2 2,297.0
2000 3,745.9 261.4 517.9 721.7 281.4 571.4 2,092.4 6,099.7 130.3 2.3 2,268.0 2,400.6
2001 3,742.6 231.7 516.3 717.9 286.6 601.6 2,122.4 6,096.7 140.7 2.4 2,271.8 2,414.9
2002 3,719.6 235.7 507.1 738.3 286.8 593.0 2,125.2 6,080.5 164.1 3.2 2,263.9 2,431.2
2003 3,719.0 239.6 485.0 730.7 286.9 595.0 2,097.6 6,056.2 202.9 4.9 2,245.6 2,453.4
2004 3,663.1 247.2 480.5 739.8 282.4 622.4 2,125.1 6,035.4 237.3 5.7 2,236.1 2,479.1
2005 3,653.9 296.0 449.7 740.8 278.6 590.3 2,059.4 6,009.3 247.6 7.9 2,258.3 2,513.8
2006 3,679.6 308.8 432.9 810.9 270.0 500.7 2,014.5 6,002.9 250.5 8.4 2,268.0 2,526.9
2007 3,676.6 303.7 426.8 832.6 267.2 475.8 2,002.4 5,982.7 249.5 8.2 2,296.1 2,553.8
2008 3,631.4 318.5 408.6 819.6 279.8 493.1 2,001.1 5,951.0 248.1 10.7 2,327.7 2,586.5
2009 3,516.8 406.4 364.5 814.6 278.7 529.3 1,987.1 5,910.3 265.1 14.3 2,348.0 2,627.4
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated 
based on the 2001 population census. 
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiveing pension or child support . The data on 
students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: FH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.2: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, in thousandsa
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,750.5 0.0 173.8 196.3 0.0 99.1 469.2 3,219.7 265.3 0.0 491.8 757.1
1990 2,524.3 37.9 188.4 284.2 1.2 80.3 554.1 3,116.3 123.7 0.0 665.5 789.2
1991 2,351.6 150.3 218.7 296.5 1.5 115.0 631.7 3,133.6 90.4 0.0 700.7 791.1
1992 2,153.1 263.2 252.0 302.4 1.7 174.8 730.9 3,147.2 65.1 3.2 722.1 790.4
1993 2,029.1 311.5 263.2 346.9 2.0 203.3 815.4 3,156.0 47.9 4.5 735.7 788.1
1994 2,013.4 270.0 277.6 357.1 3.7 239.6 878.0 3,161.4 41.6 3.8 740.0 785.4
1995 2,012.5 259.3 282.2 367.4 4.9 237.8 892.3 3,164.1 37.1 2.1 742.6 781.8
1996 2,007.4 242.4 291.9 372.8 3.3 248.3 916.3 3,166.1 28.9 1.3 746.3 776.5
1997 2,018.0 212.2 306.0 377.6 1.5 251.6 936.7 3,166.9 25.5 1.9 743.5 770.9
1998 2,015.5 186.5 345.4 350.4 1.0 264.2 961.0 3,163.0 26.2 2.8 737.3 766.3
1999 2,068.4 170.3 312.7 338.8 4.2 261.5 917.2 3,155.9 34.7 0.4 727.2 762.3
2000 2,086.0 158.2 315.2 358.2 4.1 261.7 939.2 3,183.4 39.8 0.7 758.8 799.3
2001 2,087.6 141.6 311.0 353.4 4.3 283.2 951.9 3,181.1 41.1 0.9 763.0 805.0
2002 2,080.4 137.3 307.5 370.3 5.0 273.4 956.2 3,173.9 45.2 0.7 764.4 810.3
2003 2,073.5 137.6 293.6 367.9 4.3 288.1 953.9 3,165.0 53.0 0.9 762.5 816.4
2004 2,052.7 136.2 293.5 371.2 4.6 300.2 969.5 3,158.4 64.6 0.6 758.8 824.0
2005 2,050.7 158.2 278.8 375.4 5.8 288.8 948.8 3,157.7 65.4 0.9 763.9 830.2
2006 2,076.5 163.6 268.1 404.1 7.0 239.3 918.5 3,158.4 60.5 1.0 770.9 832.8
2007 2,082.6 163.2 267.7 412.3 3.8 225.2 909.0 3,154.8 60.4 1.0 779.0 840.4
2008 2,052.0 173.4 266.3 408.2 4.8 240.4 919.7 3,145.1 58.8 0.9 791.7 851.4
2009 1,983.6 232.3 241.8 410.8 4.6 261.6 918.8 3,134.4 61.6 1.3 800.7 863.6
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated 
based on the 2001 population census.  
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiveing pension or child support . The data on 
students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: FH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.3: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, in thousandsa
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 2,137.4 0.0 127.0 173.8 259.0 240.6 800.4 2,937.8 305.0 0.0 1,140.3 1,445.3
1990 2,010.0 24.5 95.8 264.7 248.5 217.3 826.3 2,860.8 222.0 0.0 1,279.4 1,501.4
1991 1,918.9 103.1 116.9 281.8 258.3 201.9 858.9 2,880.9 159.1 0.0 1,344.5 1,503.6
1992 1,745.3 171.7 140.8 317.6 260.4 261.1 979.9 2,896.9 119.2 6.6 1,379.6 1,505.4
1993 1,660.4 191.1 174.3 337.0 268.5 276.8 1,056.6 2,908.1 89.6 11.8 1,405.5 1,506.9
1994 1,619.7 167.4 198.9 351.1 277.2 301.1 1,128.3 2,915.4 76.8 8.1 1,423.8 1,508.7
1995 1,558.8 150.7 213.0 356.0 280.4 358.3 1,207.7 2,917.2 70.4 4.3 1,438.0 1,512.7
1996 1,538.7 151.6 220.7 367.2 285.9 351.1 1,224.9 2,915.2 73.2 4.8 1,438.3 1,516.3
1997 1,531.5 130.3 236.9 374.4 287.5 348.3 1,247.1 2,908.9 71.4 4.4 1,445.3 1,521.1
1998 1,593.0 119.0 243.4 346.6 294.5 301.5 1,186.0 2,898.0 63.1 4.7 1,460.3 1,528.1
1999 1,632.6 113.0 222.0 336.8 291.1 288.3 1,138.2 2,883.8 75.8 1.0 1,458.0 1,534.8
2000 1,659.9 103.2 202.7 363.5 277.3 309.7 1,153.2 2,916.3 90.5 1.6 1,509.2 1,601.3
2001 1,655.0 90.1 205.3 364.5 282.3 318.3 1,170.4 2,915.5 99.6 1.5 1,508.8 1,609.9
2002 1,639.2 98.4 199.6 368.0 281.8 319.6 1,169.0 2,906.6 118.9 2.5 1,499.5 1,620.9
2003 1,645.6 102.0 191.4 362.8 282.6 306.9 1,143.7 2,891.2 149.9 4.0 1,483.2 1,637.1
2004 1,610.2 111.0 186.8 368.6 277.8 322.2 1,155.4 2,876.6 172.8 5.1 1,477.3 1,655.2
2005 1,603.2 137.8 170.9 365.4 272.8 301.5 1,110.6 2,851.6 182.2 7.0 1,494.4 1,683.6
2006 1,603.1 144.8 164.8 406.8 263.0 262.0 1,096.6 2,844.5 189.6 7.4 1,497.1 1,694.1
2007 1,594.0 140.5 159.1 420.3 263.4 250.6 1,093.4 2,827.9 189.1 7.2 1,517.1 1,713.4
2008 1,579.4 145.1 142.3 411.4 276.0 252.7 1,082.4 2,806.9 189.3 9.8 1,536.0 1,735.1
2009 1,533.5 174.1 122.7 403.8 274.1 267.7 1,068.3 2,775.9 203.5 13.0 1,547.3 1,763.8
a Annual average figures.
Note: Up to 1999 the weighted figures are based on the 1990 population census, since 2000 the data is updated 
based on the 2001 population census.  
Data on ‘employed’ includes conscripts and those working while receiveing pension or child support . The data on 
students for 1995–97 are estimates. ‘Other inactive’ is a residual category, so it includes the institutional popula-
tion not observed by MEF.
Source: Pensioners: 1980–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: FH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.4: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 and female 15–54 Population of male  above 59 and female above 54
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 79.4 0.0 4.9 6.0 4.2 5.5 20.6 100.0 25.9 0.0 74.1 100.0
1990 75.9 1.0 4.8 9.2 4.2 5.0 23.1 100.0 15.1 0.0 84.9 100.0
1996 58.3 6.5 8.4 12.2 4.8 9.9 35.2 100.0 4.5 0.3 95.3 100.0
1997 58.4 5.6 8.9 12.4 4.8 9.9 35.9 100.0 4.2 0.3 95.5 100.0
1998 59.5 5.0 9.7 11.5 4.9 9.3 35.4 100.0 3.9 0.3 95.8 100.0
1999 61.3 4.7 8.9 11.2 4.9 9.1 34.0 100.0 4.8 0.1 95.1 100.0
2000 61.4 4.3 8.5 11.8 4.6 9.4 34.3 100.0 5.4 0.1 94.5 100.0
2001 61.4 3.8 8.5 11.8 4.7 9.9 34.8 100.0 5.8 0.1 94.1 100.0
2002 61.2 3.9 8.3 12.1 4.7 9.8 35.0 100.0 6.7 0.1 93.1 100.0
2003 61.4 4.0 8.0 12.1 4.7 9.8 34.6 100.0 8.3 0.2 91.5 100.0
2004 60.7 4.1 8.0 12.3 4.7 10.3 35.2 100.0 9.6 0.2 90.2 100.0
2005 60.8 4.9 7.5 12.3 4.6 9.8 34.3 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.8 100.0
2006 61.3 5.1 7.2 13.5 4.5 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.9 0.3 89.8 100.0
2007 61.5 5.1 7.1 13.9 4.5 7.9 33.5 100.0 9.8 0.3 89.9 100.0
2008 61.0 5.3 6.9 13.8 4.7 8.3 33.6 100.0 9.6 0.4 90.0 100.0
2009 59.5 6.9 6.2 13.8 4.7 9.0 33.6 100.0 10.1 0.5 89.4 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1996–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: FH REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
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Figure 3.1: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59 and female 15–54, total
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: FH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.5: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, males, per cent
Year
Population of male 15–59 Population of male 60 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 85.4 0.0 5.4 6.1 0.0 3.1 14.6 100.0 35.0 0.0 65.0 100.0
1990 81.0 1.2 6.0 9.1 0.0 2.6 17.8 100.0 15.7 0.0 84.3 100.0
1995 63.6 8.2 8.9 11.6 0.2 7.5 28.2 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1996 63.4 7.7 9.2 11.8 0.1 7.8 28.9 100.0 3.7 0.2 96.1 100.0
1997 63.7 6.7 9.7 11.9 0.0 7.9 29.6 100.0 3.3 0.2 96.4 100.0
1998 63.7 5.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 8.4 30.4 100.0 3.4 0.4 96.2 100.0
1999 65.5 5.4 9.9 10.7 0.1 8.3 29.1 100.0 4.6 0.1 95.4 100.0
2000 65.5 5.0 9.9 11.3 0.1 8.2 29.5 100.0 5.0 0.1 94.9 100.0
2001 65.6 4.5 9.8 11.1 0.1 8.9 29.9 100.0 5.1 0.1 94.8 100.0
2002 65.5 4.3 9.7 11.7 0.2 8.6 30.1 100.0 5.6 0.1 94.3 100.0
2003 65.5 4.3 9.3 11.6 0.1 9.1 30.1 100.0 6.5 0.1 93.4 100.0
2004 65.0 4.3 9.3 11.8 0.1 9.5 30.7 100.0 7.8 0.1 92.1 100.0
2005 64.9 5.0 8.8 11.9 0.2 9.1 30.0 100.0 7.9 0.1 92.0 100.0
2006 65.7 5.2 8.5 12.8 0.2 7.6 29.1 100.0 7.3 0.1 92.6 100.0
2007 66.0 5.2 8.5 13.1 0.1 7.1 28.8 100.0 7.2 0.1 92.7 100.0
2008 65.2 5.5 8.5 13.0 0.2 7.6 29.2 100.0 6.9 0.1 93.0 100.0
2009 63.3 7.4 7.7 13.1 0.1 8.3 29.3 100.0 7.1 0.2 92.7 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: FH REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
Figure 3.2: Labour force participation of population at male 15–59
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 
TB and estimation, after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990–91: FH REG, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.6: Labour force participation of the population above 14 years, females, per cent
Year
Population of female 15–54 Population of female 55 and above
Employed Unem-ployed
Inactive
Total Employed Unem-ployed
Pensioner, 
other 
inactive
Total
Pensioner Full time student
On child 
care 
leave
Other 
inactive
Inactive 
total
1980 72.8 0.0 4.3 5.9 8.8 8.2 27.2 100.0 21.1 0.0 78.9 100.0
1990 70.3 0.9 3.3 9.3 8.7 7.6 28.9 100.0 14.8 0.0 85.2 100.0
1995 53.4 5.2 7.3 12.2 9.6 12.3 41.4 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.1 100.0
1996 52.8 5.2 7.6 12.6 9.8 12.0 42.0 100.0 4.8 0.3 94.9 100.0
1997 52.6 4.5 8.1 12.9 9.9 12.0 42.9 100.0 4.7 0.3 95.0 100.0
1998 55.0 4.1 8.4 12.0 10.2 10.4 40.9 100.0 4.1 0.3 95.6 100.0
1999 56.6 3.9 7.7 11.7 10.1 10.0 39.5 100.0 4.9 0.1 95.0 100.0
2000 56.9 3.5 7.0 12.5 9.5 10.6 39.5 100.0 5.7 0.1 94.2 100.0
2001 56.8 3.1 7.0 12.5 9.7 10.9 40.1 100.0 6.2 0.1 93.7 100.0
2002 56.4 3.4 6.9 12.7 9.7 11.0 40.2 100.0 7.3 0.2 92.5 100.0
2003 56.9 3.5 6.6 12.5 9.8 10.6 39.6 100.0 9.2 0.2 90.6 100.0
2004 56.0 3.9 6.5 12.8 9.7 11.2 40.2 100.0 10.4 0.3 89.3 100.0
2005 56.2 4.8 6.0 12.8 9.6 10.6 38.9 100.0 10.8 0.4 88.8 100.0
2006 56.4 5.1 5.8 14.3 9.2 9.2 38.6 100.0 11.2 0.4 88.4 100.0
2007 56.4 5.0 5.6 14.9 9.3 8.9 38.7 100.0 11.0 0.4 88.6 100.0
2008 56.3 5.2 5.1 14.7 9.8 9.0 38.6 100.0 10.9 0.6 88.5 100.0
2009 55.2 6.3 4.4 14.5 9.9 9.6 38.5 100.0 10.1 0.5 89.4 100.0
Source: Pensioners: 1980–90: NYUFIG, 1995–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB and estimation, 
after 1997 MEF. Unemployment: 1990: FH REG, 1995–: KSH MEF.
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Figure 3.3: Labour force participation of population at female 15–54
Source: Pensioners: 1990–91: NYUFIG, 1992–: KSH MEF. Child care recipients: Up to 1997 TB 
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Table 3.7: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), in thousands
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a 2009a
Together
In work 3,710.8 3,778.9 3,804.1 3,827.4 3,827.1 3,843.6 3,834.4 3,852.2 3,864.1 3,857.2 3,800.7 3,715.3
Unemployed 473.5 448.1 411.6 414.5 410.4 431.8 451.0 488.2 468.1 448.3 481.4 592.5
Student, pupils 753.9 749.9 716.4 739.9 763.1 767.7 783.8 792.0 847.8 870.4 868.9 864.5
Pensioner 1,079.7 991.8 968.9 990.8 940.4 856.4 800.3 755.6 617.8 568.6 611.0 600.9
Disabled 195.5 223.8 245.4 251.0 284.4 338.3 370.4 359.7 520.4 560.3 530.0 495.5
On child care 
leave 289.0 272.4 280.1 272.3 278.3 281.7 274.7 272.4 273.5 279.7 292.4 290.5
Dependent 167.5 165.9 168.9 170.7 160.4 181.7 133.3 134.6 116.1 111.9 106.2 105.6
Out of work for 
other reason 113.1 133.6 181.8 184.7 185.7 181.7 178.4 160.0 108.0 103.3 103.6 106.4
Total 6,783.0 6,764.4 6,777.2 6,851.3 6,849.8 6,836.3 6,826.3 6,814.7 6,815.8 6,799.7 6,794.2 6,771.2
Males
In work 2,042.7 2,075.4 2,091.8 2,089.5 2,090.2 2,087.3 2,082.8 2,088.3 2,105.0 2,108.9 2,074.0 2,013.1
Unemployed 286.1 270.4 255.7 255.2 239.3 244.2 247.7 265.2 251.6 241.9 257.5 334.2
Student, pupils 375.9 371.4 353.0 363.6 380.9 383.7 391.1 398.5 418.9 430.2 431.5 432.9
Pensioner 426.4 388.6 377.3 386.3 368.1 337.4 322.5 304.5 236.0 205.2 233.8 235.1
Disabled 106.0 120.4 133.1 134.2 148.1 169.9 184.5 178.7 250.4 269.9 259.4 237.1
On child care 
leave 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.5 4.1 5.8 6.0
Dependent 6.5 5.3 6.3 6.3 5.1 5.3 6.0 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.3
Out of work for 
other reason 67.4 77.6 99.9 100.8 101.2 97.5 89.6 80.1 54.9 52.1 52.1 50.1
Total 3,314.9 3,312.9 3,321.1 3,339.9 3,337.8 3,330.0 3,329.1 3,328.4 3,328.1 3,318.9 3,321.3 3,315.8
Females
In work 1,668.1 1,703.5 1,712.3 1,737.9 1,736.9 1,756.3 1,751.6 1,763.9 1,759.1 1,748.3 1,726.6 1,702.2
Unemployed 187.4 177.7 155.9 159.3 171.1 187.6 203.3 223.0 216.5 206.4 223.8 258.3
Student, pupils 378.0 378.5 363.4 376.3 382.2 384.0 392.7 393.5 428.9 440.2 437.4 431.6
Pensioner 653.3 603.2 591.6 604.5 572.3 519.0 477.8 451.1 381.8 363.4 377.2 365.7
Disabled 89.5 103.4 112.3 116.8 136.3 168.4 185.9 181.0 270.0 290.4 270.6 258.4
On child care 
leave 285.1 268.6 276.1 268.3 273.4 277.0 269.8 266.3 268.0 275.6 286.7 284.5
Dependent 161.0 160.6 162.6 164.4 155.3 129.8 127.3 127.6 110.3 105.3 99.1 98.3
Out of work for 
other reason 45.7 56.0 81.9 83.9 84.5 84.2 88.8 79.9 53.1 51.2 51.4 56.3
Total 3,468.1 3,451.5 3,456.1 3,511.4 3,512.0 3,506.3 3,497.2 3,486.3 3,487.7 3,480.8 3,472.8 3,455.3
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspondence to the time series calcu-
lated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 3.8: Population aged 15–64 by labour market status (self-categorised), per cent
1999 2000 2001 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a 2009a
Together
In work 54.7 55.9 56.1 55.9 55.9 56.2 56.2 56.5 56.7 56.7 55.9 54.9
Unemployed 7.0 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.1 8.8
Student, pupils 11.1 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 12.8 12.8
Pensioner 15.9 14.7 14.3 14.5 13.7 12.5 11.7 11.1 9.1 8.4 9.0 8.9
Disabled 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.3 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.3
On child care 
leave 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.3
Dependent 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
Out of work for 
other reason 1.7 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males
In work 61.6 62.6 63.0 62.6 62.6 62.7 62.6 62.7 63.2 63.5 62.4 60.7
Unemployed 8.6 8.2 7.7 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 7.8 10.1
Student, pupils 11.3 11.2 10.6 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.0 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.1
Pensioner 12.9 11.7 11.4 11.6 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.1 7.1 6.2 7.0 7.1
Disabled 3.2 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.4 7.5 8.1 7.8 7.2
On child care 
leave 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Dependent 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Out of work for 
other reason 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Females
In work 48.1 49.4 49.5 49.5 49.5 50.1 50.1 50.6 50.4 50.2 49.7 49.3
Unemployed 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.4 6.2 5.9 6.4 7.5
Student, pupils 10.9 11.0 10.5 10.7 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.6 12.5
Pensioner 18.8 17.5 17.1 17.2 16.3 14.8 13.7 12.9 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.6
Disabled 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.8 5.3 5.2 7.7 8.3 7.8 7.5
On child care 
leave 8.2 7.8 8.0 7.6 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.2
Dependent 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8
Out of work for 
other reason 1.3 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspondence to the time series calcu-
lated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.1: Employment
Year In thousands 1992 = 100 Annual changes Employment ratioa
1980 5,458.2 133.7 .. 65.3
1990 4,880.0 119.5 .. 59.0
1995 3,678.8 90.1 –1.9 43.9
1996 3,648.2 89.4 –0.8 43.6
1997 3,646.4 89.3 0.0 43.6
1998 3,697.8 90.6 1.4 44.3
1999 3,811.4 93.4 3.1 45.7
2000 3,849.1 94.3 1.0 46.2
2001 3,859.5 94.5 0.3 ..
2001b 3,883.3 95.1 0.3 45.6
2002b 3,883.7 95.1 0.0 45.6
2003b 3,921.9 96.1 1.2 46.2
2004b 3,900.4 95.5 –0.5 45.8
2005b 3,901.5 95.6 0.0 45.7
2006b 3,930.1 96.3 0.7 46.0
2007b 3,926.2 96.2 0.0 46.0
2008b 3,879.4 95.0 –1.2 45.4
2009b 3,781.9 92.6 –2.4 44.3
a Per cent of the population above 14 year.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: 1980–90: KSH MEM, 1995–: KSH MEF.
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Figure 4.1: Employed
Source: 1991: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.2: Employment by gender
Year
Males Females Share of females 
(%)In thousands 1992 = 100 In thousands 1992 = 100
1980 3,015.8 136.0 2,442.4 131.0 44.7
1990 2,648.0 119.4 2,232.0 119.7 45.7
1995 2,049.6 92.4 1,629.2 87.4 44.3
1996 2,036.3 91.8 1,611.9 86.5 44.2
1997 2,043.5 92.1 1,602.9 86.0 44.0
1998 2,041.7 92.0 1,656.1 88.8 44.8
1999 2,103.1 94.8 1,708.4 91.6 44.8
2000 2,122.4 95.7 1,726.7 92.6 44.9
2001 2,130.6 96.1 1,728.9 92.7 44.8
2001a 2,128.7 96.0 1,754.6 94.1 45.2
2002a 2,125.6 95.8 1,758.1 94.3 45.3
2003a 2,126.5 95.6 1,795.4 96.2 45.8
2004a 2,117.3 95.5 1,783.1 95.6 45.7
2005a 2,116.1 95.4 1,785.4 95.8 45.8
2006a 2,137.4 96.4 1,792.7 96.1 45.6
2007a 2,143.0 96.6 1,783.2 95.6 45.5
2008a 2,110.8 95.2 1,768.6 94.9 45.6
2009a 2,044.9 92.2 1,737.0 93.2 45.9
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: 1980–90: KSH MEM, 1995–: KSH MEF.
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Figure 4.2: Employment by gender
Source: 1990–1991: KSH MEM, 1992–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.3: Composition of the employed by age groups, males, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60+
Total
years old
1980 5.1 12.6 55.4 10.2 8.0 8.7 100.0
1990 5.0 10.8 64.1 8.6 6.8 4.7 100.0
1997 2.3 12.3 68.9 9.9 5.4 1.2 100.0
1998 2.3 13.4 67.6 10.3 5.1 1.3 100.0
1999 1.9 13.2 67.1 10.5 5.6 1.6 100.0
2000 1.5 12.4 67.3 10.6 6.4 1.8 100.0
2001 1.1 10.9 68.3 11.0 6.9 1.8 100.0
2001a 1.2 10.4 68.6 11.1 6.7 2.0 100.0
2002a 0.9 9.4 69.4 11.3 6.9 2.1 100.0
2003a 0.7 8.6 69.1 11.8 7.3 2.5 100.0
2004a 0.7 7.4 69.5 12.0 7.3 3.0 100.0
2005a 0.6 6.8 68.9 12.7 7.9 3.1 100.0
2006a 0.6 6.6 68.5 13.0 8.4 2.9 100.0
2007a 0.5 6.5 68.7 13.0 8.5 2.8 100.0
2008a 0.5 6.3 69.0 13.1 8.3 2.8 100.0
2009a 0.4 5.6 69.6 12.2 9.2 3.0 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1997–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.4: Composition of the employed by age groups, females, per cent
Year
15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55+
Total
years old
1980 5.3 9.7 61.8 10.7 12.5 100.0
1990 5.2 8.6 66.2 10.0 10.0 100.0
1997 2.0 10.8 72.2 10.5 4.5 100.0
1998 2.3 12.2 71.2 10.5 3.8 100.0
1999 1.7 12.1 70.2 11.6 4.4 100.0
2000 1.4 11.1 69.6 12.7 5.2 100.0
2001 1.1 10.1 70.0 13.0 5.8 100.0
2001a 1.1 9.6 70.5 13.1 5.7 100.0
2002a 0.8 9.2 69.4 13.8 6.8 100.0
2003a 0.5 8.2 68.8 14.0 8.5 100.0
2004a 0.5 7.1 68.2 14.6 9.7 100.0
2005a 0.4 6.4 67.6 15.4 10.2 100.0
2006a 0.4 6.1 66.8 16.2 10.6 100.0
2007a 0.3 5.8 67.3 16.0 10.6 100.0
2008a 0.3 5.5 67.4 16.1 10.7 100.0
2009a 0.3 5.4 67.2 15.4 11.7 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1997–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.5: Composition of the employed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1980 40.8 32.3 18.2 8.7 100.0
1990 37.6 30.5 20.1 11.8 100.0
1998 20.3 39.4 25.7 14.7 100.0
1999 16.8 41.5 26.8 14.9 100.0
2000 16.1 41.6 26.7 15.6 100.0
2001 15.7 42.7 26.0 15.6 100.0
2001a 15.6 42.8 26.0 15.6 100.0
2002a 14.6 43.2 26.4 15.8 100.0
2003a 14.0 41.3 27.7 17.0 100.0
2004a 13.0 40.4 28.0 18.6 100.0
2005a 13.0 40.8 27.7 18.5 100.0
2006a 12.3 40.8 28.3 18.6 100.0
2007a 11.8 40.8 28.7 18.7 100.0
2008a 11.7 39.4 29.0 19.8 100.0
2009a 10.9 38.6 30.1 20.3 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest 
education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.6: Composition of the employed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1980 53.1 12.3 27.5 7.2 100.0
1990 43.4 13.4 31.4 11.8 100.0
1998 23.6 20.2 38.2 18.0 100.0
1999 20.6 20.3 40.6 18.5 100.0
2000 19.1 20.9 40.8 19.2 100.0
2001 19.0 21.2 40.4 19.4 100.0
2001a 19.1 21.3 40.3 19.3 100.0
2002a 18.5 21.5 40.2 19.8 100.0
2003a 16.4 21.5 40.9 21.2 100.0
2004a 15.9 20.5 40.2 23.4 100.0
2005a 15.4 20.2 40.0 24.4 100.0
2006a 14.3 20.7 40.1 24.9 100.0
2007a 13.6 21.2 40.1 25.1 100.0
2008a 13.3 20.3 39.3 27.1 100.0
2009a 12.5 19.9 39.2 28.4 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999, slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest 
education level.
Source: 1980–90: Census based estimates. 1998–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.7: Employed by employment status, in thousands
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1996 2,961.2 79.0 151.8 413.1 3,605.1
1997 2,989.7 68.9 137.4 414.3 3,610.3
1998 3,088.5 55.8 132.5 397.9 3,674.7
1999 3,201.3 42.5 111.8 435.9 3,791.5
2000 3,255.5 37.1 129.4 407.1 3,829.1
2001 3,296.3 30.7 119.1 398.4 3,844.5
2001a 3,313.6 31.4 118.9 404.4 3,868.3
2002a 3,337.2 22.5 109.9 401.0 3,870.6
2003a 3,399.2 8.6 114.7 399.4 3,921.9
2004a 3,347.8 8.1 136.6 407.8 3,900.3
2005a 3,367.3 5.8 146.7 381.7 3,901.5
2006a 3,431.4 4.8 126.7 367.2 3,930.1
2007a 3,439.7 4.4 123.2 358.9 3,926.2
2008a 3,405.1 2.3 122.5 349.5 3,879.4
2009a 3,309.9 2.0 136.8 333.2 3,781.9
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1996–: KSH MEF.
Table 4.8: Composition of the employed persons by employment status, per cent
Year
Employees Member of  cooperatives
Member of other 
partnerships
Self-employed 
and assisting 
family members
Total
1996 82.1 2.2 4.2 11.5 100.0
1997 82.8 1.9 3.8 11.5 100.0
1998 84.0 1.5 3.6 10.8 100.0
1999 84.4 1.1 2.9 11.5 100.0
2000 85.0 1.0 3.4 10.6 100.0
2001 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.4 100.0
2001a 85.7 0.8 3.1 10.5 100.0
2002a 86.2 0.6 2.8 10.4 100.0
2003a 86.7 0.2 2.8 10.3 100.0
2004a 85.8 0.2 3.5 10.5 100.0
2005a 86.3 0.1 3.8 9.8 100.0
2006a 87.3 0.1 3.2 9.4 100.0
2007a 87.6 0.1 3.1 9.2 100.0
2008a 87.7 0.1 3.2 9.0 100.0
2009a 87.5 0.1 3.6 8.8 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Conscripts are excluded.
Source: 1996–: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.9: Composition of employed persons by sectora, by gender, per cent
2008 2009
Males Females Together Males Females Together
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4.8 1.7 3.4 5.0 1.8 3.5
Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2
Manufacturing 27.6 19.7 23.7 26.8 18.3 22.7
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.7 0.6 1.2
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 2.0 0.7 1.4 2.0 0.6 1.3
Construction 12.8 1.3 7.3 12.3 1.2 7.0
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 11.9 16.1 13.9 11.4 15.9 13.6
Transportation and storage 9.6 3.9 6.9 9.6 4.1 6.9
Accommodation and food service activities 3.1 4.9 4.0 3.1 4.8 3.9
Information and communication 2.9 1.8 2.4 2.8 1.7 2.3
Financial and insurance activities 1.4 3.4 2.4 1.5 3.6 2.5
Real estate activities 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5
Professional, scientific and technical activities 2.1 3.7 2.8 2.2 3.4 2.8
Administrative and support service activities 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.4 2.7 3.1
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 7.8 9.1 8.4 8.3 10.2 9.2
Education 3.7 14.9 9.0 4.0 15.3 9.4
Human health and social work activities 2.5 11.5 6.8 2.6 11.5 6.9
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5
Other activities 1.2 2.1 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a By TEÁOR’08.
Note: Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.10: Employed in their present job since 0–6 months, per cent
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Hungary 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.2 6.3 6.6 7.2 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.6 7.4
Source: MEF, IV. quarterly waves.
Table 4.11: Distribution of employees in the competitive sectora by firm size, per cent
Year
Less than 20 20-49 50–249 250–999 1000 and more
employees
2000 20.2 7.0 23.5 22.5 26.8
2002 21.6 14.0 21.5 20.1 22.9
2003 23.0 15.3 20.5 19.3 21.8
2004 23.6 14.8 21.3 18.3 22.0
2005 27.0 15.0 20.5 17.5 20.0
2006 15.7 10.7 25.7 24.3 23.6
2007 25.2 14.2 20.0 18.4 22.2
2008 26.0 15.7 20.7 18.9 18.6
2009 23.4 15.7 19.7 18.4 22.8
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: FH BT.
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Table 4.12: Employees of the competitive sectora  
by the share of foreign ownership, per cent
Share of foreign  
ownership 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
100% 17.5 19.0 17.7 16.5 17.7 18.6 19.0 19.4 20.4 17.5
Majority 11.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.4 6.3
Minority 5.3 4.9 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.1 2.2 2.9 2.2 1.7
0% 65.5 65.1 69.5 70.8 70.7 69.8 71.3 70.3 71.0 74.6
a Firms employing 5 or more workers.
Source: FH BT.
Figure 4.3: Employees of the corporate sector by firm size and by the share of foreign ownership
Source: FH BT.
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Table 4.13: Employment rate of population aged 15–74 by age group, males, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 14.6 64.7 82.8 71.8 48.7 17.1 9.9 58.9
1998 11.4 59.9 78.8 66.0 38.3 10.0 3.2 54.4
1999 10.6 60.3 80.5 69.0 44.0 10.4 3.8 56.2
2000 8.4 58.9 80.9 69.6 49.6 11.8 3.8 56.8
2001a 7.9 56.7 81.6 68.2 51.3 13.1 3.1 57.1
2002a 5.6 53.1 81.9 68.6 52.8 14.4 3.4 57.1
2003a 4.8 51.8 82.2 69.7 55.2 16.8 3.8 57.6
2004a 4.5 46.5 82.7 69.7 54.0 20.1 4.3 57.5
2005a 4.0 43.6 82.5 70.1 56.6 20.9 4.2 57.4
2006a 4.2 43.9 83.3 70.3 58.6 19.2 4.3 58.0
2007a 3.7 43.8 83.7 70.7 58.2 18.9 4.7 58.0
2008a 3.5 42.2 83.1 71.2 55.1 16.8 4.9 57.2
2009a 2.5 36.6 80.5 70.5 57.1 17.2 5.0 55.5
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 4.14: Employment rate of population aged 15–74  
by age group, females, per cent
Year 15–19 20–24 25–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–74 Total
1992 16.0 54.0 72.2 58.4 18.2 10.7 5.3 46.6
1998 10.7 47.5 66.3 52.3 13.6 5.0 1.2 41.0
1999 8.7 48.1 67.3 59.4 16.2 5.5 1.6 42.3
2000 8.0 45.9 67.8 62.5 20.0 5.1 1.8 43.0
2001a 6.3 44.2 68.0 62.1 23.2 5.5 1.3 43.1
2002a 4.3 44.2 67.0 64.0 28.3 6.0 1.5 43.3
2003a 3.1 41.9 67.8 65.8 35.1 7.3 2.0 44.3
2004a 2.7 37.4 67.2 66.0 39.8 9.0 1.9 44.1
2005a 2.6 34.7 67.4 66.6 41.7 9.6 1.5 44.2
2006a 2.5 33.9 67.5 67.9 42.6 8.9 1.6 44.4
2007a 2.1 32.5 67.8 68.3 40.0 9.7 2.1 44.3
2008a 1.9 31.0 67.7 68.7 38.7 10.0 2.3 44.0
2009a 1.5 30.0 66.6 68.5 41.1 10.0 2.2 43.4
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 4.15: Employment rate of population aged 15–64  
by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 35.6 75.8 71.8 86.3 60.0
1998 35.0 75.3 67.0 84.9 60.4
1999 33.6 76.8 68.3 86.8 62.4
2000 33.6 77.4 67.9 87.1 63.1
2001a 33.0 77.6 67.3 87.4 62.9
2002a 32.0 77.6 67.1 85.8 62.9
2003a 32.4 76.5 67.8 86.4 63.4
2004a 31.0 75.7 67.3 87.1 63.1
2005a 31.6 74.7 66.9 86.9 63.1
2006a 31.5 75.2 67.5 85.7 63.8
2007a 31.6 74.6 67.5 85.9 64.0
2008a 31.3 72.6 66.5 84.7 63.0
2009a 29.0 69.9 65.1 83.1 61.1
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.4: Employment-age profiles, men aged 15–64, quarterly
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Table 4.16: Employment rate of population aged 15–64  
by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 30.8 65.0 64.0 79.2 49.3
1998 26.6 60.5 58.1 76.9 47.3
1999 26.1 61.4 59.0 77.5 49.0
2000 26.0 61.0 59.3 77.8 49.7
2001a 26.1 60.8 59.2 77.8 49.8
2002a 26.0 60.4 58.6 77.9 49.8
2003a 25.3 59.7 59.5 78.3 50.9
2004a 25.0 58.8 58.1 78.1 50.7
2005a 25.1 57.6 57.9 78.9 51.0
2006a 24.5 58.2 57.5 77.6 51.1
2007a 24.0 57.8 57.2 75.4 50.9
2008a 23.9 55.5 56.4 75.5 50.6
2009a 23.0 54.3 54.9 74.4 49.9
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 4.5: Employment-age profiles, women aged 15–64, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.1: Unemployment rate by gender and per cent  
of long term unemployed, per cent
Year
Unemployment rate Share of long term 
unemployedaMales Females Total
1992 10.7 8.7 9.8 ..
1995 11.3 8.7 10.2 50.6
1996 10.7 8.8 9.9 54.4
1997 9.5 7.8 8.7 51.3
1998 8.5 7.0 7.8 48.8
1999 7.5 6.3 7.0 49.5
2000 7.0 5.6 6.4 49.1
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2001b 6.3 5.0 5.7 46.7
2002b 6.1 5.4 5.8 44.9
2003b 6.1 5.6 5.9 43.9
2004b 6.1 6.1 6.1 45.0
2005b 7.0 7.5 7.2 46.2
2006b 7.2 7.8 7.5 46.8
2007b 7.1 7.6 7.4 48.2
2008b 7.6 8.1 7.8 47.6
2009b 10.3 9.7 10.0 43.0
a Long term unemployed are those who have been without work for 12 months or more, 
the denominator does not include those starting new jobs.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Figure 5.1: Unemployment rates by gender
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.2: Unemployment rate by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0
2001a 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3
2002a 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1
2003a 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1
2004a 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1
2005a 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0
2006a 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2
2007a 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1
2008a 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6
2009a 24.4 10.6 7.7 3.8 10.3
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999 slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest edu-
cation level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 5.3: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, males, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0
1995 37.7 44.0 14.7 3.6 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0
2001 36.8 42.9 17.4 2.9 100.0
2001a 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0
2002a 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0
2003a 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0
2004a 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0
2005a 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0
2006a 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0
2007a 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0
2008a 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0
2009a 31.0 40.1 21.9 7.0 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999 slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest edu-
cation level.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.4: Unemployment rate by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1998 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001a 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002a 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003a 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004a 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005a 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006a 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007a 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008a 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
2009a 21.6 12.4 7.7 4.1 9.7
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999 slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest edu-
cation level.
Source: KSH MEF.
Table 5.5: Composition of the unemployed by level of education, females, per cent
Year
8 grades of primary 
school or less
Vocational  
school
Secondary  
school
College,  
university Total
1993 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1996 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 33.3 28.2 32.5 6.1 100.0
2001a 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002a 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003a 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004a 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005a 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006a 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007a 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008a 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
2009a 32.1 26.1 30.3 11.4 100.0
a Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: Since 1999 slight changes have occurred in the categorisation system by highest edu-
cation level.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Figure 5.2: Intensity of quarterly flows between labour market status, population between 15–64 years
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degree polynomial.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.6: The number of unemployeda by duration of job search, in thousands
Year
Length of job search, weeks [month]
Total1–4  
[<1]
5–14 
[1–3]
15–26 
[4–6]
27–51 
[7–11]
52  
[12]
53–78 
[13–18]
79–104 
[19–24]
105– 
[>24]
1992 43.9 90.9 96.4 110.7 10.6 41.7 38.4 n.a. 432.6
1993 36.2 74.8 87.9 120.5 14.7 75.1 83.7 n.a. 492.9
1994 30.5 56.5 65.0 91.9 8.4 63.0 73.8 40.4 429.5
1995 23.0 51.0 56.5 69.4 20.2 57.2 34.3 93.2 404.8
1996 19.9 46.4 49.3 61.5 18.2 56.1 37.1 100.2 388.7
1997 16.1 43.7 45.9 54.4 15.7 44.5 31.1 77.3 328.7
1998 12.9 44.2 44.5 45.7 16.0 39.0 27.6 63.5 293.4
1999 15.4 44.1 38.8 46.0 13.2 38.1 26.8 62.3 284.7
2000 16.7 38.5 35.1 42.8 12.7 36.9 23.6 55.4 261.3
2001 14.7 36.9 33.1 38.3 11.3 31.4 20.9 44.1 230.7
2001b 14.9 37.0 33.2 38.6 11.5 31.6 20.9 44.2 231.9
2002b 15.5 39.4 34.8 40.7 11.6 32.7 19.8 42.5 237.0
2003b 15.9 42.1 38.9 42.0 14.5 27.6 17.6 43.0 241.6
2004b 13.0 42.0 39.9 41.8 13.5 33.4 19.6 47.2 250.4
2005b 14.8 48.9 44.1 51.3 14.1 41.0 27.4 54.3 295.9
2006b 13.3 50.7 48.3 51.9 17.4 41.5 26.6 58.8 308.5
2007b 13.8 49.4 44.3 50.1 12.7 43.3 26.0 64.9 304.5
2008b 13.7 50.4 47.8 53.5 13.4 39.6 27.2 74.8 320.4
2009b 18.8 71.9 67.0 77.4 18.1 51.2 19.8 88.4 412.6
a Not including those unemployed who will got a new job within 30 days; since 2003: 
within 90 days.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Figure 5.3: Unemployment-age profiles, men aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 5.4: Unemployment-age profiles, women aged 15–59, quarterly
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.7: Registered unemployeda and LFS unemployment
Year
Registered unemployed LFS unemployed, total LFS unemployed, age 15–24
In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in % In thousands rate in %
1990 47.7 – .. .. .. ..
1991 227.3 4.1 .. .. .. ..
1992 557.0 10.3 444.2 9.8 120.0 17.5
1993 671.8 12.9 518.9 11.9 141.3 21.3
1994 568.4 11.3 451.2 10.7 124.7 19.4
1995 507.7 10.6 416.5 10.2 114.3 18.6
1996 500.6 11.0 400.1 9.9 106.3 17.9
1997 470.1 10.5 348.8 8.7 95.8 15.9
1998 423.1 9.5 313.0 7.8 87.6 13.4
1999 409.5 9.7 284.7 7.0 78.6 12.4
2000 390.5 9.3 262.5 6.4 70.7 12.1
2001 364.1 8.5 232.9 5.7 55.7 10.8
2002 344.7 8.0 238.8 5.8 56.5 12.3
2003 357.2 8.3 244.5 5.9 54.9 13.4
2004 375.9 8.7 252.9 6.1 55.9 15.5
2005 409.9 9.4 303.9 7.2 66.9 19.4
2006 393.5 9.0 316.8 7.5 64.1 19.1
2007 426.9 9.7 311.9 7.4 57.6 18.0
2008 442.3 10.0 329.2 7.8 61.0 19.9
2009 561.8 12.8 420.7 10.0 79.2 26.4
a Since 2006: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseek-
ers.
Note: the denominator of registered unemployment/jobseekers’ rate in the economi-
cally active population on 1st January the previous year.
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: FH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
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Figure 5.5: Registered and LFS unemployment rates
Source: Registered unemployment/jobseekers: FH; LFS unemployment: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.8: Composition of the registered unemployeda by educational attainment, yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
8 grades of primary school or less 40.8 40.6 40.4 41.0 42.0 42.4 42.7 42.3 41.9 42.0 42.4 43.3 40.1
Vocational school 35.6 36.0a 35.7 34.9 34.1 33.5 32.9 32.3 32.4 32.1 31.5 30.9 32.5
Vocational secondary school 12.8 12.9 13.2 13.2 13.1 13.2 13.1 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.1 14.4
Grammar school 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.5
College 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2
University 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 2006: registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of 
registered unemployees to registered jobseekers.
Source: FH.
Table 5.9: The distribution of registered unemployed school-leaversa by educational attainment, 
 yearly averages, per cent
Educational attainment 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
8 grades of primary school or less 20.2 23.4 25.3 26.8 31.1 33.7 34.7 35.2 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.3 37.7
Vocational school 35.7 34.1 30.9 27.8 23.7 20.6 20.4 20.2 20.5 19.7 18.1 17.3 18.9
Vocational secondary school 23.9 24.2 25.0 25.4 25.3 25.5 23.2 22.1 21.5 20.3 20.7 21.2 23.1
Grammar school 15.5 14.0 13.6 13.7 12.6 11.6 10.8 10.7 10.8 11.7 12.8 13.3 13.7
College 3.5 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.5 6.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.5
University 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Since 2006: registered school-leaver jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: FH.
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Table 5.10: Registered unemployeda by economic activity  
as observed in the LFS, per cent
Year Employed LFS-unemployed Inactive Total
1992 5.1 71.6 23.3 100.0
1993 10.0 63.6 26.4 100.0
1994 14.4 54.5 31.1 100.0
1995 11.8 53.7 34.5 100.0
1996 13.7 51.8 34.5 100.0
1997 18.7 44.1 37.2 100.0
1998 24.8 35.1 40.1 100.0
1999 6.7 55.8 37.5 100.0
2000 4.7 54.3 41.0 100.0
2001 6.5 45.2 48.3 100.0
2002b 4.4 47.4 48.2 100.0
2003b 9.4 44.1 46.5 100.0
2004b 3.0 53.5 43.5 100.0
2005b 2.3 59.7 38.0 100.0
2006b 3.9 58.7 37.5 100.0
2007b 3.7 62.6 33.7 100.0
2008b 3.7 63.1 33.2 100.0
2009b 3.7 67.5 28.8 100.0
a Since 2006: database of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Note: The data pertain to those who consider themselves registered jobseekers in the 
KSH MEF. From 1999 those who reported that their last contact with the employment 
center was more than two months ago were filtered from among those who reported 
themselves as registered unemployed.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 5.11: Selected time series of registered unemployment, monthly averages, in thousands and per cent
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Registered unemploymenta 568.4 507.7 500.6 470.1 423.1 409.5 390.5 364.1
Of which:
School-leavers 62.1 54.5 46.2 42.4 32.5 29.9 26.0 26.8
Non school-leavers 506.2 453.2 454.4 427.7 390.6 379.6 364.4 337.4
Male 333.0 293.8 284.1 267.1 233.4 221.4 209.7 196.4
Female 235.3 213.8 216.5 203.0 189.7 188.1 180.8 167.7
25 years old and younger 153.3 134.2 124.0 105.8 89.9 85.4 79.1 75.6
Manual workers 467.6 414.3 407.4 386.3 349.0 336.8 321.2 302.0
Non manual workers 100.7 93.4 93.2 83.8 74.1 72.7 69.3 62.4
Unemployment benefit recipients 228.9 182.8 171.7 141.7 130.7 140.7 131.7 119.2
Unemployment assistance recipientsb 190.3 210.0 211.3 201.3 182.2 148.6 143.5 131.2
Unemployment rate 11.3 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5
Shares within registered unemployed, per cent
School-leavers 10.9 10.7 9.2 9.0 7.7 7.3 6.7 7.3
Male 58.6 57.9 56.7 56.8 55.2 54.1 53.7 53.9
25 years old and younger 27.0 26.4 24.8 22.5 21.3 20.9 20.3 20.8
Manual workers 82.3 81.6 81.4 82.2 82.5 82.3 82.2 82.9
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 42.3 45.7 52.8 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0
Of which: school-leavers 7.8 8.0 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.3 8.0 7.8
Outflow from the Register 51.7 47.6 54.3 57.3 60.4 57.2 56.8 59.4
Of which: school-leavers 7.9 8.5 8.9 9.0 11.0 9.4 8.2 7.7
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Registered unemploymenta 344.7 357.2 375.9 409.9 393.5 426.9 442.3 561.8
Of which:
School-leavers 28.5 31.3 33.8 40.9 38.7 40.4 41.4 49.3
Non school-leavers 316.2 325.9 342.2 369.1 354.7 386.5 400.9 512.5
Male 184.6 188.0 193.3 210.4 200.9 219.9 228.3 297.9
Female 160.1 169.2 182.6 199.5 192.5 207.0 214.0 263.9
25 years old and younger 71.1 71.6 71.4 78.9 75.8 80.3 75.9 104.3
Manual workers 286.3 296.2 308.5 336.2 321.9 .. .. ..
Non manual workers 58.4 61.0 67.4 73.7 71.6 .. .. ..
Unemployment benefit recipients 114.9 120.0 124.0 134.4 151.5 134.6 136.5c 212.1
Unemployment assistance recipientsb 113.4 116.2 120.4 133.4 121.8 133.0 147.5 156.0
Unemployment rate 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8
Shares within registered unemployed, per cent
School-leavers 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.8
Male 53.5 52.6 51.4 51.3 51.1 51.5 51.6 53.0
25 years old and younger 20.6 20.0 19.0 19.2 16.5 18.8 17.2 18.6
Manual workers 83.1 82.9 82.1 82.0 81.8 .. .. ..
Flows, in thousands
Inflow to the Register 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0
Of which: school-leavers 7.8 7.7 7.6 8.2 7.0 6.2 6.3 7.5
Outflow from the Register 55.8 53.5 54.4 59.8 51.4 48.4 51.3 58.4
Of which: school-leavers 7.5 7.6 7.1 7.9 7.1 6.0 6.2 6.7
a Since 2006: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed. (The data concern the closing date of each 
month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to 
registered jobseekers.
statistical data
276
b Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included in the number of those receiving in-
come support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 
2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the on call support.
c The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or, TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
Comparable to 2009: 141.5 thousand people.
Source: FH REG.
Table 5.12: Monthly entrants to the unemployment registera, monthly averages, in thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
First time entrants 17.0 13.4 12.8 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.0 10.5 10.8 8.6 8.0 7.1 8.3
Re-entrants 39.2 42.0 44.4 42.9 45.8 45.6 44.8 47.3 50.0 42.2 43.4 46.9 60.7
Together 56.1 55.4 57.2 54.1 57.0 56.0 54.8 57.8 60.7 50.8 51.4 54.0 69.0
a Since 2006: database of jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition 
of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
Source: FH REG.
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Figure 5.6: Entrants to the unemployment register, in thousands
Source: FH REG.
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Table 5.13: Benefit recepients and participation in active labour market programs
Year
Unemployment 
benefita
Regular 
social  
assistance b
UA for 
school-
leavers
Do not 
receive 
provision
Public  
workc Retraining
c Wage  
subsidyc
Other  
programmesc Total
1990 In thousands 42.5 – – 18.6 .. .. .. .. 61.0
Per cent 69.6 – – 30.4 .. .. .. .. 100.0
1995 In thousands 150.8 192.9 26.3 109.1 21.7 20.4 10.9 64.7 596.8
Per cent 25.3 32.3 4.4 18.3 3.6 3.4 1.8 10.8 100.0
1996 In thousands 145.4 218.5 2.6 127.8 38.5 20.6 16.4 74.5 644.3
Per cent 22.6 33.9 0.4 19.8 6.0 3.2 2.5 11.6 100.0
1997 In thousands 134.1 193.5 0.1 121.8 38.9 25.1 29.7 95.7 638.9
Per cent 21.0 30.3 0.0 19.1 6.1 3.9 4.6 15.0 100.0
1998 In thousands 123.9 158.6 0.1 109.4 37.4 24.5 30.9 86.7 571.5
Per cent 21.7 27.7 0.0 19.1 6.5 4.3 5.4 15.2 100.0
1999 In thousands 135.5 146.7 0.0 107.1 35.7 28.0 31.1 60.6 544.7
Per cent 24.9 26.9 0.0 19.7 6.6 5.1 5.7 11.1 100.0
2000 In thousands 117.0 139.7 0.0 106.5 26.7 25.3 27.5 73.5 516.2
Per cent 22.7 27.1 0.0 20.6 5.2 4.9 5.3 14.2 100.0
2001 In thousands 111.8 113.2 0.0 105.2 29.0 30.0 25.8 37.2 452.2
Per cent 24.7 25.0 0.0 23.3 6.4 6.6 5.7 8.2 100.0
2002 In thousands 104.8 107.6 – 115.3 21.6 23.5 21.2 32.8 426.8
Per cent 24.6 25.2 – 27.0 5.1 5.5 5.0 7.7 100.0
2003 In thousands 105.1 109.5 – 125.0 21.2 22.5 20.1 36.6 440.0
Per cent 23.9 24.9 – 28.4 4.8 5.1 4.6 8.3 100.0
2004 In thousands 117.4 118.4 – 132.3 16.8 12.6 16.8 28.5 442.8
Per cent 26.5 26.7 – 29.9 3.8 2.8 3.8 6.4 100.0
2005 In thousands 125.6 127.8 – 140.2 21.5 14.7 20.8 31.0 481.6
Per cent 26.1 26.5 – 29.1 4.5 3.1 4.3 6.4 100.0
2006 In thousands 117.7 112.9 – 146.4 16.6 12.3 14.6 13.8 434.3
Per cent 27.1 26.0 – 33.7 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 100.0
2007 In thousands 128.0 133.1 – 151.8 19.3 14.6 23.4 6.8 477.0
Per cent 27.6 28.7 – 32.7 2.7 2.3 3.7 2.3 100.0
2008 In thousands 120.7a 145.7 – 158.2 21.2 21.2 25.0 14.1 506.1
Per cent 23.8 28.8 – 31.3 4.2 4.2 4.9 2.8 100.0
2009 In thousands 212.8 151.9 – 205.0 7.3 14.9 26.2 4.1 622.2
Per cent 34.2 24.4 – 32.9 1.2 2.4 4.2 0.7 100.0
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or, TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
Comparable to 2009: 134.1 thousand people.
b Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included in the number of those receiving in-
come support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 
2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the on call support.
c The number financed from the MPA Decentralized Base.
Note: The closing numbers from October of each year. For the percentage data, the sum of those registered and 
those taking part in labour market programs ≈100.0.
Source: FH.
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Table 5.14: The number of registered unemployeda who became employedb on subsidised  
and non-subsidised employment
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent Persons Per cent
Subsidised employment 137,136 42.7 130,081 37.4 104,842 32.7 118,703 34.0 170,464 40.0
Non-subsidised employment 184,389 57.3 217,606 62.6 215,686 67.3 230,558 66.0 255,356 60.0
Total 321,525 100.0 347,687 100.0 320,528 100.0 349,261 100.0 425,820 100.0
a Since 2006: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employ-
ment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b Yearly total.
Source: FH.
Table 5.15: Distribution of registered unemployeda, unemployment benefit recipientsb  
and unemployment assistance recipients by educational attainment
Educational attainment 1995 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008c 2009
Registered unemployed
8 grades of primary school or less 43.6 40.9 42.3 42.7 41.8 41.5 42.8 43.8 – 40.0
Vocational school 34.5 36.0 34.2 32.2 32.6 32.3 31.5 30.7 – 33.1
Vocational secondary school 11.7 12.8 13.0 13.4 13.6 13.6 13.2 12.8 – 14.4
Grammar school 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 – 8.3
College 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.2 – 3.0
University 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 – 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0
482.7 406.4 359.6 350.7 388.1 359.6 402.7 415.6 – 549.0
Unemployment benefit recipientsd
Registered unemployed 36.9 32.0 29.7 28.9 28.2 25.4 25.4 24.4 26.3 25.7
8 grades of primary school or less 36.6 39.5 40.7 39.2 39.3 39.5 37.4 37.0 39.2 39.2
Vocational school 14.9 16.0 16.7 17.7 17.9 18.7 19.2 19.3 18.3 18.5
Vocational secondary school 8.3 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.6 10.1
Grammar school 2.2 2.6 2.9 3.6 3.7 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.7 4.7
College 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.8
University 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
164.1 121.3 110.3 100.3 104.9 91.5 119.3 92.5 126.9 210.3
Unemployment assistance recipientse
Registered unemployed 56.8 50.0 55.5 61.1 60.4 60.1 60.3 60.3 – 59.4
8 grades of primary school or less 30.6 34.3 30.0 27.6 27.8 27.7 27.1 26.5 – 26.6
Vocational school 6.9 8.7 7.4 6.1 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 – 7.5
Vocational secondary school 4.5 5.7 5.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7 – 4.8
Grammar school 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 – 1.2
College 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 – 0.4
University 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 – 100.0
220.7 186.6 136.9 114.6 127.8 116.5 130.9 145.8 – 144.1
a Since 2006: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed. (The data concern the closing date of each 
month.) From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to 
registered jobseekers.
b After 2006: those receiving jobseeking support.
c The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
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1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or, TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The right-hand column of 2008 contains the 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
d Does not contain those receiving unemployment aid prior to pension in 2004.
e Those receiving the discontinued income support supplement were included in the number of those receiving in-
come support supplement up to 2004, and in the number of those receiving regular social assistance from 2005 to 
2008. From 2009, those receiving social assistance were included in a new support type, the on call support.
Note: Data from the closing date of June in each year.
Source: FH.
Table 5.16: The ratio of those who are employed among the former participants of ALMPs, per cent
Active labour market programmes 1996a 1997a 1998a 1999a 2000a 2001a 2002a 2003a 2004a 2005a 2006a 2007a 2008a 2009b
Suggested training programmesc 44.5 46.3 46.8 46.8 48.4 45.4 43.3 43.0 45.5 43.8 41.1 37.5 42.2 42.6
Accepted training programmesd 50.2 51.1 51.5 50.0 52.0 49.3 45.8 46.0 45.6 51.4 50.9 47.6 48.0 43.0
Retrainig of those who are employede 92.8 90.4 94.7 94.8 94.9 94.2 92.7 93.3 92.1 90.4 .. 92.3 93.9 ..
Support for self-employmentf 90.2 88.1 91.7 90.5 89.4 89.2 90.7 89.6 90.7 89.6 86.4 87.6 83.6 71.4
Wage subsidy programmesg 70.1 66.3 59.1 59.7 62.3 59.7 62.9 62.0 64.6 62.6 62.3 63.4 65.0 63.8
Work experience programmesh – 65.7 59.1 55.8 57.9 64.5 66.9 66.1 66.5 66.8 66.6 66.3 74.6 ..
Further employment programmei – 72.1 75.1 68.5 73.8 71.6 78.4 78.2 71.5 70.9 65.0 77.5 – ..
a Three months after the end of programmes.
b Six months after the end of programmes.
c Suggested training: group traning programmes for jobseekers organized by the NFSZ.
d Accepted training: participation in programmes initiated by the jobseekers and accepted by NFSZ for full or par-
tial support.
e Training for employed persons: training for those whose jobs are at risk of termination, if new knowledge allows 
them to adapt to the new needs of the employer.
f Support to help entrepeneurship: support of jobseekers in the amount of the monthly minimum wage or maximum 
HUF 3 million lumpsum support (to be repaid or not), aimed at helping them become individual entrepreneurs or 
self-employed.
g Wage support: aimed at helping the employment of disadvantaged persons, who would not be able to, or would 
have a harder time finding work without support.
h Work experience programmes: to aid first time jobseekers (new entrants) for 6–9 months, the support covers the 
wage and 50–80% of additional work-related costs. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
i Further employment programmes: to support the continued employment of new entrants under the age of 25 for 9 
months. Discontinued from December 31, 2006.
Source: FH.
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Table 5.17: Outflow from the Register of Beneficiaries
Year
Total number  
of outflows
Of which:
Year
Total number  
of outflows
Of which:
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
became  
employed, %
benefit period 
expired, %
1993 580,880 32,1 .. 2002 303,288 27.6 66.7
1994 485,045 27,8 .. 2003 297,640 26.7 65.2
1995 370,941 27,7 .. 2004 308,027 27.4 64.6
1996 408,828 24,2 58,4 2005 329,738 27.2 63.0
1997 327,486 26,8 58,7 2006 234,273 33.2 53.7
1998 322,496 26,5 64,5 2007 251,889 33.4 46.9
1999 320,132 26,0 67,4 2008 232,151 40.0 48.7
2000 325,341 28,1 64,6 2008a 261,573 43.4 48.9
2001 308,780 27,2 65,1 2009 343,812 38.2 56.2
a The new IT system introduced at the NFSZ in 2008 made the methodological changes possible:
1) The filtering out of those returning after or starting a break from the number of those entering or leaving the dif-
ferent types of jobseeking support. The main reasons for a break are work for short time periods, receipt of child 
support (GYES) or, TGYÁS, or involvement in training.
2) Taking into account in the previous period the number of those entrants, for whom the first accounting of the 
jobseeking support was delayed due to missing documentation.
The row of 2008 a contains the data from 2008 in the form comparable to the 2009 data.
Source: FH.
Table 5.18: The distribution of the total number of labour market training participanta
Groups of training participants 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Participants in suggested training 52,045 52,198 53,447 46,802 45,261 33,002 29,252 36,212 32,747 48,561 41,373
Participants in accepted training 28,311 30,949 32,672 31,891 28,599 19,406 9,620 7,327 5,766 4,939 8,241
One Step Forward (OFS) programme – – – – – – – – 270 59,347 11,169
Non-employed participants together 80,356 83,147 86,211 78,693 73,859 52,407 38,872 43,539 38,783 112,847 60,783
Of which: school-leavers 25,260 22,131 20,592 19,466 18,320 12,158 9,313 1,365 1,111 18,719 21,103
Employed participants 4,408 5,026 5,308 4,142 9,036 7,487 4,853 3,602 3,467 37,466 12,496
Total 84,764 88,173 91,519 82,835 82,895 59,894 43,725 47,141 42,250 150,313 73,279
a The data contain the number of those financed from the MPA decentralized employment base, as well as those 
involved in training as a part of the HEFOP 1.1 and the TÁMOP 1.1.2 programs.
Source: FH.
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Table 5.19: Employment ratio of participants ALMPs by gender, age groups  
and educational attainment for the programmes finished in 2009, per cent
Non-employed participants Supported self-
employmenta
Wage subsidy  
programmesuggested training accepted training total
By gender
Males 41.0 41.7 41.3 73.2 71.4
Females 39.9 42.0 40.7 73.1 73.4
By age groups
–20 37.3 35.5 37.3 75.5 68.3
20–24 46.5 46.1 47.0 77.0 74.4
25–29 44.5 49.1 45.8 73.6 73.7
–29 together 43.9 44.5 42.3 75.2 72.2
30–34 41.6 47.1 42.5 73.1 74.7
35–39 40.1 39.7 40.1 75.7 72.4
40–44 37.8 38.2 38.1 68.7 71.7
45–49 30.5 37.8 32.0 70.7 70.7
50–54 32.7 30.1 32.5 71.9 72.5
55+ 36.5 27.3 35.7 70.0 64.2
By educational attainment
Less than primary school 29.9 23.9 28.7 .. 57.2
Primary school 38.2 34.6 37.8 66.6 67.6
Vocational school for skilled workers 40.7 43.0 41.0 75.5 71.5
Vocational school 38.0 37.2 37.5 56.7 68.2
Special vocational school .. .. .. .. ..
Vocational secondary school 41.4 48.5 43.2 76.5 76.1
Technicians secondary school 46.4 51.0 47.6 72.6 79.0
Grammar school 39.0 41.2 39.8 72.7 75.2
College 47.2 44.8 47.2 69.4 79.5
University 41.5 37.2 42.5 69.3 76.8
Total 40.4 41.9 41.0 73.1 72.4
a Survival rate.
Note: 6 months after the end of each programme.
Source: FH.
Table 5.20: The distribution of the yearly number of labour market training participants,  
according to the type of traning, per cent
Types of training 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Approved  
qualification 80.4 77.9 79.8 79.6 78.8 78.7 77.6 78.3 75.1 72.9 71.5 69.0 65.8 63.6
Non-approved 
qualification 15.8 16.0 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.0 13.6 12.6 15.0 14.5 16.9 19.9 22.8 26.4
Foreign language 
learning 3.8 6.1 5.7 5.7 6.5 7.3 8.8 9.1 9.9 12.6 11.5 11.1 11.4 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FH.
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Table 5.21: The distribution of those entering into the training programmes by age groups and educational level
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total number of entrants 45,092 25,760 27,727 26,459 25,353 42,710 37,467
By age groups, %
–20 10.4 9.0 9.7 8.7 7.0 8.1 4.9
20–24 24.1 22.3 23.1 23.0 24.7 26.9 25.1
25–44 54.7 54.9 52.3 52.0 51.3 48.3 51.5
45–49 6.5 7.9 7.8 7.8 8.0 7.0 8.5
50+ 4.3 5.9 7.1 8.4 9.2 9.7 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
By level of education, %
Less than primary school 1.3 1.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 2.1 7.5
Primary school 23.1 23.8 26.3 25.1 24.0 28.1 22.8
Vocational school 26.9 26.6 25.7 26.8 24.5 21.9 22.0
Vocational and technical secondary school 25.7 24.5 23.3 23.5 23.9 22.6 24.8
Grammar school 15.5 14.2 14.4 15.0 16.3 15.9 15.3
College, university 7.6 9.2 8.1 8.4 9.8 9.4 7.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: FH.
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Table 6.1: Nominal and real earnings
Year
Gross  
earnings
Net  
earnings
Gross earnings 
index
Net earnings 
index
Consumer 
price index
Real earnings 
index
HUF previous year = 100
1989 10,571 8,165 117.9 116.9 117.2 99.7
1990 13,446 10,108 128.6 121.6 128.9 94.3
1995 38,900 25,891 116.8 112.6 128.2 87.8
1996 46,837 30,544 120.4 117.4 123.6 95.0
1997 57,270 38,145 122.3 124.1 118.3 104.9
1998 67,764 45,162 118.3 118.4 114.3 103.6
1999 77,187 50,076 116.1 112.7 110.0 102.5
2000 87,645 55,785 113.5 111.4 109.8 101.5
2001 103,553 64,913 118.0 116.2 109.2 106.4
2002 122,482 77,622 118.3 119.6 105.3 113.6
2003 137,187 88,751 112.0 114.3 104.7 109.2
2004 145,520 93,715 106.0 105.6 106.8 99.0
2005 158,343 103,149 108.8 110.1 103.6 106.3
2006 171,239 110,896 108.1 107.5 103.9 103.5
2007 185,004 114,112 108.0 103.0 108.0 95.4
2008 198,964 122,267 107.5 107.0 106.1 100.8
2009 199,775 124,086 100.5 101.7 104.2 97.6
Source: KSH IMS.
Figure 6.1: Annual changes of gross and net real earnings
Source: KSH IMS.
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Table 6.2.a: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, HUF/person/month
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 59,362 72,261 84,542 89,446 97,219 103,190 112,388 122,231 133,570 137,101
Mining and quarrying 109,046 124,755 135,770 142,882 158,945 171,465 190,530 202,985 225,650 244,051
Manufacturing 88,031 100,964 113,707 123,914 136,354 145,997 158,597 172,277 183,081 190,331
Electricity, gas, steam 
and air conditioning 
supply
133,658 153,100 176,269 198,733 223,541 243,039 265,912 294,241 321,569 345,035
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities
83,938 95,214 108,585 119,341 129,486 140,699 151,912 164,572 178,049 181,818
Construction 64,288 79,368 86,324 94,193 100,124 106,608 117,626 136,301 146,475 152,204
Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles
78,417 91,303 106,709 115,922 122,538 131,068 145,243 158,077 171,780 175,207
Transportation and stor-
age 87,473 100,148 112,577 124,419 137,526 149,068 162,091 173,776 186,376 196,350
Accommodation and food 
service activities 55,276 66,358 77,756 87,115 90,089 95,823 102,908 112,222 120,600 122,561
Information and commu-
nication 169,984 203,466 234,040 250,308 273,606 288,876 306,792 328,902 358,217 366,752
Financial and insurance 
activities 189,818 217,018 241,654 274,081 324,295 349,809 401,580 390,511 431,601 427,508
Real estate activities 89,468 94,671 111,627 122,087 126,388 134,409 145,550 159,225 169,845 177,747
Professional, scientific 
and technical activities 110,626 136,522 149,544 167,758 182,970 200,830 212,963 244,998 281,150 292,974
Administrative and sup-
port service activities 73,108 89,575 102,693 107,250 113,276 119,555 128,486 139,127 147,125 149,131
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory 
social security
104,288 131,731 167,856 180,866 184,357 207,356 223,009 253,335 267,657 234,696
Education 81,160 97,580 128,536 162,293 159,803 181,444 191,211 193,250 204,600 194,958
Human health and social 
work activities 68,372 78,796 103,149 129,995 130,509 144,100 151,889 160,050 169,977 161,265
Arts, entertainment and 
recreation 75,318 87,630 112,894 137,826 141,957 154,312 161,416 183,898 183,813 179,199
Other service activities 66,946 80,752 91,198 103,554 127,136 133,846 140,893 153,512 157,950 160,375
National economy, total 87,750 103,554 122,481 137,193 145,523 158,343 171,351 185,018 198,741 199,837
Of which:
– Business sector 88,424 102,834 116,596 127,032 138,926 148,555 162,531 177,415 192,044 200,304
– Budgetary institutions 86,573 105,944 136,844 160,844 161,559 182,185 193,949 206,225 219,044 201,632
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
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Table 6.2.b: Gross earnings ratios in the economy, per cent
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 67.6 69.8 69.0 65.2 66.8 65.2 65.6 66.1 67.2 68.6
Mining and quarrying 124.3 120.5 110.8 104.1 109.2 108.3 111.2 109.7 113.5 122.1
Manufacturing 100.3 97.5 92.8 90.3 93.7 92.2 92.6 93.1 92.1 95.2
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 152.3 147.8 143.9 144.9 153.6 153.5 155.2 159.0 161.8 172.7
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 95.7 91.9 88.7 87.0 89.0 88.9 88.7 88.9 89.6 91.0
Construction 73.3 76.6 70.5 68.7 68.8 67.3 68.6 73.7 73.7 76.2
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles 89.4 88.2 87.1 84.5 84.2 82.8 84.8 85.4 86.4 87.7
Transportation and storage 99.7 96.7 91.9 90.7 94.5 94.1 94.6 93.9 93.8 98.3
Accommodation and food service activities 63.0 64.1 63.5 63.5 61.9 60.5 60.1 60.7 60.7 61.3
Information and communication 193.7 196.5 191.1 182.4 188.0 182.4 179.0 177.8 180.2 183.5
Financial and insurance activities 216.3 209.6 197.3 199.8 222.8 220.9 234.4 211.1 217.2 213.9
Real estate activities 102.0 91.4 91.1 89.0 86.9 84.9 84.9 86.1 85.5 88.9
Professional, scientific and technical activities 126.1 131.8 122.1 122.3 125.7 126.8 124.3 132.4 141.5 146.6
Administrative and support service activities 83.3 86.5 83.8 78.2 77.8 75.5 75.0 75.2 74.0 74.6
Public administration and defence;  
compulsory social security 118.8 127.2 137.0 131.8 126.7 131.0 130.1 136.9 134.7 117.4
Education 92.5 94.2 104.9 118.3 109.8 114.6 111.6 104.4 102.9 97.6
Human health and social work activities 77.9 76.1 84.2 94.8 89.7 91.0 88.6 86.5 85.5 80.7
Arts, entertainment and recreation 85.8 84.6 92.2 100.5 97.5 97.5 94.2 99.4 92.5 89.7
Other service activities 76.3 78.0 74.5 75.5 87.4 84.5 82.2 83.0 79.5 80.3
National economy, total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which:
– Business sector 100.8 99.3 95.2 92.6 95.5 93.8 94.9 95.9 96.6 100.2
– Budgetary institutions 98.7 102.3 111.7 117.2 111.0 115.1 113.2 111.5 110.2 100.9
Note: The data are recalculated based on the industrial classification system in effect from 2008.
Source: KSH mid-year IMS.
Table 6.3: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Male 0.1680 0.1690 0.1520 0.1500 0.1270 0.1400 0.1370 0.1310 0.1380 0.1630 0.1540 0.1570
Less than primary 
school –0.5610 –0.5490 –0.5540 –0.4520 –0.4080 –0.4040 –0.3860 –0.4850 –0.3850 –0.4400 –0.3730 –0.4540
Primary school –0.4140 –0.4100 –0.3770 –0.3440 –0.3220 –0.3450 –0.3490 –0.3480 –0.3500 –0.3800 –0.3710 –0.3740
Vocational school –0.2660 –0.2700 –0.2307 –0.2270 –0.2310 –0.2360 –0.2400 –0.2410 –0.2430 –0.2510 –0.2430 –0.2520
College, university 0.5450 0.5960 0.6000 0.5660 0.5700 0.6390 0.6130 0.6200 0.6170 0.6020 0.5890 0.6040
Estimated labour 
market experience 0.0224 0.0236 0.0215 0.0189 0.0186 0.0196 0.0207 0.0204 0.0232 0.0230 0.0233 0.0242
Square of esti-
mated labour 
market experience
–0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004
Civil servant 0.1970 0.1100 0.1770 0.1620 0.4820 0.2110 0.3400 0.3290 0.3240 0.2590 0.2680 0.0981
Public servant –0.2290 –0.2230 –0.1900 –0.1720 0.0208 0.0966 0.1030 0.1140 0.1290 0.0769 0.0599 –0.1230
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the reference group in log points 
(approximately percentage points). All parameters are significant at the 0.01 level.
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All equation specifications control for industrial classification. We do not include the parameter estimates of the 
industrial classification variables, since the classification changed several times between 1998 and 2009. The region 
parameters can be seen in Table 9.6.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate) , in the business sector, working 
in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: FH BT.
Table 6.4: Percentage of low paid workersa by gender, age groups, level of education and industries
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
By gender
Males 15.2 15.6 18.1 18.1 18.8 22.1 20.7 22.3 24.8 25.1 25.4 26.7 21.9 21.2 21.1
Females 24.8 26.5 25.7 25.9 26.4 26.8 25.0 22.5 21.6 22.8 22.9 21.9 21.3 20.8 21.7
By age groups
–24 40.2 37.8 39.1 37.7 37.9 37.0 35.5 37.6 39.9 43.9 44.2 46.3 40.1 34.6 38.9
25–54 18.0 19.4 20.2 20.6 21.3 22.8 21.9 21.8 22.3 23.6 24.0 24.2 21.4 20.6 21.0
55+ 10.3 11.0 11.8 12.7 17.2 19.8 18.1 16.2 15.3 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.8 15.5 17.6
By level of education
8 grades of primary school 
or less 37.6 40.1 40.6 42.9 43.9 43.4 40.4 38.3 37.1 39.6 41.2 40.1 41.4 41.3 47.4
Vocational school 24.7 23.7 27.0 26.9 28.6 31.2 29.4 32.1 35.4 35.7 36.8 37.9 32.9 32.1 33.5
Secondary school 12.9 13.1 14.0 14.2 15.4 18.8 18.0 16.5 17.7 18.6 18.6 19.7 16.1 15.4 16.4
Higher education 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 4.7 4.7 3.6 3.5 3.9 3.8 4.3 2.5 2.4 2.3
By industriesb
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 32.1 30.1 36.7 36.7 38.1 38.0 34.3 37.9 37.3 37.1 37.5 41.6 37.9 36.6 36.7
Manufacturing 16.4 15.8 18.5 18.9 18.9 20.0 19.1 19.4 25.4 24.7 22.1 24.1 20.8 23.5 23.0
Construction 23.5 26.7 32.7 32.6 36.7 42.9 41.7 44.8 49.8 51.2 50.2 55.2 43.1 37.5 38.1
Trade, repairing 31.9 31.7 36.0 37.7 36.8 42.8 41.3 44.0 49.0 49.3 51.5 49.4 40.9 35.9 35.2
Transport, storage, commu-
nication 8.6 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.0 11.3 10.6 10.5 13.6 12.6 13.8 15.1 13.2 14.6 11.2
Financial intermediation 17.9 17.0 19.9 19.9 21.1 25.3 22.6 20.7 23.1 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.9 20.0 20.5
Public administration and 
defence, compulsory social 
security
17.0 25.9 19.0 15.5 16.0 13.7 13.8 9.3 6.6 8.2 6.0 6.3 7.4 6.7 8.7
Education 20.6 25.6 21.7 23.2 23.8 21.5 22.6 16.0 4.8 6.9 8.8 6.1 9.0 7.2 11.9
Health and social work 25.2 25.9 24.1 25.8 28.0 26.7 19.9 16.1 6.3 8.4 10.3 8.6 12.6 11.1 14.5
Total 19.9 21.0 21.9 22.0 22.7 24.4 22.8 22.4 23.2 24.0 24.2 24.3 21.6 21.0 21.4
a Percentage of those who earn less than 2/3 of the median earning.
b 1995–2008: by TEÁOR’03, 2009: by TEÁOR’08.
Source: FH BT.
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Figure 6.2: The percentage of low paid workers  
by gender, per cent
Source: FH BT.
Figure 6.3: The dispersion of gross monthly earnings
Source: FH BT.
Figure 6.4: Age-income profiles by education level in 1998 and 2009, women and men
Source: FH BT.
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Figure 6.5: The dispersion of the logarithm of gross real earnings (2009 = 100%)
 Women Men
1992
1996
2002
2009
Source: FH BT.
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Table 7.1: School-leavers by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 119,809 49,232 43,167 14,859
1990 164,614 54,933 53,039 15,963
1991 158,907 59,302 54,248 16,458
1992 151,287 66,261 59,646 16,201
1993 144,200 66,342 68,607 16,223
1994 136,857 62,902 68,604 18,041
1995 122,333 57,057 70,265 20,024
1996 120,529 54,209 73,413 22,128
1997 116,708 46,868 75,564 24,411
1998 113,651 42,866 77,660 25,338
1999 114,302 38,822 73,965 27,049
2000 114,250 35,500a 72,200a 28,300a
2001 114,200a 33,500a 70,441 29,746
2002 113,923 26,941 69,612 30,785
2003 117,747 26,472 71,944 31,911
2004 113,179 26,620 76,669 31,633
2005 115,626 25,519 77,025 32,732
2006 114,240 24,427 76,895 29,871
2007 108,889 17,967 77,527 29,059
2008 106,426 19,289 68,453 28,957
2009 102,798 20,138 78,004 35,274
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Ex-
cludes special schools.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
0
20
40
60
80
100
2009
1993
2221201918171615
Age
Per cent
Figure 7.1: Full time studens as a percentage of the different age groups
Source: NEFMI STAT.
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Table 7.2: Pupils/students entering the school system by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980 171,347 60,865 57,213 17,886
1990 125,665 87,932 83,939 22,662
1995 123,997 65,352 82,665 42,433
1996 124,554 58,822 84,773 44,698
1997 127,214 53,083 84,395 45,669
1998 125,875 39,965 86,868 48,886
1999 121,424 33,570 89,184 51,586
2000 117,000 33,900a 90,800a 54,100a
2001 112,144 34,210 92,393 56,709
2002 112,345 33,497 94,256 57,763
2003 114,020 33,394 92,817 59,699
2004 101,021 32,645 93,469 59,783
2005 97,810 33,114 96,181 61,898
2006 95,954 32,732 95,989 61,231
2007 98,766 31,897 92,957 55,789
2008 97,345 32,774 90,667 52,755
2009 97,083 34,177 87,731 61,948
a Estimated data.
Note: Primary school: completed the 8th grade. Other levels: received certificate. Ex-
cludes special schools.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
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Figure 7.2: Flows of the educational system by level
Source: NEFMI STAT.
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Table 7.3: The number of full time pupils/students by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980/81 1,162,203 162,709 203,238 64,057
1989/90 1,183,573 213,697 273,511 72,381
1990/91 1,130,656 222,204 291,872 76,601
1994/95 985,291 185,751 337,317 116,370
1995/96 974,806 172,599 349,299 129,541
1996/97 965,998 158,407 361,395 142,113
1997/98 963,997 143,911 368,645 152,889
1998/99 964,248 128,203 376,626 163,100
1999/00 960,601 117,038 386,579 171,516
2001/02 905,932 123,954 420,889 184,071
2002/03 893,261 123,341 426,384 193,155
2003/04 874,296 123,206 437,909 204,910
2004/05 854,930 123,008 438,496 212,292
2005/06 828,594 121,815 441,002 217,245
2006/07 800,635 119,520 443,166 224,616
2007/08 783,948 122,978 441,886 227,118
2008/09 765,822 123,640 439,957 224,894
2009/10 752,896 128,479 443,078 222,564
Note: Excludes special schools. Beginning with the 2001/2002 schoolyear, students in 
grades 5–8 who attend a 6 or 8 year high school are included in the number of high 
school students. The reason for the missing data in 2000/01 is that the NEFMI was 
unable to carry out the analysis based in the source data due to technical difficulties.
Source: NEFMI STAT.
Table 7.4: The number of pupils/students not in full time by level of education
Year Primary school Vocational school Secondary school College, university
1980/81 15,627 – 130,332 37,109
1989/90 13,199 – 75,581 28,487
1990/91 11,536 – 68,162 25,786
1994/95 6,558 – 81,204 38,290
1995/96 5,205 – 75,891 50,024
1996/97 4,099 – 74,653 56,919
1997/98 3,165 – 78,292 80,768
1998/99 3,016 – 84,862 95,215
1999/00 3,146 – 88,462 107,385
2000/01 2,940 – 91,700 118,994
2001/02 2,793 2,453 95,231 129,167
2002/03 2,785 3,427 93,172 148,032
2003/04 3,190 3,216 93,322 162,037
2004/05 2,766 3,505 90,321 166,174
2005/06 2,543 4,049 89,950 163,387
2006/07 2,319 4,829 91,035 151,203
2007/08 2,245 5,874 83,008 132,273
2008/09 2,083 4,983 74,008 115,957
2009/10 2,035 6,594 70,124 105,511
Source: NEFMI STAT.
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Table 7.5: Number of high school applicants, full time
Year
Applied Admitted
Admitted as a 
percentage of 
applied
Applied Admitted
as a percentage of the secondary 
school graduates in the given year
1980 33,339 14,796 44.4 77.2 34.3
1989 44,138 15,420 34.9 84.0 29.3
1990 46,767 16,818 36.0 88.2 31.7
1991 48,911 20,338 41.6 90.2 37.5
1992 59,119 24,022 40.6 99.1 40.3
1993 71,741 28,217 39.3 104.6 41.1
1994 79,805 29,901 37.5 116.3 43.6
1995 86,548 35,081 40.5 123.2 49.9
1996 79,369 38,382 48.4 108.1 52.3
1997 81,924 40,355 49.3 108.4 53.4
1998 81,065 43,629 53.8 104.4 56.2
1999 82,815 44,538 53.8 112.0 60.2
2000 82,957 45,546 54.9 114.9 63.1
2001 84,380 49,874 59.1 119.8 70.8
2002 88,978 52,552 59.1 127.8 75.5
2003 87,110 52,703 60.5 121.1 73.3
2004 95,871 55,179 57.6 125.0 72.0
2005 91,583 52,863 57.7 118.9 68.6
2006 84,262 53,983 64.1 109.6 70.2
2007 74,849 50,941 68.1 96.5 65.7
2008 66,963 52,081 77.8 97.8 76.1
2009 90,878 61,262 67.4 116.5 78.5
Source: NEFMI STAT.
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Table 8.1: The number of vacanciesa reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Year
Number of vacancies  
at closing day
Number of registered unem-
ployedb at closing date
Vacancies per 100  
registered unemployed
1991 14,343 227,270 6.3
1992 21,793 556,965 3.9
1993 34,375 671,745 5.1
1994 35,569 568,366 6.3
1995 28,680 507,695 5.6
1996 38,297 500,622 7.6
1997 42,544 470,112 9.0
1998 46,624 423,121 11.0
1999 51,438 409,519 12.6
2000 50,000 390,492 12.8
2001 45,194 364,140 12.4
2002 44,603 344,715 12.9
2003 47,239 357,212 13.2
2004 48,223 375,950 12.8
2005 41,615 409,929 10.2
2006 41,677 393,465 10.6
2007 29,933 426,915 7.0
2008 25,386 442,333 5.7
2009 20,739 561,768 3.7
a Monthly average stock figures.
b Since 2006: registered jobseekers instead of registered unemployed.
Source: FH.
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Figure 8.1: The number of vacancies reported to the local offices of the NFSZ
Source: FH.
statistical data
294
Table 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staffa, per cent
Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase Year
Intending to 
decrease
Intending to 
increase
1993 I. 34,7 23,6 2000 I. 24.4 41.0
II. 28,5 22,3 II. 27.2 36.5
1994 I. 24,5 29,1 2001 I. 25.3 40.0
II. 21,0 29,7 II. 28.6 32.6
1995 I. 30,1 32,9 2002 I. 25.6 39.2
II. 30,9 27,5 II. 27.9 35.4
1996 I. 32,9 33,3 2003 I. 23.6 38.5
II. 29,4 30,4 II. 32.1 34.3
1997 I. 29,6 39,4 2004 30.0 39.8
II. 30,7 36,8 2005 25.3 35.0
1998 I. 23,4 42,7 2006 26.6 36.2
II. 28,9 37,1 2007 20.4 27.0
1999 I. 25,8 39,2 2008 26.9 23.2
II. 28,8 35,8 2009 18.4 26.8
a In the period of the next half year after the interview date, in the sample of FH PROG, 
since 2004: 1 year later from the interview date.
Source: FH PROG.
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Figure 8.2: Firms intending to increase/decrease their staff
Source: FH PROG.
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Table 9.1: Regional inequalities: Employment ratea
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 62.3 57.7 62.0 57.2 52.2 52.5 57.9 58.0
1995 57.1 53.1 58.5 48.8 46.3 46.4 53.0 52.5
1996 56.8 52.7 59.3 50.3 45.7 45.6 52.8 52.4
1997 56.8 53.6 59.8 50.0 45.7 45.2 53.6 52.5
1998 57.7 56.0 61.6 51.5 46.2 46.4 54.2 53.7
1999 59.7 58.5 63.1 52.8 48.1 48.8 55.3 55.6
2000 60.5 59.2 63.4 53.5 49.4 49.0 56.0 56.3
2001 60.8 59.8 63.2 52.5 49.6 49.6 56.2 56.5
2001b 60.6 59.3 63.1 52.3 49.7 49.5 55.8 56.2
2002b 60.9 60.0 63.7 51.6 50.3 49.3 54.2 56.2
2003b 61.7 62.3 61.9 53.4 51.2 51.6 53.2 57.0
2004b 62.9 60.3 61.4 52.3 50.6 50.4 53.6 56.8
2005b 63.3 60.2 62.0 53.4 49.5 50.2 53.8 56.9
2006b 62.7 61.4 62.8 53.6 50.4 51.1 54.3 57.3
2007b 62.7 61.8 63.4 51.2 50.8 50.5 55.2 57.3
2008b 62.7 60.3 62.1 51.0 49.5 49.9 54.5 56.7
2009b 61.6 57.8 59.7 52.1 48.6 48.1 53.2 55.4
a Age: 15–64.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
Figure 9.1: Regional inequalities: Labour force participation rates,  
gross monthly earnings and gross domestic product in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: Employment rate: KSH MEF; gross domestic product: KSH; earnings: FH BT.
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Table 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment ratea
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1992 7.4 11.7 7.3 9.6 14.0 12.5 10.2 9.9
1993 9.9 12.6 9.0 12.8 16.1 14.8 12.4 12.1
1994 8.8 10.7 7.7 12.0 15.2 13.8 10.5 10.8
1995 7.4 11.0 6.9 12.1 16.0 13.8 9.3 10.3
1996 8.2 10.4 7.1 9.4 15.5 13.2 8.4 10.0
1997 7.0 8.1 6.0 9.9 14.0 12.0 7.3 8.8
1998 5.7 6.8 6.1 9.4 12.2 11.1 7.1 7.8
1999 5.2 6.1 4.4 8.3 11.6 10.2 5.8 7.0
2000 5.3 4.9 4.2 7.8 10.1 9.3 5.1 6.4
2001 4.3 4.3 4.2 7.8 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2001b 4.3 4.3 4.1 7.7 8.5 7.8 5.4 5.7
2002b 3.9 5.0 4.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 6.2 5.8
2003b 4.0 4.6 4.6 7.9 9.7 6.8 6.5 5.9
2004b 4.5 5.6 4.6 7.3 9.7 7.2 6.3 6.1
2005b 5.2 6.3 5.9 8.8 10.6 9.1 8.2 7.2
2006b 5.1 6.1 5.7 9.0 11.0 10.9 7.8 7.5
2007b 4.7 5.0 5.0 10.0 12.3 10.8 7.9 7.4
2008b 4.6 5.8 5.0 10.3 13.4 12.0 8.8 7.8
2009b 6.6 9.3 8.6 11.0 15.2 14.2 10.9 10.0
a Age: 15–74.
b Marked data are reweighted on the basis of the 2001 Population Census. Correspond-
ence to the time series calculated with the old weights is ensured by the 2001 data, 
which is prepared using both weights.
Source: KSH MEF.
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Figure 9.2: Regional inequalities: LFS-based unemployment rates in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: KSH MEF.
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Table 9.3: Regional differences: The ratio of unemployeda in the active population,b per cent
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1991 1.7 3.7 2.8 4.8 7.0 6.5 5.2 4.1
1992 5.7 10.4 7.2 10.8 15.7 15.0 12.2 10.3
1993 8.0 12.8 9.1 13.1 19.1 18.2 14.7 12.9
1994 6.6 11.5 8.5 11.9 16.6 16.9 12.9 11.3
1995 6.3 10.6 7.6 11.7 15.6 16.1 11.5 10.6
1996 6.4 10.7 8.0 12.6 16.7 16.8 11.3 11.0
1997 5.6 9.9 7.3 13.1 16.8 16.4 11.0 10.5
1998 4.7 8.6 6.1 11.8 16.0 15.0 10.1 9.5
1999 4.5 8.7 5.9 12.1 17.1 16.1 10.4 9.7
2000 3.8 7.5 5.6 11.8 17.2 16.0 10.4 9.3
2001 3.2 6.7 5.0 11.2 16.0 14.5 9.7 8.5
2002 2.8 6.6 4.9 11.0 15.6 13.3 9.2 8.0
2003 2.8 6.7 5.2 11.7 16.2 14.1 9.7 8.3
2004 3.2 6.9 5.8 12.2 15.7 14.1 10.4 8.7
2005 3.4 7.4 6.9 13.4 16.5 15.1 11.2 9.4
2006 3.1 7.0 6.3 13.0 15.9 15.0 10.7 9.0
2007 3.5 6.9 6.3 13.6 17.6 16.6 11.7 9.7
2008 3.6 7.1 6.3 14.3 17.8 17.5 11.9 10.0
2009 5.4 11.5 9.5 17.8 20.9 20.2 14.4 12.8
a Since 2006: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Em-
ployment Act changed the definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers.
b The denominator of the ratio is the economically active population on January 1st of 
the previous year.
Source: FH REG.
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Figure 9.3: Regional inequalities: Registered unemployment rate in NUTS-2 level regions
Source: FH REG.
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Table 9.4: Annual average registered unemployment ratea by counties, per cent
County 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Budapest 0.1 5.7 5.7 4.8 4.0 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6
Baranya 1.1 11.8 12.2 13.3 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.1 11.2 11.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 12.9 13.6 14.7
Bács-Kiskun 1.1 11.0 10.9 10.7 9.7 10.0 10.0 9.3 8.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 10.2 11.4 12.0 17.9
Békés 1.1 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.9 11.2 11.5 12.0 13.0 13.5 15.0 14.8 17.3
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 2.3 16.7 18.0 19.0 17.9 19.5 20.3 19.0 19.1 19.6 18.3 18.9 18.0 19.9 20.1 23.1
Csongrád 1.0 9.9 9.3 9.2 8.1 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.5 9.7 10.7 8.8 9.2 9.3 11.6
Fejér 1.0 10.6 10.4 9.4 8.4 8.3 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.1 7.5 11.5
Győr-Moson-Sopron 0.5 6.8 7.4 6.4 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.9
Hajdú-Bihar 0.9 14.2 15.6 15.0 14.0 15.6 14.7 13.6 12.8 13.1 12.9 14.0 13.9 15.6 16.5 19.1
Heves 1.6 12.5 13.6 12.1 11.7 12.3 12.0 10.6 9.8 10.0 10.6 11.3 11.1 12.2 12.7 15.8
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 1.6 14.6 14.8 14.8 13.5 13.7 13.4 11.5 10.2 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.4 11.8 12.2 15.5
Komárom-Esztergom 1.0 11.3 12.0 11.4 9.8 10.1 8.3 7.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 6.8 5.8 5.4 5.5 10.2
Nógrád 2.4 16.3 17.0 16.3 15.6 16.2 14.9 14.3 13.8 14.6 14.6 16.1 16.1 17.7 17.8 21.2
Pest 0.5 7.6 7.8 7.3 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.2 3.9 4.3 4.4 6.7
Somogy 1.4 11.2 12.5 12.7 11.3 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.5 12.2 13.4 14.5 14.6 16.2 16.9 19.4
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 2.6 19.3 19.7 18.9 17.2 18.7 19.5 17.8 16.7 17.7 17.5 18.6 18.8 21.0 22.4 24.7
Tolna 1.6 12.2 13.4 13.5 12.3 12.9 11.8 11.0 10.0 10.7 11.6 11.8 10.5 11.5 12.1 15.2
Vas 0.4 7.2 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.1 9.8
Veszprém 0.9 10.0 9.9 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 7.7 8.0 8.2 12.6
Zala 0.8 9.2 9.8 9.2 8.1 7.7 7.2 6.5 6.4 7.0 7.4 9.3 9.0 9.3 9.4 13.0
Total 1.0 10.6 11.0 10.5 9.5 9.7 9.3 8.5 8.0 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.0 9.7 10.0 12.8
a Since 2006: the ratio of registered jobseekers. From the 1st of November, 2005 the Employment Act changed the 
definition of registered unemployed to registered jobseekers. The denominator of the ratio is the economically 
active population on January 1st of the previous year.
Source: FH REG.
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Figure 9.4: Regional inequalities: Means of registered unemployment rates in the counties, 2009
Source: FH REG.
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Table 9.5: Regional inequalities: Gross monthly earningsa
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central 
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
1989 11,719 10,880 10,108 10,484 10,472 9,675 9,841 10,822
1995 46,992 38,492 36,394 35,383 35,995 34,704 33,633 40,190
1996 58,154 46,632 44,569 43,015 41,439 41,222 41,208 47,559
1997 70,967 56,753 52,934 51,279 51,797 50,021 50,245 58,022
1998 86,440 68,297 64,602 60,736 60,361 58,208 58,506 69,415
1999 101,427 77,656 74,808 70,195 70,961 68,738 68,339 81,067
2000 114,637 87,078 83,668 74,412 77,714 73,858 73,591 90,338
2001 132,136 100,358 96,216 86,489 88,735 84,930 84,710 103,610
2002 149,119 110,602 106,809 98,662 102,263 98,033 97,432 117,672
2003 170,280 127,819 121,464 117,149 117,847 115,278 113,532 135,472
2004 184,039 137,168 131,943 122,868 128,435 124,075 121,661 147,111
2005 192,962 147,646 145,771 136,276 139,761 131,098 130,406 157,770
2006 212,001 157,824 156,499 144,189 152,521 142,142 143,231 171,794
2007 229,897 173,937 164,378 156,678 159,921 153,241 153,050 186,229
2008 245,931 185,979 174,273 160,624 169,313 160,332 164,430 198,087
2009 254,471 187,352 182,855 169,615 169,333 160,688 164,638 203,859
a Gross monthly earnings (HUF/person), May.
Note: The data refer to full-time employees in the budgetary sector and firms employing at 
least 20 workers (1989), at least 10 workers (1995–99) and at least 5 workers (2000–), 
respectively.
Source: FH BT.
Table 9.6: Regression-adjusted earnings differentials
Year
Central  
Hungary
Western  
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern  
Hungary
Northern  
Great Plain
Southern  
Great Plain
1997 0.0863 –0.0381 –0.0842 –0.1090 –0.1020 –0.0913
1998 0.0897 –0.0416 –0.1010 –0.1270 –0.1280 –0.1140
1999 0.1190 –0.0105 –0.0927 –0.1060 –0.1120 –0.1030
2000 0.1070 –0.0093 –0.1410 –0.1330 –0.1350 –0.1340
2001 0.1000 –0.0095 –0.1230 –0.1310 –0.1300 –0.1350
2002 0.1100 –0.0274 –0.0936 –0.0840 –0.0977 –0.0788
2003 0.0807 –0.0450 –0.1070 –0.1150 –0.1280 –0.1180
2004 0.0849 –0.0338 –0.1270 –0.1010 –0.1290 –0.1150
2005 0.0699 –0.0304 –0.1110 –0.0921 –0.1180 –0.1130
2006 0.0850 –0.0236 –0.1250 –0.0891 –0.1180 –0.1020
2007 0.0772 –0.0778 –0.1260 –0.1210 –0.1420 –0.1270
2008 0.0563 –0.0831 –0.1480 –0.1280 –0.1700 –0.1460
2009 0.0850 –0.0387 –0.1090 –0.1080 –0.1230 –0.1250
Note: the results indicate the earnings differentials of the various groups relative to the 
reference group in log points (approximately percentage points). All parameters are 
significant at the 0.01 level.
All equation specifications control for industrial classification. We do not include the 
parameter estimates of the industrial classification variables, since the classification 
changed several times between 1997 and 2009.
Reference category: women, with leaving certificate (general education certificate) , in 
the business sector, working in the Central-Transdanubia region.
Source: FH BT.
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Table 9.7: Regional inequalities: Gross domestic product
Year
Central 
Hungary
Central  
Transdanubia
Western 
Transdanubia
Southern 
Transdanubia
Northern 
Hungary
Northern 
Great Plain
Southern 
Great Plain Total
Thousand HUF/person/month 
1994 619 365 424 353 292 311 350 422
1995 792 494 559 442 394 386 449 544
1996 993 617 701 532 459 468 539 669
1997 1,254 801 871 641 554 569 640 830
1998 1,474 969 1,083 754 662 660 742 983
1999 1,710 1,051 1,275 859 731 707 819 1,113
2000 2,014 1,255 1,468 957 827 815 918 1,290
2001 2,311 1,372 1,539 1,074 947 965 1,031 1,458
2002 2,701 1,462 1,703 1,204 1,050 1,062 1,136 1,648
2003 2,940 1,719 2,001 1,321 1,186 1,213 1,254 1,841
2004 3,237 1,953 2,143 1,468 1,366 1,351 1,439 2,021
2005 3,564 2,056 2,169 1,517 1,439 1,390 1,483 2,185
2006 3,921 2,127 2,359 1,591 1,505 1,487 1,563 2,359
2007 4,153 2,348 2,480 1,724 1,619 1,591 1,688 2,527
2008 4,387 2,342 2,575 1,807 1,634 1,656 1,789 2,644
Per cent
1994 145.6 86.4 100.7 84.0 69.6 73.9 83.3 100.0
1995 144.3 90.5 102.9 81.6 72.9 71.2 83.2 100.0
1996 146.9 91.9 105.0 80.0 69.1 70.4 81.2 100.0
1997 149.1 96.0 105.2 77.6 67.3 69.1 77.9 100.0
1998 147.8 98.1 110.5 77.2 68.0 67.7 76.3 100.0
1999 151.1 93.7 114.9 77.7 66.3 64.1 74.5 100.0
2000 152.2 97.3 113.9 74.8 64.6 63.4 71.8 100.0
2001 158.5 94.1 105.6 73.7 64.9 66.2 70.7 100.0
2002 163.9 88.7 103.4 73.0 63.7 64.4 68.9 100.0
2003 161.1 92.4 107.6 71.6 64.0 65.3 68.0 100.0
2004 157.9 95.3 104.5 71.6 66.6 65.9 70.2 100.0
2005 163.2 94.0 99.2 69.4 65.9 63.6 67.8 100.0
2006 166.2 90.2 100.0 67.4 63.8 63.0 66.3 100.0
2007 164.3 92.9 98.1 68.2 64.1 63.0 66.8 100.0
2008 165.9 88.6 97.4 68.3 61.8 62.6 67.7 100.0
Source: KSH.
Table 9.8: Commutinga
Year
Working in the residence Commuter
in thousands per cent in thousands per cent
1980 3,848.5 76.0 1,217.2 24.0
1990 3,380.2 74.7 1,144.7 25.3
2001 2,588.2 70.1 1,102.1 29.9
2005 2,625.1 68.2 1,221.3 31.8
2008 2,645.2 70.9 1,085.1 29.1
a For methodological notes see Dr. Lakatos Miklós – Váradi Rita: A foglalkoztatottak 
napi ingázásának jelentősége a migrációs folyamatokban (The role of daily commuting 
in geographical mobility). Statisztikai Szemle. (87), 2009. 7–8., 763–794.
Source: 1980–2005 NSZ, microcensus, 2008 MEF ad-hoc modul.
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Table 10.1: Strikes
Year Number of strikes Number of involved persons Hours lost, in thousands
1991 3 24,148 76
1992 4 1,010 33
1993 5 2,574 42
1994 4 31,529 229
1995a 7 172,048 1,708
1996 8 4,491 19
1997 5 853 15
1998 7 1,447 3
1999 5 16,685 242
2000 5 26,978 1,192
2001 6 21,128 61
2002 4 4,573 9
2003 7 10,831 19
2004 8 6,276 116
2005 11 1,425 8
2006 16 24,670 52
2007 13 64,612 189
2008 8 8,633 ..
2009 9 8,134 9
a Teachers strikes number partly estimated.
Source: KSH strike statistics.
Table 10.2: National agreements on wage increase recommendationsa
Year
ÉT Recommendations Actual indexes
Minimum Maximum Budgetary sector Competitve sector
1992 113.0 128.0 120.1 126.6
1993 110.0–113.0 125.0 114.4 125.1
1994 113.0–115.0 121.0–123.0 127.0 123.4
1995 – – 110.7 119.7
1996 113.0 124.0 114.6 123.2
1997 114.0 122.0 123.2 121.8
1998 113.5 116.0 118.0 118.5
1999 112.0 115.0 119.2 114.8
2000 108.5 111.0 112.3 114.2
2001 .. .. 122.9 116.3
2002 108.0 110.5 129.2 113.3
2003 4.5 % real wage growth n.a. 117.5 108.9
2004 107.0 108.0 100.4 109.3
2005 106.0 n.a. 112.8 106.9
2006 104.0 105.0 106.4 109.3
2007 105.5 108.0 106.4 109.1
2008 105.0 107.5 106.2 108.4
2009 103.0 105.0 92.1 104.3
a Average increases of gross wages: recommendations accepted by the National Interest 
Reconciliation Council (ÉT). Previous year = 100.
Source: KSH, NEFMI.
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Table 10.3: Minimum wage, guaranteed wage minimuma
Date
Monthly amount, 
HUF
Average gross  
earnings = 100
Monthly amount of the 
guaranteed minimum wageb
Monthly amount of the  
guaranteed minimum wagec
Monthly amount of the  
guaranteed minimum waged
1992. I. 1. 8,000 35.8 – – –
1993. II. 1. 9,000 33.1 – – –
1994. II. 1. 10,500 30.9 – – –
1995. III. 1. 12,200 31.4 – – –
1996. II. 1. 14,500 31.0 – – –
1997. I. 1. 17,000 29.7 – – –
1998. I. 1. 19,500 28.8 – – –
1999. I. 1. 22,500 29.1 – – –
2000. I. 1. 25,500 29.1 – – –
2001. I. 1. 40,000 38.6 – – –
2002. I. 1. 50,000 40.8 – – –
2003. I. 1. 50,000 36.4 – – –
2004. I. 1. 53,000 37.2 – – –
2005. I. 1. 57,000 33.6 – – –
2006. I. 1. 62,500 36.5 – – –
2006. VII. 1. 62,500 36.5 65,700 68,800 –
2007. I. 1. 65,500 35.4 72,100 75,400 –
2008. I. 1. 69,000 34.7 82,800 86,300 –
2009. I. 1. 71,500 35.8 – – 87,000
2009. VII. 1. 71,500 .. – – 87,500
2010. I. I. 73,500 .. – – 89,500
a The guaranteed minimum wage pertains to employees who have completed at least a secondary education level and 
are employed in an occupation requiring skills.
b Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers less than 2 years of practical experience.
c Guaranteed minimum wage of skilled workers with at least 2 years of practical experience, or who are above the 
age of 50.
d Beginning in 2009. January 1, the specification regarding the 2 years of practical experience and those above the 
age of 50 was dropped from the legislation.
Note: As of September 2002, minimum wage earners do not pay personal income tax. (As a result of this measure, 
the net minimum wage increased by 15.9 per cent.)
Source: KSH.
Table 10.4: Single employer collective agreements in the business sector
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 1,218 1,303 1,358 1,333 1,277 1,272 1,295 1,025 1,033 1,032 1,027 962
Number of persons covered 734,545 743,259 730,107 698,262 667,634 649,861 637,508 513,118 489,568 532,065 467,964 432,086
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Table 10.5: Single institution collective agreements in the public sector
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 2,015 2,084 2,079 2,077 2,019 2,026 2,020 1,750 1,435 1,711 1,710 1,737
Number of persons covered 256,848 274,329 272,051 268,139 251,849 251,352 250,492 228,080 203,497 224,246 222,547 225,434
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 10.6: Multi-employer collective agreements in the business sector
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 40 52 70 68 66 71 79 71 75 74 78 80
Number of persons covered 317,012 338,354 246,734 213,443 206,729 261,848 263,752 92,196 86,079 83,117 80,506 222,236
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Table 10.7: Multi-institution collective agreements in the public sector
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 7 11 12 10 9 9 10 5 4 2 1 1
Number of persons covered 2,498 2,177 2,357 2,081 2,045 2,042 2,072 403 360 238 .. ..
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Table 10.8: The number of firm wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of employees covered
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 768 827 572 471 531 545 515 298 302 214 202 785
Number of persons covered 582,751 587,476 334,056 259,033 279,753 316,585 347,223 169,639 151,022 171,259 100,206 377,677
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
Table 10.9: The number of multi-employer wage agreements, the number of affected firms,  
and the number of covered companies and employees
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of agreements 31 41 23 19 18 22 19 40 44 40 45 62
Number of companies 3,048 3,231 211 181 172 243 145 145 162 147 150 2,350
Number of persons covered 305,035 328,774 125,327 68,882 76,129 88,855 25,175 35,039 42,817 33,735 40,046 191,258
Source: NGM, Registry of collective agreements.
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Table 11.1: Family benefits
Year
Tax credit for familiesa Child benefitb Regular child protection allowancec
Wage related  
maternity benefitd
Flat rate  
maternity benefitsd
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount per 
family, HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipient 
families
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
Average 
monthly 
amount, 
HUF
Average 
number of 
recipients
1990 – – 3,539 1,514,100 – – 5,199 154,977 3,303 94,711
1995 – – 5,841 1,429,500 – – 13,215 128,540 7,882 175,773
2000 3,359 1,112,177 8,496 1,299,800 3,436 786,000 31,448 54,008 16,660 245,410
2001 6,547 1,172,862 8,617 1,295,800 4,193 780,000 39,274 62,904 17,828 234,221
2002 6,588 1,069,911 10,034 1,277,900 4,338 758,000 44,901 70,167 19,842 222,104
2003 6,841 1,009,660 11,283 1,292,000 4,705 704,000 48,742 77,942 22,091 214,640
2004 6,941 969,512 11,971 1,290,200 5,236 670,000 54,322 83,678 24,174 210,509
2005 6,979 924,263 12,597 1,264,500 5,619 663,000 58,484 87,172 25,706 208,708
2006 9,392 122,883 21,637 1,269,000 – – 62,684 91,678 27,102 212,741
2007 .. .. 23,031 1,224,000 – – 68,394 93,973 28,496 207,608
2008 .. .. 24,521 1,246,600 – – 73,902 94,515 30,880 208,652
2009 .. .. 24,524 1,245,900 – – 78,725 95,050 30,328 214,416
a Introduced in 1999. Beginning in 2006, this became a part of family benefits, only families with 3 or more children 
are entitled to tax credits in the amount of 4,000 HUF per child.
b Annual mean. From 1999 to 8th of November, 2000, the child care benefit includes the family allowance and 
schooling support. Beginning in 2002, the benefits paid in the 13th month are included as well.
c Annual average. Was in use from 1998 to 2005.
d Annual average. In 2009 the average monthly amount of child support (GYES): HUF 30,716.
Source: NAV, KSH Welfare Statistics.
Table 11.2: Number of those receiving self-entitled pension, and the mean sum  
of the provisions they received in January of the given year
Year
Old age pension Disability pension under and above retirement age
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, HUF
Average amount 
after increase, HUF
Number of  
recipients
Average amount 
before increase, HUF
Average amount 
after increase, HUF
2000 1,671,090 33,258 35,931 762,514 29,217 31,556
2001 1,667,945 37,172 41,002 772,286 32,381 35,705
2002 1,664,062 43,368 47,561 789,544 37,369 40,972
2003 1,657,271 50,652 54,905 799,966 43,185 46,801
2004 1,637,847 57,326 60,962 806,491 48,180 51,220
2005 1,643,409 63,185 67,182 808,107 52,259 55,563
2006 1,658,387 69,145 72,160 806,147 56,485 58,935
2007 1,676,477 74,326 78,577 802,506 59,978 63,120
2008 1,716,315 81,975 87,481 794,797 65,036 69,160
2009 1,731,213 90,476 93,256 779,130 70,979 73,166
Source: ONYF.
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Table 11.3: Unemployment benefits and average earnings
Year
Insured unemployment benefit and 
other non-means tested benefitsa
Means tested  
unemployment assistanceb Net monthly earnings, HUF
c
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients
Average monthly 
amount, HUF
Average number 
of recipients Male Female Together
1990 3,845 30,302 3,209 46,823 11,226 9,455 10,371
1995 11,891 182,788 6,590 234,411 28,831 24,283 26,637
2000 22,818 131,665 14,656 162,245 60,319 50,562 55,650
2001 25,677 119,210 14,749 142,001 69,910 59,059 64,750
2002 30,113 114,934 14,869 132,895 82,745 72,036 77,770
2003 34,762 107,226 15,010 138,127 94,612 84,632 89,906
2004 37,107 109,654 15,864 144,853 98,101 87,710 93,233
2005 39,593 111,732 16,991 158,565 108,139 98,625 103,727
2006 43,344 109,095 23,771 160,426 .. .. 110,951
2007 46,208 96,463 25,703 194,716 .. .. 114,282
2008 49,454 97,047 27,347 213,436 .. .. 122,267
2009 51,871 158,990 .. .. .. .. 124,116
a Average of headcount at the end of the month. Includes the pre-pension allowance (2000–2002) and the school-
leavers’ allowance (1990–1995).
b This scheme changed substantially in July 2006, therefore figures for 2006 are given for the period July-December 2006.
c Net earnings for the whole economy (including the public sector). Data on the business sector cover firms with 
more than 19 employees between 1990–1995, and more than 4 employees thereafter.
Source: NFSZ: Labour Market Report, 2001. KSH: Welfare systems 2007, Welfare Statistics, Yearbook of Demographics. 
KSH Social Statistics Yearbooks.
Table 11.4: Number of those receiving social annuities for people with damaged health,  
and the mean sum of the provisions they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Temporary annuity Regular social annuity Health damage annuity  for miners Total
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
Number of 
recipients
Average 
amount, HUF
2000 15,491 18,309 196,689 14,435 2,852 48,581 215,032 15,167
2001 15,640 20,809 198,820 15,610 3,304 53,379 217,764 16,556
2002 11,523 26,043 200,980 17,645 3,348 59,558 215,851 18,744
2003 12,230 30,135 203,656 19,907 3,345 65,380 219,231 21,171
2004 11,949 33,798 207,300 21,370 2,950 69,777 222,199 22,681
2005 13,186 36,847 207,091 22,773 2,839 74,161 223,116 24,259
2006 14,945 40,578 195,954 23,911 2,786 77,497 213,685 25,776
2007 19,158 42,642 184,845 25,050 2,693 80,720 206,696 27,406
2008 21,538 46,537 170,838 27,176 2,601 85,805 194,977 30,096
2009 21,854 46,678 159,146 27,708 2,533 86,165 183,533 30,774
Source: ONYF.
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Table 11.5: The median age for retirement and the number of pensioners
Pension
2002 2003 2004 2005
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 56.8 25,730 58.8 13,591 57.6 36,806 57.7 45,115
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 48.1 23,649 48.5 21,507 48.7 19,901 49.1 19,250
Total 52.6 49,379 52.5 35,098 54.5 56,707 55.1 64,365
Males
Old age and similar 60.1 30,217 59.7 32,611 60.1 36,111 59.9 30,560
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 49.7 29,013 50.0 27,115 50.1 24,915 50.5 24,565
Total 55.0 59,230 55.3 59,726 56.0 61,026 55.7 55,125
Together
Old age and similar 58.6 55,947 59.5 46,202 58.9 72,917 58.6 75,675
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 49.0 52,662 49.3 48,622 49.5 44,816 49.9 43,815
Total 53.9 108,609 54.3 94,824 55.3 117,733 55.4 119,490
2006 2007 2008 2009
Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons Age Persons
Females
Old age and similar 57.5 46,093 57.8 62,015 57.3 39,290 59.9 15,243
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 49.3 18,488 49.8 15,837 50.5 8,565 51.1 9,065
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.1 1,604 44.9 6,574
Total 55.2 64,581 56.2 77,852 55.7 49,459 54.1 30,882
Males
Old age and similar 59.9 33,134 59.7 50,878 59.8 25,749 59.7 37,116
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 50.6 23,045 51.1 19,032 51.9 11,069 52.3 11,992
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.5 1,556 44.8 6,278
Total 56.1 56,179 57.4 69,910 56.9 38,374 56.4 55,386
Together
Old age and similar 58.5 79,227 58.7 112,893 58.3 65,039 59.7 52,359
Disability and accident-related 
disability pension 50.0 41,533 50.5 34,869 51.3 19,634 51.8 21,057
Rehabilitation annuity – – – – 44.3 3,160 44.9 12,852
Total 55.6 120,760 56.8 147,762 56.2 87,833 55.6 86,268
Note: The source of these statistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so 
these do not include the data for the armed forces and the police. Data on MÁV is included from 2008.
Source: ONYF.
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Table 11.6: The number of those receiving a disability annuity and the mean sum of the provisions  
they received after the increase, in January of the given year
Year
Disability annuity
Year
Disability annuity
Number of recipients Average amount, HUF Number of recipients Average amount, HUF
2000 25,267 13,746 2005 28,738 27,257
2001 25,490 18,220 2006 29,443 28,720
2002 26,350 20,931 2007 30,039 30,219
2003 27,058 23,884 2008 30,677 32,709
2004 27,923 25,388 2009 31,263 33,434
Source: ONYF.
Table 11.7: Newly determined disability pension claims and detailed data  
on the number of newly determined old-age pension claims
Year
Disability and 
accident-related 
disability pensions
Old-age and old-age type pensionsa From the total: at the age limit From the total: under the age limit
Total Male Female Together Male Female Together Male Female Together
1996 59,967 31,770 59,939 91,709 9,893 20,073 29,966 18,681 31,857 50,538
1997 48,262 37,886 32,614 70,500 10,630 1,138 11,768 24,308 28,154 52,462
1998 42,975 12,908 17,841 30,749 385 882 1,267 11,461 15,244 26,705
1999 46,701 15,181 24,418 39,599 2,601 5,808 8,409 11,494 16,922 28,416
2000 55,558 18,071 29,526 47,597 613 813 1,426 16,089 26,859 42,948
2001 54,645 28,759 14,267 43,026 2,200 4,882 7,082 25,175 7,396 32,571
2002 52,211 30,209 25,719 55,928 2,593 646 3,239 26,346 23,503 49,849
2003 48,078 32,574 13,574 46,148 3,058 5,098 8,156 28,064 6,537 34,601
2004 44,196 35,940 36,684 72,624 3,842 989 4,831 30,234 33,817 64,051
2005 41,057 33,175 48,771 81,946 4,035 6,721 10,756 27,719 40,142 67,861
2006 36,904 34,207 47,531 81,738 4,013 732 4,745 29,025 45,675 74,700
2007 34,991 51,037 62,168 113,205 3,722 6,660 10,382 45,731 54,177 99,908
2008 19,832 25,912 39,423 65,335 3,154 288 3,442 22,180 38,761 60,941
2009 21,681 37,468 15,468 52,936 4,193 6,692 10,885 32,452 8,289 40,741
a Old-age type pensions include: old-age pensions given with a retirement age threshhold allowance (early retire-
ment), artists’ pensions, pre-pension up until 1997, miners’ pensions.
Note: Pensions disbursed in the given year (determined according to the given year’s rules). The source of these sta-
tistics is data from the pension determination system of the ONYF (NYUGDMEG), so these do not include the 
data for the armed forces and the police.
Source: ONYF.
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Table 12.1: Employment and unemployment rate of population  
aged 15–64 by gender in the EU, 2009
Country
Employment rate Unemployment rate
Males Females Together Males Females Together
Austria 76.9 66.4 71.6 5.1 4.6 4.9
Belgium 67.2 56.0 61.6 7.8 8.1 8.0
Denmark 78.3 73.1 75.7 6.7 5.4 6.1
United Kingdom 74.8 65.0 69.9 8.7 6.5 7.7
Finland 69.5 67.9 68.7 9.0 7.6 8.4
France 68.5 60.1 64.2 8.9 9.4 9.1
Greece 73.5 48.9 61.2 7.0 13.3 9.6
Netherlands 82.4 71.5 77.0 3.4 3.4 3.4
Ireland 66.3 57.4 61.8 15.1 8.0 12.0
Luxembourg 73.2 57.0 65.2 4.4 6.1 5.2
Germany 75.6 66.2 70.9 8.2 7.3 7.8
Italy 68.6 46.4 57.5 6.9 9.3 7.9
Portugal 71.1 61.6 66.3 9.4 10.7 10.0
Spain 66.6 52.8 59.8 17.8 18.5 18.1
Sweden 74.2 70.2 72.2 8.8 8.1 8.5
EU-15 71.9 59.0 65.9 9.2 9.1 9.1
Hungary 61.1 49.9 55.4 10.3 9.8 10.1
Bulgaria 66.9 58.3 62.6 7.1 6.7 6.9
Cyprus 77.6 62.5 69.9 5.3 5.6 5.4
Czech Republic 73.8 56.7 65.4 5.9 7.8 6.8
Estonia 64.1 63.0 63.5 17.4 10.8 14.1
Poland 66.1 52.8 59.3 7.9 8.8 8.3
Latvia 61.0 60.9 60.9 20.8 14.2 17.5
Lithuania 59.5 60.7 60.1 17.3 10.5 13.9
Malta 71.5 37.7 54.9 6.7 7.6 7.0
Romania 65.2 52.0 58.6 8.0 6.2 7.2
Slovakia 67.6 52.8 60.2 11.4 12.9 12.1
Slovenia 71.0 63.8 67.5 6.1 5.9 6.0
EU-25 71.1 58.9 65.0 9.2 9.1 9.1
EU-27 70.7 58.6 64.6 9.1 8.9 9.0
Source: CIRCA.
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Table 12.2: Employment composition of the countries in the EUa, 2009
Country Self employed Part time Fix term contr. Service Industry Agriculture
Austria 13.3 24.5 0.1 69.7 25.0 5.3
Belgium 14.7 23.4 8.2 75.0 23.5 1.5
Denmark 9.2 26.0 8.9 77.2 20.3 2.5
United Kingdom 13.5 26.1 5.7 79.4 19.5 1.1
Finland 13.6 14.0 14.6 71.5 23.9 4.6
France 10.5 16.9 14.2 73.9 23.1 3.0
Greece 35.5 6.0 12.1 66.9 21.2 11.9
Netherlands 13.4 48.3 18.2 80.9 16.6 2.5
Ireland 17.3 21.2 8.5 73.9 21.1 5.0
Luxembourg 8.6 18.2 7.2 86.3 12.4 1.3
Germany 11.4 26.1 14.5 69.6 28.7 1.7
Italy 24.8 14.3 12.5 67.0 29.3 3.7
Portugal 22.0 11.6 22.0 60.6 28.2 11.2
Spain 16.9 12.8 25.4 71.1 24.7 4.2
Sweden 10.7 27.0 15.3 77.7 20.1 2.2
EU-15 15.2 21.6 13.7 72.6 24.3 3.1
Hungary 12.5 5.6 8.5 64.2 31.2 4.6
Bulgaria 12.4 2.3 4.7 57.7 35.2 7.1
Cyprus 19.7 8.4 13.4 73.9 22.2 3.9
Czech Republic 16.7 5.5 8.5 58.3 38.6 3.1
Estonia 8.0b 10.5 2.5 74.5 21.5 4.0
Poland 22.6 8.4 26.5 55.6 31.1 13.3
Latvia 11.4 8.9 4.3 66.3 25.0 8.7
Lithuania 12.1 8.3 2.2 64.0 26.8 9.2
Malta 13.4b 11.3 4.8 73.9 24.7 1.4
Romania 32.8 9.8 1.0 40.9 30.0 29.1
Slovakia 15.7 3.6 4.4 58.6 37.8 3.6
Slovenia 16.0 10.6 16.4 57.9 33.0 9.1
EU-25 16.4 18.8 13.5 69.0 25.9 5.1
EU-27 15.7 19.4 14.1 70.4 25.6 4.0
a All employed = 100.
b Without contributing family members.
Source: Eurostat (Newcronos) Labour Force Survey.
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– had a job from which they were temporarily absent 
during the survey week.
Persons on child-care leave are classified according 
to their activity. Conscripts are considered as economi-
cally active persons, exceptions are marked in the foot-
notes of the table.
From the survey’s point of view the activities below 
are not considered as work:
– work done without payment for another household 
or institute (voluntary work),
– building or renovating of an own house or flat,
– housework,
– work in the garden or on own land for self-consump-
tion.
Unemployed persons are persons aged 15–74 who:
– were without work, i.e. neither had a job nor were at 
work (for one hour or more) in paid employment or 
self-employment during the reference week
– had actively looked for work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the reference week,
– were available for work within two weeks following 
the reference week or were waiting to start a new job 
within 30 days (since 2003 within 90 days).
Active job search includes: contacting a public or 
private employment office to find a job, applying to an 
employer directly, inserting, reading, answering adver-
tisements, asking friends, relatives or other methods.
The labour force (i.e. economically active population) 
comprises employed and unemployed persons.
Persons are defined economically inactive (i.e. not 
in the labour force) if they were neither employed nor 
unemployed, as defined.
Passive unemployed (known as “discouraged per-
sons” according to the ILO concepts) are persons aged 
15–74 who desire a job but have given up any active 
search for work, because they do not believe that they 
are able to find any.
The Labour Force Survey is based on a multi-stage 
stratified sample design. The stages of sampling are 
defined as follows: primary sampling units (PSUs) are 
enumeration districts (EDs) and secondary sampling 
units (SSUs) are dwellings in settlements with 15,000 
or more inhabitants, while PSUs are settlements, SSUs 
are EDs and ultimate sampling units are dwellings in 
all other cases.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN DATA SOURCES
The data have two main sources in terms of who gath-
ered them: the regular institutional and population 
surveys of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 
and the register and surveys of the Employment Office.
CSO LABOUR FORCE SURVEY – KSH MEF
The Hungarian Central Statistical Office has been con-
ducting a new statistical survey since January 1992 – 
using the experience of the pilot survey carried out in 
1991 – to obtain ongoing information on the labour 
force status of the Hungarian population. The Labour 
Force Survey is a household survey which provides 
quarterly information on the non-institutional popu-
lation aged 15–74. The aim of the survey is to observe 
employment and unemployment according to the in-
ternational statistical recommendation based on the 
concepts and definitions recommended by the ILO 
independently from the existing national labour regu-
lations or their changes.
In international practice, the labour force survey is 
a widely used statistical tool to provide simultaneous, 
comprehensive and systematic monitoring of employ-
ment, unemployment and underemployment. The sur-
vey techniques minimise the subjective bias in classi-
fication (since people surveyed are classified by strict 
criteria) and provide freedom to also consider national 
characteristics.
In the Labour Force Survey the population surveyed 
is divided into two main groups according to the eco-
nomic activity performed by them during the refer-
ence week:
– economically active persons (labour force) and
– economically inactive persons.
The group of economically active persons consists of 
those being in the labour market either as employed or 
unemployed during the reference week.
The definitions used in the survey follow the ILO 
recommendations. According to this those designat-
ed employed are persons aged 15–74 who, during the 
reference week:
– worked one hour or more for pay, profit or payment 
in kind in a job or in a business (including on a farm),
– worked one hour or more without payment in a fam-
ily business or on a farm (i.e. unpaid family workers),
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The main indicators of the labour market are repre-
sentative for regions.
The Labour Force Survey sample is basically a sam-
ple of dwellings, and in each sampled dwelling, labour 
market information is collected from each household 
and from each person aged 15–74 living there. For 1998, 
the quarterly sample contains about 33,000 households 
and 66,000 persons. The sample has a simple rotation 
pattern: any household entering the sample at some 
time is expected to provide labour market information 
for six consecutive quarters, then leaves the sample per-
manently. The samples of two consecutive periods tend 
to be less than 5/6, which would be obtained at a 100 
per cent response rate.
In the Labour Force Survey sample design strata 
are defined in terms of geographic units, size catego-
ries of settlements and area types such as city centres, 
outskirts, etc.
CSO LABOUR FORCE ACCOUNTING CENSUS – KSH MEM
Before the publication of the Labour Force Survey the 
annual Labour Force Account gave a view of the total 
labour force in the period between the two censuses.
The Labour Force Account, as its name shows, is a 
balance-like account which compares the labour sup-
ply (human resources) to the labour demand at an ideal 
moment (1 January). Population is taken into account 
by economic activity with a differentiation between 
those of working age and the population outside of 
the working age.
Source of data: Annual labour survey on employment 
on 1st January of enterprises and of all government in-
stitutions, labour force survey, census, tax records and 
social security records, and company registry. Data on 
unemployment comes from the registration system of 
the Employment Office. Source of the labour force: 
working age population, active earners outside of work-
ing age and employed pensioners.
CSO INSTITUTION-BASED LABOUR STATISTICS – KSH IMS
The source of data is the monthly (annual) institutional 
labour statistical survey. The survey range covers en-
terprises with at least 5 employees, and public and so-
cial insurance and non-profit institutions irrespective 
of the staff numbers of employees.
The earnings relate to the full-time employees on 
every occasion. The potential elements of the prevail-
ing monthly average earnings are: basic wages, bonus-
es, allowances (including miner’s loyalty bonus, any 
Széchenyi-grant), payments for time not worked, bo-
nuses, premiums, wages and salaries for the 13th and 
more months.
Net average earnings are calculated by deducting 
from the gross average earnings the actual personal in-
come tax, employee’s social security contributions, etc., 
according to the actual rates (i.e. taking into account 
the threshold concerning the social security contribu-
tion). It does not take into account the impact of the 
new tax allowance related to the number of children. 
The personal income tax is calculated by the actual 
withholding rate applied by the employers when dis-
bursing monthly earnings.
The difference between the gross and the net (af-
ter-tax) income indexes depends on eventual annual 
changes in the tax table (tax brackets) and in the tax 
allowances.
The change of net real earnings is calculated from 
the ratio of net income index and the consumer price 
index in the same period.
Non-manual workers are persons with occupations 
classified by the ISCO-88 in major groups 1–4., man-
ual workers are persons with occupations classified in 
major groups 5–9. since 1st January 1994. Census data 
were used for the estimation of the employment data in 
1980 and 1990. The aggregate economic data are based 
on national account statistics, the consumer’s and pro-
ducer’s price statistics and industrial surveys. A detailed 
description of the data sources are to be found in the 
relevant publications of the Central Statistical Office.
UNEMPLOYMENT (JOBSEEKERS’) REGISTER DATABASE 
– FH REG
The other main source of unemployment data in 
Hungary – and in most of the developed countries – is 
the huge database containing so called administrative 
records which are collected monthly and include the in-
dividual data of the registered unemployed/jobseekers.
The register actually contains all jobseekers, but out 
of them, at a given point of time, only those are regarded 
as registered unemployed/jobseekers, who:
– had themselves registered with a local office of the 
National Employment Service as unemployed/job-
seekers (i. e. he/she has got no job but wishes to work, 
for which they seek assistance from the labour mar-
ket organisation).
– at a point of time (on the final day of any month), the 
person is not a pensioner or a full-time student, and 
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is ready to co-operate with the local employment of-
fice in order to become employed (i. e. he/she accepts 
the suitable job or training offered to him/her, and 
keeps the appointments made with the local employ-
ment office’s placement officer/counsellor/benefit 
administrator).
If a person included in the register is working under 
any subsidised employment programme on the clos-
ing day, or is a participant of a labour market training 
programme, or has a short-term, temporary job her/his 
unemployed/jobseeker status is suspended.
If the client is not willing to co-operate with the local 
office he/she is removed from the register of the unem-
ployed/jobseekers.
The data – i. e. the administrative records of the reg-
ister – allow not only for the identification of date re-
lated stock data but also for monitoring flows: inflows 
as well as outflow within a period.
Based on the records of the labour requests needs re-
ported to the National Employment Service, the stock 
and flow data of vacancies are also processed and pub-
lished for each month.
Furthermore, detailed monthly statistics of partici-
pation in the different active programmes, number of 
participants and their inflows and outflows are also 
prepared monthly.
The very detailed monthly statistics – in a breakdown 
of country, region, county, local employment office ser-
vice delivery area and community – build on the sec-
ondary processing of administrative records that are 
generated virtually as the rather important and useful 
“by-products” of the accomplishment of the National 
Employment Service’s main functions (such as place-
ment services, payment of benefits, active programme 
support, etc.).
The Employment Office (and its predecessors, i. e. 
OMK – National Labour Centre, OMMK and OMK-
MK) has published the key figures of these statistics on 
a monthly basis since 1989. The more detailed reports 
which also contain data by local office service delivery 
area are published by the County/Metropolitan (Bu-
dapest) Labour Centres.
The denominators of the unemployment rates cal-
culated for the registered unemployed/jobseekers are 
the economically active population data published by 
the Central Statistical Office’s Labour Market Account 
(KSH MEM).
The figures of the registered unemployed/jobseekers 
and the registered unemployment/jobseekers rate are 
obviously different from the figures based on the Cen-
tral Statistical Office’s labour force survey. It is mainly 
the different conceptual approach, definition and the 
fundamentally different monitoring/measuring meth-
ods that account for this variance.
SHORT-TERM LABOUR MARKET PROJECTION SURVEYS 
– FH PROG
At the initiative and under the co-ordination of the 
Employment Office (and its legal predecessors), the 
National Employment Service conducted the so called 
short term labour market survey since 1991, twice a 
year, in March and September. The survey uses an enor-
mous sample, it contains over 4,500 employers. Since 
2004 the survey is conducted once a year, in the month 
of October.
The interviews focus on the companies’ projections 
of their material and financial processes, their devel-
opment and human resource plans, and they are also 
asked about their concrete lay-off or recruitment plans 
as well as their expected need for any active labour mar-
ket programmes.
The surveys are processed from bottom up, from the 
service delivery areas, through counties and regions to 
the whole country, providing useful information at all 
levels for the planning activities of the National Em-
ployment Service.
The survey provides an opportunity and possibility 
for the regions, the counties and Budapest to analyse 
in greater depth (also using information from other 
sources) the major trends in their respective labour mar-
kets, to make preparations for tackling problems that 
are likely to occur in the short term, and to effectively 
meet the ever-changing needs of their clients.
The forecast is only one of the outputs of the survey. 
Further very important “by-products” include regular 
and personal liaison with companies, the upgraded skills 
of the placement officers and other administrative per-
sonnel, enhanced awareness of the local circumstances, 
and the adequate orientation of labour market train-
ing programmes in view of the needs identified by the 
surveys. One of the most important by-products is the 
so called Labour Market Barometer, which shows the 
most wanted and mostly superfluous occupations, based 
on the recruitment and layoff plans of the employers.
The prognosis surveys are occasionally supplemented 
by supplementary surveys to obtain some further use-
ful information that can be used by researchers and 
the decision-makers of employment and education/
training policy.
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From 2005 the surveys are conducted in coopera-
tion with the Institute for Analyses of the Economy 
and Entrepreneurship of the Hungarian Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce. Since then the main results 
are available on the internet also in the form of an in-
teractive database.
WAGE SURVEY DATABASE – FH BT
The Employment Office (and its legal predecessors) has 
conducted since 1992, once a year, a representative sur-
vey to investigate individual wages and earnings. The 
survey uses an enormous sample and is conducted at 
the request of the Ministry of National Resources (for-
merly: Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Ministry 
of Labour, Ministry of Social and Family Affairs, Min-
istry of Social Policy and Labour).
The reference month of data collection is the month 
of May in each year, but for the calculation of the 
monthly average of irregularly paid benefits (beyond 
the base wage/salary), the total amount of such benefits 
received during the previous year is used.
In the competitive sector, the data collection initially 
only covered companies of over 20 persons; it was in-
cumbent on all companies to provide information, but 
the sample includes only employees born on certain 
dates in any month of any year.
Data collection has also covered companies of 10–19 
since 1995, and companies of 5–9 have been covered 
since 2000, where the companies actually involved in 
data collection are selected at random (ca. 20 per cent) 
and the selected ones have to provide information about 
all their full-time employees.
Data on basic wages and earnings structure can only 
be retrieved from these surveys in Hungary, thus it is 
practically these huge, annually generated databases 
that can serve as the basis of the wage reconciliation 
negotiations conducted by the social partners.
In the budgetary sector all budgetary institutions pro-
vide information, regardless of their size, in such a way 
that the decisive majority of the local budgetary institu-
tions – the ones that are included in the TAKEH central 
payroll accounting system – provide fully comprehen-
sive information, and the remaining budgetary institu-
tions provide information only about their employees 
who were born on certain days (regarded as the sample).
Data has only been collected on the professional 
members of the armed forces since 1999.
Prior to 1992, such data collection took place in eve-
ry third year, thus we are in possession of an enormous 
data base for the years of 1983, 1986 and 1989 too. Of 
the employees included in the sample, the following 
data are available:
– the sector the employer operates in, headcount, em-
ployer’s local unit, type of entity, ownership structure
– employee’s wage category, job occupation, gender, 
age, educational background.
Based on the huge databases which include the data 
by individual, the data is analysed every year in the 
following ways:
– Standard data analysis, as agreed upon by the social 
partners, used for wage reconciliation negotiations 
(which is received by every confederation participat-
ing in the negotiations)
– Model calculations to determine the expected impact 
of the rise of the minimum wage
Analyses to meet the needs of the Wage Policy De-
partment, Ministry of National Resources, for the com-
parison and presentation of wage ratios (total national 
economy, competitive sector, budgetary sector, and also 
by regions and counties).
The entire database is adopted every year by the Cen-
tral Statistical Office, which enables the Office to also 
provide data for certain international organisations, (e. 
g. ILO and OECD). The Employment Office also regu-
larly provides special analyses for the OECD.
The database containing the data by individual al-
lows for a) the analysis of data for groups of people de-
termined by any combination of pre-set criteria, b) the 
comparison of basic wages and earnings, with special 
regard to the composition of the different groups ana-
lysed, as well as c) the analysis of the dispersion of the 
basic wages and earnings.
Since 2002 the survey of individual wages and earn-
ings was substantially developed to fulfill all require-
ments of the EU. So from this time it serves also for the 
purposes of the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), 
which is obligatory for each member state in every 
fourth year (SES 2002 was the first and recently the 
database of SES 2006 was also sent to the Eurostat.)
Since 2003 the most important results of the Wage 
Survey are also available on the website of the Hungar-
ian National Employment Service, since 2006 also in 
English (www.afsz.hu).
UNEMPLOYMENT (JOBSEEKERS’) BENEFIT REGISTER 
– FH REG
The recipients’ fully comprehensive registry is made up, 
on the one hand, of the financial records containing 
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the disbursed unemployment benefits (unemployment 
benefit, school-leavers’ unemployment benefit, pre-re-
tirement unemployment benefit, jobseekers’ benefit, 
jobseekers assistance) and, on the other hand, of the 
so-called master records containing the particulars of 
benefit recipients. This register allows for the accurate 
tracking of the recipients’ benefit related events, the 
exact date of their inclusion in, and removal from, the 
system, as well as why they have been removed from it 
(e. g. got a job, eligibility period expired, were exclud-
ed, joined an active labour market programme, etc.)
This huge database allows for reporting for any point 
of time the detailed data of persons who received ben-
efits on a given day, in a breakdown of country, region, 
county and local office service delivery area. In order 
to align these data with the closing day statistics of 
the registered unemployed, these monthly statistics 
are also completed by the 20th of each month. (Stock 
in the closing day.)
In addition, the monthly statistics also contain in-
formation on the number of those who were affected 
during the month, e.g. the number of those who have 
received benefits on any day of the month between the 
previous month’s and the given month’s closing day. 
Of course, data indicating inflows and outflows are 
also reported here.
It is an important and rather useful aspect from a 
research perspective that, in addition to the standard 
closing day statistics, groups defined by any criteria can 
be tracked in the benefit register, e. g. inflow samples 
can be taken of newly registered persons for different 
periods, and through tracking them in the registry sys-
tem the benefit allocation patterns of different cohorts 
can be compared.
The detailed data of unemployment benefit recipients 
have been available from the benefit register since Janu-
ary 1989. The first two years had a different benefit al-
location system, and the current system, which has been 
modified several times since then, was implemented by 
the Employment Act of 1991 (Act IV).
For the period of between 1991 and 1996, the regis-
ter also contains the stock and flow data of the recipi-
ents of school-leavers’ unemployment benefit. Between 
1997–2005 the system has also contained the recipients 
of pre-retirement unemployment benefit. In addition to 
headcount data, the benefit register can also monitor the 
average duration of the period of benefit allocation and 
the average monthly amount of the benefits allocated.
The key data regarding benefits were published by 
the Employment Office in the monthly periodical La-
bour Market Situation. In addition, time series data 
was published annually in the Time Series of the Unem-
ployment Register, always covering the last six years in 
the form of a monthly breakdown. More recently these 
publications are available on the website of the Hun-
garian National Employment Service (www.afsz.hu).
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